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A Letter Concerning Toleration

Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

BY JOHN LOCKE

The Principles of Human Knowledge

BY GEORGE BERKELEY

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

BY DAVID HUME



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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

John Locke 163 -1704

Locke was born August 29, 1632 the ldest child of a respectabl Som rsetshire family f Puritan sympathies. His f ther was a lawye small landowner and captain f volunteer regime t in the parl me tary army Lock s a.ly ed cation was carefully t nded by his f ther at thei rural hom t Bel t ar B is- t l and t was probably throu h th nflue ce of the elder Locke s parliame tary patrons that he btained a place t Westminst School, where he remained from his f urtee th t his twent th year In 652 he won scholarship t Christ Church College Oxf rd.

At th time Lock tered Oxford Cromwell as hancellor nd the Puritans were in con trol. The curriculum, however was till the tra di ional ne of grammar h toric, logic, geometry and moral philosophy Lock later declared that he had lost great deal of t me t th commencement of his tud es, because the nly philosophy th known t Oxford was the Peri patetic, and his fr nd Lady Masham, re ported that he of en t ld her that h had so small satisf u th re from his tud es that this discourageme t k pt him from being any very hard tud t. Nevertheless, after taking his ba helor' degree in 656 h remai ed t Oxford bta his master' degree and th became success vely lecture in Greek, re der hetoric, nd finally in 1664 censo f moral

the founding t Oxford of the Royal Soci ty led him t begin experime u h mistry and meteorology Soo afterwards he began th study of medici d by 666 h vas gaged in occas nal pr ct ce al hough h ever took a doc or' degree

The common-place books k pt between his twenty-e ghth and thirty fourth y ar show that was also Oxford that Lock became ter es ed in poli cal q est ns. His citations are concerned w th su h top cs as th const tu n of society the rela io f hurch and tat and the mportance f rel gious t lera n. In 1665 he in errup ed his medical tudies t serve

dipl mat mission to Brande burg On his re secret ry

This ct on came bout largely as result f an

lif by perating n an mposth me i the breast, prescr bed for the servants h lped to rrange th marriage f the ldest son, d drew p the Fundame tal Const t t ns f th Government of Caroli a colo y of which Ashley was a lord protector When Ashley was made first Earl f Shaftesbury and Lord Chancellor in 67 Lock became secretary of presentat ns and secretary f the coun l of trade.

Lock s many pract cal d ties in Lond d d n t prevent him from pursuing his scient fi d philosophical terests. His medical stud es provided th basis for clos fri ndship with Syd n ham, nd Lock sometimes accompanied him on his professi nal calls. He k pt up his arly interest in ch mistry w th his friend Robert Boyl and upo th latt r' d th, edited his *General History f t e Air* H frequ tly h ld in formal gatherings f th discussion f questions in sci ce and theology On ne such occas n wh n meet g w th fi e or ix fri nds, a q es-

as co t ed by tre ty writt n by coher t parcels, aft l g intervals of eglect re umed again as humour and occas ns per mitted" and p blished after almost twe ty years as *An Essay Concerni g Human Under tand*

Lock fortunes were los.ly linked w th those of Shaftesbury d wh n th Earl f ll from power in 6 5 Lock w thdrew from public

life He went to France where he remained four years during which he sought to restore his health which had never been good and to work upon his *Essay* At Montpellier he was the neighbor of the Earl of Pembroke later also the patron of Berkeley to whom he dedicated his work When Shaftesbury again arose to power in 1679 Locke returned to England and resumed his former activities Although he seems to have played little part in Shaftesbury s plotting with Monmouth against the King which led to the Earl s exile and death he fell under royal suspicion and in 1683 he found it safer to seek refuge in Holland Fearing arrest at the insistence of the English Government he lived at first in Amsterdam under the assumed name of Dr Van der Linden He rapidly formed congenial associations especially among the Remonstrants with whom Sp noza had also lived and settled down to complete the *Essay* In 1687 he made h s first appearance as an author by publ shing an abstract of it in the *Bibliotheque Universelle* of his friend Le Clerc It seems likely that he was involved to some extent in planning the Revolution of 1688 He had friends among the English refugees he was known to William of Orange and he returned to England in 1689 in the same ship which carr ed William s wife Princess Mary

Although Locke was offered several responsible posit ons in the new reg me he preferred to devote himself to his writings and accepted only the comparatively light task of comm ss oner of appeals Within four years he completed his most important works The *Letter Concerning Toleration* which had been written and published in Latin in Holland appeared in English the year of his return In 1690 the *Two Treatises on Civil Governme t* and the *Essay* appeared and three years later the *Thoughts on Education*

Prompted by ill health and dissatisfaction with the course of public affairs Locke retired in 1691 to Oates Manor in Essex the home of Lady Masham daughter of Ralph Cudworth

brought out during his life time The *Essay* and *Letter Conce nin Toleration* involved him in a long series of controversies regarding the rel gious implications of his teaching The *Sec nd* and *Third Letter Concerning Tolerat o* the pamphlets interchanged with Bishop Still ngfleet of Worcester and the *Reasonableness of Christianity* belong to these years as does the series of letters to Isaac Newton He continued to be occup ed with political problems and expressed h s views on currency reform in h s *Observations on Silver Money* and *Further C nsiderations on Raisin the Value of M ney* Upon the establishment of a commission on trade and plantations Locke reluctantly accepted a post as one of the commissioners This office absorbed all the time his health permitted him to spend in London from 1696 to 1700 when constant illness compelled his resignat on

Locke s last years were spent quietly in retirement at Oates He occupied h mself with biblical stud es and wrote a commentary on St Paul s Ep stles He was in the midst of writing a *Fourth Letter on Toleration* when he died on October 28 1704 He was buried near Oates by the parish church of High Laver

A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION

HONOURED SIR,

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith—for everyone is orthodox to himself—these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and empire over one another than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never so true a claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of charity, meekness, and good will in general towards all mankind, even to those that are not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian himself. "The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them," said our Saviour to His disciples, "but ye shall not be so."[1] The business of true religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to the regulating of men's lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will list himself under the banner of Christ, must, in the first place and above all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is in vain for any man to usurp the name of Christian, without holiness of life, purity of manners, benignity and meekness of spirit. "Let everyone that nameth the name of Christ, depart from iniquity."[2] "Thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren," said our Lord to Peter.[3] It would indeed be very hard for one that appears careless about his own salvation to persuade me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that those should sincerely and heartily apply themselves to make other people Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian religion in their own hearts. If the Gospel and

commit against the precepts of the Gospel; when I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of their own communion that are tainted with enormous vices and without amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see them thus express their love and desire of the salvation of their souls by the infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men's souls that they deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments, starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take away their lives—I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer whoredom, fraud, malice, and such-like enormities, which (according to the apostle) manifestly relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and abound amongst their flocks and people? These, and such-like things, are certainly more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the Church, and to the salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical decisions, or separation from public worship, whilst accompanied with innocence of life. Why then does this burning zeal for God, for the Church, and for the salvation of souls—burning I say, lit

[1] Luke 22. 25.
[2] II Tim. 2. 19.
[3] Luke 22. 32.

Rom.

erally with fire and faggot—pass by those moral vices and wickednesses without any chastise

of opinions which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters that exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings? Which of the parties contending about these things is in the right which of them is guilty of schism or heresy *whether those that domineer or those that suffer* will then at last be manifest when the causes of their separation comes to be judged of He certainly that follows Christ embraces His doctrine and bears His yoke though he forsake both father and mother separate from the public assemblies and ceremonies of his country or whomsoever or whatsoever else he relinquishes will not then be judged a heretic

Now though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be never so obstructive *of the salvation of souls yet nevertheless* adultery fornication uncleanliness lasciviousness idolatry and such like things cannot be

the kingdom of God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men ought to apply himself with no less care and industry to the rooting out of these immoralities

he be indulgent to such in quities and immoral

another kingdom he aims at and not the advancement of the kingdom of God

That any man should think fit to cause another man—whose salvation he heartily desires—to expire in torments and that even in an unconverted state would I confess seem very strange to me and I think to any other also But *nobody surely will ever bel eve that such a car*riage can proceed from charity love or good will If anyone mainta n that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword *to profess certa n* doctrines and conform to this or that exterior worship without any regard had unto their morals if anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to practise things that the Gospel does not permit it cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same profession with himself but that he principally intends by those means to compose a truly Christian Church is altogether incredible It is not therefore to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion and of the Church of Chr st make use of arms that do not belong *to the Christian warfare If like the Captain of* our salvation they sincerely desired the good of souls they would tread in the steps and follow the perfect example of that Prince of Peace who sent out His soldiers to the subduing of nations and gathering them into His Church not armed

rors by armed soldiers we know very well that it was much more easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church how potent soever with all his dragoons

The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and to the genuine reason of mankind that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necess ty and advantage of it in so clear a light I will not here *tax the pr de and ambition of some* the passion and uncl aritable zeal of others These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed but yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of without covering them with some specious colour and so pretend to commendation hilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions But however that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the publ c weal and observation of the laws and that others under pretence of

p etences of loyalty and obedience to the p nce or of tenderness and sincer ty in the worship of *God I esteem it* above all things necessary to d stingui h exactly the business of c vil government f om that of rel g on and to settle the just bounds that *lie between the one and the other* If tl is be not done there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising be

tween those that ha 'e or at least pretend to have th one de, a co cernme t f the terest cf m s souls, d, o th thers d a care f th commo ealth

Th commonwealth seems to m to be a soci ty of me constituted nly for th procuring preserving and ad a ing th ir own ci il interests.

Ci il interests I call lif liberty health and i d lency of body d th possess n f outward things, such as m y lands, h uses furniture, and the lik

It is th d ty f the ci il magistr e by th impartial ex cution f qual laws, to secure u t all th peopl in g eral d t ery ne f his

fully satisfied in our own mind that the o is tru and the the ell pleas g unt God such profess on d such practice f from be g any furtherance are indeed great bstacles t our

we dd u to the numbe of our ther sins those also f hypocrisy a d contempt of His D ine Majesty

I th seco d place the care of so ls cann t belon to th ci il magistrate because his power consists nly outward forc but tru and sav g rel gi consists in the in ard persuas o of th mind w thout which nothing ca be accept

punishm t, consistu of th d privation di min u f those civil terests, or goods, which therwise h might d ght t enjoy B t seeing o ma does willingly suffer himself to be p nished by th d pri ati n f any part f his goods, and m h less f his liberty or life th f re is th magistra armed with th f rce and str gth f all his subjects in order to th pun ishm t of those that lat y other man rights.

Now that th wh l jurisdict f th magistrate reaches nly t these c il co cernm ts d that all vil powe right nd d minion, is bo ded and onfi d t th nly care of promoti these things and that t n ther ca nor ou ht in y man er t be e t nded to the sal t f souls, these f llowing consid rati ns seem t m bund tly t dem trat

First, because th care f souls is t com mi ed t th civil magistr t any more than to othe m n. I is t comm tted unt him, I say by God because t ppears th t God has eve gi y ch uth rity t man er another as t compel y to his el gion Nor ca any ch power be es d th magistrate by th conse t f th pe pl because man can so far band n th ca f his own sal ation as blindly to l t th ch f y th h ther prince or subject, p escribe t him what faith or worship he shall mbrac For no m

mak m n change th inward j dgement that they ha framed f th gs.

It may deed be alleged that th magistrate may mak use of argum ts, d thereby draw the h t rodo int the vay f truth d procure th ir sal ati n f grant t but th is mmon to him w th ther men. I t ching nstructi g and redressing the erro eous by reaso he may certainly d what becomes any good man t do M gistracy does t oblige him to put ff e ther humanity o Christia ty but it is thi g to persuad another t comma d o th g to

th f error d by r aso g to dra him to truth but to gi la s, ece e obed e ce a d c mpel w th th sw d bel gs t b t th magi tr t A d upo this gro nd I ffirm

light can in no manner proceed *from corporal* sufferings or any other outward penalties

In the third place the care of the salvation of

the salvation of their souls For there being but one truth one way to heaven what hope is there that more men would be led into it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under the necessity to quit the light of their own reason and oppose the dictates of their own *consciences* and blindly *to resign themselves* up to the will of their governors and to the religion which either ignorance ambition or supersti tion had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born? In the variety and con *tradiction of opinions in religion* wherein the princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests the narrow way would be much straitened one country alone would be in the right and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to destruction and that which heightens the absurdity and very ill suits the no tion of a Deity men would owe their eternal hap piness or misery to the places of their nativity

These considerations to omit many others that might have been urged to the same purpose seem unto me sufficient to conclude that all the *power of civil government* relates only to men s civil interests is confined to the care of the things of this world and hath nothing to do with the world to come

Let us now consider what a church is A *church* then I take to be a voluntary *society* of men joining themselves together of their own accord in order to *the public worshipping of God* in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him and effectual to the salvat on of their souls

I say it i a free and voluntary soc ety No body i born a member of any church otherw ise the rel gion of parents would descend unto chil dren by the same right of inheritance as their temporal estates and everyone would hold his faith by the same tenure he does his lands than which nothing can be imagined more absurd *Thus* therefore *that matter stands No man by* nature is bound unto any particular church or sect but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly ac *ceptable to God The* hope of salvat on as it was the only cause of his entrance into that commun ion so it can be the only reason of *his stay there.*

For if afterwards he discover anything either er roneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the worship of that society to which he has joined himself why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a re lig ous society can be tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life A church then is a society of *members voluntarily uniting to that end*

It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto what laws it is subject

Forasmuch as no society how free soever *or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted* whether of philosophers for learning of mer chants for commerce or of men of leisure for mu tual conversation and discourse no church or company I say can in the least subsist and hold together but *will* presently d ssolve and break in pieces unless it be regulated by some laws and the members all consent to observe some or der Place and time of meeting must be agreed on rules for admitting and excluding members must be established distinction of officers and putting things into a regular course and such like cannot be omitted But since the joining together of several members into this church society as has already been demonstrated is ab-

is the same thing) to those whom the society by common consent has authorised thereunto

Some perhaps may object that no such soci ety can be said to be a true church unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter with rul ng authority derived from the very apostles and continued down to the present times by an uninterrupted succession

To these I answer In the first place let them show me the edict by wh ch Christ has imposed that law upon His Church And let not any man think me impertinent if in a thing of this conse

Whether such an assembly want anything nec essary to a true church pray do you consider Certain I am *that noth ng can be there wanting* unto the salvat on of souls which is sufficient to our purpose

Next pray observe how great have always been the d isions amongst e en those who lay

[1]*Matt 18 20*

so much stress upon the Divine institution and continued succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now their very dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating and, consequently allows a liberty *of choosing* that which upon consideration we prefer.

And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler in their church, established by such a long series of succession as they judge necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to that society in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty will be preserved on all sides, and no man will have a *legislator imposed* upon him but whom himself has chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their own inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, or at least not expressly command? Whosoever requires those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not require in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed constitute a society accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage; but how that can be called the *Church of Christ* which is established upon laws that are not His, and which excludes such persons from its communion as He will one day receive into the Kingdom of Heaven, I understand not. But this being not a proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church, I will only mind those that contend so earnestly for the decrees of their own society, and that cry out continually, "The Church! the Church!" with as much noise, *and perhaps* upon the same principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for their Diana; this, I say, I desire to mind them of, that the Gospel frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution; but that the Church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline ought, *therefore*, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be *thereunto confined*. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. *No force* is here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is subject to his jurisdiction.

But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be established, if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I answer: They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such things, whereof the external profession and observation—if not proceeding from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind—is altogether useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society. This is the last and utmost force of ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can thereby be inflicted than that, the relation ceasing between the body and the member which is cut off. The person so condemned ceases to be a part of that church.

These things being thus determined, let us inquire, *in the next place*: How far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by it?

And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues obstinately to offend against the laws of the society. For these being the condition of communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them were permitted without any animadversion the society would immediately be thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all *such* cases care is to be taken that the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person may any wise be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often been said) belongs only to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All those things be

long to the civil government and are under the magistrate's protection The whole force of excommunication consists only in this that the resolution of the society in that respect being declared the union that was between the body and some member comes thereby to be dissolved and that relation ceasing the participation of some certain things which the society communicated to its members and unto which no man has any civil right comes also to cease For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister's refusing him that bread and wine in the celebration of the Lord's Supper which was not bought with his but other men's money

Secondly no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man or as a denizen are inviolably to be preserved to him These are not the business of religion No violence nor injury is to be offered him whether he be Christian or Pagan Nay we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice charity bounty and liberality must be added to it This the Gospel enjoins this reason directs and this that natural fellowship we are born into requires of us If any man err from the right way it is his own misfortune no injury to thee nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in religion I understand also of particular churches which stand as it were in the same relation to each other as private persons among themselves *nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over any other* no not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion For the civil government can give no new right to the church nor the church to the civil government So that whether the magistrate join himself to any church or separate from it the church remains always as it was before—a free and voluntary society It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate's coming to it nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication by his going from it This is the fundamental and immutable right of a spontaneous society—that it has power to remove any of its members who transgress the rules of its institution but it cannot by the accession of any new members acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it And therefore peace equity and friendship are always mutually to be observed by particular churches in the same manner as by private persons without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another

That the thing may be made clearer by an example let us suppose two churches—the one of Arminians the other of Calvinists—residing in the city of Constantinople Will anyone say that either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some doctrines and ceremonies whilst the Turks in the meanwhile silently stand by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the other ill I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs and by what right? It will be answered undoubtedly that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical This is in great and specious words to say just nothing at all For every church is orthodox to itself to others erroneous or heretical For whatsoever any church believes it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce to be error So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal nor is there any judge either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth by whose sentence it can be determined The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous In the meanwhile let those men consider how heinously they sin who *adding injustice if not to their error yet certainly to their pride* do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the servants of another master who are not at all accountable to them

Nay further if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches were in the right there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of destroying the other For churches have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men's minds of error and inform them of the truth Let us suppose nevertheless that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased Will any man say that any right can be derived

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co rt f ou has gi en th ... f th taff d they beg to f l th msel es th tr ger th p esc tly pea d harity are t be l d as d Otherw th y r l g ously t be bsen d Wher they ha t th power to ca ry persecuti a d to bec me masters th th y des to l p f t rms d p ch pt l tion Wh they ar tstr gth e cd w th th il pow th th y ca bear nost p u tly d m dly the co tagio of d l try supersu nd h esy in th ghbou hood f wh h th ccas the t est f l g m kes l m to be tr mely pp hens They d tforwardly tta k those errors wh h ar in fash t t or ar ou tena d by th gov m t. H e th y ca be co t to sp th gum ts wh h y t (th he l) is th ly ght m thod f p p g t g tru h, whi h has h w y f pr l g as wh tr g gum ts d good easo ar j ed w th th sof ess f ci l ty a d good usag

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that d ffer ce betwee th m n rel g whatsoe e t l f l t th whol Chu ch ca t by ny ccles astical right becom la v

f ery e l for l n s ct o th aft f thers has ki dl d g nst d sse t I w ll t u d r tak t ep es t how happy d h g t would be th fru t, both Ch h a d Stat f th p lp ts ev rywher so ded with th doc tr f pe c d toler ti n lest I sho ld seem to fl t too sev rely upon those men whose d g n ty I des t to d tr ct f m, or w ld h e it d m ished th by ther o themsel e B t thus I s y th t thus it ght to be A d f y one that p fesses himself to be minister f th

long to the civil government and are under the magistrate s protection The whole force of ex communication consists only in this that the resolution of the society in that respect being de clared the union that was between the body and some member comes thereby to be dissolved and that relation ceasing the participation of some certain things which the society communi cated to its members and unto which no man has any civil right comes also to cease For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister s refusing him that bread and wine in the celebration of the Lord s Supper which was not bought with his but other men s money

Secondly no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion All the rights and franchises that be long to him as a man or as a denizen are invio lably to be preserved to him These are not the business of religion No violence nor injury is to be offered him whether he be Christian or Pa gan Nay we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice charity bounty and liberality must be added to it This the Gospel enjoins this reason directs and this that natural fellowship we are born into requires of us If any man err from the right way it is his own misfortune no injury to thee nor there fore art thou to punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in religion I understand also of particular churches which stand as it were in the same relation to each other as private persons among themselves nor has any one of them any manner of juris diction over any other no not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion For the civil government can give no new right to the church nor the church to the civil government So that whether the magistrate join himself to any church or separate from it the church re mains always as it was before—a free and volun tary society It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate s coming to it nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommuni cation by his going from it This is the funda tion but it cannot by the accession of any new members acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it And therefore peace equity and friendship are always mutu ally to be observed by particular churches in the same manner as by private persons without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another

That the thing may be made clearer by an ex ample let us suppose two churches—the one of Arminians the other of Calvinists—residing in the city of Constantinople Will anyone say that either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some doctrines and cere monies whilst the Turks in the meanwhile si lently stand by and laugh to see with what inhu man cruelty Christians thus rage against Chris tians? But if one of these churches hath this pow er of treating the other ill I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs and by what right? It will be answered undoubtedly that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical This is in great and specious words to say just noth ing at all For every church is orthodox to it self to others erroneous or heretical For what soever any church believes it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce to be error So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal nor is there any judge either at Constan tinople or elsewhere upon earth by whose sen tence it can be determined The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men to whom also alone belongs the punish ment of the erroneous In the meanwhile let those men consider how heinously they sin who adding injustice if not to their error yet cer tainly to their pride do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the servants of anoth er master who are not at all accountable to them

Nay further if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches were in the right there would not accrue thereby unto the or thodox any right of destroying the other For churches have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters nor are fire and sword any proper instru ments wherewith to convince men s minds of er ror and inform them of the truth Let us sup pose nevertheless that the civil magistrate in clined to favour one of them and to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased Will any man say that any right can be derived

my hair is not of th right cut bec_use perhaps, I ha e ot been d pped in the right fash be caus I eat flesh upon th ro d or som ther food which rees w th my st mach because I o d certain bv wa s, hich seem unto me t l d int briars or precipices because am st the several p ths that are in th sam road, I choose that to walk n whi h seems t be th strai_htest and cleanes because I avo d t keep company w th some tr eller that are less gr e and thers that are mor sour than thev ou ht t be or in fine, because I f llow gu d that either is, or is n t, clothed wh t or crowned with a mitre Certainly if w cons d ght, we shall find that, for th most part, they ar such fr nlm thines as these that (w thout y preju

ter known by pri ce than by his subjects or at least that in this cerutud of things the safest a d most commodious way f r pri at persons d rs. You will sa What

such lik thing as

bl enmi es amon st Christian brethren, who ar all greed in th substantial and truly fundamental part of reli on.

But l t us grant unto these eal ts, who condemn all things that ar n f their mod that from these circumsta ces are d fferent nds. What shall we co cl de from thence Ther is h m wav to ternal

d m f Heaven

Perhaps some will say that they do n t suppose this infallible jud ement, that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of ligion, to be in th civil magistrat but in th Church. What th Church has determined that th ci il mag istrate orders to be bserved d h provides by his thority that nobody shall ther ct or believ in th business f religion otherwise than S derment f

way that leads to hea en more certainly to the ma istrat than every pri ate man search and study discovers t unto himself I ha weak body sunk under lan uishi g disease, for which (I suppose) there is on nly remedy but that u_known. Does t ther for belo g un th mag istrat to prescribe me remedy because there is but one, and because is unknown Because there is but on way for m to escape death, will t t_erefor be saf for me to d whatsoever th ma istrate ordains. Those things tha every man ought sincerely to inquir into himself and by meditation, tudy sear h, and hi own endea ours, ttain th knowledge of cann t be looked pon as the peculiar possessi n f any sort f men. Princes, indeed, are born superior unto ot_er men in power but in natur equal \ei ther the right nor th art f rul g does ecessarily carry al g w th th certain knowledge of ther thi s, and least of all of tru relig n. For if t were so, how could com to pass that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as they d in religious matters B t let us grant that t is probabl the way t ernal lif may be bet

sees not how frequently th nam of th Cl urch, which was ener bl in time f the postles has been mad use f to throw dust in the peopl s eyes n the f llowing ages But, however in th present case t helps us not. Th one only nar ow wa which leads to hea en is n t better known to th magistr t than to pri at persons, and therefore I cannot saf ly tak him for my guide, who may probably be as gnorant f the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned for my sal ation than I m self am. Amon st so many kings f th Jews, how many of them wer there whom any Israelite, thus blindly f _owing had n t fallen into d latry and ther by int destructi n. Y t, nevertheless, you bid m be f good courage and tell me that all is now saf and secure, because th ma istrate does not ow enjoin th bservance f his own decrees in matters f rel gi n, but nly the d crees f th Church. Of what Church, I beseech you f that, certainly which likes him best. As if h that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or th other Church, did not in-

Word of God a preacher of the gospel of peace teach otherwise he either understands not or neglects the business of his calling and shall one day give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace If Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all manner of revenge even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries how much more ought they who suffer nothing who have had no harm done them forbear violence and abstain from all manner of ill usage towards those from whom they have received none! This caution and temper they ought certainly to use towards those who mind only their own business and are solicitous for nothing but that (whatever men think of them) they may worship God in that manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have the strongest hopes of eternal salvation In private domestic affairs in the management of estates in the conservation of bodily health every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best No man complains of the ill management of his neighbour s affairs *No man is angry with another for* an error committed in sowing his land or in marrying his daughter Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his substance in taverns Let any man pull down or build or make whatsoever expenses he pleases nobody murmurs nobody controls him he has his liberty But if any man do not frequent the church if he do not there conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies or if he brings not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the other congregation this immediately causes an uproar The neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so great a crime and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and the poor man be according to form condemned to the loss of liberty goods or life Oh that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would apply themselves with all the strength of arguments that they are able to the confounding of men s errors! But let them spare their persons

tion and show that what they desire is temporal dominion For it will be very difficult to persuade men of sense that he who with dry eyes and satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner to be burnt alive does sincerely and heartily concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to come

In the last place let us now consider what is the magistrate s duty in the business of toleration which certainly is very considerable

We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate Not a magisterial care I mean (if I may so call it) which consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments But a charitable care which consists in teaching admonishing and persuading cannot be denied unto any man The care therefore of every man s soul belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself But what if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer What if he neglect the care of his health or of his estate which things are nearlier related to the government of the magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law that such *a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide* as much as is possible that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence of others they do not guard them from the negligence or ill husbandry of the possessors themselves No man can be forced to be rich or healthful whether he will or no Nay God Himself will not save men against their wills Let us suppose however that some prince were desirous to force his subjects to accumulate riches or to preserve the health and strength of their bodies Shall it be provided by law that they must consult none but Roman physicians and shall everyone be bound to live according to their prescriptions? What shall no potion no broth be taken but what is prepared either in the Vatican suppose or in a Geneva shop? Or to make these subjects rich shall they all be obliged by law to become merchants or musicians? Or shall everyone turn victualler or smith because there are some that maintain their families plentifully and *grow rich in those professions*? But it may be said there are a thousand

For if there were several ways that led thither

to the sacred geography leads straight to Jerusalem why am I beaten and ill used by others because perhaps, *I wear not buskins because*

ship they may draw others unto the love of the true religion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.

These religious societies I call *Churches* and these I say the magistrate ought to tolerate, for the business of these assemblies of the people is nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of—I mean the salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any difference between the National Church and other separated congregations.

But as in every Church there are two things especially to be considered—the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of faith—these things must be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of toleration may the more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship I say, in the first place, that the magistrate has no power to enforce by law, either in his own Church, or much less in another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of God. And this, not only because these Churches are free societies, but because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is only so far justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable unto Him. Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith is neither well in itself

...

making is taken away ... indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are subjected to the legislative power. But it does not therefore follow that the magistrate may ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The public good is the rule and measure of all law making. If a thing be not useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not presently be established by law.

And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the magistrate's jurisdiction, because in that use they have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only business of the Church is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony be there made use of. Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man. For example, let it be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an indifferent thing. Let it be granted also that the magistrate understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease the children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law. In that case he may order it to be done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to ordain by law that all children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their souls. The extreme difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the child of a Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews. Now if we acknowledge that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him, against his own opinion, to practise in his religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent, how can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a Christian.

Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human authority, be made any part of the worship of God—for this very reason, because they are indifferent. For since indifferent things are not capable, by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the Deity, no human power or authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it. In the common affairs of life, that use of indifferent things which God has not forbidden is free and lawful, and therefore in those things

... of ... But it is not so ... not ... as ... H...

men. Nor when an incensed Deity shall ask us, Who has required these, or such like things, at your hands, will it be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction extend thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into religion. What hodge podge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions, built upon the magistrate's authority, might not (against conscience) be imposed upon

terpose his own judgement in the matter What difference is there whether he lead me himself or deliver me over to be led by others? I depend both ways upon his will and it is he that determines both ways of my eternal state Would an Israelite that had worshipped Baal upon the command of his king have been in any better condition because somebody had told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head nor commanded anything to be done by his subjects in divine worship but what was approved by the counsel of priests and declared to be of divine right by the doctors of their Church? If the religion of any Church become therefore true and saving because the head of that sect the prelates and priests and those of that tribe do all of them with all their might extol and praise it what religion can ever be accounted *erroneous false and destructive? I am* doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians I am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the Papists or Lutherans will it be ever a jot safer for me to join either unto the one or the other of those Churches upon the magistrate s command because he commands nothing in religion but by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that Church?

But to speak the truth we must acknowledge that the Church (if a convention of clergymen making canons must be called by that name) is for the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by the Church How the Church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and Arian emperors is very well known Or if those things be too remote our modern English history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of Henry VIII Edward VI Mary and Elizabeth how easily and smoothly the clergy changed *their decrees their articles of faith their form of* worship everything according to the inclination of those kings and queens Yet were those kings and queens of such different minds in point of religion and enjoined thereupon such different things that no man in his wits (I had almost said none but an atheist) will presume to say that any sincere and upright worshipper of God could with a safe conscience obey their several decrees To conclude it is the same thing whether a king that prescribes laws to another man s religion pretend to do it by his own judgement or by the ecclesiastical authority and advice of others The decisions of churchmen whose

be taken notice of—that princes seldom have any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that are not favourers of their own faith and way of worship

But after all the principal consideration and which absolutely determines this controversy is this Although the magistrate s opinion in re

be no safety for me in following it No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed I may grow rich by an art that I take not delight in I may be cured of some disease by remedies that I have not faith in but I cannot be saved by a religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor It is in *vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward* show of another man s profession Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God The most likely and most approved remedy can have no effect upon the patient if his stomach reject it as soon as taken and you will in vain cram a medicine down a sick man s throat which his particular constitution will be sure to turn into poison In a word whatsoever may be doubtful in religion yet this at least is certain that no religion which I believe not to be true can be either true or profitable unto me In vain therefore do princes compel their subjects to come into their Church communion under pretence of saving their souls If they believe they will come of their own accord if they believe not their coming will nothing avail them How great soever in fine may be the pretence of good will and charity and concern for the salvation of men s souls men *cannot be forced* to be saved whether they will or no And therefore when all is done they must be left to their own consciences

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in matters of religion let us now consider what they are to do All men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped why otherwise do they compel one another unto the public assemblies Men therefore constituted in this liberty are to

themselves are not ashamed of and such as they
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or

wealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in life or estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a sacrifice. But if peradventure such were the state of things that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever. Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the law is not made about a religious, but a political matter; nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.

By this we see what difference there is between the Church and the Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own house, the law ought not to abridge him of the same liberty in his religious worship; though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very different and be there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority to the oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.

It may be said: "What if a Church be idolatrous, is that also to be tolerated by the magistrate?" I answer: What power can be given to the magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which may not in time and place be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it must be remembered that the civil power is the same everywhere, and the religion of every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore, such a power be granted unto the civil magistrate in spirituals as that at Geneva, for example, he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there reputed idolatrous, by the same rule another magistrate, in some neighbouring country, may oppress the reformed religion and, in India, the Christian. The civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the prince's pleasure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to introduce any thing into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the same manner be lawful to alter everything according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has framed unto himself. No man whatsoever ought, therefore, to be deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion. Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing the rites of their own country and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left unto God and themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a Pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this means takes root in that country and spreads itself, but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless these innocent Pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and the law of nature and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say, unless they will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their forefathers and perhaps deprived even of life itself. Then, at last, it appears what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by laws, punishments, fire, and sword, may apply this story to himself. For the reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither Pagans there, nor any dissenting Christians here, can, with any right, be deprived of their worldly goods by the predominating faction of a court-church; nor are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of religion in one place more than another.

the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as are in their own nature indifferent nor are they sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of them The sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life altogether indifferent Will any man therefore say that these things could have been introduced into religion and made a part of divine worship if not by divine institution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship? Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches and expiations by water or fire and abundance more of this kind? But these things how indifferent soever they be in common uses when they come to be annexed unto divine worship without divine authority they are as abominable to God as the sacrifice of a dog And why is a dog so abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat in respect of the divine nature equally and infinitely distant from all affinity with matter unless it be that God required the use of one in His worship and not of the other? We see therefore that indifferent things how much soever they be under the power of the civil magistrate yet cannot upon that pretence be introduced into religion and imposed upon religious assemblies because in the worship of God they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His favour But that cannot be done by him who upon the command of another offers unto God that which he knows will be displeasing to Him because not commanded by Himself This is not to please God or appease his wrath but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him by a manifest contempt which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worship

But it will be here asked If nothing belonging to divine worship be left to human discretion how is it then that Churches themselves have the power of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like? To this I answer that in religious worship we must dis

cannot be separated from worship yet the particular instances or modifications of them are not determined and therefore they are indifferent Of this sort are the time and place of worship habit and posture of him that worships. These are circumstances and perfectly indifferent where God has not given any express command about them For example amongst the Jews the time and place of their worship and the habits of those that officiated in it were not mere circumstances but a part of the worship itself in which if anything were defective or different from the institution they could not hope that it would be accepted by God But these to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel are mere circumstances of worship which the prudence of every Church may bring into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order decency and edification But even under the Gospel those who believe the first or the seventh day to be set apart by God and consecrated still to His worship to them that portion of time is not a simple circumstance but a real part of Divine worship which can neither be changed nor neglected

In the next place As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church so neither has he any power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received approved and practised by any Church because if he did so he would destroy the Church itself the end of whose institution is only to worship God with freedom after its own manner

You will say by this rule if some congregations should have a mind to sacrifice infants or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused) lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness or practise any other such heinous enormities *is the magistrate obliged to tolerate* them because they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer No These things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life nor in any private house and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God or in any religious meet

ited by a law Melibœus whose calf it is may lawfully kill his calf at home and burn any part of it that he thinks fit For no injury is thereby done to any one no prejudice to another man s goods And for the same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting Whether the doing so be well pleasing to God or no it is their part to consider that do it The part of the magistrate is only to take care that the common

idolatry was thus rooted out of th land f Ca naa y tev ry dol ter was not br ght t e cut on. The wh le family f Rah b th wh I Yoshu ma y l ters.

D d and Sol m n *subd ed ma y* untr es w tho t th e fin f the Land of Pr mise a d carried th ir co q ests as far as Euphrates Amongst so ma y captu es tak n so m y t ns ed ced d r th r bed e, w find t ne ma f ced t th J wish r l n and th worship f th tru God and pu shed f d l try though all of th m wer ta nly *guilty of* t. If any e, indeed becom p os lyte d *ired to be mad* d niz n f their comm wealth h was obl ed t submit t th law that is, t embr their religi B t this h d d

pr lege And as soo as h was dmitted i e becam subject t th l ws f th comm nw alth by which all d l try was fo b dd w th th borders f th land f Canaa B t that l w (as I ha said) d d t ea h t y of thos re gions, h we er subjected u t the Jews that wer s tu t d witho t those bou ds

Thus far co cerni tward w rsh p Let us *ow cons d articles f faith.*

Th articles f l gi ar som f them p c tical d som pecul u N w th gh both sorts cons t in th k owledg f truth y t these terminat imply n th understand those in fl nc th w ll and man rs. Specul ti opin ions ther f and articles f f th (as th y ar called) wh h ar *equired ly to be believed*, can t be mposed y Church by th l w of th land F r t is bsu d th t thi gs hould be e j ed by l ws which ar not men power t perf rm. A d to bel this th t to be tru does t d pe d po ou will. But f this ough has been sa d alr dy B t, vill som say *l t m t l ast p fess that they be l e* A swee ligi ind ed that bl ges me to dissembl d t ll l es both t God and man, for th sal ti f th ir souls If the magistr te thinks to sa m th h seems t derstand littl f th w y f sal tion. And if he does t order to sa th m, why is h so sol tous bout th articles f f th as t en t th m by law

Further th magistr t ought t t f b d the pr h g or p fess g f any pecul ti p nion y Chur h because th y h n manner of *relati to th ci l* ghts of th sub-

jects If a R man Cath l bel e e *that to be* r ally th body of Christ hich another man *does n* in ury ther by to his Test e e hea ere The

powe of the magistrate and th ta f the peopl m y be equally secur whethe y man bel thes thi gs r o l r d ly grant that these pini *ns are false* a d bsurd B t the bus iness of l s is n t t p o de for th truth of *pinions* but f r the saf ty and secur ty of th commonw alth and of ev ry part cular man s goods a d perso And so t ought to be F r the truth certainly w uld d w ll e ough if she were n left t hift f herself She seldom has re c ed and I f a e will ec e m ch as-sistance fr m the power f gr t men t whom sh is but rarely kn wn and more ar ly w l com Sh is n t taught by laws no has sh a y need f f rce to p ocu e her e trance nt th minds f men Errors deed p evail by th as sista c ff gn d borr wed cc rs B t if Truth makes not her way to th u d rsta d g by her ow l ght, he w ll be but th w aker f any borr wed f c ol e ca dd t her Thus mu h fo pecul t e pin ns Let u n w *proceed t pr tical es*

A good lif in which c nsist n t th l ast p t f r l gion and tru p ty ncerns also the ci il g rnm t a d it lies the safety both of m n s souls and of th mmonwealth. M al ti ns bel g ther f to th jur sd tio both f th outward and ward court both f th ci il and d mestic g or I mean both of th magistr te and co c c Here, ther fore, is great danger lest of these *jurisd cti ns i* tr ch upon the other d disc rd arise be twee the keeper f th publ c peace a d th erseers f so ls B t f wh t has bee already sa d co cern g th l mits f both these go ern *m ts be ghtly cons d ed t will* easily remo e all difficulty in this matter

E ery ma has *n imm rtal* soul, cap bl f ternal happ ess or misery whose happiness d pe d g upo his bel eving and doing those thi gs in this lif wh h are necessary t th ob-ta ing f God f ur and are p escr bed by God t that d It f ll ws fr m thence fir t, th t th obser e f these things is th highest bl g tio that l es pon manki d and th t ou utmost car ppl cati d d lig ought to be cised th search d perf rmance f them because th e is thing in this world th t

But idolatry say some is a sin and therefore not to be tolerated If they said it were therefore to be avoided the inference were good But it does not follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to be punished by the magistrate For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his sword in punishing everything indifferently that he takes to be a sin against God Covetousness uncharitableness idleness and many other things are sins by the consent of men which yet no man ever said were to be punished by the magistrate The reason is because they are not prejudicial to other men s rights nor do they break the public peace of societies Nay even the sins of lying and perjury are nowhere punishable by laws unless in certain cases in which *the real turpitude of the thing and the of*fence against God are not consi red but only the injury done unto men s neighbours and to the commonwealth And what if in another country to a Mahometan or a Pagan prince the Christian religion seem false and offensive to God may not the Christians for the same reason and after the same manner be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther that by the law of Moses idolaters were to be rooted out True in*deed by the law of Moses but that is not obliga*

Moses only to that people And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge the authority of the law of Moses for the inflicting of capital punishment upon idolaters But however I will examine this argument a little more particularly

the Mosaical rites and made citizens of that commonwealth did afterwards apostatise from the worship of the God of Israel These were proceeded against as traitors and rebels guilty of no *less than high treason* For the commonwealth of the Jews different in that from all others was an absolute theocracy nor was there or could there be any difference between that commonwealth and the *Church* The laws established there concerning the worship of One

Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people *and a part of their political government in which* God Himself was the legislator Now if any one can shew me where there is a commonwealth at this time constituted upon that foundation I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil and that the subjects of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that Church by the civil power But there is absolutely no such thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth There are indeed many cities and kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ but they have retained their ancient form of government with which the law of Christ hath not at all meddled He indeed *hath taught men how by faith and good works* they may obtain eternal life but He instituted no commonwealth He prescribed unto His followers no new and peculiar form of government nor put He the sword into any magistrate s hand with commission to make use of it in forcing men to forsake their former religion and receive His

Secondly foreigners and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of Israel were not compelled by force to observe the rites of the Mosaical law but on the contrary in the very *same place where it is ordered that an Israelite* that was an idolater should be put to death[1] there it is provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed I confess that the seven *nations that possessed the land which was prom*ised to the Israelites were utterly to be cut off but this was not singly because they were idolaters For if that had been the reason why were the Moabites and other nations to be spared? No the reason is this God being in a peculiar manner the King of the Jews He could not suffer the adoration of any other deity (which was properly an act of high treason against Him

reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out of their countries by the children of Esau and Lot and their lands upon the same grounds given by God to the invaders[2] But though all

[1] *Exod* 22 20 21
[2] Deut 2

which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man's self. Thus the safeguard of men's lives and of the things that belong unto this life is the business of the commonwealth; and the preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate. And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them to that; nor change property amongst fellow subjects (no not even by a law) for a cause that has no relation to the end of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for the public good? I answer: As the private judgment of any particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law, so the private judgment (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not give him any new right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant, much less if he make it his business to enrich and advance his followers and fellow sectaries with the spoils of others. But what if the magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws and that they are for the public good, and his subjects believe the contrary? Who shall be judge between them? I answer: God alone. For there *is no judge* upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say, is the only Judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day according to his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to promote piety and the public weal and peace of mankind. But what shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and chief care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next place, of the public peace; though yet there are very few will think it is peace there where they see all laid waste.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the other by force; and these are of that nature that where the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise without a judge to determine them. You will say then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry his point. Without doubt; but the question is not here concerning the doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions contrary to human society or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these, indeed, examples in [illegible]

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thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over with a *specious show of deceitful words*, but in effect opposite to the civil right of the community. For example: we cannot find any sect that teaches, expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate and awaken all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. What else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics? Their meaning, forsooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves; for they declare all that are not of their communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms? It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also an assertion by which those that maintain it do plainly lay claim to the possession of all things. For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe, or at least as not to profess themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil concernments; or who upon pretence of religion do chal-

is of any consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly, that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs, *therefore, the care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself.* But I would not have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce men from errors, which are in*deed the greatest duty of a Christian.* Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the promoting of another man's salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be forborne. Nothing is to be done *imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that matter* to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another, further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody else is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal lives here upon earth; the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several outward conveniences to the support thereof, which are to be procured or preserved by pains and industry. For those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themselves fit and prepared for our use. This part, therefore, draws on another care, and necessarily gives another employment. But the pravity of mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than take pains to provide for themselves, the necessity of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired, and also of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into society with one another, that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this life, leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of his own eternal happiness, the attain[illegible]

forced from him by any external violence. But forasmuch as men thus entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their temporal goods, may nevertheless be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens, or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms, riches, and multitude of citizens; the remedy of the other in *laws;* and the care of *all* things relating both to one and the other is committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the legislative (which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision may be made for the security of each man's private possessions; for the peace, riches, and public commodities of the whole people; and, as much as possible, for the increase of their inward strength *against foreign invasions.*

These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed, and by what measures regulated; and that is the temporal good and out*ward prosperity of the society;* which is the sole reason of men's entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that is, that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness. For obedience is due, in the first place, to God and afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask, "What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private person?" I answer that, if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to the public good, this will seldom happen. But if, perhaps, it do so fall out, I say, that such a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private *judgement of any person concerning a law en*acted in political matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation. But if the law, indeed, be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate's authority (as, for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences. For the political society is instituted for no other end, but only to secure every man's possession of the things of this life. The care of each man's soul and of the things of heaven

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B t what if the magistra believe such law as t is to be for the public good? I answer As the priva judgement of an particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the b- ligation f law so t pri ate jud ement (as I ma call t) of the magistrat does n t gi e him an new ri t of imposin laws pon his s b- jects, which neither was in t constitution of t government granted him, nor ever was n th power of the peop t grant, much less if h make t his business t enr ch and d ance his followers and f llow-sectaries w th th spoils others. But wha if the magistrate believe that h has right to mak such laws and that they are for t publi good nd his subjects believe th contrary Wh shall be jud between them. I answer God alon For ther is no judge upon earth between th supreme magistra and th peopl God, I say is th nl Judge n this case ho will retribut u to every ne t the las day

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These things being thus explained it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed and by what measures regulated and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society which is the sole reason of men s entering into society and the only thing they seek and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation and that is that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness For obedience is due in the first place to God and afterwards to the laws

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lenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion I say these have no right to be tol erated by the magistrate as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion For what do all these and the like doctrines signify but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the *magistrate so long until they find themselves* strong enough to effect it?

Again That Church can have no r ght to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby *ipso f cto* deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his ov n country and suffer his own people to be listed as it were for soldiers against his own Gov ernment Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience espe c ally when both the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same per son who has not only power to persuade the members of his Church to whatsoever he l sts either as purely relig ous or in order thereunto but can also enjo n it them on pa n of eternal fire It is ridiculous for any one to profess h m self to be a Mahometan only in his religion but in everything else a faithful subject to a Chris t an mag strate wh lst at the same time he ac knowledges himself bound to yield bl nd obedi ence to the Mufti of Constant nople who him self s entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emper or and frames the fe gned oracles of that religion accord ng to his pleasure But th s Mahometan living amongst Chr stians v ould yet more ap parently renounce their government if he ac knowledged the same person to be head of his Church v ho is the supreme mag strate in the state

Lastly those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God Prom ses covenants and oaths which are the bonds of human society can ha e no hold upon an atheist The tak ng away of God though but e en in thought dissolves all bes des also those that by the r atheism undermine and destroy all rel gion can have no pretence of relig on whereupon to chal lenge the pr vilege of a toleration As for other practical opin ons though not absolutely free from all error if they do not tend to establish domination over others or civil impunity to the Church in which they are taught there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated

It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies which being vulgarly called and perhaps having somet mes been conventicles and nurseries of factions and sed tions are thought to afford the strongest matter of objection against this doctrine of toleration But this has not happened by anything peculiar unto the genius of such assemblies but by the unhappy circum stances of an oppressed or ill settled liberty These accusations v ould soon cease if the law of toleration v ere once so settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the foun dation of their own l berty and teach that l berty of conscience is e ery man s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters as to themselves and that nobody ought to be compelled in mat ters of religion either by law or force The establishment of th s one thing would take av ay all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience and these causes of discontents and animosities being once removed there v ould remain nothing in these assemblies that v ere not more peaceable and less apt to produce dis turbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever But let us examine part cularly the heads of these accusations

You v ll say that assemblies and meetings en danger the publ c peace a d threaten the com monwealth I ansv er If th s be so why are there daily such numerous meet ngs in markets and Courts of Jud cature? Why are crov ds upon the Exchange and a concou se of people in c ties suf fered? You w ll reply Those are civil assem bl es but these v e object against are ecclesiasti cal I ansv er It is a likely thing ind ed that such assembl es as are altogether emote from civ l affa rs should be most apt to embro l them. Oh but civil assemblies are composed of men that differ from one another in matters of re ligion but thes ecclesiastical meetings are of persons that are all of one op n on As if an agree ment in matters of religion were in effect a con sp racy against the common ealth or as if men would not be so much the mo e warmly unani mous in rel g on the less liberty they had of as sembling But t ill be urg d st ll that c v l as semblies are open and free f any one to enter into wher as rel gious convent cles are more pri vate and thereby gi e oppo tunity to clandestine machinations I ans er that this is not strictly true for many ci il assemblies are not open to e eryone And if some religious meetings be p vate who are they (I beseech you) that are to be

blamed for t, those that desire or those that for bid their being public Again, you will say that re ligious communion does xceedingly unit m n s minds and affections t on an the a d is there fore th more dangerous. B t f this be so why is not the magistrate afraid of his own Church and why does h n t forbid th r assemblies as Yo w ll

lessly soever th d mea themse es i m penses them n therwise than by galleys, pris ons, confiscati ns, and death. These h cherishes nd defends those h co ti u lly scourges and oppresses. Let him turn th t bles O let those disse ters enjoy but th sam pri ileges in ci ils as his ther subjects, and h w ll quickly find that these eligious meetings will be n longer dan gerous. For if men enter into seditious conspira cies, t is t religion nsp res them to t in their meeti gs, but th ir sufferings and pp ess ns that mak them willing to ease themsel es. Just and moderate governm ts are everywhere qui t, everywhere saf but ppression raises fer ments and makes m truggl t cast ff an un easy and tyrannical yok I know that seditio ns are ery frequently raised pon pretenc of reli gion, but t is as tru tha for l gi n subjects are freq ently ill tre ted and l e miserabl Believe me the tirs that ar mad proceed n t from any peculiar temper f this or that Church or religious soci ty but from the common dispo sition f all manki d wh wh they groa un der hea y burth n d ur naturally t hake ff th yok tha galls th ir necks. S p pose this business f ligi were l t alon and that there were som th distinction mad be tween men and men upo ccount f the dif ferent complexi ns, hapes and features, so that those wh ha e black hair (f exampl) or grey eyes should t joy the same pr ileges as ther citizens that they should no be permitted either to buy or sell, or li by th ir callings that par ents should not ha e th government and ed ca t of th ir own children that all should ther be excluded from th benefit f the laws, or et w th partial jud es can t be d bted but these persons, thus distinguished from others by the colour of their hair and eyes, and united to-

gether by e common persecution, would be as da erous to the magistrat as any thers that had associated themsel es mer ly upon the ccount of religio Some enter nto compa y for trade and profit, others for wa t of bus ess ha e th ir clubs for claret. ghbourhood jo ns some and religion others But there is nly ne thing which gathers people into sed tious com motions, d that is opp essi n

You will say What, will you ha e people to meet at d ne serv ce against the magistrat s will I nswer Why I pray gainst his will Is t not both lawful and necessary that they hould meet Aga nst his w ll do you sa That is what I compla f that is the ery root of ll th mischi f Why are assemblies less sufferable in a hurch than n theatre or mark t. Those that meet there are not either more icious or more turbul t than those that meet elsewhere. Th bus ess n that is that they are ll used and therefore they are not t be suffered T k away the partial ty that is used towards them in mat ters of commo right change th laws, take way th penalties unt which they are subjected and all thin s will immedi tely become saf and peaceable nay those that are erse to the reli gion of th magistrate will think themsel es so much th more bou d to maintain th peace of th commonwealth as their conditi n is better in that place than lsewhere and all the several separate congregati ns, lik so ma y guardians of th public peace, will w tch o another that nothing may be innovated or cha ged in th form of the government, because they can hope for

government, and that for no other reason (as has already been shown) than because th prince is kind and th laws are f vourable to t, how much gre ter will be the secur ty of government wher all good subjects, of whatsoever Church they be without any distinctio upon account of eligion, joying the sam f ur f th pr ce and th sam ben fit f th laws, hall become th common support and guard f t, and wher no will ha e any occasion to fear th sever ty of th laws but those that d injur es to their neighbours and offend gainst th ci il peace

That we may draw towards conclus on. Th sum f all we drive t is that every man may n joy th sam ghts that ar granted to others. Is t permitted to worship God in the Roman man ner? Let t be permitted to d t in th Geneva

form also Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market place? Let those that have a mind to it be permitted to do it also in the Church Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel stand sit or use any other posture and to clothe himself in white or black in short or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread drink wine or wash with water in the church In a word whatsoever things are left free by law in the common occasions of life let them remain free unto every Church in divine worship Let no man s life or body or house or estate suffer any manner of prejudice upon these accounts Can you allow of the Presbyterian discipline? Why should not the Episcopal also have what they like? Ecclesiastical authority whether it be administered by the hands of a single person or

do with riches and revenues

Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by daily experience and public allowance *These are allowed to people of some one persuasion* why not to all? If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary to the public peace it is to be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market These meetings ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and flagitious fellows Nor ought it to be less lawful for men to meet in churches than in halls nor are one part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for their meeting together than others Every one is to be accountable for his own actions and no man is to be laid under a suspicion or odium for the fault of another Those that are seditious murderers thieves robbers adulterers slanderers etc of whatsoever Church whether national or not ought to be punished and suppressed But those whose doctrine is peaceable and whose manners are pure and blameless ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow subjects Thus if solemn assemblies observations of festivals public worship be permitted to any one sort of professors all these things ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians Independents Anabaptists Arminians Quakers and others with the same liberty Nay if we may openly speak the truth and as becomes one man to another

ew ought the com he Gospel commands no such thing the Church which judgeth not those that are without wants it

[1] I Co 5 12 13

not. And the commonwealth which embraces indifferently all men that are honest peaceable, and industrious requires it not Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with us and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us why should we not allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false their worship more abominable or is the civil peace more endangered by their meeting in public than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to Jews and Pagans surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be worse than theirs in a Christian commonwealth

You will say perhaps Yes it ought to be because they are more inclinable to factions tumults and civil wars I answer Is this the fault of the Christian religion? If it be so truly the Christian religion is the worst of all religions and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person nor tolerated by any commonwealth For if this be the genius this the *nature of the Christian religion to be turbulent* and destructive to the civil peace that Church itself which the magistrate indulges will not always be innocent But far be it from us to say any such thing of that religion which carries the greatest opposition to covetousness ambition discord contention and all manner of inordinate desires and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was We must therefore seek another cause of those evils that are charged upon religion And if we consider right we shall find it to consist wholly in the subject that I am treating of It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided) but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted) that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion The heads and leaders of the Church moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion making use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves by preaching unto them contrary to the laws of the Gospel and to the precepts of charity that

their honest industry and contrary to all th law of equity both human and di ine to be delivered up for pr y t ther m n lence and rapine especially wh n they are others ise altogether blameless nd that the occas n f which they are thus treated does n t t all be lo g to th jurisdiction of th magistrate but entirely to th consc ce f every particular man for the cond t f which he is accountabl to God nly what else can be expected but that these men, growing w ary of the e ils u der which t y labour should in th nd think t la ful for them to esist force w th f rce a d to defend th ir natural hts (which are n t for feitabl upo ccount of rel gi) w th arms as well as they can That this has bee hithert the ordinary course f things is bu d tly evident in his ory and that t will co ti u to be so he after is but too ppar t in ason. It cann t in deed, be therwise so l g as th p cipl of persecutio for rel gi n hall prevail as t has don hitherto, w th magistr t nd people, and so lon as those that ought t be th pre chers f peace and co cord hall co ti u w th all their art and stre gth to excit men t arms and

dered t if t d d t ppear th t they h e been in ted by th munt particip ti n f th spoil and ha e theref thought fit t mak use f their ovetousness and p d as means whereby to increase th ir own power For wh does n t see that these good men ar ndeed mo min isters f the g vernmen than mini ters f the Gospel and that, by flatterin th mb ti nd fa ourin th d mini f p nces and m n in a thority they e dea our w th all th ir might to p mot that tyran y in th comm wealth which therwise they hould n t be bl to es-

th wo ldly w lfar f th mm w alth, th other t th sal ti f souls— t is imposs bl that any discord h uld ev ha happened be tween th m. *S d pud t ha ppr bri t* God Al mighty grant, I beseech H m, th t th gospel f peace may t length be pre hed nd th t l magistrates, growing more careful t conf rm their own consciences to th l w f God and less solicitous about th binding f ther m co sciences by huma laws may lik f thers f th ir country direct all their counsels and d ours to promote uni ersally th civil welfare of all th ir children except only of such as are arrogant ungo ernabl nd jur ous t their bre thr nd th t all ecclesia t cal men who boast themsel es to be the successors of the Apostles, walki g peaceably and modestly in the Apostles steps, w thout i termeddl g with Stat Affairs, may pply themsel es wh lly to promote the sal ati n f souls.

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by this t ppears that men of differe t rel gi ns cannot be heretics or schismatics to one th

We are to nquire therefore what men ar of th same rel gion Concerning which t is manifest that those who ha e o and th same rule of faith and worship ar of the same rel gion and those wh ha e n t th same rule of fa th and worship are of different religions. For since all things that bel g u to that religion are co tained in th t rul t f llows necessarily th t those wh agree in o rule are of o e and th same religi and *vice versa*. Thus Turks and Christians are of differe t rel gions, because these tak th H ly Scriptures to be the rule of th ir religi n, and those the Alcoran. And for the same reaso there may be d fferent religions also eve am gst Christians. The P pists and Luth erans, thou h both f them profess faith in Christ and are therefor called Christians, yet are not both f th sam religion because these c knowledg n thing but th H ly Scriptures to be the rul and fou d u f their religi n, those take in also trad tions and the decrees of P pes and of these together mak th rul f their rel gi n nd thus th Christians of St. J hn (as th y ar called) and th Christians of Geneva are of diff re t religi ns, because these also tak only th Scr ptures, and those I know n t what tr d ti ns, for th rul f th ir eligi n.

This being settled t f ll ws, first, that heresy is separ tion mad ecclesiastical commun between m n f the sam eligi n for som p ns w y co tained in the rul tself and secondly that am gst those who ackn wledge thing but th H ly Scr ptures to be their rul of faith h resy is a separ tion mad in th ir Christia commun n for pinions not con tained in the express w rds f Scripture. Now

this separation may be made in a twofold manner

1 When the greater part or by the magistrate s patronage the stronger part of the Church separates itself from others by excluding them out of her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions which are not the express words of the Scripture For it is not the paucity of those that are separated nor the authority of the magistrate that can make

tarily makes a separation because of such opinions

When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because that Church does not publicly *profess some certain opinions* which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals and they err obstinately against *knowledge for when they have determined the* Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture and because others will not acknowledge *these add tional opinions of theirs nor build* upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental they therefore make a separation in the Church either by withdrawing themselves from others or expelling the others from them *Nor does it signify anything for them to say that* their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture and to the analogy of faith for if they be conceived in the express words of Scripture *there can be no question about them because* those things are acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental But if they say that the art cles wh ch *they require to be professed are consequences* deduced from the Scripture it is undoubtedly well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith But it would be very ill done to *obtrude those things upon others* unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture and to make a separation for such things as these which neither are nor can be fundamental *is to become heretics* for I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as divine inspirations and *compare the art cles of faith* that he has framed accord ng to his own fancy with the authority of Scripture. I know there are some proposit ons so evidently agreeable to Scripture that nobody can deny them to be drawn from thence but about those there*fore there can be no difference* This only I say—that however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture we ought not therefore to impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe *it to be agreeable to the rule of faith* unless we would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner and that we should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and contradictory opin ons of *Lutherans Calvinists Remonstrants Ana*baptists and other sects which the contrivers of

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*cannot but wonder at the extravagant arro*gance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost the eternal and infinite wisdom of God

Thus much concerning heresy which word in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion Let us now consider schism which is a crime near ak n to it for both these words *seem unto me to signify an ill grounded separa*tion in ecclesiastical communion made about things not necessary But s nce use which is the

Schism then for the same reasons that have already been alleged is nothing else but a sepa

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what Christ our legislator or the Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit have commanded in express words

In a word *he that denies not anything that* the Holy Scriptures teach in express words nor makes a separation upon occas on of anything that is not manifestly contained in the sacred text—*however he may be nicknamed by any* sect of Christians and decla ed by some or all of

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of *your parts*.

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this separation may be made in a twofold manner

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2 When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because that Church does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals and they err obstinately against knowledge for when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture and because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs nor build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental they therefore make a separation in the Church either by withdrawing themselves from others or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture and to the analogy of faith for if they be conceived in the express words of Scripture there can be no question about them because those things are acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental But if they say that the articles which they require to be professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture it is undoubtedly well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith But it would be very ill done to obtrude those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture and to make a separation for such things as these which neither are nor can be fundamental is to become heretics for I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as able to Scripture that nobody can deny them to be drawn from thence but about those therefore there can be no difference This only I say—that however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith unless we would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner and that we should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans Calvinists Remonstrants Anabaptists and other sects which the contrivers of symbols systems and confessions are accustomed to deliver to their followers as genuine and necessary deductions from the Holy Scripture I cannot but wonder at the extravagant arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost the eternal and infinite wisdom of God

Thus much concerning heresy which word in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion Let us now consider schism which is a crime near akin to it for both these words seem unto me to signify an ill grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not necessary But since use which is the supreme law in matter of language has determined that heresy relates to errors in faith and schism to those in worship or discipline we must consider them under that distinction

Schism then for the same reasons that have already been alleged is nothing else but a separation made in the communion of the Church upon account of something in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is not any necessary part of it Now nothing in worship or discipline can be necessary to Christian communion but what Christ our legislator or the Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit have commanded in express words

In a word he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in express words nor makes a separation upon occasion of anything that is not manifestly contained in the sacred text—however he may be nicknamed by any sect of Christians and declared by some or all of them to be utterly void of true Christianity—yet in deed and in truth this man cannot be either a heretic or schismatic

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your parts

AN ESSAY
CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

Chap. I. *Of Political Power*

1\. It having been shown in the foregoing discourse:

Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended.

Secondly. That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.

Thirdly. That if his heirs had, there being no law of Nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined.

Fourthly. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam's posterity being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance.

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against), must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

A. Essay Concerning Certain False Principles

2\. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be political power. That the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another, and show the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

3\. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.

Chap. II. *Of the State of Nature*

4\. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by

every man upon this score by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general may restrain or where it is necessary destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one who hath transgressed that law as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others from doing the like mischief. And in this case and upon this ground every man hath a right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of Nature.

9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men but before they condemn it I desire them to resolve me by what right any prince or state can put to death or punish an alien for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislature reach not a stranger. They speak not to him, nor if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world—men without authority. And therefore if by the law of Nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country since in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another.

10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the laws, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature and to be a noxious creature there is commonly injury done and some person or other some other man, receives damage by his transgression which case he who hath received any damage has (besides the right of punishment common to him, with other men) a particular right to seek reparation from him that hath done it. And any other person who finds it just may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he hath suffered.

11. From these two distinct rights (the one of punishing the crime for restraint and preventing the like offence which right of punishing is in everybody the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party) comes it to pass that the magistrate who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That he who hath suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name and he alone can remit. The damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender by right of self preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end. And thus it is that every man in the state of Nature has a power to kill a murderer both to deter others from doing the like injury (which no reparation can compensate) by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security And upon this is grounded that great law of Nature Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal that after the murder of his brother he cries out Every one that findeth me shall slay me, so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

12. By the same reason may a man in the state of Nature punish the lesser breaches of that law it will, perhaps, be demanded with death I answer Each transgression may be punished to that degree and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence that can be committed in the state of Nature may in the state of Nature, be also punished equally and as far forth, as it may in a commonwealth. For though it would be beside my present purpose to enter here into the particulars of the law of Nature or its measures of punishment, yet it is certain there is such a law and that too as intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive laws of commonwealths, nay possibly plainer as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words for truly so are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which

any manifest declaration of his will set one above another and confer on him by an evid nt and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and so ereignty

5 This equality of men by Nature the judi cious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself and beyond all question that he makes it the foundation of that obl gation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they o e *one another and from whence he derives* the great maxims of justice and charity His words are

The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves for seeing those things which are equal must needs all have one meas ure if I cannot but wish to receive good even as much at every man s hands as any man can wish unto his own soul how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied un*less myself be careful to satisfy the like desire* hich is undoubtedly in other men weak being of one and the same nature to have anything offered them repugnant to this desire must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me so that if I do harm I must look to suffer there be ing no reason that others should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me sho ed unto them my desire therefore to be loved of my equals n Nature as much as pos sible may be imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them ard fully the like affection From which relat on of equality between our selves and them that are as oursel es hat sev eral rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for d rection of life no man is ignorant (*Eccl P l* 1)[1]

6 But though this be a state of liberty yet it is not a *state of l cence though man in that state* have an uncontrollable l berty to d spose of his person or possess ons yet he has not liberty to destroy himself or so much as any creature in — h h om nobl r use than te of Na t hich

to harm another in h s life health liberty or p s sess ons for men being all the orkmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely ise Maker all the servants of one sovereign Master sent into the world by H s order and about His bus ness they are His property hose orkmanship they are made to *last during H s not one anoth e s*

[1]Richard Hooker *The Laws f Eccl sia tic l P l ty*

pleasure And being *furnished with like facul* ties sharing all in one community of Nature there cannot be supposed any such subordina tion among us that may authorise us to destroy one another as if we ere made for one another s uses as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours Every one as he is bound to preserve him self and not to qu t his station wilfully so by the like reason hen h s o n preservation comes not in competition ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind and not unless it be *to do justice on an offender* take a ay or impair the life or what tends to the preserva tion of the life the liberty health l mb or goods of another

7 And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights and from doing hurt to one another and the law of Nature be observed which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind the execution of the law of Nature is *in that state put into every man s hands where* by every one has a right to punish the transgres

vain if there were nobody that in the state of Na ture had a power to execute that law and there by preserve the innocent and restrain offenders and if any one in the state of Nature may punish *another for any evil he has done every one may* do so For in that state of perfect equality here naturally there is no superiority or jurisd ction of one over another hat any may do in prose cution of that law every one must needs have a right to do

8 And thus in the state of Nature one man comes by a po er over another but yet no ab- — l h

calm reason and consc ence dictate hat is pro- port onate to h s transgression which is so much as may s rve for r parat on and restraint. For these t o are the only reasons hy one man may *la fully do harm to anoth r h ch is that we* call punishment In tra sgress ng the law of Na ture the offender declares himself to live by an

— m n d ol nce be

thereby put himself into a stat of war w th him t bet t be understood as declaration of a design pon his lif F r I ha e reaso t con clud that he who would get me into his power thout my consent would use me as h pl ased wh h had got me th re and destroy me too when be had a fancy t t f body can desire t ha me in his bsol t powe unless t be to compel me by force t that which is gainst the r ht of my freed m make me sla e T ecurity of my

necessarily be supposed t na ay everythin lse that freed m be the foundati of all th rest as h th t n the st t of society would tak way th freed m bel g ing those f th t soci ty or commo wealth must be supposed t des gn t take away from th m everythin lse and so be looked n as in ta f war

8 This makes lawful for man t kill thief who has t in th l ast hurt him, nor declared an design upo his lif y farther than by the use of f rc so t g him in his powe as t tak way his money or what h pl ases, from him because usin f rce where h has o ri ht get me int his power l his pre ence be what t will I ha e no reaso suppose hat h wh would tak w y my liberty would n t, wh n h had me in his power tak way erything lse. And h m as

sta of war and is ggresso t.

9. And here we ha e th plai difference be tween th st f N ture and the ta of war which however some me ha e conf unded are as far dista as ta of pe ce goodwill mu tual assistance and preserv ti n and tat of enmity malice vi lence and mutual destructi n are ne from an th M n livin tog ther c cording reason w thou comm n superior on arth w th thority t judge between th m, is properly the sta of N ture. But force or de clared design of force pon th person of an th er where there is no comm superior n arth to ppeal to for relief is the sta of war and t is the wan of such an ppeal gi es man the righ of war eve gainst an ggressor though h be in society and a f llow subject. Thus, a thief wh m I cann t harm, but by appeal to the law for ha ing st l n all that I am worth, I may kill wh n he sets n me t rob me but of my horse or coat, because th law which was mad for my preservat on where t cannot interpose to secure my lif from present force which if lost cap- bl of no reparat on permits me my own de fence and the right f war a liberty to kill the aggresso because th ggressor allows t tim t appeal to our comm n j dge nor the decis on of th law for remedy n a case where th mis- ch f may be irreparable Want of a comm n j dg w th uthority put all men in a state of N ture force w thout right upon a man s per son makes a st t of war both where there is, and is n t, a common j dge

o. But wh n the ctu l force is over the state of war ceases betwee those that are in soci ty and are equally o both sides sub ect to the judge and therefore in such co trovers es, wh re the quest n is put, Wh shall be judge t cannot be meant wh shall dec de the controversy ev ery one knows what Jephth here t lls us, that th Lord th Jud e shall judge. Where there is no judge n arth the ppeal lies t God in He en. That quest o then cannot mean wh shall judge whether nother hath put himself in a state of war th me and whether I may as J phtha did ppeal to H a en in t Of that I m self can nly j dge in my own consci ce as I will answer t t th great day t the S preme J dg of all men.

Chap IV Of Slavery

I Th natural liberty of man is t be free from any superi powe arth and not to be un der th will or legislat e uthority of man, but t ha e only th la f N ture for his rul The liberty f man in soci ty is t be under no other legislat e power but that established by consent in th commonwealth nor under the d mini n f any will, or restraint of a y law but what that legisl t e shall na t ccording t the trust put in t. Freedom, th n is n t what Sir R bert Fil mer tells us A liberty for every one to d wh t h lists, t live as he pl ases, and n t to be tied by any laws but freed m of men under gov ernme t is t ha e tanding rul t li e by common t every ne of that soci ty and mad by th legislati e power erected in t. A liberty t follow my own will in all things where that rul prescribes t, t t be subject t th n constant, uncertai unknown, arbitrary w ll of another man, as freed m f nature is t be u der no ther restraint but th law of N ture

are only so far right as they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted

13 To this strange doctrine—viz That in the state of Nature every one has the executive power of the law of Nature—I doubt not but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases that self love will make men partial to themselves and their friends and on the other side ill nature passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will

ment is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of Nature which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own

remember that absolute monarchs are but men

is therefore not to be endured I desire to know what kind of government that is and how much better it is than the state of Nature where one man commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in his own case and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases without the least question or control of those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth whether led by reason mistake or passion must be submitted to? *which men in the state of Nature are not* bound to do one to another And if he that judges judges amiss in his own or any other case he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind

14 It is often asked as a mighty objection where are or ever were there any men in such a state of Nature? To which it may suffice as an

they are or are not in league with others for it

munity and make one *body politic other p o u*ises and compacts men may make one with another and yet still be in the state of Nature The promises and bargains for truck, etc between

the two men in Soldania in or between a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America are binding to them *though they are perfectly in a* state of Nature in reference to one another for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men and not as members of society

erto mentioned —*i e* the laws of Nature— do bind men absolutely even as they are men although they have never any settled fellowship *never any solemn agreement amongst themselves* what to do or not to do but for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our Nature doth desire a life fit for the

duced to seek communion and fellowship with others this was the cause of men uniting themselves as first in politic societies But I moreover *affirm that all men are naturally in that* state and remain so till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse to make it very clear

Chap III *Of the State of War*

16 The state of war is a state of enmity and de

a state of war with him against whom he has de

I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction for by the fundamental law of Nature man being to be preserved as much as possible when all cannot be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him or has discovered an enmity to his being for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion because they are not under the ties of the common law of reason have no other rule but that of force and violence and so may be treated as a beast of prey those dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power

17 And hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power does

begin to be his when he digested, or when he ate, or when he boiled? or when he brought them home, or when he picked them up. And it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common. That added something to them more than Nature the common mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right. And will any one say he had no right to those corns or apples he thus appropriated because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his. Was it robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common. If such a consent as that was necessary man had starved not withstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

3. By making an explicit consent of every commoner necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master had provided for them in common without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out. His labour hath taken it out of the hands of Nature where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.

0. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilised part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of Nature for the beginning of property in what was before common, still takes place and by virtue thereof what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind, or what ambergris any one takes up here is by the labour that removes it out of that common state Nature left it in, made his property who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting is thought his who pursues her

[illegible]

bour about any of that kind as to make sue her has thereby removed her from the state of Nature wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.

30. It will perhaps be objected to this that if gathering the corns or other fruits of the earth, etc. makes a right to them, then any one may engross as much as he will. To which I answer Not so. The same law of Nature that does by this means give us property does also bound that property too. God has given us all things richly I[illegible] the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has He given it us— to enjoy? [illegible] can make use of to

[illegible]

contentious about property so established.

3. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself as that which takes

[illegible]

proves, cultivates, and can use the product of so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right to say everybody else has an

[illegible]

commanded man also to labour and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth— i.e. improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his

2 This freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to and closely joined with a *man s preservation that he cannot part with it* but by what forfeits his preservation and life together For a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact or his own consent enslave himself to any one nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another to

other power over it Indeed having by h s fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death he to whom he has forfeited it may when he has him in his power delay to take it and make use of him to his own service and he does him no injury by it For whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his

which is nothing else but the state of war continued betw*een a lawful conqueror and a cap*tive for if once compact enter between them and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side and obed ence on the other the state of war and slavery ceases as long as the compact endures for as has been sa d no man can by agreement pass over to another that which he hath not in himself—a power o er h s own l fe

I confess we find among the Jews as well as other nations that men did sell themselves but it is plain this was only to drudgery not to slavery *for it is evident the person sold was not un*der an absolute arbitrary despotical power for the master could not have power to kill him at any time whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service and the master of such a servant *was so far from having an arbi*trary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod *21*)

Chap V *Of Property*

24 Whether we consider natural reason wh ch tells us that men be ng once born have a right to their preservation and consequently to meat and dr nk and such other things as Nature affords for their subsistence or revelation which gives us an account of *those grants God made of* the world to Adam and to Noah and his sons it is very clear that God as King David says (Psalm 115 *16*) has given the earth to the children of men given it to mank nd in common But this being supposed it seems to some a very great d fficulty how any one should ever come to have a

property in anything I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common it is impossible that any man but one universal *monarch should have any* property upon a

old to Adam

ll the rest

to show

how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common and that without any express compact of all the commoners

25 God who hath given the world to men in

to men for the support and comfort of their being And though all the fruits it naturally produces and *beasts it feeds belong to mankind in* common as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature and nobody has originally *a private dominion exclusive of the rest of man*kind in any of them as they are thus in their natural state yet being given for the use of men there *must of necessity be a means to appropriate them* some way or other before they can be of any use or at all beneficial to any particular men The fruit or ven son which nourishes the wild Indian who knows no enclosure and is still a tenant in common must be his and so his—*i e* a part of him that another can no longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the sup*port of his life*

26 Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men yet every man has a property in h s own person This nobody

lf Th labour of his

say

moves

out of the state that Nature hath provided and *left it in he hath mixed h s labour* ith it and jo ned to it someth ng that is h s own and thereby makes it h s property It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in it hath by this labour someth ng annexed to t that excludes the common right of other men For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer no man b t he can ha e a r ght to *what that is once joined to at least where there* is enough and as good left in common for others

7 He that s nourished by the acorns he picked

sent) larger possessions and a r t t them w... how it has done I shall by and by show more large

3 This is certain, that in the beginnin be- fore the desire of havin more than men needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness t the lif of man, or had agreed that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or de- cay should be worth great piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn, though men had a right to appropriate by their labour each one t him- self as much of the things of Nature as he could use yet this could not be much, nor to the preju- dice of others, where the same plenty was still left those who would use the same industry

Before the appropriation of land he who gath- ered as much of the wild fruit, killed caught, or tamed as many of the beasts as he could—he that so employed his pains about any of the spontan- eous products of Nature as any way to alter them from the state Nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a property in them but if they perished in his possession without their due use—if the fruits rotted or the venison putrefied before he could spend it he offended against the common law of Nature and was liable to be punished he in- vaded his neighbour's share for he had no right farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.

30. The same measures governed the posses- sion of land, too. Whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure was still to be looked on as waste and might be the possession of any other Thus, at the beginning Cain might take as much ground as he could till and make his own land and yet leave enough Abel sheep to feed a few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased and industry enlarged their stocks, their possessions enlarged with the need of them but yet it was commonly without any fixed property the ground they made use of till they incorporated, settled themselves to- gether and built cities, and then, by consent, they came in time to set out the bounds of their distinct territories and agree on limits between them and their neighbours, and by laws within

themselves settled the properties of those of the same society For we see that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as Ab- raham time they wandered with their flocks and their herds, which was their substance free- ly up and down—and this Abraham did in a country where he was a stranger whence it is plain that, at least, a great part of the land lay in common, that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of but when there was not room enough in the same place for their herds to feed together they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did (Gen. xiii. 5) separated and enlarged their pasture where it best liked them. And for the same rea son, Esau went from his father and his brother and planted in Mount Seir (Gen. 36. 6)

39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion and property in Adam over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made

quarrel.

4 Nor is it so strange as, perhaps, before con- sideration it may appear, that the property of

sown with wheat or barley and an acre of the same land lying in common without any hus- bandry upon it, and he will find that the im- provement of labour makes the far greater part of the value I think it will be but a very modest computation to say that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects of labour Nay, if we will rightly esti- mate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them—what in them is purely owing to Nature and what to labour— we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour

4 There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several nations of the Ameri cans are of this, who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty—i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance what might serve for

property which another had no title to nor could without injury take from him

32 Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land by improving it any prejudice to any other man since there was still enough and as good left, and more than the yet unprovided could use So that in effect there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself For he that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all Nobody could h t —
drinking of an
draught, who
ter left him to q ct cu nis thirst And the case of land and water where there is enough of both is perfectly the same

33 God gave the world to men in common but since He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain common and uncultivated He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious He that had as good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another s labour if he did it is plain he desired the benefit of another s pains, which he had no right to and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed and more than he knew what to do with or his industry could reach to

34 It is true in land that is common in England or any other country where there are plenty of people under government who have money and commerce no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his fellow commoners because this is left common by compact—*i e* by the law of the land which is not to be violated And though it be common in respect of some men it is not so to all mankind but is the joint propriety of this country or this parish Besides the remainder after such enclosure would not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world it was quite otherwise The law man was under was rather for appropriating God commanded and his wants forced him to labour Th v h pron
minion we see are joined together The one gave title to the other So that God by commanding to subdue gave authority so far to appropriate. And the condition of human life which requires labour and materials to work on necessarily introduce private possessions

35 The measure of property Nature well set, by the extent of men s labour and the conveniency of life No man s labour could subdue or appropriate all nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part so that it was impossible for a v m n
the right of a
erty to the pr
still have room for as good and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated Which measure did confine every man s possession to a very moderate proportion and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody in the first ages of the world when men were more in danger to be lost by wandering from their company in the then vast wilderness of the earth than to be straitened for want of room to plant in

36 The same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to anybody full as the world seems Fo supposing a man or family in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam or Noah let him plant in some inland vacant places of America We shall find that the possessions he could make himself upon the measures we have given would not be very large nor even to this day prejudice the rest of mankind or give them reason to complain or think themselves injured by this man s encroachment though the race of men have no spread themselves to all the corners of the world and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning Nay the extent of ground is of so little value without labour that I have heard it affirmed that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough sow and reap without being disturbed upon land he has no other title to but only his making use of it But on the contrary the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him who by his industry on neglected and consequently waste land has increased the stock of corn which they wanted But be this as it will which I lay no stress on this I dare boldly affirm that the same rule of propriety—*viz* that every man should have as much as he could make use of would hold still in the world without straitening anybody since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants had not the invention of money and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it introduced (by con

can make use of, and so still be in common, though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.

46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after—as it doth the Americans now—are generally things of short duration, such as—if they are not consumed by use—will decay and perish of themselves. Gold, silver, and diamonds are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which Nature hath provided in common, every one hath a right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and had a property in all he could effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state Nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of corn or apples had thereby a property in them; they were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And, indeed, it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to anybody else, so that it perished not uselessly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour, or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others; he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it.

47. And thus came in the use of money; some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.

48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them. For supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but a hundred families, but there were sheep, horses, and cows, with other useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money. What reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities with others? Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask, what would a man value ten thousand or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated and well stocked too, with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product. It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of Nature whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life, to be had there for him and his family.

49. Thus, in the beginning, all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was anywhere known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.

50. But, since gold and silver being little useful to the life of man, in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men—it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth—I mean out of the bounds of society and compact; for in governments the laws regulate it; they having, by consent, found out and agreed in a way how a man may rightfully and without injury possess more than he himself can make use of by receiving gold and silver, which may continue long in a man's possession without decaying for the overplus, and agreeing those metals should have value.

51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of Nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it; so that there could then be

food raiment and delight yet for want of im proving it by labour have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy and a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds lodges and is clad worse than a day labourer in England

42 To make this a little clearer let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life through their several progresses before they come to our u e and see how much they receive of their value from human industry Bread wine and cloth are things of daily use and great plen ty yet notwithstanding acorns water and leaves or skins must be our bread drink and clothing did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities For whatever bread is more worth than acorns wine than water and cloth or silk than leaves skins or moss that is wholly owing to labour and industry The one of these being *the food and raiment which unassisted Nature* furnishes us with the other provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us which how much they exceed the other in value when any one hath computed he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of th ngs we enjoy in this world and the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as any or at most but a very small part of it so little that even amongst us land that is left wholly to nature that hath no improvement of pasturage tillage or planting is called as indeed it is waste and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than noth ing

43 An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat and another in America which with the same husbandry would do the like are without doubt of the same natural intrin sic value But yet the benefit mank nd ec ves from one in a year is worth fi e pounds and the other possibly not worth a penny if all the prof it an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here at least I may truly say not one thousandth It is labour then wh ch puts the

ducts for all that the stra bran bread of that acre of wheat is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land hich l es aste is all the effect of labour Fo t is not ba ly the *ploughman s pains the reaper s and thresher s*

ployed about the plough mill oven or any

other utensils which are a vast number requi site to this corn from its sowing to its being made bread must all be charged on the account of labour and received as an effect of that Nature and the earth furnished only the almost worth less materials as in themselves It would be a strange catalogue of things that industry pro vided and made use of about every loaf of bread before it came to our use if we could trace them iron wood leather bark timber stone br cks coal lime cloth dyeing drugs pitch tar masts ropes and all the materials made use of in the ship that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen to any part of the work all wh ch it would be almost impossible at least too long to reckon up

his own person and the actions or labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of prop erty and that wh ch made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life was perfectly his own and d d not belong in common to others

45 Thus labour in the beginn ng gave a right of property wherever any one was pleased

first for the most part contented themselves with what unass sted Nature offered to the r necessities and though afterwards in some parts of the world where the increase of people and stock with the use of money had made land scarce and so of some value the se eral com munit es settled the bou ds of their distinct ter ritor es and by laws ithin themsel es regu lated the properties of the private men of their society and so by compact and agreement set tled the property wh ch labour and indu try be

to the land in the other s possession have by common consent g en up the r pretences to the r natural common r ght hich or ginally they had to those countries and so ha e by pos iti e agreement settled a property amongst themsel es in dist nct pa ts of the orld yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found

more than the people who dwell on it, do or

can mak use f d so ull i e in comm though this can scarce happe am gst th t part of ma kind that ha e ns nted t th use f mo y

46 Th ore test part f things r ally usef l to th lif f man, and such as th e ess ty of sub- ting mad the first ommo rs f the wo ld look after— s t d th th Am ca s n —are g n ally thi gs f ho t du ti n su h as—if they are t consumed by use—w ll decay d pe h f th mselves G ld l er a d diamo ds ar thi th t fa cy agre m t h th put the al mor than l use d the cessary support f l f Now f those good thi gs which N tur hath p ded omm n, ery e hath right (h th bee sa d) t as much as he could se a d had p pe t all h e ld ffect w th his l bo all that hi du try could xte d to t It f m the ta N tu h d p t t was hi H th t g th ed hu dred b sh ls f a orns r pples h d th by pr perty n them th y w hi good as soon s g th ed H was ly t look th t h used th m bef re they spo led lse h took m e than hi hare d robbed th rs A d deed t was foolish thi g as w ll dish est t h ard p mor than h could mak use f If h g e ay part t y body lse so th t t perished t use lessly his possess th se h lso m d se f And if h also bart ed y pl ms that would ha rotted week f uts that o ld l t good f his ti g wh l y ar h d d n jury h wasted t th mm ock destroyed part f th po ti f goods tha bel ged t ~ hed selessl

ting pe / h m all his life, h d d t th ght of others h m ght h p p as m h f these d abl thi gs as h pl ased th d g f th bou d f his just p perty t l y g the larg ess f hi possess but th perish g f y hi g usefessl t.

47 A d thus cam th use f m y some last g thi g tha m m gh keep w thout p il g d th t, by m tual ns t, m ould tak in excha g f th truly sef l but perish bl supports f lif

48 And as d ff t d gr es f dustry w apt t g m possess ns d ff re t p po ti ns, so th t f m y g th m th ppo ty co t d larg th m F suppos g an l d sep e f m all poss bl commerce w th th est f th wo ld wh in th re were but a hundred f mil es but there w re heep h rses a d cows w th th r use f l a mals wh lesome fruits d la d no gh f r c n f r a hund ed thousand t mes as many but noth g in the sla d ithe because of it commo ess r pe ishabl ness fit to supply the pla e f mo y What ason could any one h th re to enlarg h possess ns beyond the se f his f m ly and a plentiful supply t ts ~ m d ry

ther is not som th g both as b and so valu ble t be h ded up th r men will not be pt to enl g th possess ns of la d were t n ver so h n ers of ee f th m t tak For I ask what would man val e ten th usand o an hu d ed th sa d eres of ex cell t l d r dy culti ated and well tocked too with c ttl n the m ddle of the l d parts of Am ca wh r he had no h pe of ommerce with oth r p rts f the wo ld t dr w m y t h m by the sale of th p od t It would ot be o th th enclos g nd w should see him gi up gain t th wild comm n f Natu e whateve as m e tha would supply th e ces f lif t be had ther f r him a d his f mily

49 Thu in the beg n ng all th wo ld was Am ca and mo so th th t is n w f n su h thi g as m ey was ywhere known F nd t som th g th t hath th use a d val of m y mo st his n ghbours, you hall see th sam ma will begi pres ntly t enlarge his possess s.

5 B t s ce g ld d l ber g l ttl use ful t th l f f ma p po ti n t food ra m t a d carriag has ts l only from the c nse t f m n—wh f l bo yet makes n

out of th bou d f soci ty and comp ct for n gov rnm nts th l ws egul te t they havi g ~ ~

a alu

5 A d thus I thi k, t is ery asy to co ce w thout any d fficulty h w labo co ld t first begi til f p pe ty in th mm thi s of N t d h w th spend g t upon ur uses bo ded t so that there could th n be

no reason of quarrelling about title nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave Right and conveniency went together For as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of This left no room for controversy about the title nor for encroachment on the right of others What portion a man carved to himself was easily seen and it was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much or take more than he needed

Chap VI *Of Paternal Power*

52 It may perhaps be censured an impertinent criticism in a discourse of this nature to find fault with words and names that have obtained in the world And yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes as this of paternal power probably has done which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father as if the mother had no share in it whereas if we consult reason or revelation we shall find she has an equal title which may give one reason to ask whether this might not be more properly called parental power? For whatever obligation Nature and the right of generation lays on children it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it And accordingly we see the positive law of God everywhere joins them together without distinction when it commands the obedience of children Honour thy father and thy mother (Exod 20 12) Whosoever curseth his father or his mother (Lev 20 9) Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father (Lev 19 3) Children obey your parents (Eph 6 1) etc is the style of the Old and New Testament

53 Had but this one thing been well considered without looking any deeper into the matter it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes they have made about this power of parents which however it might without any great harshness bear the name of absolute dominion and regal authority when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father would yet have sounded but oddly and in the very name shown the absurdity if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental and thereby discovered that it belonged to the mother too For it will but very ill serve the turn of those men who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it. And it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for when by the very name it appeared that that fundamental authority from whence they would derive their government of a single person only was not placed in one but two persons jointly But to let this of names pass

54 Though I have said above (2) That all men by nature are equal I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality Age or virtue may give men a just precedency Excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level Birth may subject some and alliance or benefits others to pay an observance to those to whom Nature gratitude or other respects may have made it due and yet all this consists with the equality which all men are in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another which was the equality I there spoke of as proper to the business in hand being that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man

55 Children I confess are not born in this full state of equality though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world and for some time after but it is but a temporary one The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in and supported by in the weakness of their infancy Age and reason as they grow up loosen them till at length they drop quite off and leave a man at his own free disposal

56 Adam was created a perfect man his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason and so was capable from the first instance of his being to provide for his own support and preservation and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason God had implanted in him From him the world is peopled with his descendants who are all born infants weak and helpless without knowledge or understanding But to supply the defects of this imperfect state till the improvement of growth and age had removed them Adam and Eve and after them all parents were by the law of Nature under an obligation to preserve nourish and educate the children they had begotten not as their own workmanship but the workmanship of their own Maker the Almighty to whom they were to be accountable for them

57 The law that was to govern Adam was the same that was to govern all his posterity the law of reason But his offspring having another way of entrance into the world different from him by a natural birth that produced them igno-

rant, and without th use of reason, they were not presently under that law For nobody can be under a law that is not promulgated t him and this law bein promulgated mad known by reason I h that is n t come to th use of his reason cannot be said to be under this law and Adam children bei g n t presently as soon as born under this law f reason, were n t pres- en free. For law n its tru n ti n, is t so much the limitati n as the directi n f a free and intelli ent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for th general good of those under that law Could they be happ er without t, the law as useless thi would of itself vanish and that ill deserves th name of confinement which hed es us in nly from bogs and precip ces. So that however t may be mistaken, the end of law is t t bolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarg freed m. For ll the sta es of cre ted beings, cap bl f laws, where there is n law there no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint nd len from others, whi h cann t be where ther is no law and is not, as we ar told, l berty f every man to d what h lists." For who could be free when every ther man humou mi ht domineer over him. But liberty t d spose nd order freely as he lists his person, ti ns, possessions, and his whol property within the al lowance f those law under hich h is, nd therein not to be sub ect to th arb trary will of another but freely f Low his own.

form the mind, and govern the ctions f th ir yet ignorant nona till reason shall tak its place and ease them f that trouble, is what the hildren want, and the parents are bound to For God ha i gi en ma an understanding t direct his ctions, has allowed him freed m of will nd liberty of cting as properl bel nging thereu o w thin the bou ds f that law h is under But whilst h is n estat where he has no understand f his own to direct his will, he is not to ha e n will f his own to f l low He that understands for him must w ll for him too he must prescribe t his will, and regu late his ctions, but when h comes th esta that mad his father free man, th son is a free man too.

59. This holds in all the laws man is under whether natural or civil. I man under th law of N ture Wha mad him free f that law? what ga e him free disposing of his property according to his own will w thin the compass of that law I answer a estat wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law that so h might keep his acti ns w thin the bounds of it. When he has cquired that state, he is pre sumed to know how far that law is to be his guid and how far he may make use of his free dom, and so comes to ha e it till th n, some body lse must guid him, who is presumed to know how far the law allows a l berty If su h a tat of reason, su h an e of discretion mad him free th same hall mak hi son free too Is a man under th l w f En land? what mad him free of that law—that is t ha e th l berty t dispose of his a tions and possessions, ccord ing to his own will, withi th permission of that law cap city f knowing that law Which is supposed, by that law t the e of twenty-o nd n some cases soo er If this made the f ther free t hall mak the son free too Till then, we see the law allows th so t ha e no will but he is t be gu ded by the will of his f ther or guard ia wh is t understand for him. And if th

understanding th law takes car to d t som other must govern him and be will t him till he hath ttained t stat of freed m, d his understand n be fit t tak th governme t of his will. But af er that the father and son are equall f ee as much as tu or and pupil after nonage equall sub ects of t same law tog th- er w thout any dominion left in the f ther over the l Liberty or estat of his son, whether they be only in th tat and under th law of N ture or under the pos ti e laws of a estab- lished governme t.

60. But if throu h d fects that may happen out of the ordinary course of N ture any on comes n t t such degree of reaso wher in h m ht be su posed capabl of know n th l w nd so l w thin th rules of he is never capabl f be free man, h is ever l loose t th disposure of his own will because he knows no bounds t t, has not understandin its proper guid but is conti ued under th tui ti n nd governm t f thers all the time his own understa ding is incapabl of that harge And so lunatics and idi ts are ever set f ee f om the government f their pare ts Children who are not as t com unto those years whereat they may ha and innocents, which are ex cluded by natural d fect fr m ever ha ing Thirdly Madmen, which, for th present ca not possibly ha e th use f ght reason to gu d

themselves have for their guide the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them to seek and procure their good for them says Hooker (*Eccl Pol* lib 1 s 7) All which seems no more than that duty which God and Nature has laid on man as well as other creatures to preserve their offspring till they can be able to shift for themselves and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority

61 Thus we are born free as we are born ra tional not that we have actually the exercise of either age that brings one brings v ith it the other too And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together and are both founded on the same principle A child is free by his father s title by his father s understanding which is to govern him till he hath it of his own The freedom of a man at years of discretion and the subjection of a child to his parents v h lst yet short of it are so con sistent and so distinguishable that the most blinded contenders for monarchy by right of fatherhood cannot miss of it the most obsti nate cannot but allow of it For were their doc trine all true were the right heir of Adam now known and by that title settled a monarch in his throne invested with all the absolute un limited power S r Robert Filmer talks of if he should die as soon as his heir were born must not the child notwithstanding he were never so free never so much sovereign be in subjection to his mother and nurse to tutors and gover nors till age and education brought h m reason and ability to govern himself and others? The necess ties of h s l fe the health of h s body and the informat on of l s m nd v ould require him to be d rected by the v ill of others and not his own and yet w ll any one th nk tl at this re straint and subjection v ere inconsistent with or spoiled him of that liberty or sovere gnty he had a right to or ga e a ay his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it If anybody should ask me when my son s of age to be free I shall an sv er just wl en his monarch is of age to govern But at hat t ne says tl e judicious Hooker (*Eccl Pol* lib 1 s 6) a man may be sa d to have attained so far forth the use of reason as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws

mine

62 Commonwealths themselves take not ce of and allow that there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty or allegi ance or other public owning of or submission to the government of their countries

63 The freedom then of man and liberty of acting according to his own will is grounded on his having reason which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty before he has reason to guide him is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free but to thrust him out amongst brutes and abandon him to a state as wretched and as much beneath that of a man as theirs This is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children God hath made it the r business to employ this care on their offspring and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this pov er to apply it as His wisdom designed it to the children s good as long as they should need to be under it

64 But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their offspring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father whose pov er reaches no farther than by such a d sci pl ne as he finds most effectual to give such strength and health to the r bodies such vigour and rectitude to their minds as may best fit his ch ldren to be most useful to themselves and others and if it be necessary to his condition to make them v ork when they are able for the r own subsistence but in this power the mother too has her share v ith the father

65 Nay this power so little belongs to the fa ther by any pecul ar r ght of Nature but only as he is guardian of h s ch ldren that v hen he qu ts h s care of them he loses his pov er o er them vh ch goes along with their nourishment and education to v hich it is nseparably an nexed and belongs as much to the foster father of an exposed ch ld as to the natural father of another So little pov er does the bare act of be gett ng give a man over h s ssue if all his care ends there and this be all the t tle he l ath to the name and authority of a fathe And what v ill become of th s paternal po e in that part of the wo ld v here one v oman hath more than one husband at a t me? o in those parts of America here hen the husband and wife part v h ch happens frequently the ch ldren are all left to the mother follo her a d are wholly under her care and provi o And if tl e father d e v h lst tl e ch ldr n a e young do they not naturally e ery here owe the same obed

ence t their mother durin th ir minor ty as to t ir father were he al And will an n say that th mother hath l gislati e po er over her children that he can mak sta d g rules whi h shall be of perpetu l bl g ti by hich t ey ou ht t regul t all th c cerns f their property and bou d th ir liberty all th course of their l es, and nf rce th bserva tion of them w th cap tal punishm ts F this is the proper power f t magistr t f whi h the f ther hath not so m ch as th hadov His command over his childr n is but t mporary and eaches not their lif or p perty It is but a help to the weakness and mperfect n of th ir age disciplin necessary t th ir educa tion. And thou h f ther ma dispose of his own possessi as as h p eases when h s children are out f da er f perishing for want, yet his power ex ends t th li es or goods whi h either the own industry or an ther s bo ty has mad theirs no t their liberty ther when they ar nce arr ed to th nfranchise

mother and el t his w f

66 But thou h ther be tim wh child comes to be as free fr m subjecti to th w ll nd command f h f ther as h himself f ee fr m subjecti t the w ll f bod lse and they ar both under o other estrain but that hich is common to th m both, th t be th law f N ture or muni pal l w f th ir cou try yet this f eed m ex mpts t son from that h nour which h ou ht, by th law f God and N ture t p y his par ts, God ha g mad the par ts nstrume ts in His great design f co tin in th ce f mankind and the occasi ns f l f th ir hildr n. As H hath laid on th m an bl u t ourish p serv and brin p their ff p g so H has laid on th child perpetual bligati f honouring their par ts, which, containi in t an ard es eem and evere ce to be hown by all outward xp ess ns, ties p th child from anything tha ma er injur or ff t, d turb or nda ger th happ ess or lif f those from whom h ece ed his, nd es him al actions f d fence reli f assistance and comfort f those b whose means h ntered to bei g and has been mad cap bl f any joyments of life. From this bligati no a

n freedom, can bsol e children. But thi is ery far from gi ing parent a power of com mand over th ir childr n, or an authority to make l w and d pose as they pl ase f th r li es or l berties. It i one thing t owe ho our respect, gratitude a d assi tance another t re quire absolut obed nce d subm ss n

m t.

67 Th subject of mi places th f ther a t mporary government wh ch termi nates w th th minor ty f the child a d the h our d from a child places in the parents

po ers which th father hath, in the r ht of tu ti n, durin minority and the right f h our all his lif may perhaps ha e caused great part f th mistakes about thi matter For t speak prope l of them, th first f these is r ther th p ilege of hildren d duty f parents

from taki care f t. And though th power of commandi nd hasti g them go along w th

cess is seld m o th sever side, th tr g b as

them as man hastens his son (Deut. 8 5) — w th t nderness nd affecti n nd k pt th m und n severer disciplin than what was bsol t ly best for them, and had been less kind ness, to ha slackened. This is that power to which hildren ar comma ded bedi nce that the pains d care of th ir parents may n t be increased or ill rewarded.

68. On th ther sid ho our and support all that whi h gr titud eq ires t return for th be fits rece ed by and fr m th m is th ndis pensabl duty f th child and the proper pri lege f th parents This is tended f th parents d antag as th ther is for the child s

though education the parents duty seems to have most power because the ignorance and in firmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction which is a visible exercise of rule and a kind of dominion And that duty which is comprehended in the word honour requires less obedience though the obligation be stronger on grown than younger children For who can think the command Children obey your parents requires in a man that has children of his own the same submission to his father as it does in his yet young children to him and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father s commands if out of a

I is education belongs so to the father that it terminates at a certain season When the business of education is over it ceases of itself and is also alienable before For a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands and he that has made his son an apprent ce to another
of a grea
and to h
the other part remains nevertheless enti e to them
ble
can
can u scharge his son from honou ing her that bore him But both these are very far from a pov er to make laws and enforcing them with penalties that may reach estate liberty limbs and life The power of commanding ends with nonage and though after that honour and respect support and defence and v hatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to for the h ghest benefits he is naturally capable of be al ays due from a son to his parents yet all this puts no sceptre into the father s hand no so ere gn pov er of commanding He has no dominion over his son s property or actions no any right that his will should presc ibe to his son s in all things hov ever it may become his son in many th ngs not very inconvenient to him and his family to pay a deference to it

70 A man may ov e honour a d respect to an anc ent or v ise man defence to his ch ld or fr end relief and support to the d stressed and gratitude to a benefactor to such a degree that all he has all he can do cannot suff ciently pay it But all these give no author ty no right of making lav s to any one over him from v hom they are owing And it is pla n all this is due not to the bare title of father not only because as has been said it is owing to the mother too but because these obligations to parents and the degrees of what is required of children may be varied by the different care and kindness trouble and expense is often employed upon one child more than another

71 This shows the reason how it comes to pass that parents in societies v here they them selves are subjects retain a power over their children and have as much right to their sub-jection as those who are in the state of Nature which could not possibly be if all political pov er were only paternal and that in truth they were one and the same th ng for then all pa ternal power being in the prince the subject could naturally have none of it But these two po vers political and paternal are so perfectly distinct and separate and built upon so differ ent foundations and given to so different ends that every subject that is a father has as much a paternal po ver over his children as the prince has over his And every prince that has parents owes them as much filial duty and obedience as the meanest of his subjects do to theirs and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dom mon v hich a prince or magistrate has over h s subject

7 Though the obligat on on the parents to bring up the r children and the obligation on children to honour their parents contain all the power on the one hand and submiss on on the other which are proper to th s relation yet there is another pov er ord narily in the father whe eby he has a tie on the obed ence of his children v hich though it be common to him v th other men yet the occas ons of shov ing it almost constantly happening to fathers in the r pr ate famil es and in nstances of it elsev here being are and less taken notice of it passes in the v orld for a pa t of paternal jurisdiction And this is the po ver men generally have to bestov the r estates on those who please them best The possess on of the father being the ex pectation and inher tance of the children ord narily n c rta n propo t ons ccording to the law and custom of each country yet t is com monly in the father s pov er to bestov it with a more spar ng or l beral ha d ccord ng as the behaviour of this or that ch ld hath comported v ith h s v ll and humour

73 Th s s no small tie to the obed ence of children a d there be ng always annexed to the enjoyment of land a subm ss on to th gov ernment of the country of wh ch that land s a pa t t has been commo ly supposed that a fa ther could oblige his poste ity to that go ern

ment of which he himself was subject, that his compact held them whereas, t being only ecessary conditio annexed t th land wh ch is under that governm t, re ches only those ho will take t o that co ditu and so s n ural ti or engagement, but oluntary submissio for every man s hildren being by Na

under But if they will joy th nh tance of their ancestors, they must tak t th same erms their ancestors had t, and submit t all the conditions annexed to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers bli e th ir childre bedi ce to themsel es even hen they ar past minority and most comm nl too, subject them to this or that pol ti al power B t either of these by an peculiar ht f f ther hood, but by th reward they ha e in their hands to enforce d ecompense such a compliance and is n more power than hat Frenchman has over an Englishman, who, by the hopes of an estat h will l e him, will certainly ha e stro ti n his bedi ce and if h t is left him, h will jov t, h must certainly tak t po the cond tions annexed to the possessio of land n that country where it lies, whether t be France or England.

4. T conclud then though th father s power of commandin ex ends farther than the minority of his children, and o degree only fit for the discipline and go ernm t f that e and thou h tha h nour and espect, and all that which th Latins called p ty hich they indispensabl owe to th ir parents all their lifetime, and all esta es w th all that pport and defence is d t th m, gi es the f her no power of governm — makin la s and exacting penalties on his childre though by this he has d mi over th property or actions of his son, et t is by ous t co ce e how asy t was, in the firs ges f the world and in places still where th thinness f peopl gi es families lea to separ t in unpossessed quarters, and they ha e room to mov and plant themsel es in et acant habitati ns, for the father f the famil become th prince of h had been ruler from the beginnin of

I is no improbabl pinion, therefore which the arch-philosopher was f, That th hief person in every household was al ays, as were king so hen umbers f households joined themselves in l societies oether kings were th first kind of governors mong them, hich is also as seemeth, the reason why the name f fathers con-

likeliest t should by th express or tacit consent f th childr n, be in th f ther her t seemed w thout any change barely to conti ue And when, ndeed n thing more was required t t than th permitting th father to exercise al ne his famil that ecuti e power of the la of N tur which every free man aturally hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a m archical power whilst th y remained in t, B t that this was not by an paternal r ht, but nl by th conse t f his children, is evid nt fr m hence that nobod doubts but if a tran er whom chance or busi ess had brou ht to his family had ther killed an of his childr n or committed any ther ct, he might cond mn and put him to death ther wise ha e punished him as well as an of his children, which was mposs bl he should do by irtue of an paternal thority over on who was n t his child but by irtu f that execu ti e power of the law of N ture which as man, h had ri ht t and h al could punish him in his family here the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such power to gi e way t the dignity and uth ty th y were willin should remain in him bove the rest f his family

5. Thus t was easy and almost natu al f r childre by tac t d almost natural conse t, to mak wa for th f ther thority and government. Th had been ccustomed their childhood to f ll his directi n, and t refer their littl differe ces to him and wh n they wer men, ho was fitter to rul th m. Their littl p perties and less cov tousness seld m afforded greater controversies and wh n any should arise wher could they have fit er umpire than he by whose car they had ev ry o been sustained and brought up and wh had a

in ed stil in them, who f fathers were mad rulers as also the ancien cust m f go ernors t

tenderness for them all? It is no wonder that they made no d stinction betwixt minority and full age nor looked after one and twenty or any other age that might make them the free disposers of themsel es and fortunes when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage The government they had been under during it continued still to be more their protection than restraint and they could nowhere find a greater security to their peace liberties and fortunes than in the rule of a father

76 Thus the natural fathers of families by an insensible change became the politic monarchs of them too and as they chanced to live long and leave able and worthy heirs for several suc cessions or otherwise so they laid the founda tions of hereditary or elective kingdoms under several constitutions and manors according as *chance contr vance or occasions happened to* mould them But if princes have their titles in the father s right and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political author ity because they commonly were those in whose hands e find *de fact* the exercise of govern ment I say if this argument be good it ill as strongly prove that all princes nay princes only ought to be priests since it is as certain that in the beginning the father of the family was priest as that he was ruler in hi own house hold

Chap VII *Of Political or Civil Society*

77 God having made man such a creature that in His o n judgment it was not good for h m to be alone put him under strong obligat ons of *necessity convenience and inclinat on to drive* h m into society as ell as fitted him with un derstanding and language to continue and en joy t The first soc ety was bet een man and w fe hich gave beginn ng to that bet een parents and children to hich in time that between master and servant came to be added And though all these might and commonly d d meet together and make up but one family here n the master or m stress of it had some ort of rule proper to a family each of these or all together came short of polit al soc ety as e shall see if e consider the different ends ties and bounds of each of these

78 Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact bet een man and woman and thou h it consist chiefly in such a co nmun on and right in one another s bodies as is necessary to its ch ef end procreation yet it dra s ith it mu tual support and assistance and a commun on of interests too as necessary not only to unite their care and affection but also necessary to their common offspring who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them till they are able to provide for themselves

79 For the end of conjunction bet een male and female being not barely procreation but the continuation of the species this conjunction be twixt male and female ought to last even after procreation so long as is necessary to the nour ishment and support of the young ones ho are to be sustained by those that got them till they are able to shift and provide for them elves This rule which the infinite ise Maker hath set to the orks of His hands e find the inferior crea tures steadily obey In those vivaporous animals which feed on grass the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation because the teat of the dam bein *sufficient to nourish the young till it be able to* feed on grass the male only begets but concerns not himself for the female or young to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts lon er be cause the dam not being able ell to subs st her self and nourish her numerous offspring by her own prey alone (a nore laborious as ell as more dangerous ay of li ing than by feeding on grass) the ass stance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common fan ily hich can not subsist till they are able to prey for them selves but by the joint care of male and female The san e is observed in all birds (except some domestic ones here plenty of food excuses the cock from feed ng and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest the cock and hen continue mates till the youn are able to use their ings and prov de for them selves

80 And he ein I think lies the cl ief if not *the only reason hy the male and female in* mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures— iz because the female is cap able of concei ing and *de f ct* is commonl with child aga n and brings forth too a ne

d

to him f on h s par nts I reby the father ho is bound to take care fo those he hath begot is under an obligation to co t n e in conjugal so- ciety ith the same o nan lo ger than other c eatu es ho young be ng able to subs st of

ni ersary season summons them again to choose

new mates. Wherein cann t but admir th wisd m f th great Cr tor who, ha ing gi en to man an bility to la up for th f ture as well as supply the p esent ecessity hath mad it nec essary that society f man and if should be more lasting than of mal and f mal amo gst ... m ht be

frequent sol tions of conj al soci ty would mi tl disturb.

8 But though these ar ties upon mankind hich mak th co ugal bo ds mor firm and lastin man than th other spec es of an mals, yet t would give reason quir why this compact, where procre ti nd ed catio ar secured and inher ta ce tak car f may not be mad d ermin b ther by consent, or t certain tim or po certa conditi ns as well as y ther olu tary compa ts, there be g necess ty th natur f th thing or to the ends f t, that t should alwa s be for lif —I mean, t such as ar under restraint of any posi e law which ordains all su h co tr cts to be perpetual.

8 But th husband nd w f though they ha e but one comm n co cern, yet ha ing dif ferent understandings, will una o dably sometimes ha e different wills too It ther fore being necessary that th las d terminati (i e th ru) sh uld be placed somewhere, t naturally falls to th man shar as th bler and th stronger But this, rea hi g but to th th gs f their common in erest and property lea es th if in th full and tru possess on f what by co tract is her peculiar ght, and at least gi es the husband no mor power over her than she has over his lif th power f the husband be g so far f om that f an bsol m narch that th wi has, in many cases, l berty to separ t from him where tural right or th ir co tract allow t, whether that co tr t be mad by themsel es th state f N tur b t cust ms or la of the country they li e in, nd th children, pon such separ ti n, fall to th father or m th er lot as su h co tract does d ermine.

83. F all th nds of marriage bein to be btained under poli government, as well as in the state f N tur the ci il magistrat d th n t br dge th right or power f ther naturally necessary to those nds— iz., procreati n and mutual support and assistance whilst they are to ther but nly decides any controversy that may arise between ma and wif bout them. If wer therwise, and that bsol t sover nty and power of lif and death naturally bel ged t the husband nd were ecessary to th soc et between ma and w f there could be no matr mo y any of these cou tries where the husband is allowed no such bsol t author ty B t th e ds of matrimony equ ri g no such power the husband it as n t t all necessary t it The conditi f conj l society put t n t him but hatsoever mi ht consist w th p ocre ti n and suppo t of the children till they could shift f th msel es—mutual ssi tance ...

which t is made.

84. Th soci ty betwe t parents and children, and th distinct r ghts and powers be g r specti l to th m, I ha tr ted f so larg ly in th foregoing chapte that I hall n t here eed to say anythi g of t and I think t is plain that t is far different fr m a politic society

85. Master and servant are names as old as history but gi en to those f far different co diti for a free man makes himself servant to an ther by selli g him for a certain time the ser ce he undertakes to do exchange for wages he is t recei e and though thi commo ly p ts him to th f mily of his master and und r the ...

wh being captı es taken in a just war are by the right f Natur subjected t th absol t domini n and arbitrary power of th masters. These men ha in , as I say forfeited their l es and with t, their liberties, nd lost their estates, and being in th tat f sla ery not cap bl of any property can ot in that tate be cons dered as any part f ci il soci ty the chief end where of is the preservatio of p perty

86 Let us ther for consider a master f family w th all these subo dinate lati ns f wife, children servants d sl es, united und th d mest rule of famil with what esemblance soever t may ha e in ts order ffices, and umber too, w h littl commo alth yet is ery fa from t both n ts constitution, power and d if t must be tho ght mon archy nd th p terfamilias th bsol te m n arch in t, bsolut m narchy will ha but ery shattered and short power when t is plain by what has been said befor that the master of th f mily has ery distinct and differently lim

ited power both as to time and extent over those several persons that are in it for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family and his power as paterfamilias as great whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family who has but a very limited one over every individual in it But how a family or any other society of men differ from that which is properly political society we shall best see by considering wherein political society itself consists

87 Man being born as has been proved with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature equally with any other man or number of men in the world hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that is his life liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offence deserves even with death itself in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it But because no polit cal society can be nor subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property and in order thereunto punish the offences of all those of that society there and there only is political soc ety where every one of the mem

tion to the law established by it And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded the commun ty comes to be umpire and by understanding indifferent rules and men authorised by the commun ty for their execution decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concern ng any matter of right and punishes those offences which any member hath comm tted against the society with such penalties as the law has established whereby it is easy to d scern

peal to with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders are in civil society one with another but those who have no

Nature

88 And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by any one that is not of it (which is the power of war and peace) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society as far as is possible But though every man entered into society has quitted his power to punish offences against the law of Nature in prosecution

the magistrate he has given up a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it which indeed are his own judgments they being made by himself or his representative And herein we have

committed within the commonwealth and also by occas onal judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact how far injur es from without are to be ind cated and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need

89 Wherever therefore any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executi e power of the law of Nature and to resign it to the public there and there only is a political or civil soc ety And this is done wherever any number of men in the state of Nature enter into society to make one people one body pol tic under one supreme government or else when any one joins h mself to and incorporates with any government al eady made For hereby he autho ises the society or which is all one the legislati e thereof to make la s for him as the public good of the soc ty shall require to the execut on whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due And this puts men out of a state of Nature into that of a commonwealth by sett ng up a judge on earth with authority to determine all the contro ers es a d redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the common ealth which judge is the legislati e or magistrates appointed by it And wherever there are any number of men however assoc ated that ha e no such decisive power to appeal to there they are still in the state of Nature

90 And hence it is evident that absolute mon

arch which by some me is cou ted f r th

t such an th ty to ppeal to u u any differ n between th m th e those pe sons are till in th stat f N tur And so is ery bsol te p ince in espect f those who are under his d min n.

91 For h be g supposed to ha all both legislat and executi power himself alo e, there is n j dg to be f d ppeal l es open to any wh may fai ly and indiff tly d w th th ty decid d f om wh ce e l f and edress may be expected f any injury or cy that may be suff ed f m him, or by his der So th t su h man however itled Czar or G d S gn ho you pl ase is as much th tat f N tur with all der his d m as h is w th th est of mankind. F wherev y n m ar who ha tanding l d mm j d t p- peal to earth f th d terminati f co trovers es f ght betwixt th m, th they are still in th tate f N tur and under all th in co enencies f t, w th nly th woeful diff ence to th subject, or ther sl f an absol t prince. That whereas th ordinary stat f

N tu e h has a l berty to j dge of his r ght, c co ding to the best f his powe t mainta n it but wh ever his pr pe ty s ded by the w ll a d o der f his m arch he has ot o ly no ppeal as th se soc ety ought to have but, as if h r d graded f om the comm tat of r ti al cr tures, s den ed a l berty to judge of or def d h s ght d so s xposed to all th misery d con e ces th t a man can f ar f m o e wh being in th unrestrai ed tat f Natur i y t corrupted w th flattery a d armed w th pow r

92 Fo h that th ks absol t power pu fies me blood a d co rects th base ess of hu man nature eed r d but th h t ry of this, or any ther age t be co vinced t th co trary H that wo ld ha been insol nt and jur ous in the woods f Amer ca would t p bably be

Fo wh t th p tect f absol t m narchy is what ki d ff thers of th ir cou tr es t makes p inces t be, and t wh t a d gree f happ ness d secu ty t carr es ci il soc ty whe e this sort f gover ment is gr wn t perfect o he that w ll look i t the late relati f Ceyl n may eas ly se

93 I bs l t m na h es, deed s ell as th r g nm ts of th w ld th subjects ha e appe l t th law d j dges to dec d a y co tr ers es, and estrai y l ce that may happe betwixt the subj ts th msel es, o e mon st a th Thi ery th nks neces- ary a d bel eves h deser es t be thought declared emy t soc ty d manki d ho h uld g bo t to tak t w y B t wh th r thi be f m tr l f manki d d soc ty and such a har ty as w o e all t th ther is aso t d bt F thus no mo tha whate ry ma wh l es h wn powe p f t, gr tness may a d tur lly must d keep those animal f m hurt g destr ying ne ther wh l bour and dr dg nly f his pl asur and d tag and so ar tak n care f t out f y love th mast has f them, but lov of himself d th p fit th y br g

Th p blic power f ll soc ty is bo e every soul co tained in th sam soci ty d h p in pal use f that power is t gi laws t ll th t ar under which laws in h cases we must bey nless there be aso h w d wh h may necessarily enforce h th law f aso f God doth join h co trary Hook *Ec l P l* 6

T tak way all su h m ual gr eva es in juries, d wro gs— h as d m in h ta f N ure, there was way but nly by growing in compos io d greeme t mo gst h —

ffered they migh be d f nd rs f h msel es They knew tha however men may seek h ir own

d termin p oc d in main nance thereof in as m h as every ma is t wards hims lf d

ited power both as to time and extent over those several persons that are in it for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family and his power as paterfamilias as great whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family who has but a very limited one over every individual in it But how a family or any other society of men differ from that which is properly political society we shall best see by considering wherein political society itself consists

87 Man being born as has been proved with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature equally with any other man or number of men in the world hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that is his life liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offence deserves even with death itself in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it But because no political society can be nor subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property and in order thereunto punish the offences of all those of that society there and there only is political society where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded the community comes to be umpire and by understanding indifferent rules and men authorised by the community for their execution decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society with such penalties as the law has established whereby it is easy to discern who are and are not in political society together Those who are united into one body and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders are in civil society one with another but those who have no such common appeal I mean on earth are still in the state of Nature each being where there is no other judge for himself and executioner which is as I have before showed it the perfect state of Nature

88 And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by any one that is not of it (which is the power of war and peace) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society as far as is possible But though every man entered into society has quitted his power to punish offences against the law of Nature in prosecution of his own private judgment yet with the judgment of offences which he has given up to the legislative in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate he has given up a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it which indeed are his own judgments they being made by himself or his representative And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society which is to judge by standing laws how far offences are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth and also by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact how far injuries from without are to be vindicated and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need

89 Wherever therefore any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of Nature and to resign it to the public there and there only is a political or civil society And this is done wherever any number of men in the state of Nature enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government or else

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execution whereof his own assistance (as to h s

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a true controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it And wherever there are any number of men however associated that have no such decisive power to appeal to there they are still in the state of Nature

90 And hence it is evident that absolute mon

96 For when any number of men ha e, by the consent of e ery indi d al, made commun ty they have th by mad that community o body w th pow er t a t as body wh ch s only by th will nd d terminat on f th ma jority For that which a ts any c mmunity be only th consent f the indi d als of t, and t bein on body must mov way t is ec essary th body should mov that way whither th greater f ce carries t, which th consent f th major ty or lse t is mposs bl t h uld r t co un e ne body community which

power f the whol

97 And thus every man by conse tin w th thers to make body pol ti u der e gov ernment, puts himself under an blig ti to ev ery one f that soci ty to submit t th d ter minati f th maj ty and to be concl ded by t or lse this original comp t wher by h th thers incorpor tes int soci ty would signify nothing and be comp ct f h be l ft f ee and nder th ties than h was in be

h ma submit himself and nse t any ts of t if h thi ks fit.

98 For if th consen f th major ty hall not in ason be recei ed as th t f th wh le, nd co cl d ery nd vid al thi g but the consent f every d dual ca mak anything to be th t f the wh l which, cons derin th infirmities f health and ocati ns f bus ness, which in n mber though much less than that of commonwealth will ecessarily keep ma w y from th publi ssembly and th var ety of opinions and trar ty f t est which na o d bly happen in all collecti ns f men, is t imposs bl ever to be had. And ther fore, if coming in soci ty be po such terms, t will be only lik Ca o coming t th the tre *ta..m at n et S h* cons tu as this would mak the mighty leviatha f

shorter duratio than th feeblest creatures and not l t t outlast th d y it was born in which cann t be supposed till we can thi k that ra tional cre tures should des r and constitut so cieties nly to be dissol ed. For h e the ma jority ca not concl d the rest, there th y can n t act as ne body and consequently will be

stood to gi up all th power ecessary ds f hich th y u te t soci ty to the ma

did o could gi e beginning to any l wful g v ernment in th world

100 To this I find two bjecti ns mad 1 That ther are n insta ces to be fou d in tory f company f me ind pend t and equal am gst an ther that met together and in this way bega and set up governm t. It is imposs bl f ht that m n hould d so be cause all m n, bein bo under governm t, they ar to submit to that and are not t l berty to begin a new

f soci ty n soo er b ou ht any number of th m tog ther but th prese tl un ted d n corpor ted f they designed to co tinue to ther And if w may n t ppose m ever to ha e bee th stat f N ture because w hear n t m ch f th m such tat we m y as well suppose th armies of Salmanasser Xerxes e ever children because h ar l ttl f them till th y wer men and mbod ed armies. Go me t is erywh antecede t t ec ords, and l tters seldom om in am est peo pl till l ng co tin ti n of ci il soc ty has, by th mo cessary arts p ov ded for their saf t ease, d plenty And th they begi t look after th history f th f unders and search into th ir or ginal wh n they ha outli ed th memory f t. For t is w th commo wealths as

him For if it be asked what security what fence is there *in such a state against the violence and* oppression of this absolute ruler the very ques tion can scarce be borne They are ready to tell you that it deserves death only to ask after safe ty Betv ixt subject and subject they will grant there must be measures laws and judges for their mutual peace and security But as for the ruler he ought to be absolute and is above all such circumstances because he has a power to do more hurt and v rong it is right when he does it To ask how you may be guarded from *or injury on that side where the strongest hand* is to do it is presently the voice of faction and rebellion As if v hen men quitting the state of Nature entered into society they agreed that all of them but one should be under the restraint of laws but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of Nature increased with pow er and made licentious by impunity This is to think that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes but are content nay think it *safety to be devoured by lions*

94 But whate er flatterers may talk to amuse people s understandings it never hinders men from feeling and v hen they perceive that any man in what station soever is out of the bounds of the civil society they are of and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm they may receive from him they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature in respect of *him whom they find to be so and to take care* as soon as they can to have that safety and secur ity in civil soc ety for v hich it v as first insti tuted and for which only they entered into it And therefore though perhaps at first as shall be shov ed more at large hereafter in the fol lowing part of th s d scourse some one good

their differences by a tac t consent devol ed in to his hands without any other caut on but the assurance they h d of his uprightness and w s dom yet when time giving author ty and as some men v ould persuade us sacredness to cus toms v hich the negligent *and unforeseeing in* nocence of the first ages began had brought in *successors of* another stamp the people finding their properties not secure under the government as then it v as (v hereas go ernment has no other end but the preservation of property) could nev *er be safe nor at rest* nor think themselves in civil society till the legislative v as so placed in collective bodies of *men call them senate par* liament or what you please by which means

ed nor could any one by his own authority avoid the force of the law v hen once made nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption thereby to license his ov n or the mi carriages *of any of his dependants No man in civil society* can be exempted from the lav s of it For if any man may do what he thinks fit and there be no appeal on earth for redress or security a ainst any harm he shall do I ask v hether he be not perfectly still in the state of Nature and so can be no part or member of that civil society un less any one v ill say the state of Nature and civil society are one and the same thing v hich I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm [1]

Chap VIII *Of the Beginnin of Political Societies*

95 Men being as has been said by nature all free equal and independent no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the polit cal power of another v ithout his ov n consent which is done by agreeing v ith other men to join and unite into a commun ty for their comfortable *safe and peaceable l ving one amon st anoth* er in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against any that are not of it Th s any number of men may do because it in jures not the freedom of the rest they are left as they were in the l berty of the state of Na ture When any number of men have so con sented to make one commun ty or *government* they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic v here n the majority have a right to act and conclude tl e rest

go n g b t ll perm tted unt th wisdom a d disc t on wh l w e to rul t ll by e per

[1] *Ecl Pol* 10
C l l be g th ct of the wh l bod pol t d tl the f o errul e ch ver l p t f *th sam body Hook r b d*

tm together there t s not to be doubted but they used th ir n tural freedom to set p him whom they j dged th blest and most l ke l t rule well over th m. Conformabl her un to e find the peopl f Amer ca, who—li ing out f the reach f th co qu g swords and spreading dominau f the two great mpires of Peru d Mexico—enj ed th ir own nat ural freed m, thou h *teris paribus* they m monly prefer th h r f th ir deceased kin y t, f they find him any w y w ak incapabl — h d set up th toutest and

is ec o ld, ly find —

t

soci ty who wh they are us ... ted might set p what f rm f governme t they thought fit. B t this ha g gi occas n to men to mistak and think that, by N ture, *governm t was m narchical* and bel ed to he m her cons der

plain that th easo that co tinued ... f governme t in sin l perso was n t any gard or espect t p ternal utho ty since all petty monarchies—that is, almost all m narchies, near their or al ha been comm nly t least po occasi lecti e.

107 First, th th beginni g f things, the f ther governm t f th hildhood f those spru g from him ha ing cus med th m to th rul of one man and ta ght th m that wher t was exercised w th car and skill with affec tion and lov t those und t, was sufficient to procure and preserv m (all th pol tical happ ess they sough f soc ty) was no wonder that th y should p tch pon and natur ally ru into that *form* f gov rnm t which, fr m their inf ncy they had bee all ccust med to, and which, by per ence th y had found both asy and saf T which if we add that monarch bei g simpl and most bv ustom whom either xper ence had instru ted in forms of government, or th ambiti or insol ce of empire had taught t bewar f th encroa h ments f prerog ti or th incon eni cies f bsol te power which monarchy in successi n, was apt t la claim to and bring upon th m it was n t at all strange that th y should not much trouble th msel es to think of methods of re str ni g any b tances of those to wh m th y had gi en the a th ty er th m, and f bal ancin th powe f go ernm nt by placing se ... h ds. Th y had ne

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fr dship tog ther d some ti us ... other they could not but ha greater appre hensi ns of thers than f ne an th r and theref th first car and thought cann t but be supposed to be, how to secure themsel es gainst for gn f rce. It was natural for th m t put themsel es under fr m of government which might best serve to that e d and choose th wisest and br est man to co d t th m in —

pl and mo ey g m n temptati n t n larg th ir possess ns f land co est for w d er exte t of ground ar l ttl more than g e als f th ir armies and thou h th y command bsolut ly in war y t t h me and in tim of pe ce they exe cise ery little d mini d — ... h eso

sol uth ty

109. And thus, in Isra l tself th chi f bus ness f th ir judges and first ki gs seems t ha e been to be captains in war and lead rs f th ir armies, which (besides what is signified by go-

with particular persons they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies and if they know anything of it they are beholding for it to the accidental records that others have kept of it And those that we have of the beginn g of

no

plain instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned or at least have manifest footsteps of it.

102 He must show a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact when it agrees not with his hypothesis who will not allow that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection And if Josephus Acosta s word may be taken he tells us that in many parts of America there was no government at all There are great and apparent conjectures says he that these men [speaking of those of Peru] *for a long time had neither* kings nor commonwealths but lived in troops as they do this day in Florida—the Cheriquanas those of Brazil and many other nations which have no certain kings but as occasion is offered in peace or war they choose their captains as they please (lib 1 cap 25) If it be said that every man h

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thought it has been already proved but be that as it will these men it is evident were actually free and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them they themselves claimed it not but by consent were all equal till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors and forms of government

103 *And I hope those who went away from* Sparta with Palantus mentioned by Justin will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another and to have set up a government over themselves by their own consent Thus I have given several examples out of history of people free and in the state of Nature that, being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth And if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that governments were not nor could not be so begun I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone than urge it against natural liberty for if they can give so many instances out of history of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at least an argument from what has been to what should of right be of no great force) *one might without any great danger yield them* the cause But if I might advise them in the case they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments as they have begun *de facto* lest they should find at the foundation of most of them something very *little favourable* to the design they promote and such a power as they contend for

104 But to conclude reason being plain on our side that men are naturally free and the examples of history showing that the governments of the world that were begun in peace had their beginning laid on that foundation and were made by the consent of the people there can be little room for doubt either where the right is or what has been the opinion or practice of mankind about the first erecting of governments

105 I will not deny that if we look back as far as history will direct us towards *the original* of commonwealths we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man And I am also apt to believe that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself and continued entire together without mixing with others as it often happens where there is much land and few people the government commonly began in the father For the father having by the law of Nature the same power with every man

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wer ly likely to submit to his punishment and all join with him against the offender in their turns giving *him thereby power* to execute his sentence against any transgression and so in effect make him the lawmaker and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family He was fittest to be trusted paternal affection secured *their property and interest under* his care and the custom of obeying him in their childhood made it easier to submit to him rather than any other If therefore they must have one to rule them as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father unless negligence cruelty or any other *defect of mind or body made him unfit for it?* But when either the father died and left his next heir—for want of age wisdom courage or any other qualities—*less fit for rule* or where several families met and consented to con

f ture ces, would retai and ncrease th pow er without doing the busi ess for which it was gi n, and aided by flatt ry tau ht princes to ha e distinct and separate interests from th ir peop e, men found t n cessary to xami m re carefully th original and ri hts f government, and to find out w ys to estrain th b tances nd p event th buses f that pow which they ha ing entrusted in n ther s hands, nly for th ir own good they f und was made use f to hurt th m.

1 2 Thus w may se how probable t is that peopl that were naturally f e, and by th ir own conse t, ther submitted to th govern ment f th ir fath united tog th out f differ t families, to make governm nt, hould g ally put th rul into on man s hands, and choose to be under th co d ct f a singl pe son, w thout so m ch, as by xp ess cond ti ns, limitin or regulating his pow r which they thou ht saf him his h e ty and prud nce though they ev dreamed f m narchy bein *jur Divino* which we nev h ard of amo g man kind till t was re al d us by th divinity f this last ge, nor allowed p t rnal pow to have ri ht to d mi on or t be th foun dation f all governm n And thus much may suffice t show that, as far as w ha any light from history w ha reaso to co cl d that all peaceful begin ings f government ha been la d in th consent f th peopl I say peace ful, because I shall h e occas n, in ther place to speak f co q est, whi h som est em w y f beginnin f gov rnments.

Th the bj ctı I find urged gainst the beginning f polities, in th way I ha men tioned is thus, viz.

13. "That all me being born und govern ment, som or th t is impossibl any of th m should ever be f ee and t l berty t unit together and begi ew e, or be bl to erect lawful gov rnme If this argument be good I ask, How came so many l wful mon archies in the world For if anybody upon this suppos tion can show me any o man, y g f th wo ld free to begin lawful mon archy I will be bound to show him t th free me t l berty t th same tim to unit and begi new governmen und a regal or

any ther form. It being dem nstrati that if any born und r the domini n of anoth r may be so free as to have a r ght to command others in new and distinct empir e ery one that is born under the domini n of an the may be so free too and may become a rul or subject of a distinct separat governm t. And so ... pr cipl e ther ll men how law o ld ely to ha as ly

o their ... s in th bj tion to show that t sam difficulties that t doth those they use t gainst, y t I shall nd a our to disco er the w akness of this argum nt a littl farthe

All men, say they are born under govern ment, and th ref th y can ot be at l berty t begin a new one. E ry o e is born a subject t his fath r his prince and is th fore und r th perpetual ti f subj ti n and allegiance It is plain mankind nev owned consid red any such n tural subjecti n that th y wer born in, t ne r to th other that tied th m, w th out th ir own conse ts, to subjection to th m and th ir h irs.

1 5. F th ar n xamples so f eq t in history both sacred and profan as those of men w thdr wing themsel es and th ir obed ence from th jurisdi ti they were born under and th family or community they were bred up in, and setting up new gov rnments n ther places, from wh nce sprang all that umber of petty com mo wealths in th beginning f ges, and which always multiplied as l g as th re was room nou h, till th stro more fortunat swal ... n

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p ernal sover gnty and plainly p ua t was n t th natural ght f th father desce d ing to his heirs that made gov rnm nts in the beginning since t was mposs ble, upon th t ground th hould ha be n so many littl kingdoms but only uni ersal monarchy if men had not been t l berty to separ te them sel es from their families and their government, be what t will that was set up n t, d go and make distinct commo wealths and th r g ernme ts as they thought fit.

6 This has been th pra tice f th world from ts firs beginnin t this day nor is t now any more hindrance t th fr ed m f mankind

remed d d indeed bu increase th sore which t hould have cured They saw that live by ne ma will becam th cause f all m misery This constrained them come un laws wherein ll men migh see their duty beforeha d and know h penal ies f transgressing th m. Hooker *Eccl. Pol.* L. o.

ing out and in before the people which was to march forth to war and home again at the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephtha The Ammonites making war upon Is rael the Gileadites *in fear send to Jephtha a* bastard of their family whom they had cast off and article with him if he will assist them *against the Ammonites to make him their ruler* which they do in these words And the people made him head and captain over them (Judges 11 11) which was as it seems all one as to be judge And he judged Israel (Judges 12 7)—that is was their captain general— six years

ered you out of the hands of Midian (Judges 9 17) Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general and indeed that is all is found in his history or in any of the rest of the Judges And Abimelech particularly is called king though at most he was but their general And when being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel s sons the children of Israel desired a king like all the nat ons to judge them and to go out be fore them and to fight their battles (1 Sam 8 20) God granting their desire says to Sam uel I will send thee a man and thou shalt anoint him to be capta n over my people Israel that he may save my people out of the hands of the Phil stines (ch 9 16) As if the only busi ness of a king had been to lead out their armies and fight in their defence and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him declares to Saul that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over his nheritance (ch 10 1) And therefore those who after Saul be ng solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah were unwilling to have him their king make no other objection but this How shall this man save us? (ch 10 27) as if they should have said This man is unf t to be our king not having skill and conduct enough in war to be able to defend us And when God re

His own heart and the Lord hath commanded him to be capta n over His people (ch 13 14) As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general and therefore the tribes who had stuck to Saul s fam ly and op posed David s reign when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him they tell him amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king that he was in effect, their king in *Saul s time and therefore they had no* reason but to receive him as their king no

Also say they in time past when Saul was *king over us thou wast he that leddest out and* broughtest in Israel and the Lord said unto thee Thou shalt feed my people Israel and thou shalt be a captain over *Israel*

110 Thus whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth and the fatherly au thority being continued on to the elder son every one in his turn growing up under it tacitly submitted to it and the easiness and equal ty of it not offending any one every one acquiesced till time seemed to have confirmed it and settled a right of succession by prescription or whether several families or the descendants of several families whom chance neighbourhood or bus iness brought together united into society the need of a general whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age such as are almost all those which begin governments that ever come to last in the world gave men one of another made the first beginners of commonwealths gen erally put the rule into one man s hand with out any other express limitation or restraint but what the nature of the thing and the end of gov ernment required It was g ven them for the pub lic good and safety and to those ends in the in fanc es of common ealths they commonly used it and unless they had done so young societies could not have subsisted Without such nursin fathers without this care of the governors all go ernments would have sunk under the weak ness and infirmities of their infancy the prince and the people had soon perished together

111 But the golden age (though before va n amb tion and *amo s ler tus h bend* evil con cupiscence had corrupted men s m nds into a m stake of true po er and honour) had more virtue and consequently better governors as well as less vicious subjects and there as then no stretching prero ati e on the one s de to oppress the people nor c nsequently on the other any dispute about priv lege to le s n or restrain the po er of the mag strate a d so no contest be twixt rulers and people about go e nors or gov ernment Yet when amb t on and luxury in

his nitn himself thereunto annexes also and s bmits to the commun ty those possessi ns hich he has, or shall cquire, that d n t alr dy be lon to any ther government. F r t would be a direct contradi tion for any o to enter to soc n w th others for th securin and egu l d

ton f that governm nt and th property f th land is subject. By th same ct, therefore, wher by any unites his person, which was bef free t any comm alth, by th same h unites his possess ns, which wer befor free to t also and they be come, both of them, person and possess n, subject to th governm nt and d mini n f that commonwealth as l g as t hath being Who ever therefore, fr m thenceforth, by inher tance purchases permission or therwise enjoy any part of th land so annexed to, and under th government of that comm nweal, must tak t w th th co ditı t is under—that is, of submittin t th government of th comm wealth, under whose jurisdicti n t is, as far forth as any subject f t.

ı B t since th government has direct l d and eaches th

men so that whenever th ov n w ıtas g en nothi g but such tacit consent to the go ernment will by d natı n, sal or therwise quit th said possessi n, h is t liberty to g and incorpor t himself in any th common alth, or agree w th th rs to begin new e *vacuus locis* in any par f th world they can find free and unpossessed wh as h that has once by actual greement and any exp ess dec lar tion gi en his conse t to be f y comm n weal, is perpetually and indispensably bliged to be, and emain unal er bly subject to t, and can ever be a in th liberty f th state of N ture, unless by any calamity th gov ernmen h was und comes to be dissol ed.

B submitting th law f any coun try l g qui tly and joyin pr il ges and pr tectı und them, makes t man m m ber of tha soci ty is nly local p tectı n nd homag d to and f m all those who, not bei g in tat of war come within the territor ies belonging to any governme t, all parts whereof th force of ts law extends. B t this no more makes a man a member f that soci ty a perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than t would make a man subject to an ther n whose family h f nd t con nient to b de for some time, th ugh, whilst he continued n t, he were bliged t comply w th the laws and submit to th go ernm nt he f und there. And thus e see that f eign rs, by l ing all their li es under an ther government, and e joying th p i il ges and p otecti n f t, though they are bound, even in consci n e to submit t ts administrati n as far f th as y deni en yet do n t thereby come t be subjects members of that commo w alth. Nothin can mak any man so but his actually e tering into t b positi e enga m t and e p ess promise and comp ct. This is that which I think, concernin the beginning of political soci ties, and that consent which makes any o e a member of any commonw alth.

Chap IX Of the Ends f Politic l Society a.d G ernment

123 I man in the state f N ture be so free as has been said if h be absol t lord of his own person and possessions, equal to th greatest and subject to body why will he part w th his freed m, this mpir and subject himself to the d mini nd co trol f any ther power To which t is bv ous t answer that though n th state f N tur h hath such a ght, yet th en joyment f t is ery u certain and constantly exposed to th in as n f others for all being kings as much as h every man his equal and th greater part n strict bservers f equity and justice, th enjoyment f th property he has in this tate is ery unsaf ery insecure. This makes him willin t quit this cond tion which, how ever f e is full f fears and continual dangers and t is t w thout easo that h seeks t and is willing t j in in soci ty w th thers who ar already united, ha e a mind t unit f th mutual preserv ti n f their li es, liberties and estates, which I call by th general nam — pr perty

1 4. Th gr t and chi f end, theref re, of men uniti g into commonwealths, nd p tti g th msel es under governm nt, is th preserv ti f th ir property t which in th state f N tur ther are many things wanting

Firstly ther wants an established, settled known law ece ed and allowed by common consent to be th standard f ght and wro g and th comm measur t decid all co tro ersies betwee th m. F though th l w f N tur be plai and intelligible to all ti nal cr tures, yet men, being biased by their inter

that they are born under constituted and ancient polities that have established laws and set forms of government than if they were born in the woods amongst the unconfined inhabitants that run loose in them For those who would persuade us that by being born under any government we are naturally subjects to it and have no more any title or pretence to *the freedom of* the state of Nature have no other reason (bating that of paternal power which we have already answered) to produce for it but only because *our fathers or progenitors* passed away *their natural* liberty and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government which they themselves submitted to It is true that whatever engagements or promises any one made for himself he is under the obligation of them but cannot by any compact whatsoever bind his children or posterity For his son when a man being altogether as free as the father any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son than it can of anybody else He may indeed annex such conditions to th [illegible]

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sessions which were his father s because that estate being his father s property he may dispose or settle it as he pleases

117 And this has generally given the occasion to the mistake in this matter because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but under the same terms his father did by becoming a member of the society whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established as much as any other subject of that commonweal And thus the consent of free men born under government which only makes them members of it being given separately in their turns as each comes to be of age and not in a multitude together people take no notice of it and thinking it not done at all or not necessary conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men

118 But it is plain governments themselves understand it otherwise they claim no power over the son because of that they had over the father nor look on children as being their subjects by their fathers being so If a subject of England have a child by an Englishwoman in France whose subject is he? Not the King of England s for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it Nor the *King of France s* for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away and breed him as he pleases and whoever was judged as a traitor or deserter if he left or warred *against a country for being barely* born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then by the practice of governments themselves as well as by the law of right reason *that a child is born a subject of no country nor* government He is under his father s tuition and authority till he come to age of discretion and then he is a free man at liberty what go er

[illegible] it is evident there is no tie upon him by *his father* being a subject *of that kingdom* nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors and why then hath not his son by the same reason the same liberty though he be born anywhere else? Since the power that *a father hath* naturally over his children is the same wherever they be born and the ties of natural obligations are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths

119 Every man being as has been showed naturally free and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power but only his own consent it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man s consent to make him subject to the laws of any government There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case Nobody doubts but an express consent of any man entering into any society makes him a perfect member of that society a subject of that government. *The* difficulty is what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent and how far it binds—*i e* how far any one shall be looked on to have consented *and thereby submitted to any government where* he has made no expressions of it at all And to this I say that every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government *doth hereby give his tacit* consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as any one under it whether this his possession *be of land to him and his heirs for* ever or a lodging only for a week or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway and in effect it reaches as far as the very being of *any one within the territories of that government*

1 0 To understand this the better it is fit to consider that every man when he at first incor*porates himself into any commonwealth* he by

Chapter X Of the Forms f a Comm nwealth

132. The majority ha ing as has been howed upon men s first un ting int society th wh le hem may th ing g ver r of making law into th ha ds of w se men, and their heirs or su cessors, and then t is an o garchy or else into th hands f o e man and then t is monarchy if to him and his heirs, t is hereditary m archy if to him only for lif but po his death th pow er only f nominating successo t tur t th m, an elective monarchy And so cco dingly of these make compou ded and mixed forms f govern ment, as they think good And if th legislatu e power be t first gi by th major ty to o more persons only for th ir li es, or any limited time and then th sup eme power to evert to them gain, wh t is so everted th commu nity may dispose of t gain anew int what hands they please and so constitut a ew form of government for th form of governm t depending po th placin th sup m pow er which is th legislatu t being imposs bl to concei that an infer or power should prescribe to superior or any but th suprem mak laws, ccording as th pow er f makin laws is plac ed, such is th f rm f th comm wealth.

133 By commonwealth I must be under stood all along to mean no democr cy or any form f government, but any ind pendent com munity which th Latins signified by th word as, to which th word which bes answers in our langu ge is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such soci ty f men which community" does n (for ther may be subordinate communities government) and city m ch less. And ther fore, t o d am biguity I cra e lea e t use th word com monwealth in that sense, in wh ch sense I find th word used by King James himself which I think to be ts genuine signification, which, if anybody dislike, I consent with him t chang t for better

Chap XI Of the Extent f the Legisl e Power

134. T e great end of men enteri g soci ty being th enjoyment f their properties in peace nd saf ty and the grea instrum t d means of that being th laws established in that soci ty the first and fundamental positive law f ll comm nw alths is the establishing f th mental la nd) of nly every perso in t This legis wealth, but th supr m power f th comm wealth, but sacred and unalter ble th hands where the community ha e o ce placed t Nor can any edict of anybody lse in what f rm soever con cei ed, by what power soever backed ha e th f ce and bligation f a law which has n t ts sancti n from that legislat which th public has chosen and ppo ted for w thout this th la could n t ha e that which is absol tely ecessary to ts be ng a la the conse t of th soci ty o e whom n body can ha e power to make laws but by the own consent and by uthor ty rece ed from them and therefore all h h by the most sol mn ties

any f gn pow whatsoev r or any d mestic subordinat power d scharge any member f th soci ty fr m his obed ence to the legislatu e cti g pursuant t th ir trust, nor obli him to any bedience contrary to the laws so enacted or farther than they d allow it being diculous to imagin can be tied ultimat ly to bey any power in th soci ty which is n t th su preme.

135. Thou h th legislatu e, whether placed in o or more, wh ther t be alw ys in being or nly by intervals, though t be th sup em power in every commo wealth, yet, first, t is n t, nor can poss bly be, bsolut ly arb trary over th

Th lawful power f making laws t command whol politic soci es f men belonging so properly un th same entire societies, that for any prince pot ta f what kind soeve po earth exercise th same f himself, and no by express commission immediat ly d personally rece ed from God, or lse by hor y d ri ed th first from their consent pon whose persons they impose la t is no bet er than mere tyranny Law they are not, therefore which p blic pproba hath no mad so Hooker *Ibid* o.

Of this point, therefore we ar t not that such men naturall ha e no full and perfect power command whol poli ic multitudes f men, theref re tterly witho our conse t we could in su h sort be t no man ommandment living And be commanded, we do consent

est as well as ignorant for want of study of it are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases

125 Secondly in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences according to the established law For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature men being partial to themselves passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases as well as negligence and unconcernedness make them too remiss in other men s

126 Thirdly in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right and to give it due execution They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous and frequently destructive to those who attempt it

127 Thus mankind notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of *punishing the transgressions of others* make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government and therein seek the preservation of their property It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them and by such rules as the community or those authorised by them to that purpose shall agree on And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves

128 For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty *he has of innocent delights* a man has two powers The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature by which law common to them all he and all the rest of mankind are one community make up one society distinct from all other creatures and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men there would be no need of any other no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community and associate into lesser combinations The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law Both these he gives up when he joins in a private if I may so call it or particular political society and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind

129 The first power—viz of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require which laws of the *society in many things confine the liberty he had* by the law of Nature

130 Secondly the power of punishing he wholly gives up and engages his natural force which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature by his own single authority as he thought fit to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require For being now in a new state wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour assistance and society of others in the same community as well as protection from its whole strength he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty in providing for himself as the good prosperity and safety of the society shall require which is not only necessary but just since the other members of the society do the like

131 But though men when they enter into society give up the equality liberty and executive *power they had in the state of Nature* into the hands of the society to be so far disposed of by the legislature as the good of the society shall require yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society or legislature constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good but is obliged to secure every one s property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth is

right judges who are to decide controversies by those laws and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws or abroad to prevent or redress foreign i

of the people.

had a liberty to defend their right against th in ines of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain t, wh ther invaded by a sin l man or many in combination. Whereas by sup- posing they ha e given up themsel es t th b- sol arbitrary power and will f a legislator they ha e disarmed themsel es, and armed him to mak prey of them when he pleases h be- ing in m ch worse condition that is exposed to the arbitrary power of on man who has the command of hundred thousand than h that is exposed t the arbitrary power f a hundred thousand s men, n body be n secur that his will wh has such a command is better than that of ther men, thou h his force be hundred thousand times stronger And ther fore, what ever form the commonwealth is under the rul ing power o ght to govern by declared and re- cei ed laws, and n t by ex mpo ary di ta es [illegible]

men w h the join power of multitud to u them to bey t pleasur the exorb tant and un limi ed decrees of their sudd n thou hts, or u restrained and till that m m t, unknown wills, without ha ing any measures set down which may guid and justify th ir ctions. For all the power the government has, bein onl for th good of the society as t ought n t to be arbi trary and t pleasure so ough t be exercised by established and promul ed laws, that both the peopl may know their d ty and be saf and secure w thin th limits of the law and th rulers, too kept w thin their due bounds, and not be empted by th power they ha e in their hands to employ t purposes, and by such measures as they would n t ha e known, and own not willi ly

38. Thirdl th supreme power cannot tak from any man any part of his property w thout his own consent. For the preservation of proper ty bei g t end f government, d tha for which men en er in soci ty t ecessaril sup- poses and equires that th peopl should ha e property w thou which they must be supposed to lose that by entering into soci ty which was the end for which they entered to too gross an bsurdi y for any man to own. Men, there fore, in society having property they ha e such n h the goods, which by the law f th commun ty are theirs, tha body hath right to tak them, or any part of them, from them without their own consent w thou this they ha e no property t all. For I ha e trul no property in that which another can by right tak from me when h pleases gainst my consent. Hence t is a mistake t think that th supreme or legisla ti power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of th estates of the subject arbitraril or tak any part of them at pleasure This is not much t be f ared in governments wher th legislat e consists wholly or in part in assemblies which ar ariable whose m m bers upon th dissol tio of th assembly are sub- jects under the common laws f their country equall w th th rest. But in governments where the legislat is in lasting assembly always in bein or in ne man as in bsolute monarch es, there is danger still that they will think them sel es to ha e distinct interest from the rest of th commun ty and so will be pt to increase th ir own ches and po er by taking what they think fit from th people. For a man s property is n t t all secure though there be good nd equ tabl laws t set th bounds of t between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects ha po er to tak from any pri at man what part he pl ases of his property and use and dispose of t as he thinks good.

39. But government, nt whosoever h nd t is put, being as I ha e before shown, e trusted with this cond tion, and f this end, that m n mi ht ha e and secure their properties, the prince or senat however t ma ha e power t mak laws for th regul tin of property between th subjects on amongst an ther yet can ever ha e a power t tak to themsel es th wh le or any [illegible]

that reason and confined to those ends which required t in some cases t be absolut we need look no farther than the common pra tice of martial discipl e. For th preservati n f the army and in t f the whol commonwealth e quires an bsolut obedience to th command f every super or fficer and t is justly death t disobey or dispute th most dangerous or un ason bl of them but yet we see that ne ther th sergeant that could command a soldier t march p to th mouth of cann n, or stand a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to gi e him one pen y f his money nor th general that can condemn him t death for deserting hi post, or n t bey ing the most desper t orders, cann t yet w th all his bsol power of lif and death dispose f one farthing of that soldier estate, or seize one jot of his goods whom yet he can command

lives and fortunes of the people For it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is legislator it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they entered in to society and gave it up to the community For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself or over any other to destroy his own life or take away the life or property of another A man as has been proved cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another and having in the state of Nature no arbitrary power over the life liberty or posses sion of another but only so much as the law of Nature gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind th s is all he doth or can give up to the commonwealth and by it to the legislative power so that the legislative can have no more than this Their power in the ut most bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society [1] It is a power that hath no other end but preservation and therefore can never have a right to destroy enslave or designedly to impoverish the subjects the obligations of the law of Nature cease not n society but only in many cases are drawn closer and have by hu man laws known penalt es annexed to them to enforce their observation Thus the law of Na ture stands as an eternal rule to all men legisla tors as well as others The rules that they make for other men s actions must as well as their own and other men s act ons be conformable to the law of Nature—*i e* to the will of God of which that is a declarat on and the fundamen tal law of Nature be ng the preservation of man kind no human sanction can be good or val d against it

Tw found t ons th e a wh ch b up publ oc et es th on a n t al m l n t n whe by all men d sir oci bl lif and f llow sh p the oth an der p essly o sec tly

136 Secondly the legislati e or supreme auth ority cannot assume to itself a pow er to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the sub ject by promulgated standing law s [2] and known authorised judges For the law of Nature being unwritten and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men they w ho through passion or interest shall miscite or misapply it cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge and so it serves not as it aught to determ ne the rights and fence the properties of those that live under it especially where every one is judge interpreter and e e cutioner of it too and that in his own case and he that has right on his side having ordinarily disorder men s properties in the state of Nature men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties and may have stand ing rules to bound it by w h ch every one may know what is his To this end it is that men give up all their natural pow er to the society they enter into and the community put the legislati e power into such hands as they think fit with this trust that they shall be governed by declared laws or else their peace quiet and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it w as in the state of Nature

137 Absolute arbitrary pow er or governing w ithout settled standing law s can neither of them cons st w ith the ends of society and government which men w ould not quit the freedom of the state of Natu e for and tie themselves up under were it not to p eserve their l ves libert es and fortunes and by stated rules of right and prop *erty to secure their peace and quiet* It cannot be supposed that they should intend had they a po er so to do to gi e any one or more an ab solute arbitrary power o er their persons and estates and put a force into the mag strate s hand to execute his unlimited w ill arbitrarily upon them this ere to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature w here n they

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To onst in men to nything ncon en ent doth em unreasonabl *Ib d* i. 10

tion of it. So that under this consideration the whole community is one body in the state of Nature in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.

46. This, therefore, contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.

47. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are parts of it, the other the management of the security and interest of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive, and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good. For the laws that concern subjects one amongst another being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth.

48. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons. For both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands, or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons that might act separately whereby the force of the public would be under different commands, which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.

Chap XIII Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth

49. Though in a constituted commonwealth standing upon its own basis and acting according to its own nature—that is, acting for the preservation of the community there can be but one supreme power which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all power given with trust for the attaining an end being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve

sequ ... the means ... to ... and arbitrary dominion of another whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a power to part with and to rid themselves of those who ... this fundamental, sacred and unalterable law of self-preservation for which they entered into society. And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power but not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved.

50. In all cases whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme power. For what can give laws to another must needs be superior to him, and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and every member of the society prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all other powers in any members or parts of the society derived from and subordinate to it.

51. In some commonwealths where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is vested in a single person who has also a share in the legislative there that single person, in a very tolerable sense, may also be called supreme not that he has in himself all the supreme power which is that of law making but because he has in him the supreme execution from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or at least, the greatest part of them having also no legislative superior to

anything and hang for the least disobedience Because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his power—viz the preservation of the rest but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it

140 It is true governments cannot be supported without great charge and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it But still it must be with his own *consent—i e the consent of the majority* giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority and without such consent of the people he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself?

141 Fourthly The legislative cannot transfer *the power of making laws to any other hands* for it being but a delegated power from the people they who have it cannot pass it over to others The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth which is by constituting the legislative and appointing in whose hands that shall be And when the people have said We will submit and be governed by laws made by such men and in such forms nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them nor can they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to make laws for them

142 These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society and the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative power *of every commonwealth in all forms of government* First They are to govern by promulgated established laws not to be varied in particular *cases* but *to have one rule for rich and poor* for the favourite at Court and the countryman at plough Secondly These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the *good of the people* *Thirdly They must not raise* taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or their deputies And this properly concerns only such governments where *the legislative is always in being* or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies to be from time to time chosen by themselves Fourthly Legislative neither must nor can *transfer the* power of making laws to anybody else or place it anywhere but where the people have

Chap XII *The Legislative Executive and Federative Power of the Commonwealth*

143 The legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it Because those laws which are constantly to be executed and whose force is always to continue may be made in a little time therefore there is no need that the legislative should be always in being not having always business to do And because it may be too great temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make and suit the law both in its making and execution to their own private advantage and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community contrary to the end of society and government Therefore *in well ordered commonwealths where the good* of the whole is so considered as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons who duly assembled have by themselves, or jointly with others a power to make laws *which* when they have done being separated again they are themselves subject to the laws they have made which is a new and near tie upon them to take care that they make them for the public good

144 But because the laws that are at once and in a short time made have a constant and lasting force and need a perpetual execution or an attendance thereunto therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being which should see to the execution of the laws that are made and remain in force And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated

145 There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call natural because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society For *though in a commonwealth the members* of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another and as such are governed by the laws of the society yet in reference to the rest of mankind *they make one body which is, as every* member of it before was still in the state of Nature with the rest of mankind so that the controversies that happen between any man of the *society with those that are out of it are managed* by the public, and an injury done to a member of their body engages the whole in the repara

they should exercise the power of makin l ws, either at certain set times, or wh n there is need of t, when they are hindered by an force from hat is so necessary to the society and wherein the safety and preservation of the people con sists, the peo ha e ri ht t remove t by force In all sta es and cond tions the true remed of force w thout thority is to oppose force to t. The use of force w thout uthor ty always puts him that uses t into a sta of ar as the aggressor and renders him liabl to be treated accordingly

156. The power of assemblin nd dismissing the legislat e placed in the executi e, gi es not the executive s eriority over t, but is fid ciary trust placed in him for the sa ty of the peo in a case wher t uncertainty nd ar ableness of human ffairs could not bear st ady fixed rule. For t not bein possibl that the first framers of the governmen should by an fore- s ht be so much masters of future events as to be ble to prefix so just periods of eturn and duration t the assembl es of th legislat e in all times t come that might exa tl answer all the exigencies of the commo wealth, the best remed could be found for this d fect was to trust this to the prudence f one who was alwa s to be present, and whose business t was to watch over the public good. Constant, frequent meet ings of the legis ti e and l g conti uations of their assemblies, w thou necessary occasion, could but be burdensom to the peopl and must necessarily in time prod ce more dan er ous incon eniences, and et th quick turn of affairs mi h be sometimes such as to need their present help an d lay f th ir con ening might endanger the publi and som times, too, th ir business mi h be so gre t that th limited time f he no hoer for her work.

community from being exposed som time or other to imminent hazard on one sid or the other by fixed intervals and periods set to th meeting and cting of th legislat e but to en- trust t to the prudence of som who, being pres- en and acquain ed with the sta of public af fairs, migh mak use of this prerogative for the public good? And where lse could this be so well placed as in his hands who was entrusted w th the execution of the laws for th sam end? Thus, supposing the regulation of times for th assembling and sitting of the legislati e not set tled by the original constitution, t naturall f ll into the hands of the execut e not as an arbi trary power depending on his good pleasure but w th this trust alwa s to ha e t exercised only for the public eal as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whe her settled per ods of their con ening, or a liberty l ft to the prince for con oking the legislat e or perhaps mixture of both hath the l ast in- con enience ttendin t, t is not my business here to inquire but onl to show that, thou h the executi e power may ha e the prerogati e of con oking and dissolv g such con entions of the legislati e et t is not thereby superior to t.

157. Things o this world are in so consta t a flux that nothi g remains long n the same stat Thus people, riches, trad power chan e thei stat ns flourishin mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in time neglected desolat corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow t pop- ulous countr es filled w th wealth and inhabit ants. B t things not always changing equall and pri ate in erest often keeping up customs and pri ileges hen the reasons of them are ceased, t of en comes to pass that in governme ts where part of th legislat e consists of represen tati es chosen by th peopl that in tract of tim this representation becomes ery unequal and disproportionat to th reasons t was t first established upon. T what gross bsurd ties the followin of custom when reason has left it ma lead, we may be satisfied when we see the bare name of a town, of hich there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much hous- ing as sheepcote or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found send as many represen tati es to the grand assembly of law-makers as whol county numerous peopl and power ful in riches. This strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remed though most think t hard t find one because th constitution of th legislati e being the orig inal and suprem ct of the soci ty antecedent to all positi e laws n t, and depending wholl on the people, no inferior power can alter t. And therefore the peopl when the legislati e

158. *Salus popul sprema lex* is certainly so just and fundamental rule, that he who sincerely f llows cannot dangerousl err If therefore the executi e who has the power of con oking the legislati e, observing rather the tru propor tion than fashion of representation, regulates not by old custom, but true reason, the number of

him there being no law to be made without his consent which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative *he is properly enough in this sense supreme* But

utor of the law made by a joint power of him with others allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law which when he violates he has no right to obedience nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law and so is to be considered as the image phantom or representative of the commonwealth acted by the will of the society declared in its laws and thus he has no will no power but that of the law But when he quits this representation this public will and acts by his own private will he degrades himself and is but a single private person without power and *without will the members owing no obedience* but to the public will of the society

152 The executive power placed anywhere but in a person that has also a share in the legislative is visibly subordinate and accountable to it and may be at pleasure changed and displaced so that it is not the supreme executive power that is exempt from subordination but the supreme executive power vested in one who having a share in the legislative has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and ac

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other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth we need not speak they being n h d ff rent

necessary to our present purpose we may take notice of concerning them that they have no manner of authority any of them beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them and are all of them accountable to some other power in the commonwealth

153 It is not necessary—no nor so much as convenient—that the legislative should be always in being but absolutely necessary that the executive power should because there is not always need of new laws to be made but always need of execution of the laws that are made When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws they make into other hands they have *a power still to resume it out of those hands* when they find cause and to punish for any maladministration *against the laws* The same holds also in regard of the federative power that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative which as has been shown in a constituted commonwealth is the

and so will as supreme naturally have the supreme executive power together with the legislative may assemble and exercise their legislative at the times that either their original constitution or their own adjournment appoints or when they please if neither of these hath appointed any time or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them For the supreme power being placed in them by the people it is always *in them and they may exercise it when they* please unless by their original constitution they *are limited to certain seasons or by an act of* their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time *and when that time comes they* have a right to assemble and act again

154 *If the legislative or any part of it be of* representatives chosen for that time by the people which afterwards return into the ordinary

at certain appointed seasons or else when they

limitations in respect of time —that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling according to due forms or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old or making of new laws or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies that lie on or threaten the people

155 It may be demanded here what if the executive power being possessed of the force of the commonwealth shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative when the original constitution or the public exigencies require it? I say using force upon the people without authority and contrary to the trust put in him that does so is a state of war with the people who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power For having erected a legislative with an intent

rogative, to the good or hurt of the people, will easil decid that questu

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mined in those po ts wh rein they t ur u cased vantage from t, and declared limitati ns f prerogat e in those cases wh h th y and th ir ancestors had l ft th utmost latitud t the wisdom of those p inces who mad ther b t a ght use of t—that is, for the good of th ir peop e.

63 And therefore they ha e a ery ro g notio of governm t wh say that th people ha e encroached upon th p rog u wh n they ha got any part f t to be d fi ed by posi t ulled

hands, to be reised f th ir good, was n t thing th y in ended him, when h used t ther wise For the d f governm t being the good f th community whatsoev alt u ns are made t nd g t tha nd cann t be an croachmen po anybody si ce n body n government t ca ha ght nding t any ther nd nd those nly ar croachm nts which pr judice hi d th p bli good. Those who say therwise speak as if th pri ce had distinct nd separat est from th good f the community and was t mad f t th oot and source from whi h spri almost all those evils and disord rs which happe n kingly governments. And ndeed, if tha be so the people nd his governme are t soci ty f rational creatures, tered community for their m tual good su h as ha e se rulers o th mselves, t guard d promot that good but are to be looked on as herd f infer or cre tures under the d minio f master who keeps them and works them for his own pl asure or profit. If men were so oid f reason and brutish as t t into society upon such terms, prerogat e might indeed be, what some m would ha e t, an arbitrary power to d things hurtful to th people.

R ce rational creature ca not be

h ps, think t e ther necessary o us t p ecis bounds to his power n all things) prerogati e can be nothi g but the people s permit tin their rulers to do se e al thi gs f their own free cho ce h r the law was s l t, and some times too aga nst th d ect l tt of the law for the public good and th ir acquiescing in it when so d For as good prince who mindful of th trust put into his ha ds and careful of the

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cas n to cl m th ir right and l mit that po er which, hilst t was exercised f th ir good they were co tent should be tacitl allowed.

165. And th fo h th t will look i to th hist ry of En land will find that p erogati e was al ys larg st in th h ds f our wise t and best p inces, because th peopl bservin th wh le t de cy f th ir cti ns to be the public good or if any human frailty o mi take (fo princes are but m made as oth rs) ppeared some small declinati ns fr m that end yet t was visibl the main f th ir condu t t nded to nothi g but th care of th p bl c. Th people theref finding reason t be satisfied w th these p ces

li good

66 S ch God lik pr ces, deed had some title to arb trary pow r by th t argume t that would prov bsol t m narchy the best g ernme t, as th t which God Himself g rns th un erse by because such kings partak f His isdom d good ess. Upon this is founded that saying That th ns f good princes ha e been alw ys most dangerous t the l bert f th ir peopl For wh n th ir success rs, man agi g th governm nt w th d f t thoughts, wo ld dr w th ti ns f those good rul rs into p eced t nd make th m th tandard f th ir prerogati e—as if what had been done only for

members in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented which no part of the peo ple however incorporated can pretend to but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative but to have restored the old and true one and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time had insensibly as well as *inevitably introduced for it being the inter* est as well as intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative whoever brings it nearest to that is an undoubted friend to and es tablisher of the government and cannot miss the consent and app obation of the community pre rogative being nothing but a power in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in sucl cases which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences certain and unalter able laws could not safely direct Whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the peo ple and establishing the government upon its true foundations is and always will be just pre rogative The power of erecting new corpora tions and therewith new representatives car ries with it a supposition that in time the measures of representation might vary and those have a just right to be represented which before had none and by the same reason those cease to have a right and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege which before had it It is not a change from the present state wh ch perhaps corruption or decay has introduced that makes an inroad upon the government but the ten dency of it to injure or oppress the people and to set up one part or party with a dist nction from and an unequal subject on of the rest What soever cannot but be acknowledged to be of ad vantage to the society and people in general upon just and lasting measures will alv ays when done justify itself and whenever the people shall choose their representatives upon just and un deniably equal measures suitable to the original frame of the government it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the soc ety v hoever permitted or proposed to them so to do

Chap XIV *Of Prerogative*

159 WHERE the legislative and executive power are in d stinct hands as they are in all moder ated monarchies and well framed governments there the good of the society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power For the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by la s for all that may be useful to the community the execu tor of the laws, having the power in his hands has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society in many cases where the munic pal law has given no direction till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it nay many things there are which the law can by no means provide for and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, *to be ordered by him as the public good and ad* vantage shall require nay it is fit that the la s themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power or rather to this fundamental law of Nature and government—viz that as much as may be all the members of the society are to be preserved For since many accidents may happen wherein a strict and ri id observa tion of the laws may do harm as not to pull down an innocent man s house to stop the fire when the next to it is burning and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law which makes no distinction of persons by an action that may deserve reward and pardon it is fit the ruler should have a power in many cases to mitigate the severity of the law and pardon some offenders since the end of government being the preservat on of all as much as may be even the guilty are to be spared where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent

160 This power to act according to discretion for the public good without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it is that which is called prerogative for since in some governments the law making power is not al ways in be ng and is usually too numerous and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execu tion and because also it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necess ties that may concern the publ c or make such laws as v ll do no harm if they are execut ed with an inflexible rigour on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in their way therefore there is a latitude left to the executive po er to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe

161 This power whilst employed for the bene fit of the commun ty and su tably to the trust

in the point or quest n ng of prerogative whilst it is in any *tolerable* degree employed for the use it was meant—that is the good of the people and not manifestly aga nst it But if there comes to be a question bet een the executive po er and the people about a thi g claimed as a p e rogative the tendency of the exerc se of such pre

not reach t all t the property of th child which is onl in his own disposin

Secondl political pow e is that power which every man ha in th stat f N ture has given up t the hands of th soci ty and therein to the governors wh m the society hath set over self w th this express or tacit trust, that hall be mployed for th ir good and the p eservation of th ir propert Now this powe which every man has in th tat of N ture and which he parts w th to the soci ty n all su h cases where th soci ty can secur him, is to use such m ans for the preserving f his own property as h thinks good and N tur allows him and t punish th bre ch f the law of N ture in th rs so as (cord to the best f his ason) may most con duce to the preservati n f himself and th rest of mankind so that th nd and m asur of this power when in every man hands, in the state of N ture, bein the preservation of all f his society—that is, all mankind in general— t can have no the nd or measur wh n th hands of the magistra but t preserv th members of tha soci ty n their li es, libe ties, and possessions, and so cannot be an bsolut arbitrary power over th ir li es and fortunes, which ar as much as poss bl o be preserved but a power to mak la s, and an such penalties t th m end th preserv ti n of the whol by

power has its or inal nl from pa agreement and th m tual consent f those who mak p th community

2 Thirdl despotical powe is an bsolute, arbitrary pow ne ma has ove th o tak away his li whenever h pl ases and this is powe which th N tur gi es, for t has mad no such distin ti n betwee man and another or comp ct can con ey For ma not ha e such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot gi e another man su h powe e t, b is th ffect nl f forf ture which th aggressor makes f his own lif when h puts himself into the stat f war w th anoth F ha ing quitted reason, which God hath gi n be the rule betwixt man and ma and the pe ce of w which that ches, and mad use f force compass his unjust ds po an h here he has no right, h rend rs himself liabl to be destroyed by his d ersary wh neve he can, as an her noxious and brutish cr ture tha is destructive t his being And thus captives, taken just and lawful war and su h only are subject to despotical power which, as

it arises n t from compact, so n ther is it capable of an but is th tate f war continued For what compa t can be made w th man that s not maste of his own lif What condition can — And if h be once allowed to be mas- — power

sla ery ceases, and n so e power nd puts an nd t the stat of ar wh ent rs nto conditi ns w th his captive

1 3 Natur gi es the first of th se— iz. p t pare ts for th benefit of th ir

derstood h re as t property which men ha e in th ir persons as ll as goods.) Vol tary agreem t gi es the sec nd— iz. political pow to go ernors, for th be fit f th ir subjects, to secure th m n th possessi n and use f their properties. And f f ture gi es th third—despotical power t l rds for th ir own be fit over those who are stripped f all property

1 4. He that shall consider the distinct rise and ext t, and th different nds f these sev al powers, will plainl see that paternal power comes as far short f that f th magistrate as despotical exceeds t and that bsol te d m n however placed, is so far from bein n kind of ci il soci ty that t as consist t w th t as sla ery is w th property P t rnal pow e is nl wh re min ty makes the child incapabl to manage his prope ty political h re men ha property n th ir own disposal and despotical ove such as ha n prope ty at all.

Chap XVI *Of Conquest*

1 5. Thou h governm nts can or ginally ha no th se than that before menti ned, nor polities be found d n anything but the consent of th peopl yet such ha e be n th disord rs ambi n has filled th world w th, that n the n ise f war which makes so gr t a part f the hi tory f manki d this consent is litl tak n n tice f and th fore many ha e mistak n th force f arms for th consent f th peopl and eck conqu st as f th originals f governme t. But conquest is as far from settin up any government as d m lishing hous is from buildi g new in th place. I deed t ften makes way for a new fram f comm n wealth by destroy g th f rm r but, w thout the consent of th people, can never erect a new on

the good of the people was a right in them to do for the harm of the people if they so pleased—it has often occasioned contest and sometimes public disorders before the people could recov their o

not to

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ety sho... ave a right to do the people harm though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good For prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule

167 The power of calling parliaments in England as to precise time place and duration is certainly a prerogative of the king but still with this trust that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation as the exigencies of the times and v

ing in

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which t ... aso ... the choice of these was left with the executive power as might be best subservient to the public good and best suit the ends of parliament.

168 The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of? I answer Between an executive power in being with such a prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening there can be no judge on earth As there can be none between the legislative and the people should either the executive or the legislative when they have got the power in their hands design or go about to enslave or destroy them the people have no other remedy in this as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth but to appeal to Heaven for the rulers in such attempts exercising a power the people never put into their hands, who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should rule over them for their harm do that which they have not a right to do And where the body of the people or any single man are deprived of their right or are under the exercise of a power without right having no appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment And therefore though the people cannot be judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and give effective sentence in the case yet they have reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind where there lies no appeal on earth by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men whether they have just cause to make their appeal to Heaven And this judgment they can not part with it being out of a man s power so to submit himself to another as to give him a liberty to destroy him God and Nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation And since he cannot take away his own life neither can he give another power to take it Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it and are weary of it and find a necessity to have it amended And this the executive power or wise princes never need come in the danger of and it is the thing of all others they have most need to avoid as of all others, the most perilous

Chap XV *Of Paternal Political and Despotical Power Considered Together*

169 THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before yet the great mistakes of late about government having as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together

170 First then paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them for the children s good till they come to the use of reason or a state of knowledge wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule whether it be the law of Nature or the municipal law of their country they are to govern themselves by—capable I say to know it as well as several others who live as free men under that law The affection and tenderness God hath planted in the breasts of parents towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government but only for the help instruction and preservation of their offspring B t

... anybody else ... keep the child in subjection to the will of his parents when grown to a man and the perfect use of reason any farther than as having received life and education from his parents obliges him to respect honour gratitude assistance and ...

not reach at al t th property of th child which is onl in his own disposing

Secondl political powe is that power which every man ha ing in the stat f Nature has given p into the hands of the society and therein to the governors whom the soci ty hath set over the w h this express or tacit trust that shall be employed for their good and the preservation f their property Now this power which every man has in the stat of N ture, and which h parts w th to the soci ty in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means for the preservin f his own property as he thinks good and N ture allows him and to punish the breach f the law of N tur in thers so as (cording to the best his reason) ma most conduce to the preservation f himself and the rest of mankind so that the end and measur of this power whe in every man s hands, in the stat of N ure being the preservation of all of his society—that is, all mankind in general— t can have no ther end or measure, whe in the hands of the magistra bu to preserve the members of tha soci ty in their li es, liberties, and possessions, and so cannot be an bsol te arbitrary power over their li es and fortunes, which a as much as possibl to be preserved but power to make laws, and annex such penalties t th m as may end to the preservation f the who by cutti ff those parts, and thos nl which are so corrup tha they are ten the sound and health w thou which no sever ty is lawful. And this power has ts original onl from compact and agreemen and the m tual conse f those who mak p the community

72 Thirdl despotical power is an bsol te arbitrary power one man has over another to tak awa his li whenever he p ases and this is powe which ne ther N tur gi es, for has mad no uch distinction between one man and another nor compact can con ey For man, not ha ing such a art trary power over his own li canno gi e another man uch power over t, b is the ffect on of forf ture which the aggressor makes of his own li when he puts himself the ta f war w th another For ha g qu ed ason, which God hath gi en be the rule betwixt ma and man, and the pe ce hi w s which that t aches, and mad use f force compass his unjust ends pon another where he has no rig t, he renders himself liabl to be destroyed by his adversary whenever he can, as an other noxious and brutish cre tur tha is destructi to his bei And thus captives, taken in just and lawful war and such onl are subject to despotical power which, as t arises not from compact, so ne ther is it capab e but is the state f war continued. For

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power and puts an nd to the sta o o
enters into conditions w th his captive.

3 N ture gi es the first f these— iz., paternal power to parents for the benefit of their

as
ood— iz., political powe to governors, for the benefit f th ir subjects, to secure them in the possession nd use of their properties. And for f ture gi es the third—despotical power to lords for their own benefit over those who are stripped of all property

4 H that shall consider the distinct ise and ext nt, and th different ends f these several powers, will plainly see that paternal power comes as far short f that of th magistrat as despotical exceeds t and that bsol dominion, however placed, is so far from being ne kind of ci il soci ty that t is as inconsistent w th t as sla ery is w th property P t rnal powe is only where minority makes the child incapab to manage his pr perty political where men ha e property in their own disposal and despotical over such as ha e n prope ty at all.

Chap XVI Of Conquest

1 5 THOUGH governments can originally have no other ise than that before menti ned, nor polities be founded on anything but the conse t of the peopl yet such ha been th disorders ambition has filled the world w th, that in th noise f war which makes so great a part f the history f mankind, this consent is littl taken notice f and, ther for many ha e mistak n the force of arms for the consent f the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals f governme t. But conquest is as far from setting p an ov rnme t as demolishing a house is from buildin new one in th place. Indeed, t o en makes way for new frame of a commo w alth by destroying the former but, w hout the consent of the peop can never erect new one

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the good of the people was a right in them to do *for the harm of the people if they so pleased*—it has often occasioned contest and sometimes public disorders before the people could recover their original right and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which truly was never so since it is impossible anybody in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good For prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule

167 The power of calling parliaments in England as to precise time place and duration is certainly a prerogative of the king but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation as the exigencies of the times and variety of occasion shall require For it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in and what the best season the choice of these was left with the executive power as might be best subservient to the public good and best suit the ends of parliament.

168 The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of? I answer Between an executive power in being with such a prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening there can be no judge on earth As there can be none between the legislative and the people should either the executive or the legislative when they have got the power in their hands design or go about to enslave or destroy them the people *have no other remedy in this as in all other cases* where they have no judge on earth but to appeal to Heaven for the rulers in such attempts exercising a power the people never put into their hands, who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should rule over them for their harm do that which they have not a right to do And where the body of the people or any single man are deprived of their right or are under the exercise of a power without right having no appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. And therefore though the people cannot be judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and give effect the sentence in the case yet they have reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind where there lies no appeal on earth by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men whether they have just cause to make their appeal to Heaven And this judgment they cannot part with it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another as to give him a liberty to destroy him God and Nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation And since he cannot take away his own life neither can he give another power to take it Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it and are weary of it and find a necessity to have it amended And this the executive power or wise princes, never need come in the danger of and it is the thing of all others they have most need to avoid as of all others, the most perilous.

Chap XV *Of Paternal Political and Despotical Power Considered Together*

169 THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before yet the great mistakes of late about government having as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together

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17 Seco dly pol tical pow r s that power h h every man ha th stat of N ture has gi e p into the hands of the soc ty and th in to th gov ors wh m th soc ty hath set ov tself w th this exp ess or tac t trust, that t shall be mploy d for th good a d the p es-

cording to th be t of h ason) may most con d ce to the preservati f himself and th rest of manki d so that th d d measur f this power wh ev ry man s hand n th tat of N ture, being the preserv ti f all f his so- ci ty—that is, all mankind in g al— t can ha the d measur whe the hands — —where

m ch as poss bl to be preserv d b t power to make laws, d ann ch penalt t th m as may t d to th p s rv t f th wh l by cu ting ff those parts and thos nly hich ar so corrupt th t they thr ten th sound d h al th thout wh h se ty l wful. And thus power has ts or n al nly f m comp t d agreem t and th m tual conse t f those wh mak p th mmu ty

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p eserv g t so that as soo as comp t ente s sl ery ceases and he so far quits his abs lut powe and p ts n d to the stat f war ho t t co d t o s w th hi capt e

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174 H that shall cons d r th distı t se and te t, and th diff r nt ends of th se se e al powe will plainly se that p t rnal powe com s as f h t f that f th magistr t as d pot cal ce d t d that abs l t d m hov pl ced is so far f m be g e ki d of c l ociety that t is as co ist nt w th t as sla ry s w th p pe ty P te nal pow r is ly wh m ty mak s th child cap bl t manag his p pe ty pol t cal he e m h p pe ty th ir own d sposal a d despotical o such as ha p pe ty t all

Chap XVI *Of C quest*

175 Tho h go nm ts can o ginally h e n th se than that befor m ntı d n r polit be f und d n anythi g but th cons t f th pe pl yet such ha be n th diso d s mb t has fill d th ld w th, that the oise f war which make so gr at a part f the h ry f mank d this conse t is littl tak n n tice of and th for ma y ha mistak n th f ce of arms f th consent f the pe ple and eek co q t as f th or ginals f gov rnm t. But co qu t is as far fr m s tting up any gov m t as d m lishing a h use fr m *building* n w the place I d d t ft mak way f n w fram f comm n ealth by destr y g th f rme but, w th ut th conse t f th pe ple, can er erect new one

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men given to their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war (for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and injustice that is committed in an unjust war any farther than they actually abet it, no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves or any part of their fellow-subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together but yet this alters not the right for the conqueror's power over the lives of the conquered being only because they have used force to do or maintain an injustice he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force all the rest are innocent, and he has no more title over the people of that country who have done him no injury and so have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other who, without any injuries or provocations have lived upon fair terms with him.

80. Thirdly the power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war is perfectly despotical he has an absolute power over the lives of those who, by putting themselves in a state of war have forfeited them, but he has no thereby right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries than say such an one conquered it, as if conquest, without any more ado conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the conquered not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering swords.

81. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon, yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war For whether by force he begins the injury or else having quietly and by fraud done the injury he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it, which is the same thing as at first to have done it by force it is the unjust use of force that makes the war For he that breaks open my house and violently turns me out of doors, or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does, in effect, the same thing supposing we are in such a state that we have no common judge on earth whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit, for of such I am now speaking It is the unjust use of force that puts a man into the state of war ... t ... n ... n ... es ... liable to be destroyed by him he uses it, as any savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being

82. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children who may be rational and peaceable notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father the father by ...

destruction, though, perhaps, he may have some right to them to repair the damages he has sustained by the war and the defence of his own right, which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered we shall see by-and by so that he that by conquest has a right over a man's person, to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it. For it is the brutal force the aggressor has used that gives his adversary a right to take away his life and destroy him, if he pleases, as a noxious creature but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man's goods for though I may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money and let him go this would be robbery on my side His force, and the state of war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. The right, then, of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war but not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received and the charges of the war and that, too, with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.

83 Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side as could be supposed, he has no right

176 That the aggressor who puts himself into the state of war with another and unjustly invades another man's right can by such an unjust war never come to have a right over the conquered will be easily agreed by all men who will not think that robbers and pirates have a *right of empire over whomsoever they have force* enough to master or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them Should a robber break into my house and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him would this give him any title? Just such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror who forces me into submission *The injury and the crime is equal whether com*mitted by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain The title of the offender and the number *of his followers make no difference in the offence* [illegible]

[illegible]

warded with laurels and triumphs because they *are too big for the weak hands of justice in this* world and have the power in their own posses sion which should punish offenders What is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my [illegible]

[illegible]

when able may seek the relief of the law which I am denied he or his son may renew his appeal till he recover his right But the conquered or their children have no court—no arbitrator on *earth to appeal to Then they may appeal as* Jephtha did to Heaven and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors which was to have such a legislative [illegible]

[illegible]

the court he appeals to And he that appeals to Heaven must be sure he has right on his side and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived and will be sure to retribute to every *one according to the mischiefs he* hath created to his fellow subjects—that is any part of mankind From whence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered

177 But suppose victory favours the right side let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war and see what power he gets and over whom.

First it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest *but must at least* be as much free men [illegible]

[illegible]

other advantages that attend the conquering sword or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them And the conquering people are not I hope to be slaves by con*quest and wear their laurels only to show they* are sacrifices to their leader's triumph They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword make their *heroes who are the founders* of such monarchies arrant drawcansirs and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won or assisted them in the subduing or shared in pos*sessing the countries they mastered* We are told by some that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman Conquest and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion which [illegible]

[illegible]

could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons that were then inhabitants of this country The Normans that came with him and helped to conquer and all descended from them are free men and no subjects by conquest let that give what dominion it will And if I or anybody else shall claim *freedom as derived from them* it will be very hard to prove the contrary and it is plain the law that has made no distinction between the one and the other intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges

178 But supposing which seldom happens that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people under the same laws and freedom let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued and that I say is purely despotical He has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it

179 *Secondly I say then the conqueror gets* no power but only over those who have actually assisted concurred or consented to that unjust force that is used against him For the people

having even to their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war (for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an unjust war any farther than they actually abet it, no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves or any part of their fellow-subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together; but yet this alters not the right; for the conqueror's power over the lives of the conquered being only because they have used force to do or maintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country who have done him no injury and so have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other who, without any injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

Thirdly, the power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war is perfectly despotical; he has an absolute power over the lives of those who by putting themselves in a state of war have forfeited them, but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world, there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries than to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the conquered not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering swords.

Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon, yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war. For whether by force he begins the injury, or else having quietly and by fraud done the injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it — which is the same thing as at first to have done it by force — it is the unjust use of force that makes the war. For he that breaks open my house and violently turns me out of doors, or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a state that we have no common judge on earth whom I may appeal to and to whom we are both obliged to submit, for of such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of force, then, that puts a man into the state of war with another and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life. For quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being.

182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children, who may be rational and peaceable notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father, the father by his miscarriages and violence can forfeit but his own life, and involves not his children in his guilt or destruction. His goods which Nature, that willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children. For supposing them not to have joined in the war either through infancy or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them, nor has the conqueror any right to take them away by the bare right of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction, though perhaps he may have some right to them to repair the damages he has sustained by the war and the defence of his own right, which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered we shall see by-and-by; so that he that by conquest has a right over a man's person, to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it. For it is the brutal force the aggressor has used that gives his adversary a right to take away his life and destroy him, if he pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man's goods; for though I may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money and let him go; this would be robbery on my side. His force and the state of war he put himself in made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. The right, then, of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war, but not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received and the charges of the war, and that, too, with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.

3. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side as could be supposed, he has no right

176 That the aggressor who puts himself into the state of war with another and unjustly invades another man s right can by such an unjust war never come to have a right over the conquered will be easily agreed by all men who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them Should a robber break into my house and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him would this give him any title? Just such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror who forces me into submission The injury and the crime is equal whether committed by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain The title of the offender and the number of his followers make no difference in the offence unless it be to aggravate it The only difference is great robbers punish little ones to keep them in their obedience but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world and have the power in their own possession which should punish offenders What is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice But perhaps justice is denied or I am crippled and cannot stir robbed and have not the means to do it If God has taken away all means of seeking remedy there is nothing left but patience But my son when able may seek the relief of the law which I am denied he or his son may renew his appeal till he recover his right But the conquered or their children have no court—no arbitrator on earth to appeal to Then they may appeal as Jephtha did to Heaven and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors which was to have such a legislative over them as the majority should approve and freely acquiesce in If it be objected this would cause endless trouble I answer no more than justice does where she lies open to all that appeal to her He that troubles his neighbour without a cause is punished for it by the justice of the court he appeals to And he that appeals to Heaven must be sure he has right on his side and a right too that is worth the trouble and part of mankind From hence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered

177 But supposing victory favours the right side let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war and see what power he gets and over whom.

First it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest but must at least be as much free men as they were before And most commonly they serve upon terms and on condition to share with their leader and enjoy a part of the spoil and other advantages that attend the conquering sword or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them And the conquering people are not I hope to be slaves by conquest and wear their laurels only to show they are sacrifices to their leader s triumph They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword make their heroes who are the founders of such monarchies arrant draw can sirs and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won or assisted them in the subduing or shared in possessing the countries they mastered We are told by some that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman Conquest and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion which if it were true (as by the history it appears otherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons that were then inhabitants of this country The Normans that came with him and helped to conquer and all descended from them are free men and no subjects by conquest let that give what dominion it will And if I or anybody else shall claim freedom as derived from them it will be very hard to prove the contrary and it is plain the law that has made no distinction between the one and the other intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges

178 But supposing which seldom happens that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people under the same laws and freedom let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued and that I say is purely despotical He has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it

179 Secondly I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted concurred or consented to that unjust force that is used against him For the people

tly t estore t—i qu t ie u
of t or I may resume t myself— choose
h th I will perf rm t. F r th I w f N ture
la g an bl gation n m only by the rules
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cuses the force and pass s the right, wh n I
put my hand my pock t nd d l my purse
myself t a thi f who demands t w th a p tol at
my br ast.

187 From all which t f llo s that th gov rn
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cest rs, if it were a gov nment made by th ir
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19 By the seco d the nhab tants of any
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s on f their nce t rs though they cons t n t
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we e by force imposed on the possessors of that
country F r th first co qu ror ne er ha i g
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189. I sa thus co cerns t th ir childr who
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body ca tak aw y any part of t w th ut th r
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po to d it.

93 B t granting that th conque n a just

them but by th ir own conse t, wh tever h
may dr them t say d d h has law
ful thor ty whilst force and n t ch ce com
pels them to submiss on

90 E ry man is born w th doubl right.
First, ght f f edom t his perso which
ther man has power ove but th fr dis-
posal f t lies in himself Seco dly ght be
fore y ther ma t h t, w th his br th
his f th goods.

9 By th first f these man is naturally
f ee f om subjecti to any gov rnme t, though
he be bor pl ce nd ts jurisd cti n. But
if he disclaim the lawful g ernme t f th coun
try he was born he must lso qu t the ght
that belonged to him, by th law f t, nd th
possessions there descend g t him from his an

will f llow from h ce n the continu nce of th
g nm t. Because th descendants f these
be g all f men f h grants th m tat nd
possessions t h b t his country w ch t which
t would be worth n thing whatsoe e h grants
them th y ha e so far as t is grant d p pe ty
n th n tur wh e f is, that, w thout man
own conse t, t can ot be tak f om him.

94. Their persons are free by a n ti e right
and their properties, be they mor less, are
th ir own, and t th ir own dispose and n t t
his or lse t is o prope ty S ppos g th con
qu gi es to on ma thousand cres t
him and his h irs for ev to a other h l is
thousand cre for his l f und th t f
£50 or £500 per annum. Has n t th of these

to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit his life is at *the victor* s mercy and his service and goods he *may appropriate to make* himself reparation but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed and their shares in the estate he possessed For example I in the state of Nature (and all commonwealths are in th

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... unjustly makes me the aggressor I am conquered my life it is true as forfeit is at mercy but not my wife s and children s *They made not the* war nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit *their* lives they were not mine to forfeit My wife had a share in my estate that neither could I forfeit And my children also being born of me had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance Here *then is the case* The conqueror has a title *to* reparation for damages received and the children have a title to their father s estate for their subsistence For as to the wife s share whether her own labour or compact gave her a title to it it is plain her husband could not forfeit what was *hers* What must be *done in the case? I answer* The fundam

as much a

lows that

both—viz for the conqueror s losses and children

184 But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror *to the* utmost farthing *and that the* children of the vanquished spoiled of all their father s goods are to be l

country he shall conquer For the *damages* of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land in any part of the world where all the land is possessed and none lies waste And if I have not taken away *the conqueror s land* which *being* vanquished *it is* impossible I should scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine supposing it of an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his, and equally cultivated *too* The destruction *of a year s product* or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done For as to money and such riches and treasure taken away these are none of Nature s goods they have but a phantastical imaginary value Nature has put no such upon them *They are of no more* account by her standard than the *Wampompeke of th*

... five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land where all is possessed and none remains waste to be taken up by *him that is disseised which* will be easily granted if one do but take away the imaginary value of money the disproportion being more than between five and five thousand though at the same time half a year s product is more worth than the inheritance where *there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of* any one has liberty to make use of the waste But their conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished No damage therefore that men in the state *of Nature* (as all princes and *governments* are in *reference to* one another) *suffer* from one another can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished and turn them out of that inheritance which ought to be the possession of them and their *descendants to all generations The conqueror* indeed will be apt to think himself master and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right But if that be all it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger *over the weaker* and *by this reason* he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on

185 Over those then that joined with him in the war and over those of the subdued country *that opposed him not* and the *posterity even of* those that did *the conqueror* even in a just war *hath* by his conquest no right of *dominion* They are free from any subjection to him and if their former government be dissolved they are at liberty *to* begin and erect another to *themselves*

186 The conqueror it is true usually by the force he has over them compels them with a sword at their breasts to stoop to his conditions and submit *to such a government* as he pleases to afford them but the inquiry is what right he has to do so? If it be said they submit by their own consent then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to *rule over them It remains only to be considered* whether promises extorted by force without right can be thought consent, and how far they bind To which I shall say they bind not at all because whatsoever *another* gets from me by

are both at l berty to consent, and h e a tually consented to all w a d confirm h m th pow er he hath till the usurped.

Chap XVIII Of Tyranny

199. As usurpat is th cise f powe which another hath ht t so tyr y is th cise f power beyo d ht, hi h n body can ha a ight t d thus is maki g use of the pow has in his hands, t f r th good

tion, en covetous ss, r y o g lar passi n.

200 If e can doubt this to be truth or son because t com from th bscu hand f a subject, I hope th uth ty f k g ll make

stitu ns, t y particular and p a us o mine think e th wealth d w l f th common wealth be my gr test w al and w ld l f berty — point wh l wful king d th directly diff f m tyrant for I d know l edge tha th special d gr test po t f dif fer nce tha is betw n a ghtful king and an

by doubl oath th bserv t f th f dam tal laws f his kingd m — tacitl as by be g ki g and so bou d p cet, as w ll th peopl as th law f his k gdom nd pressly by his oath his co nat so as ry just king in ed kingd m, is bou d bserve that p ct on mad hi peopl b his laws, framing his goverr m t ree bl h t cordi that p ction which God mad w th Noah af the d l g Her af seed time, and harvest, and cold, nd h t, and summ and wi t nd day and night, h ll cease whil the arth emaineth. And ther for king governi g settled ki gd m, l es t be a king and deg ner es to tyr t, as soo as

h l a es off to rule ccord ng to his la s. And l f The ef re, all ki gs that are not h m hey is, h. od

ernm nt tl oth r makes all g u j ws d nnet e

pow e th t is put in a y hands u b m t f th pe pl and the pr ervati f the r properties is appl ed t th r ends, and mad use of to impove h harass, subd e th m to the arb trary and rregular commands f those th t ha e t, th t p ese tly becomes tyranny wh th those that thus use t are o many Thu e ad f the thirty tyrants t Athens, as w ll as on t Syr cuse and tl ntol r bl do- mi n f the Decem ri t R m as nothing bett

Wh e la nds, tyran y begins, f th la be transgressed t ther s harm and hosoe a th ty e eeds th power gi him by th law and makes use of th f ce h has u d hi comma d to compass that upo the ubj t wh ch th l w all s n t, ceases n that t be magistr t a d ct w th ut u th rity may be pposed as any other man wh by force in ades th ght f oth Thi ac know led ed in subo dinat magistrates H that hath th ty t seiz my person in the street

warrant d su h l gal uthor ty as will em

tat h ld th eb ha ht t tak y y f his oung b th rs po ti ns O that a h man wh possessed whol cou try hould f m th ce h e ght t se h n h pl as ed th co tag and gard of hi poo n gh bou Th be g ghtfully possessed of gre t powe and riches, exceed gly bey d th gr t est part f th sons of Adam, is so far f m being an excuse, m ch less a ason f rap and op-

a right to his thousand acres for ever and the other during his life paying the said rent? And hath *not the tenant for life a property in all that* he gets over and above his rent by his labour

from the heirs of one or from the other during his life he paying the rent? Or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land at his pleasure? If he can then all free and voluntary contracts cease and are void in the world there needs nothing but power enough to dissolve them at any time and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion For can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say I give you and yours this for ever and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised and yet it is to be understood that I have right if I please to take it away from you again to morrow?

195 I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country but this I am sure they owe subjection to the laws of God and Nature Nobody no power can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal

that hold the Almighty whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world who all together with all their people joined to them are in comparison of the great God but as a drop of the bucket or a dust on the balance—inconsiderable nothing!

196 The short of the case in conquest is this The conqueror if he have a just cause has a despotical right over the persons of all that actu

Over the rest of the people it

nselves

or the possessions of either he has no power and so can have *by virtue of conquest* no lawful title himself to dominion over them or derive it to his posterity but is an aggressor and puts himself in *a state of war* against them and has no better a right of principality he nor any of his successors than Hingar or Hubba the Danes had here in England or Spartacus had he conquered Italy which is to have their yoke cast off as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah by the sword God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire And the Lord was with Hezekiah and he prospered wherefore he went forth and he rebelled against the king of Assyria and served him not (II Kings 18 7) Whence it is plain that shaking off a power which force

tenances though even promises and covenants when obtained by force have intervened For it is very probable to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz and deposed him and *made Hezekiah king in his father s lifetime* and that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage and paid him tribute till this time

Chap XVII *Of Usurpation*

197 As conquest may be called a foreign usur

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tion but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to This so far as it is usurpation is a change only of persons but not of the forms and rules of the government for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes or governors of the commonwealth it is tyranny added to usurpation

198 In all lawful governments the designation of the persons who are to bear rule being as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself and that which had its establishment originally from the people—the anarchy being much alike to have no form of government at all or to agree that it shall be monarchical yet appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power and be the monarch—all commonwealths therefore with the *form of government established* have rules also of appointing and conveying the right to those

author

laws of the community have prescribed hath no right to be obeyed though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved since he is not the person *the laws have appointed* and consequently not the person the people have consented to Nor can such an usurper or any deriving *from him ever have a title till the people*

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hich threatened my lif I ....
to ppeal to the law t secure t and hen t was gone I was too lat to ppeal. Th law could not restore lif t my dead carcass. Th loss was irreparabl which to prevent the law f Nature ga e me right t destroy him who had put himself t stat f war w th me and thre t ened my destructi But in the oth case my lf not being in dan I might ha e the ben efit of ppealing t the law and ha e eparati n for my £ oo that way

208. Fourthly But if the unlawful a ts don by the magistr t be mai tai d (by th pow t has got) and th emedy which is du by law be by th sam pow bstru ted yet th ng t f resisting even in such manifest ts of tyranny will not sudd nl or sl ght occa sions, disturb the governm nt. For if re ch no farther than som p at m cases, though they ha e right to d fend themsel es, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them, yet th ght t d so will n t asily engage them in co test wh rein they are sure to perish t being as imposs bl for on or a few oppressed men to disturb th government where the bod f th peopl d not think themsel es concerned in t, as for a madman heady malcon ent to overturn w ll settled stat th peopl being as littl pt t f llow the as th other

...ion. But if ther these illegal cts ha e ex tended t the majority of th peopl or if the mischi f and oppressi has light only on som few but in such cases as th p ecedent and con se ences seem to threa en all, and they ar pe suaded in th ir consciences tha their la s, and w th them, their estates, liberties, and li es are in dange and perhaps their religion too, how they will be hindered from resisti g illegal force used gainst them I cannot ll. This is an in co n ce I confess, that ttends all govern me ts whatsoever when the governors ha e brou t to this pass, be generally suspected of their peopl th most dangerous ta they can possibly pu themsel es in where they are the less to be pitied, because t is so as to be a oided. It bein as imposs bl for governor if h reall means the good f his peopl and the preservation of t em and their laws toc ther no to mak them see and f l t, as is for the father of famil not let his children see h loves nd takes care of them.

...0. But if al the world shall bserve pre tences of n kind and ct ns of another arts used t lud th la and th trust f preroga ti e (hi h is an arb trary powe in some things left in th prince hand t d good not harm, to th peopl) mploved co trary to the d fo which t was gi en if the peopl shall find the ministers and subordinat magistr tes chosen su tabl s such nds, and fa oured or laid by proporti nably as they pr mote r ppose th m if they see several xperim ts mad of arbitrary power and that el n und hand fa oured though publicl proclaimed against, which is e diest to introduce t, and th perators in t supported as much as ma be and when that cannot be d ne, yet ppro ed still and liked th bett r and long train f actin show the counsels all te ding that wa how can man any m re hi der himself from bein persuaded in his o n mind hich way things ar going or from casting about ho to sa e himself than he could from believin th captain of a h p he was was carrying him and th rest f the com pany to Algiers, wh n he found him al a s stee ing that course though cross winds, leaks in his ship and want f men and provisions d d ften force him to turn his course an the wa f som tim which h st dil returned t again as soon as th wind weath and other circumstances would let him.

Chap XIX Of the Dissolution of Go ernment

211 He that will, w th an cl arn ss, speak f th dissol tion of government, ought in the first place to disti guish between the dissol ti n of th soci ty and the dissol ti n of th govern me t. That which makes th community and brings men out f th loose stat f N ture into on politi soci ty is th greement which every o has w th th rest t incorporat and act as on body nd so be on distinct commonwealth. Th usual, and almost nly wa whereby this uni n is dissol ed, is th inroad of for gn force making a co quest upon th m. For in that case

... pport hem

saf ty as h thinks fit, in some ther soci ty Wh never th soci ty is dissol ed t is certain the government f that soci ty cann t emain. Thus conq erors swords of en cut up governme ts by th roots, and mangl soci ties t p eces, separatin th subd ed or scattered mul

pression which the endamaging another with out authority is that it is a great aggravation of it For exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than a petty officer no more justifiable in a king than a constable But so much the worse in him as that he has more trust put in him is supposed from the advantage of education and counsellors to have better knowledge and less reason to do it having already a greater share than the rest of his brethren

203 May the commands then of a prince be opposed? May he be resisted as often
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ov e and instead of government and order leave nothing but anarchy and con fusion

204 To this I answer That force is to be op posed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force Whoever makes any opposition in any other case draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man and so no such danger or con fusion will follow as is often suggested For—

205 First As in some countries the person of the prince by the law is sacred and
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ure or condemnation But yet oppos tion may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer or other comm ssioned by him unless he will by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people d ssol
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s o can tell what the end will be? And a neighbour k ngdom has showed the world an odd example In all other cases the sacred ness of the person exempts him from all incon veniencies whe eby he is secure whilst the gov ernment stands from all violence and harm whatsoever than which there cannot be a wiser constitution For the harm he can do in his own pe son not being likely to happen often nor to extend itself far nor be n able by his single strength to subvert the la s nor oppress the body of the people should any prince have so much weakness and ill nature as to be w ll ng to do it The inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes when a heady prince comes to the throne are well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of the gov ernment in the person of the chief magistrate thus set out of the reach of danger it being safer for the body that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer than that the head of the republic should be easily and upon slight occasions exposed

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writ to all which is a full comm
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u king upon certain days nor in certain places though this commission have no such exception in it but they are the limitations of the law which if any one transgr

i e any one to act against the law or justify him by his commission in so doing The commission or command of any magistrate where he ha
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magistrate has some authority so far and to such ends and the private man has none at all for it is not the commission but the authority that gives the right of acting and against the laws there can be no autho ity But notwithstand ng such res stance the king s person and authority are still both secured and so no danger to gov ernor or government

07 Thirdly Suppos ng a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred yet this doctrine of the la ful ness of
er
him
injure y may be relieved and his damages repaired by appeal to the law there can be no pretence fo fo ce which is only to be used where a man is intercepted f om appeal ng to the law For nothing s to be accounted hostile force but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal and it is such force alone that puts him that uses it into a state of ar and makes t la ful to re s st him A man w th a sword in h s hand de mands my purse on the highway when perhaps I ha e not 12d n my pocket This man I may lawfully kill To another I deliver £100 to hold only whilst I alight which he efuses to estore me when I am got up agai but d a s his sword to defend the possession of t by force I endeavour to retake it The mi ch ef this man does me is a hund ed or poss bly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me (whom I k lled before he really d d me any)

2 Fourthly the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince or by the legislature, is certainly a change of the legislature and so a dissolution of the government. For the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one entire, free and independent society to be governed by its own laws, this is lost whenever they are given up into the power of another.

218. Why in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident, because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the State to employ, and often persuading himself or being flattered by others, that, as supreme magistrate he is incapable of control: he alone is in a condition to make great advances towards such changes under pretence of lawful authority and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government; whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative without open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, the prince, in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislature, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet so far as the other parts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another.

219. There is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons that charge so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution; this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy and so effectively to dissolve the government. For laws not being made for themselves, but to be by their execution, the bonds of the society to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function. When that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude without order or connection. Where there is no longer the administration of justice for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within

the community to direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws, and a government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics inconceivable to human capacity and inconsistent with human society.

220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons, *or form*, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good. For the society can never by the fault of another lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself which can only be done by a settled legislative and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy till it be too late *to look for any*. To tell people they may provide for themselves by erecting a new legislature, when, by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power their old one is gone, is only to tell them they *may expect relief when it is too late* and the evil is past cure. This is, in effect, no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty and when their chains are on, tell them they may act like free men. This, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief, and men can never be secure from tyranny if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly

is, when the legislature or the prince either of them act contrary to their trust.

For the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community masters or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

222 The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property and the end while they choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure by entering into society and for which the people submitted themselves to

titude from the protection of and dependence on that society which ought to have preserved them from violence The world is too well instructed in and too forward to allow of this way of dis solving of governments to need any more to be said of it and there wants not much argument to prove that where the society is dissolved the government cannot remain that being as im possible as for the frame of a house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dis placed by a whirlwind or jumbled into a con fused heap by an eartnquake

212 Besides this overturning from without governments are dissolved from within

First When the legislative is altered civil so ciety *being a state of peace amongst those who* are of it from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage which they have provided in their legislative for the ending all d fferences that may arise amongst any of them it is in their legislative that the members of a common wealth are united and combined together into one coherent living body This is the soul that gives form life and unity to the commonwealth from hence the se eral members have their mu

essence and union of the ociety consisting in having one will the legislative when once es tablished by the major ty has the declaring and as it were keeping of that will The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society whereby provision is made for the continuation of their un on under the d rection of persons and bonds of laws made by persons authorised thereunto by the consent and ap pointment of the peopl without wh ch no one man or number of men amongst them can ha e authority of mak ng laws that shall be b nd ing to the rest When any one or more shall take upon them to make laws whom the people have not appointed so to do they make laws without authority wh ch the people are not therefore bound to obey by which means they come a ain to be out of subjection and may constitute to themsel es a new leg slative as they think best being in full liberty to resist the force of those who without authority would im pose anyth ng upon them E ery one is at the d sposure of his own will when those who had by the delegation of the society the declaring of the publ c will are excluded from it and others usurp the place who have no such au thority or delegation

213 This being usually brought about by such

in the commonwealth who misuse the power they have it is hard to consider it aright and know at whose door to lay it without kno ing the form of government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons —First a single hereditary person having the constant, supreme executive power and with it the pow er of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time Secondly an as sembly of hereditary nobility Thirdly an assembly of representatives chosen *pro tempore* by the people Such a form of government supposed it is evident

14 First that when such a sin le person or *prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of* the laws which are the will of the society de

requ red to be obeyed when other laws are set up and other rules pretended and enforced than what the legislative constituted by the society have enacted it is plain that the legislative is changed Whoe er introduces new laws not being thereunto authorised by the fundamental

15 Secondly when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time or from acting freely pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted the legislative is al tered For it is not a certain number of men— no nor their meet ng unless they have also free dom of debating and le sure of perfecting what is for the good of the society wherein the legislative consists when these are taken away or altered so as to depr ve the society of the due exerc se of their power the legislati e is truly al tered For it is not names that co stitute gov ernments but the use and e ercise of those pow ers that ere intended to accompany them so that he who takes away the freedom or hinders the act ng of the legislative in ts due seasons in effect takes away the leg slat ve and puts an end to the go ernment

16 Th rdly hen by the arb trary power of the prince the electors or ways of elect on are alte ed ithout the consent and contrary to the *common interest of the people there also the* legislati e is altered For if others than those whom the soc ety hath authori ed thereunto do choose or in another way than hat the soc ety hath prescribed those chosen are not the leg slati e appo nted by the people

lays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world.

225. Secondly, I answer such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under and see whither they are going, it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected, and without which, ancient names and specious forms are so far from being better that they are much worse than the state of Nature or pure anarchy; the inconveniences being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

226. Thirdly, I answer that this power in the people of providing for their safety anew by a new legislative when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust by invading their property is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it. For rebellion be-

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who, by force, break through, and, by force, justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when men, by entering into society and civil government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do *rebellare*—that is, bring back again the state of war, and are properly rebels, which they who are in power, by the pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those about them being likeliest to do, the properest way to prevent the evil is to show them the danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation to run into it.

227. In both the forementioned cases, when either the legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted, those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion. For if any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by them made pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage which every one had consented to for a peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They who remove or change the legislative take away this decisive power which nobody can have but by the appointment and consent of the people, and so destroying the authority which the people did, and nobody else can, set up, and introducing a power which the people hath not authorised, actually introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority; and thus by removing the legislative established by the society, in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united as to that of their own will, they untie the knot, and expose the people anew to the state of war. And if those who by force take away the legislative are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shown, can be no less esteemed so, when they who were set up for the protection and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebels.

228. But if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion mean that it may occasion civil wars or intestine broils to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates when they invade their properties, contrary to the trust put in them, and that, therefore, this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world; they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbour's. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for peace sake to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered what kind of a peace there will be in the world which consists only in violence and rapine, and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace. Such a government wherein Ulysses and his companions had ... the

legislators of their own making whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power they put them selves into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedi ence and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society and either by ambition fear folly or corrup tion endeavour to grasp themselves or put into the hands of any other an absolute power over the lives liberties and estates of the people by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite con trary ends and it devolves to the people who have a right to resume their original liberty and by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security which is the end for which they are in society What I have said here con cerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the supreme executor who having a double trust put in him both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme execut on of th l

c ucasure and offices of the society to corrupt the representatives and ga n them to his purposes when he openly pre-en gages the electors and prescribes to the r choice such whom he has by solicitation threats prom ises or otherwise won to h s designs and em ploys them to bring in such who have promised beforehand what to vote and what to enact. Thus to regulate cand dates and electo s and new model the ways of elect on what is it but to cut up the government by the roots and poi son the very fountain of publ c secur ty? For the people having reserved to themselves the cho ce of their representati e h f n

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free y act and advise as the necessity of the com monwealth and the public good should upon examination and mature debate be judged to requ re This those who give the r votes befo e they hear the debate and have weighed the rea sons on all sides are not capable of doing To prepare such an assembly as this and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his o n will for the true representati es of the people and the law makers of the society is certainly as great a breach of trust and as perfect a declara tion of a design to subvert the government as is possible to be met with To which if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end and all the arts of perverted law made use of to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country it will be past doubt what is doing What power they ought to have in the society who thus employ it contrary to the trust that along with it in its first institution is easy to de termine and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any such thing as this can not any longer be trusted

2 3 To this perhaps it will be said that the people being ignorant and always discontented to lay the foundation of government in the un steady opinion and uncertain humour of the people is to expose it to certain ruin and no government will be able long to subsist if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they take offence at the old one To this I an swer quite the contrary People are not so eas ily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to And if there be any original defects or adventitious ones intro duced by time or corruption it is not an easy thing to get them changed even when all the world sees the e is an opportunity for it Th s slowness and a ersion in the people to quit their old constitutions has in the many revolut ons [that] have been seen in this kingdom in this and for mer ages still kept us to or after some interval of fruitless attempts st ll brought us back again to our old legislat e of ki g lords and com mons and whate er pro ocat ons have made the crown be taken f om some of our princes heads they ne er car ied the people so far as to place it in another line

24 But it will be said this hypothesis lays a fer ment for f equent ebell on To which I answer

First no more than any other hypothes s For when the people are made miserable and find themselves expo ed to the ill usage of arbitrary power cry up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jup ter let them be sacred and divine descended or authorised f om Heaven gi e them out for hom o what you please the same will happen The people generally ill treat ed and contrary to r ght, will be ready upon any occa on to ease themsel es of a burden that sits heavy upon them They will wish and seek for the opportunity which in the change weak ness and accidents of human affairs, seldom de

à deb tâ erent â pr pter acc ptum jurıam Præ alem denique impetum p pul nd rum p ætern tam ul xendi jus hab t Horum num alterum à naturâ t ul rit scil t orpusque tueamur Alterum er c t naturam ut ferior d s per ori pplıcium su mat Quod t que populus malum l quam f ium nt, ped pot t fi t d p tquam f t m t em authorem sc leri tt d ar p t t p pulus ur hoc mpl ùs quam p tus q isp m h b t Quod huic l pri ad er arius jud cibus e pto B chanano nullum ıst pat t em d um super t Cum ıll si nt ler b l tyr nn l (modicum enim Jerr omnino d bet) sister cum everent â p rt — Barcl y *C tr M ar homach* ıı 8

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233 B t if any sh uld ask M t th people, th al vay lay th mselve pe t th cru l ty and f tyran y—m t th y th ir cit ies pill g d and laid ın ash s, th ır and childr posed t th tyrant s lust d fury d th ms l d f m l ed d by th ır kın t ruin and all th mise es f want and oppress and y t s t till—must m al be d barred th comm p ıl f ppo g f th force, which N tu allow s f ly t all ther creatures for th ır p eserv ti n fr m inju ry I answe Self-d f ce ıs part f th law f N tur or can t be d nied th commu ty ev against th kın himself but t evenge th m

usag cru lly tyrannise th wh l s d rabl part f th pe pl this case th peopl ha ght t es t d d f d th mselves f om injury but t must be th this ca ti that they nly d f d th msel but d t t tack th pri ce. Th y m y pair th damages r d but m t t, for any p ocati n, ceed th bounds f d ever d espect. They may r pulse th

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much d s gned th m th peopl ma prev t befor be d but, wh it d they m t eve ge t th k thou h u thor f th illa y This, th for is th pri lege f h peopl ge l bove what y pri te person hath That part cular m ar allowed by our d rs ries themsel es (B chanan only xcepted) t ha ther medy b t pa nce but th body f the peopl may w th

respect ist nt l bl tyran y f when it is but mod at th y ou ht to e dure it.

234 Thus far th t gr t d ocat f m narchical pow all s f es ta e

35 It is tr h has an e ed ti o limitati ns t t t n purpos

Fir t H says t must be w th rev

Se dl It must be th ut tr b tion r p ishm t and th as h gi es ıs becaus an nf can t p nish a s pe r

First How t esist f w th t strik g gai h t trike th e er will eed som kill to mak t ll gible H that hall oppose an assault nly th a shu ld t re th

This is as d ul us w y f isti g as J al th ught t f fi ht g *Ub t pul as g pul ta tum* And th su ess f th comb t ll be d bly th sam h th descr be t

Libertas pauperis hæc st
Pul tus t t p gnis nsus ador t
Ut l t paucis cum d nt bus nd re t

This ll alw ys be th t f such an m gi nary es tance wh m n may n t trike gai H th f wh may ist must be allowed t strik And th l t ur uth any body lse j n k ock th h d cut n th f c w th as m h ce and espe t as h thinks fit H that can concil bl w d ev e may f ght I know d e f hi pains l spe tful cud lli g wh e h can m tw th t.

Seco dly As to his co d— An f or can t pu h a supe —that tru g rally speak wh l

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ouus mains —th t h h ppos th unjust gresso has this supe ty er h m th t h has ght, h n h p evails t pu ish th ff d both for th b h f th pe ce d ll th ev l that f ll d upo t Bar l y th f th pl ce m

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ing to do but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured And no doubt Ulysses who was a pru dent man preached up passive obedience and exhorted them to a quiet submission by repre

Polyphemus who had now the power over them

229 The end of government is the good of mankind and which is b st for mankind that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their pow er and employ it for the destruction and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

230 Nor let any one say that mischief can arise from hence as often as it shall please a busy head or turbulent spirit to des re the alteration of the government It is true such men may stir whenever they please but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition For till the mischief be grown general and the ill designs of the rulers become visible or their attempts sens ble to the greater part the people who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance are not apt to stir The examples of particular in

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evidence that des gns are carrying on against their liberties and the general course and ten

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they who might avoid it bring themsel es into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed if they have the sense of rational creatures and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault who put things in such a posture that they would not have them thought as they are? I grant

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goes about to invade the rights of either pr nce or people and lays the foundat on f r overturn ing the constitution and frame of any just gov ernment he is guilty of the greatest crime I think a man is capable of being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood rapine and desolation which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country and he who does it is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of man kind and is to be treated accordingly

231 That subjects or foreigners attempting by force on the properties of any people may be resisted with force is agreed on all hands but that magistrates doing the same thing may be resist ed hath of late been denied as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law had thereby a pow er to break those laws by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren whereas their offence is thereby the greater both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law and breaking also that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren

32 Whosoever uses force without right—as every one does in society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it and in that state all former ties are cancelled all other rights cease and every one has a right to defend himself and to resist the aggressor This is so evident that Barclay himself—that great assertor of the pow er and sacredness of kings—is forced to confess that it is lawful for the people in some cases to resist their king and that too in a chapter wherein he pretends to show that the D vine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebell on. Whereby it is evident even by his own doctrine

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cr del tati et furori ju ulum semper p æbebit E gone mult tudo civ tates suas fame fer o et flammâ vastari seque co juges et l bero fortunæ ludibri et tyran i libidini exponi inque omnia vitæ pericula o i esque miser as et m lestias a ege deduci pati ntur? Num ill s quod om a im t um generi est à naturâ tribulum den gar debet ut sc vim vi pell nt seseque ab i j riâ tueantur? Huic b evite responsum s t p pulo uni verso g ri d f nsionem quæ jur s natural s est ne que ultionem quæ p æter natu m est adversus regem conced debere Quap opter si rex n n s singul r s t n t m personas aliqu t priv t m od um exerc at s d c t pus et m reipubl cæ c jus ipse c put est—i e totum p pulum v l insig em aliquam ejus partem imman et intoler dâ sævitiâ seu tyr nid d exet populo qui dem hoc casu resistend ac tuendi se ab i juriâ potestas c mpetit sed tue d se t tum no en m in p i cipem inv dend et r stituendæ injuriæ illatæ non r cedendi

à d b tâ ver t â p opter c ptum jur m Præ s t d q p t m p opuls d m p t t ul d j h b t H rum m lt m â t â t t t l t o p q t m Alterum er e nl t m t fer d s pen s t pl m su t Q d st qu p p dus m lum t q m f tum st p d p t t f t d p tq m f t m t g th m ler d n p t tt p p l s g t hoc mpl ùs q m p t s q p m l b t Q od h t p d s j d b t pl B h no llum p t t em d m p t C m ll st t l b l tyr s e t (m d cum m fer d b t) ter cum er t â p t — Bu l y C t M arch m h t ß

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33 P t f any es l o ld a k M t the people th l ys lay them l pent th er l ty d g f tyr y— t t ey se th e t t p ll g d a d l d m a h th r wi s d h t

N t h

b lly tyra th wh l a o d abl p t f th pe pl th cas the people h h f th ta re

Th y p t th p t tt mpt b t m t t ev g p t vi l ce F t n t al f u to d f d l f d l mb but that f h ld p h p g t t The m h f wh h d g ed th m th p pl y p t b f t b do but wh t do th y m t t e e g t th k g th gh tho f th ll y Th th f th p l g of th p pl g l bov wh t y p t p so h th Th t p t cular m ar all w d by ad them l (B h na ly pt d) t l th m dy b t p t ce b t th body f th p pl may w th

re pect res t intoleral le tyr y for wh n it is l t mod t th y ought t e d r it

34 Th s f th t g t ad ocate of mo h l po ll s f res tanc

235 It is tr l e ha an ed t o limitat o s t it t n p rpos

F t He ays it must be with r re ce

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ag ho to st ke v th reve w ll eed som sk ll to m k t tell g ble H th at sh ll p pose ssa lt ly w th a sh l l t the bl ws

H is as r d c lo w y f res t g as Ju l th o ght t f fghtt g *Ub t pul g ful t m* A d the eces of th ml t ll be a dably th s m he th r describes it

> *Lab t pau p hæ t*
> *Pul t g t t p g ne dor t*
> *Ut l t p m d t b d ve t*

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ing to do but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured And no doubt Ulysses who was a prudent man preached up passive obedience and exhorted them to a quiet submission by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind and by showing [what] inconveniencies might happen if they should offer to resist Polyphemus who had now the power over them

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they who might avoid it bring themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed if they have the sense of rational creatures and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault who put things in such a posture that they would not have them thought as they are? I grant that the pride ambition and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the people's wantonness and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers or in the rulers' insolence and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people whether oppression or disobedience gave the first rise to the disorder I leave it to impartial history to determine This I am sure whoever either ruler or subject by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people and lays the foundation for overturn

the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country and he who does it is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind and is to be treated accordingly

231 That subjects or foreigners attempting by force on the properties of any people may be resisted with force is agreed on all hands but that magistrates doing the same thing may be resisted hath of late been denied as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law had thereby a power to break those laws by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren whereas their offence is thereby the greater both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law and breaking also that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren

232 Whosoever uses force without right—as every one does in society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it and in that state all former ties are cancelled all other rights cease and every one has a right to defend himself and to resist the aggressor This is so evident that Barclay himself—that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings—is forced to confess that it is lawful for the people in some cases to resist their king and that too in a chapter wherein he pretends to show that the Divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion Whereby it is evident even by his own doctrine that since they may in some cases resist all resisting of princes is not rebellion His words are these *Quod siq is dicat Ergone populus ty nnicæ crudel t ti et furori jugulum sempe præbeb t? Ergone multitudo ci itates suas fam ferr et fl mmâ vastari seque co jug s et liberos f rtunæ ludibrio et tyran i libid i expo i i que omnia vitæ pe cula o n sque miseri s et molesti s à g d duci p tientur? Num ill s qu d omni a m ntium generi est à naturâ tributum denegari debet ut s vim vi repell t seseque b j riâ tueant r? Huic breviter responsum sit p pulo u i vers gari def nsio em quæ ju is natur l s est ne que ult em quæ præter n tur m est ad ersus regem concedi debere Quap opter si rex no in singul res t tum pers aliquot priv t m od um e erce t s d e r pus t am reipubl cæ cujus ipse c put est—i e totum p pulum v l insig em al qu m ejus partem imm i et intoler dâ sævitiâ seu ty d d vexet populo qu d m hoc casu r s stendi ac tue di se b i juriâ p t stas c mpetit sed tuendi se ta tum non en m in principem invadend et restituendæ injuriæ illatæ non recedendi*

a debent . . . recusd prot . . . ecer . . . tam . . . Pra . . . rsen dem . . . protinus . . . tum frete . . . tem . . . jus h . . . et. Ho . . . n . . . d natur . . . d, et . . . se uti . . . tuetur. Alterum . . . s . . . et . . . fenor d . . . enim . . . Qu . . . d . . . potius . . . fxtam . . . si, e . . . potest, . . . fut . . . postnam factum . . . em . . . adhoren se . . . t . . . post . . . p . . . tus . . . hoc . . . lilis quam pr . . . quast . . . h . . . et. Qud . . . d . . . sus edere . . . jsdabus, ex . . . o Bu- . . . chanam . . . parents . . . referret. Cum ille si . . . tyrannus est (nullum . . . fore . . . d . . . et) . . . cum . . . possit."—Barclay Contr. Monarchomach . . . iii. 8.

In English thus:

233. But if any one should ask: Must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny—must they see their cities pillaged and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to the tyrant's lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still—must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force, which Nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of Nature; nor can it be denied the community, even against the king himself; but to revenge themselves . . .

. . . cruelly tyrannise over the whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury; but it must be with this caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince. They may repair the damages received, but must not, for any provocation, exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences. For it is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a superior is against nature. The mischief which is designed them the people may prevent before it be done, but when it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though author of the villainy. This, therefore, is the privilege of the people in general above what any private person hath: That particular men are allowed, by our adversaries themselves (Buchanan only excepted), to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with respect, resist intolerable tyranny; for when it is but moderate they ought to endure it."

234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance.

235. It is true he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose:

First. He says it must be with reverence.

Secondly. It must be without retribution or punishment; and the reason he gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior."

First. How to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in his hand to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting as Juvenal thought it of fighting: *Ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum*. And the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it:

> *Libertas pauperis haec est;*
> *Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus adorat*
> *Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.*

This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men may not strike again. He, therefore, who may resist must be allowed to strike. And then let our author, or anybody else, join a knock on the head or a cut on the face with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence may, for aught I know, deserve for his pains a civil, respectful cudgelling wherever he can meet with it.

Secondly. As to his second—"An inferior cannot punish a superior"—that is true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with force, being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority; and then the odds that remains is—that he who opposes the unjust aggressor has this superiority over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace and . . . the . . . hun . . . an . . . k . . .

pos . . . u . . . af . . . em . . . as . . . dum . . . tantum arma ca . . . et . . . ut . . . per . . . sua . . . tur . . . licet. Nunc . . . quandiu . . . Sic . . . cum ex . . . Regem . . . at . . . qua

potestati resistit Dei ordinationi resistit non alias i t tur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber hoc modo populus et superior efficitur reverso ad eum scilicet jure illo quod ante re em inau uratum in inter reg o h buit At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejus modi quæ hunc effectum pariunt At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem duo tantum invenio duos inquam casus quibus rex ipso f cto ex rege non regem se facit et omni ho o e et di nitate re ali atque in subditos potes tate destituit quorum etiam meminit Winzerus Ho rum u us est si regnum d sperdat quemadmodum de Nerone fertur quod is nempe senatum p pulumque Ro manum atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque v s ta e ac novas sibi sedes quærere decrevisset Et de Ca ligula quod pal m denunciarit se neque civem neque p incipem senatui amplius fore i que animo habuerit interempto utriusque o dinis electissimo quoque Alex and i m commi ra e ac ut p pul m u ictu inter meret unam ei cervicem optavit Talia cum rex aliquis m dit tur et molitu serio omnem regn nd cur m et animum ilico abjicit ac proinde impe ium in subditos amittit ut dominus se vi p o derelicto habiti dominium

36 Alter casus est si rex in alicujus clientel m se contulit ac regnum quod l berum à m j ibu et populo trad tum ccep t lie æ diti m ncip i t N m tunc qu mis forte non eâ me te d t populo plane ut in c mmodet t men q qu d p æc puum est regiæ dig nit t s m sit ut summ s sc licet in re no secu dum Deum sit et solo D i fe or atque populum eti m t tum gnora tem i l i i tum cujus libe t tem s rtam et tect m conserv e debu t in alterius ge t s d tionem et potest tem ded d t hâc velut qu d m ren i ab li tio e ff cit ut nec quod ipse i eg o impe ium habuit reti t nec in eum cui c ll t m voluit j is quicquam t ansferat atq ita eo facto lib m j m et s æ p testatis p pulum reli q t cujus rei e mplum unum an les Scotici s ppeditant —Barclay *Cont a Mo narchom ch s* I II c 16

Which may be thus Englished

37 What then can there no case happen wherein the people may of right and by their o n authority help themselves take arms and set upon their king imperiously dom neering over them? None at all v hilst he remains a king Honour the king and he that resists the pov er res sts the ordinance of God a e Divi e ora cles that will ne er permit it. The people there fore can never come by a po er over h m un less he does something that makes h m cease to be a king for then he d vests himself of h s crown and dignity and returns to the state of a pri ate man and the people become free and superior the power which they had in the inte regnum before they cro vned him king devolving to them again But there are but few miscarriages v hich bring the matter to this state After cons dering it well on all sides I can find but two Tv o cases there are I say whereby a king *ipso facto* be comes no king and loses all power and regal au thority over his people which are also taken no tice of by Winzerus The first is if he endeavour to overturn the government—that is, if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonv ealth as it is recorded of Nero that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome lay the city v aste v ith fire and sv ord and then remove to some other place and of Cal gula that he openly declared that he v ould be no long er a head to the people or senate and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks and then retire to Alexan dria and he wished that the people had but one neck that he might dispatch them all at a blow Such designs as these v hen any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously promotes he im mediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects as a master does the domin on over his slaves whom he hath abandoned

238 The other case is when a king makes himself the dependent of another and subjects h s kingdom which his ancestors left him and the people put free into his hands to the domin ion of another For hov ever perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people yet be cause he has hereby lost the principal part of re gal dignity—viz to be next and immed ately under God supreme in his k ngdom and also because he betrayed or forced his people whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved in to the pov er and dominion of a foreign nation By this as it v ere al enat on of h s kingdom he himself loses the pov er he had in it before v ith out transferring any the least right to those on v hom he would have bestov ed t and so by th s act sets the people free and lea es them at their own d sposal One example of this is to be found in the Scotch annals

239 In these cases Barclay the great cham p on of absolute monarchy is forced to allow that a k ng may be re sted a d ceases to be a king That s in short—not to mult ply cases—in what soe er he has no authority there he is no king and may be res ted for v heresoe er the autl or ity ceases the king ceas s too a d becomes l ke other men who have no authority And these two cases that he instances d ffer little from those above ment oned to be destructi e to govern ments only that he has omitted the principle

from which his doctrin flows, and that is the bre ch of trust in not p eserving the f rm of go ernm t agreed on, and n not t nd g th nd f government tself wh ch is th p bl c good and preservati f p operty Wh n king has d thr ed himself and put h ms lf i tat f m f m

ion, would d w ll to u to
f our Church, and great tickl f r th pow er and prerog ti e f princes, does if I mistake h c

pected to be gn ant f our gov nme t, or emies to t. B t I th ht Hook al m ght n

their ci il pol cy is so w so dang ous, and so destru ti to both rul rs a d pe ple th t as for me ges could bear th b chi g f t, so t may be h ped those t com ed med fr m th mpos ns of th se Egypt u d taskmast s, will bh th m m ry f ch se il flatter s, wh hilst t seemed to serve th ir turn, sol ed all gov m t into bsol t tyr anny d w uld ha all m bo t what th ir m an souls fi ted th m— l y

4 H t is lik th mmon qu ti will be mad Wh shall be judg wh th th p ce or l gisla t trary to th tru t This, perhaps, ll aff t d df ti us m n m y p d

cordi g to th trust posed in h m b h wh d p tes him and m t, by h g dep ed h m ha till pow t d scard h m h h f ils in his trust If this be as bl particular cases f p t m hy h ld t be th rwise th f th gr m m t, wh th w l far f milli ns is co d and also wh th evil, f t p ev ed, is gr t d th edr ss ry difficult, d ar d d g ous

4 B t, farther this q estu n, Wh hall be judge cannot mean th t th re is no judge at all. F wh e th re is j d cature on arth to d

d d

4 If a co tro ersy arise betw t a p c and some f th people in a matt r wh r the l ss l nto doubtf l a d th thi g be of gre t k h or per ump r

cts co tra y to or beyo d th t tru t w su pr per to j dg as th body f th peopl (wh at first lodged that trust n h m) how far th y m t t should te d B t f th p c or whoever they be n th admi istr t n decl e that w y f d terminati n the ppeal then l es now h re but to H Force betwe n th persons who h n kn n supe or n earth or wh h permits o ppeal t a j dg on arth be g h ne l l s

trary to th ginal greem t so lso h n the soc ty hath pl d the l gisl t y as sembly f m t co ti th m d th ir succ sso s, w th d ect n and a th ty f pro- vidi ch su sso s, th l gisl t an nev t t th peopl wh ls th t gov rnment lasts because h g p ov ded legisl t w th pow to ti f th y h gi up th ir pol tical po t th l gisl t e, and n t sum t. B t if th y ha t l m ts t th d ti f th ir l gisl ti d m d this sup m pow y pe son assembly ly tempor ry ls wh by th miscarr ges f thos n thor ty t is f rf ted upon th f f tu f th ir rulers t th d t rm ti f th time set, t ev rts t th oc ty d th pe pl ha ight t t sup m d co t e th l gis l t th msel pl t n w form, r new hand as th y think good

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CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

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LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY S MOST HO OURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL AND
LORD LIEUTE ANT OF THE COUNTY OF WILTS, AND OF SOUTH WALES

My Lord

This Tre tise which is grown up u der your lordship s eye and has ventured into th world by you. order does now by natural kind f right, come to your lordship for that pro ection hich you several ears ce promised t. It is not that I think any name how gr t soever set at th beginning of book, will be bl to cover the f ults tha ar to be fou d in t. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader' fancy B there being n thin more to be desired for truth than fair unprej diced —

might therwise perh ps be thou ht t deserve no consideration, for being somewhat t f th commo road. Th imputation f Novelty is terrible charge amo gst those wh j dge f men heads, as they d f th ir perukes, by th fash ion, and can all w to be ri ht but th re ce ved doctrines Truth scarce ever ye carried by o anywhere ts first ppearance ew opinions are alw y suspected, and usuall p- posed, w thou any ther reaso but because they are not alr ady common. But truth, lik gold, is th less so for bein ewly brought ou f th mi It is trial d xaminatu n must gi e price and any antiqu fash and though be t yet curren by th p bli tamp y t t may for all that, be as old as natur and is certainly not the less genuine. Your lordship can gi e gre and con incing instances f this,

whenever you please to bl ss the publ c w th som f those large and comprehens e d scov ries you ha e made of *truths hitherto u known* unless to som few from wh m your lordship has been pleased not wholly to co ceal th m. This al were a sufficient reaso were there no ther why I should dedicate this *Es ay* to your lordship nd ts ha g som l ttl correspond ence w th som parts f th n bler a d vast sys- tem f th sci ces your lordship has made so new xact, and instructi d ht of I think t glory enough, if you lordsh p permit me t boast, that here and th re I ha fall n t some thoughts n t wh lly different from yours. If your — —

lordsh p further and you w ll allow m to say that you her gi e th w ld an earnest of som thi that, if they can bear w th this, will be tru l worth th ir expectatu n. This, my lord shows what present I her mak to your lordship just such as th poor man does to his rich and — —

are mad th fferings of respect, esteem, and gratitud these you ha e gi n me so mighty and peculiar reasons t ha e, in th hi hest d gree for your l rdship that if they ca dd a pr ce to what they g al g w th, proportionabl to their own greatness, I can w th confid ce brag I here mak your lordship th richest p es- nt you ever ece ed. This I am sure I am u der th greatest bligati ns t seek all occas ons to cknowled lon train ff ours I ha e re ce ved from your l rdship fa ours, though gre t and important in th msel es, yet mad m ch more so by the forwardness, co cern, and kind

ness and other obliging circumstances that never failed to accompany them To all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem and allow me a place in your good thoughts I had almost said friendship This my lord your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions even to others when I am absent that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows but it would be want of good manners not to [illegible] gratitude as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship. This I am sure I should write of the *Understanding* without having any if I were not extremely sensible of them and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much I am obliged to be and how much I am

My Lord

Your Lordship s most humble and most obedient servant

John Locke

Dorset Court
4th of May 1689

EPISTLE TO THE READER

READER,

d uh t has been th

tak not this f comme d t n f my wo co cl d because I was pl ased w th th d ing of t, that th for I am f dly tak n w th t ow t is do H that hawks t larks nd parrow has n less sport, tho h much less cons der bl quarry than h that fl es t n bler gam and h is l ttl equ int d w th the subject f this tr tise—th RST DING—who does t know that, as is th most elevated faculty f th soul so t mpl yed w th gr er nd more consta d l ght th y f th other Its searches af truth ar so t f hawking d hun g h in th ery pursu t makes gr t part f th pl asur E ry p th mi d takes ts p gress t ward Knowl dg mak s som disco ry which is t nly but th best too f th t m t l ast.

For he der tanding lik th y j dgi g f bjects nly by ts wn h can t but be pl ased th what disco rs, ha ing less regret for ha has escaped t, because is unknown Thus h who has aised himself bo th lms-bask t, d, not co t t t l lazily n scr ps f begged opin ns, sets his own th ghts on ork, to find and f llow truth, w ll (whateve h lights on) miss th hu t satisf cti every moment f his pursu will w d his pains with som d light d h will h as t thi k his tim t ll pe ev wh h can t m ch boast f y gr t equ ti

This, R ad is th rta m t f those wh l loose their wn tho ghts, d f l w them w g hi h thou ought t tt y th m, ce they ff d th an ppo tun ty f the l k d rsi if th w lt mak use f thy ow thoughts d g I t th m, if th y are thy own tha I f myself but if th y ar tak po trus f m h s, is gr t mat ha they ar th y ar t f llow g truth,

but some mea er considerati and it is not worth while to be co cerned what h says or thinks, who says or thinks o ly as h is d ected by an ther If thou j dgest for thyself I know thou wilt j dg cand dly and the I hall not be harmed ffe ded whatever be thy en sur For though it be certa n that there is n th g this T e tise of the truth whereof I m n t fully persu ded yet I cons der myself as liabl

that had already mastered this subject, a d mad a thorough cq ai tance w th their ow n u d tand gs but for my own nf matio d th

ry de. Afte w had while puzzled our sel es w thout comi any n arer resolut on f thos doubts which pe plexed us, it cam nt my thou hts th t w took a wro g cours and that before we set oursel es po quir es of that n tur t was necessary t xami e wn ab l ties, and se what *bj t* our d rsta di gs wer or w t, fitted t d al w th This I p o-posed t th company wh all adily assent d d th pon t was gr ed that this hould be our fir t inquiry Som hasty and und gest d th ghts, bj t I had eve before co d ed which I set down against our n t me t g g th first entr ce into this Discourse wh h ha g been thus begu by chance was co ti ued by intreaty writt by coher t par cels and aft l int rvals f glect, esumed ain, as my h mou or occas ns perm tted and t last, tir m t wh re tte dance on my health g m l isur t was b ought in t that ord th u now cest t.

This disco ti ed w y f wr ting may ha oc casi ed bes des th rs tw co trary fa lts, viz.

Cf Pascal, *Pens* — W ever look for the tru h f things b fo th va ty f knowledge

Cf. Bk IV ch xix. §

ness and other obliging circumstances that never failed to accompany them To all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem and allow me a place in your good thoughts I had almost said friendship This my lord your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions even to others when I am absent that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows but it would be want of good manners not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of and every day tell me I am indebted to your lordship for I wish they could as easily assist my gratitude as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship This I am sure I should write of the *Understanding* without having any if I were not extremely sensible of them and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much I am obliged to be and how much I am

My Lord

Your Lordship s most humble and most obedient servant

John Locke

Dorset Court
24th of May 1689

Le is not th l ast knov ng and th refore most asv to be satisfied If I ha e n t

t
t

intended for them ...
b t the troubl to be f that numbe B t yet one t..nks fit to be angry and ail t t, he
better
of
n
ss,
o
ut
d
nu
ments to th dmiration f posteri ... ery
..e must no hope to be Boyl or a S d nham
and in an age that p od ces su h masters as the
g t H yg niu d th compar bl Mr
Newton, w th some thers f that strain t is am
b u ou h t be mpl ed as an u d
labourer in cl ..rin the eground littl and re
movin some f th rubbish that lies in the way

terms, introd ced in th sci ces, and ther
ma an art f, to that degree that Philosophy
w ch is n thi g but h tru kn wledg f
things, was th ht nf or cap ble t be
brou ht into ell bred compan and poli e co
ersati ... gu d n nif ant f rms f
speech, and buse f l gu ha so l ng

who speak or those wh h ar th m, hat they are
but the covers f norance d hindrance f
true knowled e. T break in upon the sanctuary
f vanity and norance will be I suppose some
service to human und rstandin thou h so few
are pt to think they dece or ar dece ed in
the use f words or tha th langua f th sect
they are f has any f ults in t which ouch be
examined or corrected that I hope I shall be par
doned if I ha e in the Third Book dwel lon
this subject, and ndea oured t mak t so plain,
that ne ther the inveter eness f the mischief,
nor the prevalency f the fashion shall be any
excuse for those wh w ll n t take care bout the
meani f th ir own ords, and will not suffer
th nifica cy of th ir express st be nquired
into.

I ha bee t ld that a short Ep tome of this
Tr tise wh ch was pr ted 683 was by some
co demned thout r d because ... as
wer der ed n t th too hastily co cl d g
th t f i n t d s were n t supposed there
would be littl left ther f th nou or proof
of sp s. If an one tak th lik offence at th
entrance of this Tr atise I shall desir him to
re d throu h and th I hope h will be co
inced that the taki wa fals fou d t ns
is n t t th pr judice but ad a tage of truth,
which is nev injured or enda gered so much
... h or built on, f lsehood

th man f ults comm t ed th former u
sures too, that t should be known that t has
wh l n w h pter c n g *Id ty* d
ma dditions and m ndm ts in th pla
es. These I must inform m der re ot all ew
matter but most of them e th furthe confirma
tion of what I had said or e plicati ns, to pr
ent thers bein mistaken th se se of what
was *forme ly prin ed, and not any* ariati n in
me from t.

I must only e cept the alterations I ha e made
in Book II chap xxi

What I had there writt concernin Liberty
and th Will, I thou ht deserved as *ccurate*
ew as I am capabl of those subjects ha ing in
all es ercised th l ed part of th w ld
w th q estions and difficulties, that ha e not a
li tl perp exed moral ty nd di inity those parts
f knowled that men are mos concerned to be
clear in. Upon c..ose inspection into the work
ing of men minds, and str ct examination
f those moti es and ews they ar turned by
I h f und son mewhat to lt the
thou hts I form l had co cerning that which
gi es th la t d termi n t th Will n all
ol tary cti ns This I cann t forbear to
knowled t th world w th as much freed m
and adiness as I first published what then
seemed to m to be right thinkin myself mor
concerned to quit and enounce any opinion
f my own, than oppose that of another wh n
truth ppears ainst t. For is truth alon I

Cf. Berkeley *Principles f Human Knowledg* Introd. Sect.

Cf. Berk ley th abuse f words, *Principles* Introd. Sect. 8–25.
Bk. II, ch. xxvii.

that I should have gone further If it seems too much to thee thou must blame the subject for when I put pen to paper I thought all I should have to say on this matter would have been contained in one sheet of paper but the further I went the larger prospect I had new discoveries led me still on and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in I will not deny but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is and that some parts of it might be contracted the
and many l
apt to cause
truth I am now too lazy or too busy to make it shorter

I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation when I knowingly let it go with a fault so apt to disgust the most judicious who are always the nicest readers But they who know sloth is apt to content itself with any excuse will pardon me if mine has prevailed on me where I think I have a very good one I will not therefore allege in my defence that the same notion having different respects may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse and that so it has happened in many parts of this but waiving that I shall frankly avow that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument and expressed it different ways with a quite different design I pretend not to publish this *Essay* for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions to such masters of knowledge I profess myself a scholar and therefore warn them beforehand not to expect anything here but what being spun out of my own coarse thoughts is fitted to men of my own size to whom perhaps it will not be unacceptable that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths which established prejudice or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves might render difficult Some objects had need be turned on every side and when the notion is new as I confess some of these are to me or out of the ordinary road as I suspect they will appear to others it is not one simple view of it that will gain it admittance into every understanding or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression There are few I believe who have not observed in themselves or others that what in one way of proposing was very obscure another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible though afterwards the mind found little difference in the phrases and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other But everything does not hit alike upon every man s imagination We have our understandings no less different than our palates and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery the meat may be the same and the nourishment good yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning and it must be dressed another way if you will have it go down with some even of strong constitutions The truth is those who advised me to publish it, advised me for this reason to publish it as it is and since I have been brought to let it go abroad I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it I have so little affection to be in print that if I were not flattered this *Essay* might be of some use to others as I think it has been to me I should have confined it to the view of some friends who gave the first occasion to it My appearing therefore in print being on purpose to be as useful as I may I think it necessary to make what I have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers as I can And I had much rather the speculative and quick sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious than that any one not accustomed to abstract speculations or prepossessed with different notions should mistake or not comprehend my meaning

It will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity or insolence in me to pretend to instruct this our knowing age it amounting to little less, when I own that I publish this *Essay* with hopes it may be useful to others But if it may be permitted to speak freely of those who with a feigned modesty condemn as useless what they themselves write methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence to publish a book for any oth

tends not they should meet with anything of use to themselves or others and should nothing else be found allowable in this Treatise yet my design will not cease to be so and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present It is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure which I expect not to escape more than better writers. Men s principles notions and relishes are so different that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men I acknowledge the age

[1] Compare Locke s letter 21 March 1704

thinks in what he says hist. rd chapt r (p 8) concerning natural nscr pt. n and nat notions. I shall not den him the pri ilege he claims (p. 5.) to s.at th q est on as h pleases, especia..y when he states t so as to l noth g in t contrary to what I ha e sa d For ccord g to him, inna e n ti ns bein co d t nal th ngs d pend upon the concurrence of several her circumr tances ord t th soul ex rti t. m, all that he .a f n m pri..ed impressed noti ns (fo f nnat h sa not..in t all) amounts at la t ly t th — th there are ce tai pr posit ns which though h soul from th beginnin or when a m n is born, does not know yet by ssis.ance from the outward senses, and th h lp f some previ ous cul ation, t may *afterward* come certa l to know th truth f wh h is no more than wh t I ha e affirmed in my First Book. For I suppose by th soul s erting them, h me ns its beginnin t k ow them or be the soul ex rt in of notions will be t me a ery un t ll gibl expression nd I th nk t best is ery unfit ne in this, t misl din m s th ughts by insinuation, as if these n t ns we in the mind be fore th soul exerts them, before they are known —wh reas truly bef th y are known ther is thin f th m n th mind but ca p city to know them, h th co curre ce of those circumstances," whi h this g ous au thor thinks ecessary rd t th soul g th m, brings them t ur kn ledge "These tural

cl de th t e ther my book is pl inly ough wr tt n to be t th und rs ood by those ho peruse t w th that attention nd ind erence wh ch every one who ll ta e h ms lf th pa ns to read ought to empl n read g or lse that I ha e wr tt n mine so bscurel that it is n a n to go bout to mend it. Whichever of these be the truth, it is m self o ly am ffected thereby nd th refore I shall be far fro troubl g my d r th what I th k r ht be sa d n an swe t those sever l bjec ns I ha e met w th nd he of my book since I

to my doctr wh n I nd my obj s t it both to be well und rs ood.

nf I h t none f their

m d r s tume n so di or ll natured a ployme t f mine as to lessen th satisf ct on any e h n hims lf or g es to thers, in so hasty a con.utat n of what I ha e wr tt n.

Th booksell rs prepar g for the Fourth Ed t f my *Es y* ga me not ce of t, that I m ght f I had l isur make a y add t ns or lterat ns I hould think f t. Wh re pon I th ght t co

th m Wh h has pla ed t himself th rs what he means b th soul ti ginn t ti ns, or th ir er h msel es and what tha p ev ous ul ti d ircumstances' n ord t th ir bein ed ar —h ill I suppose find th is sol tiI f co tr ersy bet e n him and m th poi t bat that h alls that ex ting f no ns wh h I more ul gar ty! all k in th t I h reas t hink h brou ht m name thus occa n nly out f th pl asure h has t peak ci ully f me whi h I m st gr t f ll kn l dg h has d everywher h m ti ns m t w thout conf rrin on me as som th rs h e d a titl I h e ght to.

Th ma y f h s, th t I think justice to my re d and my lf t con

I

Cl ar d d tinct I as are t rms which th gh f mil ar d f equ t m n s mouths, I h reaso t think ery o wh uses does not perfectly u d rsta d And poss bly tis but h re and th re wh gi es himself the trouble to co d th m so far as t k ow hat h hims lf th rs p ecisely m n b th m. I ha e th refore mos pl ces chose t put *d erm t* or *d ter m ed* t d f I d *di tinct* as more lik ly t dire t m n th hts t my me g t th m tter By thos d om ti s, I m n so e bj t th m d a d qu tly d t mi ed su h as t s th re een and perce ed t be This, I thi k m y fitly be call d a d ter mi t d t rm d d a, wh n su h as t s t any tim bj t el th mind d so d t mi ed th t is n ed d w th t ti n d t m ed t nam articul te so d

seek [1] and that will always be welcome to me when or from whencesoever it comes

But what forwardness soever I have to resign any opinion I have or to recede from anything I have writ upon the first evidence of any error in it yet this I must own that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book nor have from anything that has been urged against it found reason to alter my sense in any of the points that have been questioned Whether the subject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers at least such as are prepossessed are willing to allow or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it and these notions are made difficult to others apprehensions in my way of treating them so it is that my meaning I find is often mistaken and I have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood

Of this the ingenious author of the *Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man* has given me a late instance to mention no other For the civility of his expressions and the candour that belongs to his order forbid me to think that he would have closed his Preface with an insinuation as if in what I had said Book II ch xxvii concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to I went about to make virtue vice and vice virtue unless he had mistaken my meaning which he could not have done if he had given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was I was then upon and what was the chief design of that chapter plainly enough set down in the fourth section and those following For I was there not laying down moral rules but showing the original and nature of moral ideas and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations whether these rules were true or false and pursuant thereto I tell what is everywhere called virtue and vice which alters not the nature of things though men generally do judge of and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place and sect they are of

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said Bk. I ch ii sect 18 and Bk II ch xxviii sects 13 14 15 and 20 he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong and what I call virtue and vice And if he had observed that in the place he quotes I only report as a matter of fact what *others* call virtue and vice he would not have found it liable to any great exception For I think I am not much out in saying that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation is—that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men according to which they are there called virtues or vices And whatever authority the learned Mr Lowde places in his *Old English Dictionary* I dare say it nowhere tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit called and counted a virtue in one place which being in disrepute passes for and under the name of vice in another The taking notice that men bestow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of Reputation is all I have done or can be laid to my charge to have done towards the making vice virtue or virtue vice But the good man does well and as becomes his calling to be watchful in such points and to take the alarm even at expressions which standing alone by themselves might sound ill and be suspected

Tis to this zeal allowable in his function that I forgive his citing as he does these words of mine (ch xxviii sect 11) Even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute Philip iv 8 without taking notice of those immediately preceding which introduce them and run thus Whereby even in the corruption of manners the true boundaries of the law of nature which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice were pretty well preserved So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers, &c By which words and the rest of that section it is plain that I brought that passage of St Paul not to prove that the general measure of what men called virtue and vice throughout the world was the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself but to show that though it were so yet for reasons I there give men in that way of denominating their actions did not for the most part much stray from the Law of Nature which is that standing and unalterable rule by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and gravity of their actions and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices Had Mr Lowde considered this he would have found it little to his purpose to have quoted this passage in a sense I used it not and would I imagine have spared the application he subjoins to it as not very necessary But I hope this Second Edition will give him satisfaction on the point and that this matter is now so expressed as to show him there was no cause for scruple

Though I am forced to differ from him in these apprehensions he has expressed in the latter end of his preface concerning what I had said about virtue and vice yet we are better agreed than he

[1] See Bk. I ch iii § 23 Bk IV ch xi § 1

AN ESSAY

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

As thou kn west n what is th way f th Spir nor how the bones d grow in th womb f her that is w h hild even so thou knowest no th wo ks f God who mak h all things —Eccles. 11 5.

Quam bellum t rel.e onfiteri potius nesci quod nescias quam ta e fut entem nausear atque ipsum sib disp icer —Cicero *d Nat Deor I* i.

INTRODUCTION

1 *An Inquiry int th under tandi pl asant and useful* Since t is the *under tand* that sets man bove the rest f sens bl beings, and gi es him all th ad antage and domin n which he has ov them t is certainly sub ect, even for ts nobleness, worth our labour to quire to. Th understandin lik th y whilst t makes us see and perce all th things, takes no tice of tself and t requires art and pains to set t at distance and mak ts own bject. B t hat ever be th difficulties that li in th ay of this inquiry whatever t be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves sur I am that all the li ht we can l t in upo ur minds, all th cquai t ance w can mak w th our own und rstandings, ill not onl be ery pl asant, but br n us gr t d antage in directing our thoughts in th search f th things.

De n. Thus, th refor be g my purpose —to inquire in th or ginal, certai ty and tent f *human knowl d* tog th with th grounds and degrees f *b l f pini n*, and *assent* —I hall not prese t meddl w th th ph sical cons d eration f th mind or troubl myself to am ine wherein ts esse ce consists b what motions f our spirits or al u ns of our bod es w come to ha e any *ensat* by our organs, or any *idea* our und rstandi gs and wh ther thos id as d in th ir formation, any or all f them, depend on matter or t. Thes ar specula tions which, howeve cur ous and rtaining I shall decline as l ing out f my w y th d

— t h ll s ffice to my p es s imagine I ha e n t wh lly misemployed m yself in the thoughts I shall h o this occas on f

3 *Met od* It is ther fore worth whil to search out th bounds between p n nd knowledg and examine by what measures, thi gs whereof we ha e no certain knowledge, we ought t g ulat our asse t and moder t ur persuas I ord whereunto I shall pursu this f llow ng method —

First, I hall inquire into the o ginal of those

Cf Bacon, *Novum Organum* ph 3

Cf. Bk. II ch. §23 on *sensation*, nd I trod §8 on *idea*.

See Bk II

See Bk. IV ch. i–xiii.

See Bk. IV h. v–xx.

This is th special subject f Book IV

which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind or determinate idea

To ev…
determi…
that si… …u has in its view or perceives in itself when that idea is said to be in it by *determined* when applied to a complex idea I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas joined in such a proportion and situation as the mind has before its view and sees in itself when that idea is present in it or should be present in it when a man gives a name to it I say *should* be because it is not every one nor perhaps any one who is so careful of his language as to use no word till he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he resolves to make it the sign of The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men s thoughts and discourses

I know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men s discourses and reasonings But this hinders not bu… h…
he may have ir…
he makes it th…
keep it steadily a…nexed during that present discourse Where he does not or cannot do this he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas it is plain h s are not so and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion where … h…

t… …d distinct and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason inquire or argue about they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end the greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words or (which is the same) indetermined ideas which they are made to stand for I have made choice of these terms to signify (1) Some immediate object of the mind which it perceives and has before it distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it ( ) That this idea thus determined i e which the mind has in itself and knows and sees there be determined without any change to that name and that name determ… …d
men…
ies an…
far th…
avoid…
wrang…ngs they have with others [1]

Besides this the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new the one of the *Association of Ideas* the other of *Enthusiasm*. These with some other larger additions never before printed he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner and for the same purpose as was done when this *Essay* had the second impression

In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered The greatest part of what is new is contained in the twenty first chapter of the second book which any one if he thinks it worth while may with a very little labour transcribe into the margin of the former edition

[1] So in Berkeley s *Princ pl* Intr d §§ 18–25.

cause some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man

our knowledge.

7 *Occasion of this essay* This was that which gave the first rise to this *Essay* concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of Being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.

8. *What Idea stands for* Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this Inquiry into human Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word *idea*, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the *object* of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm, notion, species*, or *whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking*; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

... will be easily granted me, that

come into the mind.

BOOK I Neither Principles nor Ideas Are Innate

Chap I No Innate Speculative Principles

The way shown how we come by any knowledge sufficient to prove it not innate It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain *innate principles*; some primary notions, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search

Cf. Locke ... to Stillingfleet, p. 69; also Bk. IV ch. xvii §3.

Cf. ... §5.

Descartes *Meditations on First Philosophy*

Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* p. 43 ... below

ideas notions or whatever else you please to call them which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them [1]

Secondly I shall endeavour to show what *knowled e* the understanding hath by those ideas and the certainty evidence and extent of it [2]

Thirdly I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of *f ith* or *opinion* whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge And here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of *assent* [3]

4 *Useful to know the extent of our comprehension* If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof how far they reach to what things they are in any degree proportionate and where they fail us I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities We should not then perhaps be so forward out of an affectation of an universal knowledge to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all If we can find out how far the understand ng can extend its view how far it has faculties to attain certainty and in what cases it can only judge and guess we may learn to content oursel es with what is attainable by us in this state

5 *Our cap city su ted to our state and concerns* For though the comprehension of our understand
— d ~ ho of h v nt of

to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ ευσέβειαν whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life and the way that leads to a better How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is it yet secures their great concernments that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker and the sight of their own duties Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads and employ their hands with variety delight and satisfaction if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp everything We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us for of that they are very capable And it will be an unpardonable as well as child sh peevishness if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge and neglect to improve it to the ends for wh ch it was given us because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant who would not attend his business by candle light to plead that he had not broad sunshine The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us and we shall then use our understandings right when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration and demand certainty where probability only is to be had and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments If we will disbelieve everything because we cannot certainly know all things we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly

6 *Kn wledge of our c pacity a cure of scepticism and idleness* When we know our own strength we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success and when we have well surveyed the *powers* of our own minds and made

kno ing anyth ng nor on the other side question everything and discla m all knowledge be

[1] Th subject of the Book II nd neg t vely of the Ist

[2] Th basis and b ndary f human knowl edg or bsolut ce ta nty is exam d in the first thirteen chapters of the Book IV

[3] Assent n ts d grees of p obabil ty f om moral cert inty down to the faintest presumpt on is cons d red in the f urteenth and f llowing chapters of the Book IV

stood. So that t be n th u d rstand g and t to be und rstood to be in the mi d and ever to be perce ed is all as t say a y thing is and is t th mi d r u d rstand ng If therefore these two propos ti Wh tsoever is, is, and It is mposs bl for th sam thing to be and t t be ar by tur imp ted ch l dren cannot be gn rant f them fants, and all th t ha e souls, must n essarily ha e them in th u und rstandings, kno the truth f th m, and asse t to t

6 *That men k ow them when they com to the use f ason answer d* T o d this, t is usually an sw ed that all men know a d assent to th m *hen they ome to the use f on* a d this is gh to p ove them nnat I answ

7 Doubtful xp ess ns, that ha e scarc ny gnification g for cl ar easons to those who being prepossessed take ot the p ns t exam in even what they th ms l es say F t p-ply this answer w th any t ler bl sense t our present purpose t must emify o f these two things the that as soon as m com to the use f aso these supposed n ti in scr ptions com t be known and bserved by them or lse that th us and rcise f men ason, assists th m in th discov ry of these p in ples, and certainly make them known t th m.

8 *If ason d sc er d them that would not pr them nnat* If they m tha by th use of ea so men may discover these p ciples and that this is suffici to p ov th m na th ir ay f argum will tand thus, iz tha hates *d sco* t us d u ally sal as- nou ts ason owledg

unl ss, as I h sa d w will have all the cer tain truths th t reason ever t hes us, t be nat W may as ell think the use of reason necessary to mak our yes discove vis ble ob-jects, as that ther should be ne d of r ason or th e rcise th reof to mak the u derstand g see hat s o g n lly gra n on t and can t be n the und rstand g before t be perce ed by t. So that to make ason d sco r thos truths thus impr nted, is to say that th use f reas n disco ers to man hat h knew befor and f men ha e those innate impressed truths o gi ally and befo e the use f r aso and yet ar always gn ant of them till they come to the use of eas n, t is n eff ct t say that m n kno and know th m t at the same tim

9 us mad f asom the d scovery f th e two m xims It will h re pe haps be sa d that mathematical demonstrati ns, and other truths that ar t in t ar n t as ted to as soon as proposed wh n they are distinguished from thes maxims and other n te truths. I hall ha occas t speak of asse t upon the fir t propos n mor particularly by a d by I shall her only and th t e y d ly allow that these maxims and math mat cal d m nstrati ns ar in thi d ff r nt that the o e ha e need of re so us g f p oof to mak th m out and to gain ou asse t but th othe as soon as unde stood ar thout any th l ast r asoni g m braced d assented t But I w thal beg l e to bserv th t t lay ope th eakness f this subterfuge which requ es th use of r aso for th disco ery of these g al truths ince it must be confessed that their discov ry ther is n us mad f easoni g t all And I think thos wh gi e thi answe will not be f n ard to affirm that the kn wl dg f this maxim, 'That h s m thi g t be and t

being all disco er es mad by u usc and truths that u nal cr tur may certain ly com to know if h pply his thoughts ghtly tha w y

P how

casting bout d quires p ins at u pp t n And how ca t w th any l r bl sens be supposed that wh t was mp ted by natu as th found ti n d gu d f ur aso hould eed the use f ason to discov t.

mind som truths, d pe ds n t, th t inscr pti n, or th use f ason but f culty f th mind q t distin t from both of

of truth when they lead him ever so little out of the common road I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion as an excuse for my mistake if I be in one which I leave to be considered by those who with me dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it

General ass nt the great argument There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain *principles* both *speculative* and *practical* (for they *speak of both*) *universally* agreed upon by all mankind which therefore they argue must needs be *the constant impressions* which the souls of men r

beings and v

them as nec

their inherer u ties

3 *Universal consent proves nothin innate* This argument drawn from universal consent has th s misfortune in it that if it were true in matter of fact that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed it would not prove them innate *if there can be any other way shown how* men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in which I presume may be done [1]

4 *What is is and It is impossible for the same thing to b and n t to be not univ r all n d*

But

conse

princ o demonstration that there are none such because there are none to which all *mankind* give an uni ersal assent I shall begin with the speculati e and instance in those magnified princ ples of demonstration What soever is is and It is impossible for the same thing to b

I think h

These ha

universally received *that it will no doubt* be thought strange if any one should seem to quest on it But yet I take liberty to say that these propositions are so far from having an universal

a appr ension or thought of them And the want of that is enough to dest oy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all *innate* truths it seeming to me near a contradict on to say that there are truths imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not imprinting if it signify any thing being *nothing else but the making certain truths* to be perceived For to imprint anythin on the mind without the mind s perceiving it seems to me hardly intelligible If therefore child d

t ince they do not it is evident that there are no such *impressions For if they are not* notions naturally imprinted how can they be *innate?* and if they are *notions imprinted how* can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind and yet at the same time to say that the mind is ignorant of it and never yet took notice of it is to make this impression nothing *No proposition can be sa d to be in the* mind which it never yet knew which it was never yet conscious of For if any one may then by the same reason all propositions that are true and the mind is capable ever of assenting to *may be said to be in the mind* and *to be imprinted* since if any one can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew it must be *only* because it is capable of knowing it and so the m nd is of all truths it ever shall know Nay thus truths may be *imprinted on the mind* which it never did nor ever shall know for a man may live long and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing and that with certainty So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impress on contended for all the t uths a man ever comes to know will *by this account* be every one of them *innate* and this great point will amount to no more but only to a very improper way of speaking which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary says nothing d fferent f om those who deny innate principles Fo nobody I think eve denied that the m nd as capable of knowing several truths The capacity they say *is innate* the kno ledge acquired But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imp inted on the understanding w thout be ng perceived I can see no diff rence there can be bet een any truths the mind is *capable* of kno *ing in respect* of their o iginal they must all be innate or all ad ent tious in *vain shall a man go about to* d st guish them *He therefo e that talks of* i nate not ons in the understanding cannot (if he intend thereby any d tinct so t of truths) mean such truths to be in the understand ng as it *never perceived* and is yet wholly gnorant of Fo if these w o ds to be in the und rstand ng have any propriety *they signify to be under*

[1] Cf *Th d Lette* to Stell ngfl et p 264 286

34 Cf Bk IV ch vii.

to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase. But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words, or comes to that which we commonly call the use of reason. For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing.

6. *Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness.* A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same grounds and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also that he may come to know afterwards "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims;—whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.

7. *Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.* This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

8. *If such an assent be a mark of innate, then "that one and two are equal to three, that sweetness is not bitterness," and a thousand the like, must be innate.* In answer to this, I demand whether ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the

In Bk. IV ch. ii § and ch. vii § 9.

Cf. Bk. IV ch. vii.

them as we shall see hereafter Reason there fore having nothing to do in procuring our as sent to these maxims if by saying that men know and assent to them when they come to the use of reason be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims it is utterly false and were it true would prove them not to be innate

1 *The comin to the use of reason not the time we come to kn w these maxims* If by knowing and as senting to them when we come to the use of rea son be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind and that as soon as children come to the use of reason they come also to know and assent to these max ims this also is false and frivolous First it is false because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason and therefore the coming to the use of reason is false ly assigned as the time of their discovery How many instances of the use of reason may we ob- serve in children a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim 'That it is impos- sible for the same thing to be and not to be? And a great part of illiterate peopl nd

I en come not to the knowl edge of these general and more abstract truths which are thought innate till they come to the use of reason and I add nor then neither Which is so because till after they come to the use of rea son those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind about which those general maxims are which are mistaken for innate principles but are indeed d scoveries made and ver ties in troduced and brought into the n nd by the same way and discovered by the same steps as sev eral other proposit ons which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate Th s I hope to make plain

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edge of t ge eral truths but deny that men s com ng to the use of reason is the t me of the r discovery

13 *By th s they a not d stin ui hed fr m other k i wable truths* In the mean time it is observa ble that this saying that men know and assent to these maxims when they come to the use of rea son amounts in reality of fact to no mo e but this —that they are ne er known nor taken no- tice of before the use of reason but may possibly be assented to some time after during a man s life but when is uncertain And so may all other knowable truths as well as these which there fore have no advantage nor distinction from oth ers by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason nor are thereby proved to be innate but quite the contrary

14 *If com n to the use of reason were the time of their discovery it w uld ot prove them innate* But secondly were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to[2] were when men come to the use of reason neither would that prove them innate This way of argum is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false For by what kind of logic will it appear that any no- tion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind which has quite a distinct province begins to exert itself? And therefore the comin to the use of speech if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason) would be as good a proof that they were innate as to say they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason I agree then with these men of innate principles that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident max ims in the mind till it comes to the exercise of reason but I deny that the com ng to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken not ce of and if that ere the precise time I deny that it would prove them innate All that can with any truth be meant by th s proposition that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason is no more but th s —that the making of general abstract ideas and the under stand ng of general names being a concomitant of the rational faculty and gro ing up with it, ch ldren commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them till having for a good hile exercised their reason about famil ar and more particular deas they are by their ord nary discours and actions with others acknow led ed to be capable of rational conversation If assent ng to these maxims when men come to the use of eason can be true in any other sense I desire t may be sho n or at least how in th s or any other sense it proves them innate

15 *Th steps by wh ch the m nd att ns s ver l truths* Th senses at first let in *part cular* ideas and furnish the yet empty cab net, and the mind by degrees growing fam l ar with some of them they are lodged in the memory and names got

[1] Cf Bk IV ch ii § 1 ch vi § 19 ch xvii §§ 14 17

[2] Cf Hum *E qu y* p 457 fn bel w

print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these principles may be made more evident to us by others' teaching than nature has made them by impression: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed: but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate; but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions: not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their assent to.

22. *Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.* If it be said, the understanding hath an *implicit* knowledge of these principles, but not an *explicit*, before this first hearing (as they must who will say "that they are in the understanding before they are known,") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this,—that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind: which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

3. *The argument of assenting on first hearing, is* ... Cf. Bk. IV. ch. ii § 7

upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching. There ... in the foregoing ... there ... which ... assent ... ght, nor ... ment or ... under-standing of the terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything *de novo*; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, ... they have learned the terms, ... is born ... knowl... bout which the propositions is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We *by degrees* get ideas and names, and *learn* their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For, though a child quickly assents to this proposition, "That an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted ...

for the same thing to be and not to be;" because that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms; but as soon

terms that men would have those maxims pass for innate they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate and thus that one and two are equal to three that two and two are equal to four and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms must have a place amongst these innate axioms Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone and propositions made about several of them but even natural philosophy and all the other sciences afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood That two bodies cannot be in the same place is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be that white is not black that a square is not a circle that bitterness is not sweetness These and a million of such other propositions as many at least as we have distinct ideas of every man in his wits at first hearing and knowing what the names stand for must necessarily assent to If these men will be true to their own rule and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of innate they must allow not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of another Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be or that which is the foundation of it and is the easier understood of the two The same is not different by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other But since no proposition can be innate unless the *ideas* about which it is be innate this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours sounds tastes figure &c innate than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience [2] Universal and ready

was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate

19 *Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims* Nor let it be said that those more particular self-evident propositions which are assented to at first hearing as that one and two are equal to three that green is not red &c. are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles since any one who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding will certainly find that these and the like less general propositions are certainly known and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims and so being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing

20 *One and one equal to Two &c not general nor useful answered* If it be said that these propositions viz two and two are equal to four red is not blue &c are not general maxims nor of any great use I answer that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding For if that be the certain mark of innate whatever proposition can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard and understood that must be admitted for an innate proposition as well as this maxim That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be they being upon this ground equal And as to the difference of being more general that makes this maxim more remote from being innate those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered [4]

21 *These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed proves them not innate* But we have not yet done with assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms It is fit we first take notice that this instead of being a mark that they are innate is a proof of the contrary since it supposes that several who understand and know other things are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others For if they were innate what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent when by being in the understanding by a natural and original impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them

Cf ch ii § 20
Cf Hume *Enquiry* p 457 fn 1 below
Cf Bk IV ch ii § 1 &c

See Bk IV ch vii.

maxims we are discoursin of are n t kno n to ch dren, idiots, and great part f mankind, hereby t

native thou hts into new moulds no y pu ... inducing foreign nd studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had wri ten there one mi ht re sonably imagin that in *their* minds these inna notu ns shoud li pen fairly to every one s ew as t is certain th thou hts of children do It might ery well be expected tha these principles should be pe f ctl known to naturals which be stamped immediat ly on the soul, (as thes men suppose) can ha e no d pendence on the constu u or organs f the body the onl confessed differe ce between them and others. O would think, ccord n t thes men princip es, that all these nat e beams of li t (were ther any su h) hould, in those who have no reserves, n arts f concealment, hine out in their full lustre, and l e us n o more doubt of their bein there than we are f their love f pleasure nd bhorrence f pain. But alas, amongst childr n diots, sa a es, and the grossl illi era e, what general maxims are to be found. What uni ersal principles f knowledge Their notions are few and narrow borrowed only from those bjects they ha e had most to do th, and whi h ha e mad po th ir senses the frequen es and tron est impress ns. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and b degrees t

these bstract maxims and pu ed principles f science will, I f ar find himself mis ak n. S ch kind f general propos tions are seldom mentioned in the h ts of Indiar m ch less are they to be found in the thoughts f children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business f the schools and academies of learned nat ons, accustomed to that sort of con ersation or learni g where disputes are frequ t these maxims be ng ted to artificial argumentati n and useful for con u n, but not much conducing to th discov ery f truth or d ancement of knowledg B t of th ir small use for the improvement of knowledge I hall ha e occasi n to speak mor t large l 4, c. 7

8 *Rec pitulat on.* I know not how absurd this may seem t th masters of demonstr u n. And probably t will hardly go down w th any body t first h aring I must therefore beg a little truce w th prejud ce and th forbearance f cen sure till I ha e been h ard out n the sequel f this Discourse bei g ers willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search afte truth, I shall not be sorry to be con nced that I ha e been too f nd of my own notions which I confess we are all apt to be wh n ppli cation nd study ha e warmed our he ds w th th m.

Upon the whol matt I cannot see any ground to think these two peculati e Maxims nnat since they ar not uni ersally assented to and th asse t they so gene ally find is no other than what several propos u ns, n t allowed to be na e, equally partake n w th them and since the assent that is gi en them is prod ced another way and comes not from natural inscription, as I do bt not but to mak ppear in the f llowin Discourse And if *these* first principles of knowledg and sci ce are found n t to be nate, no *ther* speculati e maxims can (I suppose) w th better ri ht pretend to be so.

Chap II *No Inn e Practical Principl s*

moral principl so cl ar and so generally ceived as t foremen ioned peculative maxims If those speculati Maxims, whereof we discoursed in th foregoin chap er ha e n t an ctual uni er sal assent from all mankind, as w there proved t is much more isibl concerni *practical* Principles, that they come short f an uni ersal receptio and I think t will be hard to nstance an moral rul which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, What is, is or to be so manifest a truth as this, that "It is mpossibl for the same thing t be and not to be." Whereby t is ev d nt that they are further re moved fr m ti to be innat and th doubt f their being native impressions on the mind is stronger gainst those moral principles than the the t that t brings their truth t all in question. They are equally true, though not equal ly ev dent. Those speculati maxims carry their

as ever he has got those ideas and learned their names he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions and with both for the same reason viz because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not *yet in his mind to such propositions however* evidently true or false in themselves he affords *neither assent nor dissent but is ignorant.* For words being but empty sounds any further than they are signs of our ideas *we cannot but assent* to them as they correspond to those ideas we have but no further than that But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds and the grounds of several degrees of assent being the bus ness of the following Discourse it may suffice to have only touched on it here as one reason that made me doubt of those innate pr nciples

24 *Not innate because not u ivers lly ass ted to* To conclude this argument of uni ersal consent I agree with these defenders of innate principles —that if they are innate they must needs have universal assent For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to is to me as unintell gible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time But then by these *men s own confession they cannot be innate* since they are not assented to by those who un*derstand not the terms nor by a great part of* those who do understand them but have yet never

— h h

stroy un versal assent and thereby show these propos tions not to be nnate if ch ldren alone were ignorant of them

5 *These maxims n t the first kn wn* But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants hich are unkno n to us and to conclude from what passes *in their understand ngs* before they express it I say next that these two *general propositions* are not the truths that first possess the minds of children nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions hich if they were innate they must needs be Whether we can determine it or no it matters not there is certainly a time when ch ldren begin to think and their ords and act ons do assure us that they do so When therefore they are capable of thought of kno ledge of assent can it rat onally be supposed they can be ignorant *of those notions* that nature has impr nted were there any such? Can it be imagined with any appearance of reason that they perceive the impressions from things without and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being and imprinted there in indelible characters to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take *pains to no purpose or at least to write very ill* since its characters could not be read by those *eyes which saw other things very well and those*

of truth

doubted knowledge of several other things may be had The child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with nor the blackmoor it is afraid of that the wormseed or mustard it refuses is not the apple or sugar it cries for this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of but will any one say it is by virtue of this principle That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehen sion of that propos tion at an age wherein yet it is plain it knows a great many other truths?

general

thou ht to have more passion and zeal for his opin on but less sincerity and truth than one of that age

6 *And so t innate* Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent as soon as proposed to men grown up who ha e attained the use of more general and abstr ct ideas and names stand n for them yet they not bei g to be found in those of tender years o nevertheless know *other th ngs they cannot pretend to un ersal* assent of intell gent persons and so by no means can be supposed innate —it be ng impossible that any truth which is innate (f there ere any such) should be unkno n at least to any one who knows anyth ng else Since if they a e innate truths they must be innate thoughts there being noth ng a truth in t m nd that it has never thought on Wh reby it s e dent if there by any *innate truths they must necessarily be*

impos bl f r the s m thing to be and not t be It carr es its ow n l ht a d e d nce th t and eeds o oth p oof h that u d rstands ts t t fo ts ow n sak or ls

t e a t l to or t as d

soo as h ard and u d rs ood, w ase ted to as an u q t n bl truth which ma ca by m ns d bt f So th t th truth f all these mo al rules pl nly d pe ds po som th t ed t t th m d from h h they mus be *d duc d* h ch ould n t be if th they o so much as self-ev d t

5 *Instance k p n comp t* That m n h uld keep th ir comp ts is tainly a gr t d d m bl rul in m al ty B t y t f a Chris an wh has th vi w f happ ss d mis ry in an other lif be asked why man must k p his ord h w ll gi this as aso —Because God, wh has th power f rnal lif a d d th, equ res t f us. B f H bbist be asked why

natur d th rwise

6 *I tue g r lly pp d not b aus t but b aus pr fitabl* H naturally flow s th gr t ar ty f p ns co cernin m al rules wh ch ar t be fou d m g m ceo d t *th d ff* so *ts f h pp ess they ha p os*pect f p pose th ms l which could no be f pr cal p pl e d imp ed ur mu d mmed t l) by th ha d f God l gr th us f God many wa manif t, d th bed e e him so ongruous t th l ght f as that gr t part f mank d gi t um y t th l f tu bu y t I thi k t must be allowed that se al mo al rul may ece f m manki d ery g l ppr batu w thou h k ow g d mu ing th tru gr und f mo al ty which can nly be th w ll d l w f God

h sees m n n the dark, has in his hand re ards nd pun shm nts a d pow ough to call t count the proudest off der For God ha g by an ns parabl connexio jo ned r th a d made the

be sale n f om th m l nd et n l bl gat on wh ch these rules de tly ha yet t shows th t th outward ck wledgm nt me p y to th m in th words p n t that they re nate pe n n m h as that m n

s l

prof ss o a d pp batu n of u e w use u ns suff c dy prove that th y ry l tile e d r th Lawgi er th t p escr bed thes rules n r th h ll that h has dai d f r the pu h *me* t f those that tr nsgr ss th m.

7 *M act ns continc us that th rule f ri t is not their nterni l principl* F f w will n t in ci il ty allow too much cer ty t th p fes s ns f most m but think th ir cu ns to be the t p t f th ir thoughts we sh ll fi d that they ha e n ch t al e r t on f these rules so full persuas of th ir ce tainty and bl gatu n. Th gr t p ciple f m rality To d as w uld be d e to is m comm ded than p tised But the bre ch f this *rul* ca t be gr t r ce than to t ch the s, th t t no moral rule n r bl ga t ry uld be th ht mad ess, and co trary t that nt t m n r fi et h n th y bre k t *th msel s*. F hap *nse we* w ll be urged as check us f r such br ches d so the t r nal bl gat and tablishme t f the rul be pres rv d

8 *C nsci no p f f y t m al rul* T which I s e th t I d bt t b t th ut be wr tt n th ir h arts many m n may by th sam w y that th com t th kn w ledg f th thi gs, com to assent t s e al m ral rul s, and be co ced f th bl g ti n. Oth also may c m to be f th sam m d from th d cat company and customs f th ir country which persuas how

own evidence with them but *moral principles* require reasoning and discourse and some exercise of the mind to discover the certainty of their truth They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind which if any such were they must needs be visible by themselves and by their own light be certain and known to everybody But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to *two right ones* because it is not so evident as the whole is bigger than a part nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing It may suffice that these moral rules are capable of demonstration and therefore it is our own faults if we come not to a certain knowledge of them But the ignorance wherein many *men are of them* and *the slowness of assent* wherewith others receive them are manifest proofs that they are not innate and such as offer themselves to their view without searching

2 *Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men* Whether there be any such moral principles wherein all men do agree I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys Where is that practical truth that is universally received without doubt or question as it must be if innate? *Justice* and keeping of contracts is that which most men seem to agree in This is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves and the confederacies of the greatest villains and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off of humanity itself keep faith and rules of justice one with another I

of convenience within their own communities but it is impossible to conceive that he embraces justice as a practical principle who acts fairly with his fellow highwayman and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with Justice and truth are the common ties of society and therefore even outlaws and robbers who break with all the world besides must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves or else they cannot hold together But will any one say that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?

sent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts I answer first I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts But since it is certain that most men s practices and some men s open professions have either questioned or denied these principles it is impossible to establish an universal consent

reasonable to suppose innate practical principles *that terminate only in contemplation Practical principles* derived from nature are there for operation and must produce conformity of action not barely speculative assent to their truth or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative maxims Nature I confess has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) *do* continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing these may be observed in all persons and all ages steady and universal but these are *inclinations of the appetite* to good not impressions of truth on the understanding I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men and that from the very first instances of sense and perception there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them some things that they incline to and others that they fly but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind which are to be the principles of knowledge regulating our practice Such natural impressions on the understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby that this is an argument against them since if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding as the principles of knowledge we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our knowledge as we do those others on the will and appetite which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us

4 *Moral rules need a proof ergo not innate* Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is that I think *there cannot any one moral rule be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a reason* which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate or so much as self-evident which every innate principle must needs be and not need any proof to ascertain its truth nor want any reason to gain it approbation He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side or on the other side went to give a reason *why* it is

Cf Bk II ch xxi.

ment that the rul is not known, becaus t is broken. I grant the bjecti n good where men though they transgress, et disown not th law where fear of s am censure or punishment carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But t is imposs'bl to conce e that a whole na tion of men should all p blicl reject and re- ... on f th m certainly and

... which in their priva ... t believe to be tr only t keep themse es in ... d esteem amongst those who are ... to be

knew to be such and the ... one of them apprehend from thers all the contempt and bhorrence due to on who professes himself void f humanity and one who, confounding known and natural measures I right and wron cannot but be looked t as the professed enemy f their peace and happiness. Whatever practical princip is innat cannot but be known to every one to be jus and good. It is therefore li tl less than contradicti n to suppose that whole nations f men should both in their professions and pra tice unanimously and universally give th li hat, by the most invincible ev dence every one f them knew to be true right, and good. This is enou h t satisfy us that no practical ru which is anywhere universally and w th public pprobation o allowance, transgressed, can be supposed innate.—But I ha e something further to add in answer to this objection.

2. *The generally al ... proof that it is not innate* The breaking f rule, say you, is no argumen that is unknown. I grant t but the general ... thof t anywhere I say is proof that t is not innat For example let us take any f these rules, which, being the most obvious deducti ns of human reason, and conformabl to the natural inclination f the grea est part f men, fewes people ha e had the impudence to deny or inconsiderati n t doubt f. If an can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none I think, can ha e fairer pretence to be inna than this Parents, preserve and cherish your children. When, therefore you say that this is an innate rule what d you mean. Either tha t is an innate principl which upon all occasions excites and directs the actions f all m n or else that t is a truth which all men ha e imprin ed on their minds, and hich therefore they know and assent to. But in ne ther of thes senses is t nnate. *Fir t* that t is n t a principl which influ nces all men s ctions, hat I ha e proved by the examples before cited nor need we seek so far as Mingrelia or Peru to find instances f such as neglect, abuse na and destroy their children or look on t onl as th more than brutality of some sa age and barbar ous nations, when we remembe that t as a familiar nd u cond mned practice amo gst the Greeks and R mans t xpose thout pity or remorse their innoce t infa ts. *Second'y* th t t is an innat truth, known to all men is also false For Parents preserve your children, is so far from an nnate truth, that t is no truth at all t being command, and not proposition and so not capabl of truth or falsehood. To mak it ... must be ... It is ... dren. But what d ty is, cannot be ... thout a law nor law be known or supposed w hout a lawmaker or without reward and punishment ... or a y other ... be im- ... suppos- ... tion, of punishm nt, of a l... for that punishment follows not in this life the bre ch of this rul and consequently that t has not the force f a law in countries where the gen rall allowed pra tice runs counter to t, is in tself ...

ous or thinkin man, much less very one that is born, in whom they ar t be found l ar and distinct and that ne of them, which f all thers seems most lik ly to be innate, is not so, (I mean the id f God) I think, in th next chap e will ppear ery ev dent to any co s d ring man.

13 *If men can be ignorant of what is ... certainly is not described by innate principle* From what has been said I think we may saf ly conclud that whatever practical ru is n any place generally and w th allowance broken cannot be supposed innate t being impossib that men

if t were inna e,) to a degree to make t a very

Ch. iii §§ 8– 7

ever got, will serve to set conscience on v ork which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions and if conscience be a proof of innate principles contraries may be innate prin ciples since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid

9 *Instances of enormities practised without remorse* But I cannot see how any men should ever trans gress those moral rules with confidence and se renity were they innate and stamped upon their minds View but an army at the sacking of a town and see what observation or sense of moral principles or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do Robberies murders rapes are the sports of men set at liberty from punish ment and censure Have there not been whole nations and those of the most civilized people amongst whom the exposing their children and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice as little con demned or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still in some countries put them into the same graves with their mothers if they die in childb rth or despatch them if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places where at a certain age they kill or expose their parents without any re morse at all? In a part of Asia the sick when their case comes to be thought desperate are carried out and laid on the earth before they are dead and left there exposed to wind and weather to perish without assistance or pity[1] It is fam liar among the Mingrelians a people professing Christianity to bury their children alive v ithout scruple There are places v here they eat their o vn children The Caribbees were wont to geld their children on purpose to fat and eat them And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female

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lieved they merited parad se v ere revenge and eating abundance of the r enemies They have

fo God[5] d ha e no

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cannot vith modesty relate A remarkable pas-

sage to this purpose out of the voyage of Baum garten which is a book not every day to be met with I shall set down at large in the language it is published in *Ibi (sc prope* Belbes *in Ægypto) vidimus sanctum unum Sarace icum inter arenarum cumulos ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem Mos est ut didicimus Mahometistis ut eos qui a mentes et sine ratione sunt prosanctis colant et venerentur Insuper et eos qui cum d u vitam egerint inquinatissimam voluntariam demum pœnitenti m et paupertat m sa ctitate venerandos deputant Ejusmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effrenem habent domos*

vunt ma nos exhibent honores mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima eosque co ti gere ac sepeli e maximæ f rtunæ ducunt loco Aud vimus hæc dicta et d cenda per interpretem à Mucrelo nostro Insuper sanctum illum quem eo loco vidimus p bl ci tus apprimè commendari eum esse hominem sanctum d vinum ac i itegrit te præcipuum eo quod nec fœmi n rum unqu m esset nec puerorum sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum (*Pere r* Baum garten l ii c i p 73) More of the same kind concerning these precious saints amongst the Turks may be seen in Pietro della Valle *in his* letter of the 5th of January 1616

Where then are those innate principles of justice piety gratitude equity chastity? Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels v hen fash ion has made them honourable are committed without remorse of conscience nay in many places innocence in this case is the greatest ig nominy And if v e look abroad to take a view of men as they are we shall find that they ha e remorse in one place for doing or omitting that which others in another place think they merit by

10 *Men h e co t ary practic l pri cipl s* He that v ill carefully peruse the hi tory of mankind and look abroad into the several tr bes of men and with indifferency sur ey their actions v ill be able to sat sfy himself that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named or rule of vir

n d that

t nct soc eties) hich is not somev here or other sl ghted and condem ed by the general fashion of whole societ es of men go erned by practical opinions and rules of livi g qu te opposite to others

11 *Whole nat ons reject s veral m ral rules* Here perhaps it will be objected that it is no argu

Gruber apud The en t part iv p 13
Lambert pud Th ven t p 38
Voss us D A l O g ne c 18 19.
P Mart Dec I
[4] *Hist d s Incas* l i. c 12
[5] Lery c. 16 216 231

i.e., by denying freedom to mankind and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent. And upon that ground they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue who cannot put morality and mechanism together, which are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent.

5. *Lord Herbert's innate principles examined.* When I had written this, being informed that my Lord Herbert had, in his book *De Veritate*, assigned these innate principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find in a man of so great parts, something that might satisfy me in this point, and put an end to my inquiry. In his chapter *De Instinctu Naturali*, p. 72, ed. 1656, I met with these six marks of his *Notitiae Communes* — 1. *Prioritas.* 2. *Independentia.* 3. *Universalitas.* 4. *Certitudo.* 5. *Necessitas*, i.e., as he explains it, *faciunt ad hominis conservationem.* 6. *Modus conformationis*, i.e. *Assensus nulla interposita mora.* And at the latter end of his little treatise *De Religione Laici*, he says this of these innate principles: *Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsa mente caelitus descriptae, nullisque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxiae*, p. 3. And *Veritates nostrae catholicae, quae tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descriptae.*

Thus, having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these: 1. *Esse aliquod supremum numen.* 2. *Numen illud coli debere.* 3. *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultus divini.* 4. *Resipiscendum esse à peccatis.* 5. *Dari praemium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam.* Though I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to, yet I think he is far from proving them innate impressions *in foro interiori descriptae.* For I must take leave to observe —

6. *These five either not all, or more than all, common notions.* First, that these five propositions are either not all, or more than all those common notions written on our minds by the finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other propositions which, even by his own rules, have as just a pretence to such an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles as at least some of these five he enumerates, viz. "Do as thou wouldst be done unto." And perhaps some hundreds of others, when well considered.

7. *The supposed marks wanting.* Secondly, that all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions, viz. his first, second and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propositions. For besides that we are assured from history of many men, nay whole nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them, I can not see how the third, viz. "That virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God," can be an innate principle, when the name or sound *virtue* is so hard to be understood, liable to so much uncertainty in its signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about and difficult to be known. And therefore this cannot be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle.

8. *Of little use if they were innate.* For let us consider this proposition as to its meaning (for it is the sense, and not sound, that is and must be the principle or common notion), viz. "Virtue is the best worship of God," i.e., is most acceptable to him; which, if virtue be taken, as most commonly it is, for those actions which, according to the different opinions of several countries, are accounted laudable, will be a proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God's will, or to the rule prescribed by God—which is the true and only measure of virtue when virtue is used to signify what is in its own nature right and good—then this proposition, "That virtue is the best worship of God," will be most true and certain, but of very little use in human life: since it will amount to no more but this, viz. "That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands"—which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing *what it is* that God doth command; and so be as far from any rule or principle of his actions as he was before. And I think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. "That God is pleased with the doing of what he himself commands," for an innate moral principle written on the minds of all men, (however true and certain it may be,) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so will have reason to think hundreds of propositions innate principles; since there are many which have as good a title as this to be received for such, which nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.

9. *Scarce possible that God should engrave principles*

ill bargain to the transgressor Without such a knowledge as this a man can never be certain that anything is his duty Ignorance or doubt of the law hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law maker or the like may make men give way to a present appetite but let any one see the fault and the rod by it and with the transgression a fire ready to n n h

u case where any duty is imprinted on the mind) and then tell me whether it be possible for people with such a prospect, such a certain knowledge as this wantonly and without scruple to offend against a law which they carry about them in indelible characters and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? Whether men at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an Omnipotent Law maker can with assurance and gaiety *slight and trample underfoot his most* sacred injunctions? And lastly whether it be possible that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and supreme Lawgiver all the bystanders yea even the governors and rulers of the people full of the same sense both of the law and Law maker should silently connive without testifying their disl ke or laying the least blame on it? Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men s appetites but these are so far from being innate moral pr nciples that if they were left to their full sv ing they would carry men to the overturning of all morality Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires which they cannot be but by reward and punishments that will overbalance the satisfact on any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the la If therefore anything be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law all men must have a certain and unavo dable knowledge that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it For if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate innate principles are nsisted on and urged to no purpose truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured by them but men are n the same uncertain floating estate with as without them An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment great enough to make the transgression very uneligible must accompany an innate law unless with an innate law they can suppose an innate Gospel too I would not here be mistaken as if because I deny an innate law I thought there were none but positive laws There is a great deal of difference between an innate law and a law of nature between somethin imprinted on our minds in their very original and something that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of by the use and due application of our natural faculties And I think they equally forsake the truth who runnin in to contrary extremes either affirm an innate law or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature i e without the help of positive revelation [1]

14 *Those who maintain innate practical principl s tell us not wh t they are* The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles is so evident that I think I need say no more to evince that it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general assent and it is enough to make one suspect that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell *us which they are* This might with justice be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity who declaring that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours or the quiet of mankind as not to point out to them which they are in the variety men are d stracted with But, in truth were there any such innate principles there would be no need to teach them Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds they would easily be able to d stinguish them from other truths that they afterwards learned and deduced from them and there would be nothing more easy than to know what and how many they were There could be no more doubt about their number than there is about the number of our fingers and it will -

g but of them they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate princ ples since even they who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions do not tell us what they are It is easy to foresee th t if d fferent men of different sects should go about to give us a l st of those innate p act cal n

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c a schools or chu ches a pla n evidence that there are no such innate truths Nay a great part of men a e so far f om finding any such innate moral p inciples in themsel es

[1] Cf Bk II ch xxviii, §§7 8

that, by denying freedom to mankind and th re by makin me n the than bar machines, they take ay not only nnat but all mo al possibil ty t be

5. *Lord Herbert's nn princi l amune* ii I had ritten this, be nf rmed th t my Lord Herbert had, in his book *D Verit t* ass gned these innat pri ciples, I presently consulted him, hoping to find in man f so great parts something that might satisfy m in this point, and p t an nd to my quiry In his chapt r *De I stinctu Natural* p 7 ed 16 6 I m t w th these six marks of his *N t æ Commune* — *Prioritas* 2 *I d* 3 *U versal as* 4. *Certitu* 5. *Nec as e* as he xplains t, *faciunt d homini conservati em* 6 *Modus onformat onis e. Assen sus* *nullo interpo t morâ* And t th latt d f his litl tr tise *De Rel ion Laici* h says this f these innat principles *Ad ut no unu ascujusti d giron nfini arctentur qu b q ti ent erit tes Sunt eni p â ment l tus d scriptæ nullis que traditi nibus si scriptis sive no scriptis b-sentæ* p 3. And *Verit t æ holic quæ tamquam nd b Dei em t for terion d scripta*

Thus, ha ing gi en th marks f th nnate principles or comm n ti ns, and asserted th ir being nprinted th mi ds f m by th hand f God he proceeds t set th m d wn, and they are these *Esse al q od s premum numen Numen lud col d ber* 3 *V rt tem cum pi t t conjunctam optimam ss t onem cultûs d vini* 4. *Resipiscendum se â p tis* 5. *Dari præmium el pæ nam post har tam transactam* Th h I allow these to be cl ar truths and su h as, f htly explained ti nal cr tur can hardl o d gi ing his asse t e I think h is far from provi them inna impress ns *for terion descript* For I mus tak l t bsers —

6 *The f e ther not ll or mor than ll f ar er ery* First, that these fi propos ti ns a. ther ot all, or mor tha all those m-mon ti ns writt on our minds b th fi ger of God if t re reasonabl t believe any t all to be so written. Since there ar ther p p-ositions which, eve by his own rules h as just pr te ce to such an or ginal and may be as ell dmitted for inna pri ciples, as I ast some of these fiv h umer tes, viz. Do as thou ouldst be done unt And pe haps some hundreds f thers, when well cons d ed.

17 *The s ppo d marks wanti g* Seco dl, that all his ma ks are not t be found n e ch of his fi e propos ti ns, viz his first, second and third marks agree perfectly to n ther of them and the first second third f urth and ixth marks agree but ill to his third fourth and fifth prop-os tions For bes des that e are assured from history of many men nay wh le nati ns who doubt disbelieve som or all of th m I can n t see how th third z. That irtue jo ed th p ety is the best worship of God can be an innat principle whe th nam or sound irt is so hard to be und rstood l ble t so much uncertainty i ts s gnificatio and the thi it stands f so much contended bout and diff cult t be known And the ef re this cannot be but ery uncertain rul of huma pract ce and serve but ery littl t th condu t f our l es, and is th refore ry u fit to be ass gned as an nnat pra tical p incipl For l t us

most commonly it is, fo those a ti ns nich a cordin to th diff re t p ni ns f sev r l cou tr es ar ccounted laud ble will be a prop-

God—whi h is th tru d nly m asur f irtu wh n irtu is used to nify what is n ts own n tur ght and good—th thus prop-os tio That irtu is the best w rship f God

may certainly know t be tru thout kn w in *what t is* that God d th command and so be as far from any rul or p incipl f his tions as he was bef And I think ery few ill take p pos ti n which m unts t o m re than this, viz 'That God is pl ased w th th d g f what h himself commands, for an nn t mor al p incipl r tt n n th minds f all men, (h w tr and tain t may be) since t te ches so littl Whosoe e does so will ha ason t think hu dreds f p positi ns innat principles ince th ar many which ha as good titl as this to be rece ed f such which n body y t eve put int that ank f innat prin ples.

9. *Scar possibl that God hould enter e pri ci*

ples in words of uncertain meaning Nor is the fourth proposition(viz Men must repent of their sins) much more instructive till what those actions are that are meant by sins be set down For the word *peccata* or sins being put as it usually is to signify in general ill actions that will draw punishment upon the doers what great principle of morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us without knowing what those particular actions are that will do so? Indeed this is a very true proposition and fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are supposed to have been taught *what* actions in all kinds *are* sins but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be *innate principles* nor to be of any use if they were innate unless the particular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices were engraven in men s minds and were innate principles also which I think is very much to be doubted And therefore I imagine it will scarcely seem possible that God should engrave principles in men s minds in words of uncertain signifi ation such as *virtues* and *sins* which amongst different men stand for different things nay it cannot be supposed to be in words at all wh ch being *in most of these princ ples very* general names cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them And in the pract cal instances the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves and the rules of them —abstracted from words and antecedent to the kno l edge of names which rules a man must know what language soever he chance to learn whether English or Japan or if he should learn no language at all or never should understand the use of words as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men When t shall be made out that men ignorant of words or untaught by the laws and customs of their country know that it is part of the worship of God not to kill another man not to know more women than one not to procure abortion *not to expose their children not to* take from another what is his though we want it ourselves but on the contrary relieve and supply h s wants and whenever we have done the contrary we ought to repent be sorry and resolve to do so no more —when I say all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules all of wh ch come under these two general words made use of above viz *v tutes et pecc ta* virtues and sins there will be more reason for admitting these and the like for common not ons and practical principles Yet after all universal consent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwise would scarce prove them to be innate which is all I contend for

20 *Objection innate principles may be corrupted answered* Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready but not very material answer viz that the innate principles of morality may by education and custom and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse be darkened and at last quite worn out of the minds of men Which assertion of theirs if true quite takes away the argument of universal consent by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved unless those men will think it reasonable that their private persuasions or that of their party should pass for universal consent —a thing not unfrequently done when men presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason cast by the votes and op nions of the rest of mankind as not worthy the reckoning And then their argument stands thus — The principles which all mankind allow for true are innate those that men of right reason admit are the principles allowed by all mankind we and those of our *mind are men of reason* therefore we agree -

derstand how there be some principles wh ch all men do ackno ledge and agree in and yet there are none of those principles which are not by depraved custom and ill education blotted out of the minds of many men which is to say that all men admit but yet many men do deny and dissent from them And indeed the supposition of *such* first principles will serve us to very l ttle purpose and we shall be as much at a loss with as without them if they may by any human power—such as the w ll of our teachers or op n ons of our companions—be altered or lost in us and notw ithstand ng all th s boast of first *principles and innate l ght e shall* be as much in the dark and uncerta nty as if there were no such thing at all it be ng all one to ha e no rule and one that will warp any way or amongst var ous and contrary rules not to know which is the right But concern ng nn te principles I *des re these men to say hether* they can or cannot by education and custom be blurred and blotted out if they cannot we must f nd them in all mankind al ke and they must be clear in e erybody and if they may suffer variation from advent t ous notions we mu t then find them clearest and most persp cuous near

est the fountain, in children and illiterate people who have received least impression from foreign opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with this matter of fact and daily observation.

Contrary principles in the world. I easily grant that there are great numbers of opinions which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles many whereof both for their absurdity as well as oppositions to one another it is impossible should be true But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from reason, are so sacred somewhere or other that men even of good understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their lives, and what ever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.

22. *How men commonly come by their principles.* This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day's experience confirms and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse or the authority of an old woman, may by length of time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of *principles* in religion or morality For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in,) instil into the unwary and as yet unprejudiced, understanding (for white paper receives any characters,) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension and still as they grow up confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with or at least by those of whose wisdom, knowledge and piety they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable self evident, and innate truths.

23. *Principles so taught, that because we did not know when we began to hold them.* To which we may add, that when men so instructed are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions, which were taught them before their memory began to keep a register of their actions, or date the time when any new thing appeared to them and therefore make no scruple to conclude that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else These they entertain and submit to as many do to their parents with veneration not because it is natural nor do children do it where they are not so taught but because having been always so educated and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.

24. *How such principles come to be held.* This will appear very likely and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the nature of mankind and the constitution of human affairs wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings nor be at quiet in their minds without some foundation or principle to rest their thoughts on. There is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding who hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him the [illegible]

being taught that they ought not to examine there are few to be found who are not exposed by their ignorance laziness, education or precipitancy to *take them upon trust*

25. *Further explained.* This is evidently the case of all children and young folk and custom, a greater power than nature seldom failing to make them worship for divine what she hath inured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets especially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure parts, and will, who is there almost that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is everywhere prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party And where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or atheist which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions And he will be much more afraid to question those prin

Cf. Bk. IV ch. xx. §

ciples when he shall think th m —
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be the rule
And what c
sacred whe nus them the earliest of all his own thoughts and the most reverenced by others?

6 *A worship of idols* It is easy to imagine how by these means it comes to pass than men wor ship the idols that have been set up in their minds grow fond of the notions they have been long acqua nted with there and stamp the char acters of divinity upon absurdities and errors become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys and contend too fight and die in defence of their opinions *Dum solos credit habendos esse deos quos ipse colit* For since the reasoning faculties of the soul which are almost constantly though not always warily nor wisely employed would not know how to move for want of a founda tion and footing n most men who through laz iness or avocation do not or for want of time or true helps or for other causes cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge and trace truth to its fountain and original it is natural for them and almost unavoidable to take 1 n —

u cu any other proof them selves Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind and entertain them there with the rev erence usually pa d to principles never ventur ing to examine them but accustoming himself to believe them because they are to be belie ed may take up from his education and the fash ions of his country any absurdity fo innate p in ciples and by long por ng on the same objects so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity and the workmanship of his hands

27 *Pr nciples must be ex mi d* By this progress how many there are who arrive at princ ples which they believe innate may be easily ob served in the ariety of oppos te p inciples held and contended for by all so ts and degrees of men And he that shall deny this to be the meth od wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their prin ciples will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the co trary tenets which are firmly believed confidently asserted and which great numbers are ready at any time

know not what may not be believed or how any one s principles can be questioned If they may and ought to be examined and tried I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried or at least it is reasonable to demand the *marks* and *characters* whereby the genuine innate prin ciples may be distinguished from others that so amidst the great variety of pretenders I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as th s When this is done I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions and till then I may with modesty doubt since I fear universal consent which is the only one pro duced will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice and assure me of any innate principles

From what has been said I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree and therefore none innate

Chap III *Other considerations concerning Ir nate Principles both Speculative and Practical*

1 *Principles not innate unless their ide s be innate* Had those who would persuade us that there are innate p inc ples not taken them together in gross but cons dered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made they would not perhaps have been so forward to bel eve they were innate Since if the *id as* which made up those truths were not t was impossible that the *prop s t o s* made up of them should be in nate or our knowledge of them be born with us For if the ideas be not innate there was a time when the mind was without those princ ples and then they will not be nnate but be derived from some other original For whe e the deas them selves are not there can be no knowledge no as sent no mental or verbal p opos t ons about them

2 *Id as e p cially tho e belo g g to principles at b with I ld n* If e will attentively cons der new born children we sh ll ha e l ttle reason to think that they bring many deas nto the world with them Fo bating perhaps some fa nt ideas of hung r and thirst and warmth a d some pains w h ch they may ha e f lt in the womb the e s not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them espec ally of *id u ns g the terms wh h m k p tho e u ers l p p stti s th ta e t em d n t f nc pl s* One may pe cei e ho by degrees aft r rds deas come i to their minds and that they get no more nor other than what experi nce and the obser ation of things that come in thei way furnish them with which m ght be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind

Cf Bacon *N vum O g num* I aph 23

3. *I hom ty" and identity" t ... as* It is impossibl for the same thing t be nd not to be, is certainl (if there be an such) an in

...

na e, they must needs be so. Hath child an idea of imposs bility and de uty before it has f white or black, sweet or b tt And is t from the knowledge f this princip that t co ... that wormwood rubbed o th nippl hath no the same tast that t used to rece e from thence Is t th ctual knowledge of ... that makes child distinguish betwee ts mother and strange or that makes t fond of th one and flee the other Or does t mind regulat tself and ts assent by id as that t neve yet had. Or th understanding draw conclus ns from pri ci ples hich t eve yet knew or d rstood The names ... and ... stand for two ideas, so far fr m bein innat or born w th us, that I think t requires gr t care and t tention to form them ri ht in our understand ings. They are so far from be g brou ht to the world w th us, so remot from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I beli e po examina t will be found that many grown men want them.

4. *Lo ty an ide not na* If ... (to stance tha alo) be natu e impress and consequentl so l ar and bv ous t us that we must needs know even from our cradles, I would gladl be reso ed by an n of seven, or seven ty years d, whether man, being cre ture consistin f soul and body be th sam man when his bod is changed Wh the Euph bus and Pythagoras, ha in had the sam soul, were the sam men, thou h they li ed several ges asunder ... whether th cock too, which had the same soul, were no the same w th both f them. Wher by perhaps, t will ppear that our id f *sameness* is t so settled and cl ar as to deserve to be though innat in us. For if those innate ideas ar no clear and distinct, so as t be universal known and naturall greed on, they canno be subjects f uni ersal and doubted truths, bu will be th na oidabl oc casion of perpetual uncertainty For I suppose every one id f id tity will not be th same that Pythagoras and thousands f his f llowers ha e And h ch the shall be true. Which in

Cf. Bk. II ch. xxvii.

nat O are th re two different ideas f d uts both t

5. *What make the one man* Nor I t any one ...

...

) ... can think t t be when he cons d rs [that] t d as t compreh nds in t, *whol* and *part* ...

... ideas, ext ns and mbe must be so too t bein imposs bl t ha e an d a of a relati n, w thout ha ing an t all f th thing to hich t belongs, and which t is founded. Now wh ther th minds f men ha e naturally imprinted on th m the d as f ext ns on and numbe I lea e t be cons dered b those who are the patrons of innate principles.

7. *Idea f wor hip not inn* That *God to be wor shipped* is, w thout doubt, as gre t truth as any that can e ter into th mind f man nd de serves th first place amo gst all practical prin ciples. But yet t can by no means be thought in nate, unless th d as f *God* and *wor h* are in nat That the d the t rm worship tands for is not in th und rstanding of children, nd charact stamped th mind in ts first origi nal, I think will be asily granted by an one that considers how few there be amo gst grown men who ha e cl ar and distinct not of t And I suppose, th can t be anythi g more diculous than t say that childr n ha e this practical princip innat That God is to be worshipped and et that they know n t what that worship of God is, which is their d ty But to pass by this.

Cf. Bk. II ch. xxvii.

Cf. Bk. II ch. and vii. §

ciples wh n h h
do
be tl
And
sacred w e he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts and the most reverenced by others?

26 *A worship of idols* It is easy to imagine how by these means it comes to pass than men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds grow fond of the notions they have been long

[illegible] n uence of their opinions *Dum solos credit h be dos esse deos qu s ipse colit* For since the reasoning faculties of the soul which are almost constantly though not always warily nor wisely employed would not know how to move for want of a foundation and footing in most men who through laziness or avocation do not or for want of time or true helps or for other causes cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge and trace truth to its fountain and original it is natural for them and almost unavoidable to take up with some borrowed principles which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things are thought not to need any other proof themselves Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles ne er ventur ing to examine them but accustoming himself to believe them because they are to be bel eved may take up from his education and the fashions of his country any absurd ty for innate prin c ples and by long poring on the same objects so dim h s s ght as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity and the workmanship of his hands

7 *Principl s must be examined* By this progress how many there are who arrive at p inciples which they bel e e innate may be eas ly observed in the var ety of oppos te principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men And he that shall deny th s to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assu ance they have of the truth and evidence of the p in ciples will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary te ets which are firmly believed confidently asserted

know not what may not be believed or how any one s principles can be questioned If they may and ought to be examined and tried I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried or at least it is reasonable to demand the *marks* and *characters* whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others that so amidst the great variety of pretenders I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this When this is done I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions and till then I may with modesty doubt since I fear universal consent which is the only one produced will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice and assure me of any innate principles

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Chap III *Other considerations concernin In nate Principles both Speculative and Practical*

1 *P inciples not in ate u less the ide s be innate* Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross but considered s parately the parts out of which those proposit ons are made they would not perhaps have been so forw ard to bel eve they were innate Since if the *ide s* which made up those t uths were not it was impossible that the *prop s tions* made up of them should be in nate or our knowledge of them be born with us For if the ideas be not innate there as a time when the mind was without those principles and then they will not be innate but be derived from some other original For where the deas themselves are not there can be no kno ledge no as sent no mental or verbal propositions about them

Ideas e peci lly thos belong ng t pr ciples n t born w th ch ld e If we w ll attenti ely cons der new born children we shall have l ttle reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them For bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger and th rst a d warmth a d some pa ns w h ch they may have felt in the womb there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them espec ally of *de suer g the terms wh ch m k up th e u er l p positi ns th t a e este m d at princ ple* One may percei e how by degrees afterwa ds ideas come into their minds and that they get no mo e nor other than what experience and the observation of things that come in their way furnish th m with which might be enough to sat sfy us that they are not or ginal characters stamped on the mind

their own authority without examination I
Cf Bacon *Novum O ganum* 1 aph 23

and communication with it, that it seems stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish as to want the notion of God, than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire

9 *Lest of God and idea of fire* The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior powerful, wise invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide and continue it down to all generations though yet the general reception of this name and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind prove not the idea to be innate but only that they who made the discovery had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original from whom other less considering people having once received so important a notion it could not easily be lost again.

Idea of God not innate This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged, by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of God, as I imagine, is extended no further than that which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate since I think it may be truly said, that there is no person in the world who has a notion of God, who has not also the idea of fire I doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such thing, nor name for it, how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides and perhaps too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion, of God, till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion of God which having once taught to others, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

2. *Since it is God's goodness that all men should have an idea of Him, therefore naturally imprinted by Him, answered.* Indeed it is urged, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand a concernment and also, by that means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man and therefore he has done it.

... will prove

... hath d... for men all that men ... best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself but that he hath plainly stamped there in fair characters, all that men ought to know or believe of him all that they ought to do in obedience to his will and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge as St. Paul tells us all nations did after God (Acts 17 27) than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say it is best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth and therefore there is one.

therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom to say — I think it best and therefore God hath made it so." And in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topic, that God hath done so, when certain experience shows us that he hath not. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original impressions of knowledge or ideas stamped on the mind since he hath furnished man with those faculties which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being and I doubt not but to show that a man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may without innate principles, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued man with those faculties of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges or houses,—which some people in the world how

8 *Idea of God not innate* If any idea can be imagined innate the idea of *God* may of all others [1] for many reasons be thought so since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral principles without an innate idea of a Deity Without a notion of a law maker it is impossible to have a notion of a law and an obligation to observe it Besides the atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients [2] and left branded upon the records of history hath not navigation discovered in these later ages whole nations at the bay of Soldania [3] in Brazil [4] [[5]in Boranday] and in the Caribbee islands &c amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God no religion? Nicholaus del Techo *in Literis ex Paraqu ria de Caiguarum Co versione* has these words *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum et h m ts nimam sig ficet nulla sacra habet nulla idola* These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself without the help of letters and discipline and the improvements of arts and sciences But there are others to be found who have enjoyed these in a very great measure who yet for want of a due application of their thoughts this way want the idea and knowledge of God It will I doubt not be a *surprise to others as it was to me to find* the Siamites of this number But for this let them

Voyages vol i and *Histo Cultus S nensi m* And perhaps if we should with attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off we should have too much reason to fear that many in more civilized countries have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity upon their minds and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason And though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others did not the fear of the magistrate s sword or their neighbour s censure tie up people s tongues which were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do [7]

9 *The name of God not universal or obscure in me n g* But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God (whereof yet history tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow that the idea of him was innate For though no nation were to be found without a name and some few dark notions of him [8] yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind no more than the names of fire or the sun heat or number do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate because the names of those things and the ideas of them are so universally recei ed and known amongst mankind Nor on the contrary is the want of such a name or the absence of such a notion out of men s minds any argument against the being of a God any more than it would be a proof that there was no *loadstone* in the world because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such th ng nor a name for it or be any show of argument to prove *that there are no d stinct and various species* of angels or intelligent beings abo e us because we have no ideas of such distinct species or names for them For men being furnished with words by the common language of their own countries can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those th ngs whose names those they con erse with have occas on frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of excellency greatness or someth ng extraordinary if apprehension and concernment accompany it if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind —the idea is l kely to s nk the deeper and spread the further especially if it be such an idea as s agreeable to the common l ght of reason and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge as that of a God is For the visible marks of extraord nary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation that a rational creature who ll but s r ously reflect on them cannot m ss the d sco ery of a Deity And the influence that the d scovery of such a Being must necessarily ha e on the m nds of all that ha e but once heard of

[1] Cf Bk II ch xv §§2 12 xx §§21 33–36 Bk IV h x

[2] Cf Bk IV ch x

[3] R in Thevenot s *Rel t d d V y ges Cur ux*

[4] Jo de Lery p 16

[5] Ma t n è 201/322 Terry *V y g t the M g l* 17/545 and 23/545 O ingt n 489/606 (Ovingt n s *V y g t Sur t* in 1689)

[6] La Loubè e *D R yaume de S m* tom c 9 §15 c 20 §§ 4–22 c 22 §6 and c 23

considerate part of men, making far the greater number took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate; for that also wise men have always had.

Odd, low, and pitiful ideas of God common among men. This was evident by the case of all Gentilism. Nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledged but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and the true ideas of him. How many even amongst us, will be found upon inquiry to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven, and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him. Christians as well as Turks have had whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it,—that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and though we find few now amongst us who profess themselves *Anthropomorphites*, (though some I have met with that own it,) yet I believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the ignorant and uninstructed Christians many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age, or young people almost of any condition, and you shall find that, though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low, and pitiful, that nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man; much less that they were characters written by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us. For being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal. There was never any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent to them; though yet it be past doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal consent, such an one I easily allow; but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.

18. *If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.* Since then though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set any impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of Himself; as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

19. *Idea of substance not innate.* I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of *substance*; which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such *clear* idea at all; and therefore signify nothing by the word *substance* but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i.e. of something whereof we have no [particular distinct positive] idea, which we take to be the *substratum*, or support, of those ideas we do know.

20. *No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate.* Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative or practical, principles, it may with as much probability be said, that a man hath £100 sterling in his pocket, and yet denied that he hath there either penny, shilling, crown, or other coin out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think that certain *propositions* are innate when the *ideas* about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove, that the ideas expressed in them are innate; for in many cases, however the ideas came there,

See Bk. II. ch. xiii. §§ 17–20; ch. xxiii. *passim*.

Cf. Locke, *Third Letter to Stillingfleet*, pp. 5 etc.

Cf. Locke, *Third Letter*, pp. 375, etc., also *First Letter*, pp. et also the letter to Samuel Bold, 5 May 1699.

Cf. *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet.

both cases being that they never employed their parts faculties and powers industriously that way but contented themselves with the opinions fashions and things of their country as they found them without looking any further Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there And had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England he had been perhaps as knowing a divine and as good a mathematician as any in it the difference between him and a more improved Englishman lying barely in this that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways modes and notions of his own country and never directed to any other or further inquiries And if he had not any idea of a God it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it

13 *Ideas of God various in different men* I grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his Maker as a mark God set on his own workmanship to mind man of his dependence and duty and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge *But how late is it before any such notion is* discoverable in children? And when we find it there how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher than represent the true God? He that shall observe in children the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have will think that the objects they do first and most familiarly converse with are those that make the first impressions on their understandings nor will he find the least footsteps of any other It is easy to take notice how *their thoughts enlarge themselves only as they* come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects to retain the ideas of them in their memories and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them and several ways put them together How by these means they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a Deity I shall hereafter show

14 *Contrary and inconsistent ideas of God under the same name* Can it be thought that the ideas men have of God are the characters and marks of himself *engraven in their minds by his own finger* when we see that in the same country under one and the same name men have far different nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name or sound will scarce prove an innate notion of him.

15 *Gross ideas of God* What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have who acknowledged and *worshipped hundreds? Every deity* that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him and a proof that they had no true notion of God where unity infinity and eternity were excluded To which if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity expressed in their images and representations of their deities the amours marriages copulations, lusts quarrels and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods we shall have little reason to think that the heathen world i e the greatest part of mankind had such ideas of God in their minds as he himself out of care that they should not be mistaken about him was author of And this universality of consent, so much argued if it prove any native impressions it will be only this —that God imprinted on the minds of all men speaking the same language a *name* for himself but not any *idea* since those people who agreed in the name had at the same time far different apprehensions about the thing signified If they say that the variety of deities worshipped by the heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible Being or several parts of *his providence* I answer what they might be in the original I will not here inquire but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar I think nobody will affirm And he that will consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte c 13 (not to [illegible]

[illegible] it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all

16 *Idea of God not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it* If it be said that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity I grant it But then this

First excludes universality of consent in any thing but the name for those wise men being very few perhaps one of a thousand this universality is very narrow

Secondly it seems to me plainly to prove that the truest and best notions men have of God[2] were not imprinted but acquired by thought and meditation and a right use of their faculties since the wise and considerate men of the world by a right and careful employment of their *thoughts and reason attained true notions in this* as well as other things whilst the lazy and in

[1] See Bk II ch xxiii. §§ 33 36 Bk IV ch x.

[2] Cf Bk IV ch x.

them, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and that is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them: and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say there are ideas in the mind that are not in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

21. *Principles not innate, because of little use or little certainty.* Besides what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern *speculation*, are of no great use; and those that concern *practice*, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us *which they are*; and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no. Since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already: of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

22. *Difference of men's discoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties.* To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men's understanding; and some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences; though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received; though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed: God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is, from the different use they put their faculties to. Whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow; others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles. And he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being. And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth

the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas will necessarily follow Every one that hath a true idea of *God* and *worship* will assent to this proposition That God is to be worshipped when expressed in a language he understands and every rational man that hath not thought on it to-day may be ready to assent to this proposition to morrow and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day For if we will allow savages and most country people to have have some time or other and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition and make very little question of it ever after But such an assent upon hearing no more proves the *ideas* to be innate than it does that one born blind (with cataracts which will be couched to morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun or light or saffron or yellow because when his sight is cleared he will certainly assent to this proposition That the sun is lucid or that saffron is yellow And therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate it can much less the *propositions* made up of those ideas If they have any innate ideas I would be glad to be told what and how many they are

21 *No innate ideas in the memory* To which let me add if there be any innate ideas any ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on they must be lodged in the memory and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance i e must be known when they are remembered to have been perceptions in the mind before unless remembrance can be without remembrance For to remember is to perceive anything with memory or with a consciousness that it was perceived or known before Without this whatever idea comes into the mind is new and not remembered this consciousness ever idea is in the mind is either an actual perception or else having been an actual perception is so in the mind that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view it is with a consciousness that it had been there before and was not wholly a stranger to the mind Whether this be not so I appeal to every one s observation And then I desire an instance of an idea pretended to be innate which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance and whatever idea comes into the mind without *that* consciousness is not remembered or comes not out of the memory nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance For what is not either actually in view or in the memory is in the mind no way at all and is all one as if it had never been there Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours but then cataracts shut the windows and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had This was the case of a blind man I once talked with who lost his sight by the small pox when he was a child and had no more notion of colours than one born blind I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind any more than one born blind? And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all His cataracts are couched and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours *de novo* by his restored sight conveyed to his mind and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance And these now he can revive and call to mind in the dark In this case all these ideas of colours which when out of view can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance being thus in the memory are said to be in the mind The use I make of this is —that whatever idea being not actually in view is in the mind is there only by being in the memory and if it be not in the memory it is not in the mind and if it be in the memory it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the memory which is this that it had been known before and is now remembered If therefore there be any innate ideas they must be in the memory or else nowhere in the mind and if they be in the memory they can be revived without any impression from without and whenever they are brought into the mind they are remembered i e they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is and what is not in the memory or in the mind —that what is not in the memory whenever it appears

... of towns where, if th ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is further inquiry f whom t is borrowed nor whom it belongs to, so t affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in th future part of this Discourse, designing to raise an edifice uni form and consistent w th tself, as far as my own experience and bservation will assist me I hope to erect t on such basis that I shall not need to shore t p w th pr ps and buttresses, l aning on borrowed or be ged foundati ns or t least, if mine prove castl in th air I will ende our it shall be all of a p ece and han together Wherein I warn th reader not to expect unde- niabl cogent d monstrations, unless I may be allowed the pr ilege, not seldom assumed by others, to tak my principles for granted and then, I doubt n t, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on is, that I can only appeal to men s ow n un prejudiced experience and bservation whether they be true or not and this is nou h for a man who professes no more than to lay down candid ly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a subject lyin somew hat in the dark, w thout any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.

BOOK II Of Ideas

Chap I *Of Ideas in general and their O ...*

1 *Idea is the bject f thinking* E ery man being conscious t himself th t h thinks and th t which his mind is pplied bout whilst thinking being th *ideas* that are ther t is past doubt that men ha e in th ir minds several ideas,—such as are those expressed by the words *white- ness, hardness sw etness, thinking mo on, man, ele- phant, army drunkenness*, and others t is in the first place then to be inquired, *How he comes by them.*

I know t is received doctrine that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their ery first being This opinion I have t large examined alre dy and, I suppose what I ha e said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily dmitted when I have shown whence th understandin may get all the ideas has and by what ways and degrees they may come into th mind —for whi h I shall ppeal t every one s wn obs rv t n nd experience.

All ideas come from sensation or eflection. Let us then suppose th mind to be, as we say whi p per d f all ch rs w th ut ny ideas —How comes t to be furnished Whence comes t by that vast store which th busy and boundless fancy f man has painted on t w th an almost endless ariety Whence has t all the *materials* of reason and knowledge T this I an swer in ne word, from EXPERIE CE. In that all our knowledge is founded and from that t ulti- mately derives tself. Our bservation employed either bout external sensibl bjects, or bout the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which sup- plies our understandings w th all the *materials* of thinking These two are th fountains of knowl edge, from whence all the ideas we ha e or can naturally ha e do spring

3. *The objects f sensation one source f ideas* First, our Senses, con ersant bout particular sensibl bjects, d convey int th mind several distı ct perceptions[2] of things, according to those ari ous ways wh rein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those *ideas* we ha e of *yel low white heat cold soft hard, bi er swee t*, and all those which we call sensibl qualities which when I say the senses co ey into the mind, I mean, they from external bjects con ey into th mind what produces there those per ptions. This great source f most of the ideas we ha e, depending wholly upon our senses, and deri ed by them to the understanding I call SENSATION

4. *The operations f our minds, the other source f them.* Secondly the other fountain from which experience furnish th th understanding w th deas is,—the perception f the operations f our own mind w thin us, as t is emp oyed about the ideas t has got —which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider d furnish th understanding with an ther set f d as, which could not be had from things w thout. And such are *perception, thinking dou ing b ieving* *rea ing knowing willing*, and all the different ct ings of our own minds —which we being con- scious of, and bserving in oursel es, d from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source f d as every man has wholl in him self and though t be not sense, as ha ing n th ing to d with external bjects, yet t is ery like t, and might properl enough be called *internal sense* But as I call the other SENSATION so I call

Cf. Introd. § 8.

Cf. ch. xxi. § 5.

Cf. § 3 also ch. xxx. §

of it which yet his faculties if carefully employed were able to make clear and evident to him But this only by the by to show how much *our knowledge depends upon the right use of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us* and how little upon *such innate principles as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction* which all men could not but know if they were there or else they would be there to no purpose And which since all men do not know nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths we may well conclude there are no such

24 *Men must think and know for themselves* What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty I cannot tell —I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued being conformable to truth lays those foundations surer This I am certain I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse Truth has been my only aim and wherever that has appeared to lead my thoughts have impartially followed without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not Not that I want a due respect to other men s opinions but after all the greatest reverence is due to truth and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge if we sought it in the fountain *in the consideration of things themselves* and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men s to find it For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men s eyes as to know by other men s understandings So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason so much we possess of real and true knowledge The floating of other men s opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing though they happen to be true What in them was science is in us but opiniatrety whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names and do not as they did employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation Aristotle was certainly a knowing man but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced and confidently vented the opinions of another And if the taking up of *another s principles without* — — — h m nh l onh I

knows and comprehends What he believes only and takes upon trust are but shreds which however well in the whole piece make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth like fairy money though it were gold in the hand from which he received it will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use

5 *Whence the opinion of innate principles* When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of as soon as understood it was I know a short and easy way to conclude them innate This being once received it eased the lazy from the pains of search and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers to make this the principle of principles —*that principles must not be questioned* For having once established this tenet —that there are innate principles it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving *some* doctrines as such which was to take them off from the use of their — h

and made useful to some sort of men who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another to have the authority to be the dictator of principles and teacher of unquestionable truths and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them Whereas had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves when duly considered and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them when duly employed about them

6 *Conclusion* To show *how* the understanding proceeds herein is the design of the following Discourse which I shall proceed to when I have first premised that hitherto —to clear my way to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge —it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles And since the arguments which are against them do some of them rise from common received opinions I have been forced to take several things for granted which is hardly avoidable to any one whose task is to show the falsehood or improbability of any tenet —it happening in controversial discourses as it does in as

world f ew things, which by a c nsta ts l ci ta f th ir senses, d w th mind con tantly to them forward t tak n t ce f new a d apt to be d l ghted w th th ar ty f ch gi g ob-

is necessary t be d ne if t be not self-evident p opos t on But wheth r this, That the soul al w ys th ks, be a self-ev dent propos t on that erybody assents t t first h aring I appeal to m nk nd It doubted wh ther I th ught t ll last ght no The q est on being about m tt r f f ct, t is begging t to b ing as p oof

th bal n tc ts, ... proved nd past d ubt, that my watch thought

kin g d as d per pt being th sam thi g I know t an p that th so l always th nks and that t has th ctual pe c pti f d as in tself consta tly as l g as t exists a d that c tual thinking is as ns par bl f m th soul as a tual e tens n is from the body which if tru to inquir after th begi ing of man d as is th sam as t quir ft th begi n g f his soul. F r by this ccou t soul and ts d as as body and ts ext ns will begin t exi t both t the same tim

The oul thi ks t la y for th u nts proof B t wh th r th oul be s ppos d t xist antecede t to or coe al w th s m t me af t th first rud m ts f organ zat n th beginnings f lif in th body I l t be disputed by those wh h bett thought f that matt I nf ss my lf t h f those dull souls, that d th ot pe c ts lf alw ys to cont mpl t d as or ca ce ta y mo e cessary for th so l alw ys t think than f r the body al y to m th perc pti f deas be (as I co ce e) to th soul wh t m ti n is t h body t ts ss b t f ts ope t ns. A d th for though think g be sup posed eve s m ch th prope ti f the soul y t t is t n cessary t suppose th t t hould be lw y thi k g alw y n a t That, pe haps, is th p l g f th fi t A thor nd Presers f ll things h ever sl mbers or sleeps but is t e mpet t t any fin t be g t l ast t th l f man W k ow certainly b xpe th t w m t think and th d w th f ll bl con seq ce —th t th is som thing us th t has po t th nk. B t wh h that b-sta ce *perp tually* thinks or w can be f ther assured than pe ce f rms F t say that ctual thinki g is esse t al t th soul and insepar bl fr m t is t beg what is question, nd not t prove by aso —wh h

his hypoth sis th t is, because h suppos s it t be so which w y f p oving amounts t this, that I must necessarily think all last ght be caus an th supposes I alw ys think tho gh I myself cann t pe ce e that I alwa s d so

But men in l e w th the op n ns m y n t only suppose wh t n qu stio but alleg wro g matt f f ct. How lse could v o mak t n nf ce f mine that thi g s n t

thoughts and to th m t a d to th m t l ays w ll be n essary t ll w can think tho t being consc ous f t.

11 *It is not alu y c nsci us f t* I grant th t the l in w king man is ne e w th t th ught, becaus t is th co d t n f be g w k B t h th sl ping with t dr m g be t ff ct n of th wh l man mi d s w ll as body may be th waking man s e n d t t being hard to th t y th g hould think d t be c nsc ous f t. If th soul d th thi k l p man with t be co ous f t I ask h th dur su h thi ki g t has y pl as or p o be p bl f h pp ss r m ry I m ur the m is t m th th bed or ea th h l es F to be happy mi ble w th t be g c sci us f t, ems to me utt ly cons t t d imposs bl O f t be pos bl th t th l ca whilst th body l p g h e ts th nk joym ts, d co s, ts pl asu es p in part, wh h th *m* is t conscious f n par takes — t ce tain th t Socr tes asl p a d Socr tes wak t the sam perso but his

Cf h x. §§ 7 8

this REFLECTION the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself By reflection then in the following part of this discourse I would be un derstood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations and the manner of them by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding These two I say viz external material things as the objects of SENSATION and the operations of our

here I use in a large sense as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5 *All our ideas are of the one or the other of these* The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two *External objects* furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible quali ties which are all those different perceptions they produce in us and *the mind*[1] furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations [2]

These when we have taken a full survey of them and their several modes combinations and relations we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways Let any one examine his own thoughts and thoroughly search into his understanding *and then let him tell me whether all the original* ideas he has there are any other than of the objects of his senses or of the operations of his mind considered as objects of his reflection And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there he will upon taking a strict view see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted —though per haps with infinite variety compounded and en larged by the understanding as we shall see hereafter [3]

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selves before the memory begins to keep a regis ter of time or order yet it is often so late before

some unusual qualities come in the way that

so ordered as to have but a very few even of the *ordinary ideas till he were grown up to a man.* But all that are born into the world being sur rounded with bodies that perpetually and di versely affect them variety of ideas whether care be taken of it or not are imprinted on the minds of children Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere when the eye is but open sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses and force an entrance to the mind —but yet I think it will be granted

places here

let or green than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pine apple has of those par ticular relishes

7 *Men are differently furnished with these accord ing to the different objects they converse with* Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety and from the operations of their minds within ac cording as they more or less reflect on them. For though he that contemplates the operations of

nd clear ideas

any landscape *or of the parts and motions* of clock who will not turn his eyes to it and with attent on heed *all the parts of it* The picture or clock may be so placed that they may come *in* his way every day but yet he will *have but a* confused idea of all the parts they are made up of *till he applies himself* with attention *to con* sider them each in particular

8 *Ideas of reflection later because they need atten tion* And hence we see the reason why it is pret ty late before most children get ideas of the op

have not

understanding turns inward upon itself reflects on its own operations and makes them the ob jects of its own contemplation Children when they come first into it, are surrounded with a

[1] Cf Bk IV ch ix and x
[2] Cf Bacon *Novum Organum* I Aph 2
[3] See ch x ii–xxviii

use f n thinking a d that the mem ry of thou.hts is etained by th impress ons that are mad n the brain, and th traces the e left after such thinking but that in the thinking of the ~~~ ~d n a sleeping man

be satisfied in —whether the soul wh n it thinks thus part and as twe e separate f om the body a ts less rati nally than wh n co jo tly w th it o no If ts separat thoughts be less rati nal then these m n mu t y that the soul owes th perfection f r tional thinking t the body if it does n t it is a wo der that our dr ams h uld be fo th most part so f ·olous and irrat onal f ts more

oul o a ...
the body before t hath rece ved any by sensa tion. The dreams of leeping men are, as I tak it, all m d up f th waking man s deas though f th most part oddly put togeth r It is strange f th soul has d as of ts own that t deri ed n t

ings, and contemplati ns, to what purpose does it think. Th y wh mak the soul a thinking thing at this te, will n t make t much more bl being than those d whom th y co demn for allowing t to be n thing but the subtilist parts f matt Char cters dr wn n dust, that the first breath f wind ff es or impress ns mad o a heap f atoms, or animal pirits, ar altogeth as useful, and r d th subject as noble, as th thoughts of soul that pe ish in thinking that, ce out f ght, are g e for ev and lea e n memory f th msel es behind them. N tur n makes cell nt things for mean or o uses and t is hardly to be co ce ved that our infinitely wise Creator h uld mak so admirabl a f culty as th pow f thinking that faculty hich comes near st th excell ncy f his own comp h ns bl being t be so dly and uselessly employed, t l ast fourth part f ts time her as t think constantly without emem bering any f those thoughts, w thout d ing any good to tself or th rs, being any way us ful to any th part f th cr ti n. If we will ex amine t, we shall t find I suppose the moti n of dull and senseless m tter any where in th universe mad so littl use of and so wh lly thrown w y

16 O *the hypothesis th soul must hav ideas not derived f om sensation or flect on f hi h ther no f orance* It is tru we ha som times nsta ces of percep on whilst w are asleep and tain th memory of those thoughts but how xtravagant and incohe t for th most part th y are how h ll conformable t th perfecti and order f rational being those wh are cquainted w th dreams need not be t ld. This I would willingly

thinking (so p t that th man minsen pe ce es t not,) tain any f them the very moment t wakes out of th m, and then make the man glad w th nev disco er es Who can find t r ason that th soul should in ts r tireme t during sleep ha so ma y hours thoughts, and yet never light any f those ideas t borrowed n t fr m sensation or eflecti n or t least preserve th memory f non but such, which being oc cas ed f m the body must needs be less natu al t pir t. It s trange th soul should nev ce in man s wh le life ecall o e any f ts ...

be s pposed but that during sleep t ecoll ts ts natu d as and dur g that tirem nt from communicating w th th body whilst t thinks by its lf th deas t is bus ed bout should be ...

does n t or lse that memory belo gs only t such d as as are d ri ed fr m th body or the mind s per ti ns bout th m.

18. *How know any ne that the soul alway thinks.*

soul when he sleeps and Socrates the man consisting of body and soul when he is waking are two persons since waking Socrates has no knowledge of or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps without perceiving anything of it no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies whom he kno...

... the concernment that accompanies it it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity [1]

12 *If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it the sleeping and waking man are two persons* The soul during sound sleep thinks say these men Whilst it thinks and perceives it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble as well as any other perceptions and *it* must necessarily be *conscious* of its own perceptions But it has all this apart the sleep...

... body which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with who so liberally allow life without a thinking soul to all other animals These men cannot then judge it impossible or a contradiction that the body ...

... body to think apart Let us suppose too that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man v g Pollux who is sleeping without a soul For if Castor s soul can think whilst Castor is asleep what Castor is never conscious of it is no matter what *place* it chooses to think in We have here then the bodies of two men with only one soul between them which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns and the soul still thinking in the waking man whereof the sleeping man is never conscious has never the least perception I ask then whether Castor and Pollux thus ...

... distinct *persons* as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two persons who make the soul think apart what the man *is* not conscious of For I suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul s being united to the very same numerical particles of matter For if that be necessary to identity it will be impossible in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies that any man should be the same person two days or two moments, together

13 *Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming that they think* Thus methinks every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine who teach that the soul is always thinking Those at least, who do at any time *sleep without dreamin* can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it and if they are taken in the very act waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation can give no manner of account of it

14 *That men d eam without rememberi g it in vain urged* It will perhaps be said —That the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep but the *memo y* retains it not That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a thinkin and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts is very hard to be conceived and would need some better proof than bare assertion[2] to make it be believed For who can without any more ado but being barely told so imagine that the greatest part of men do during all their lives for several hours every day think of something which if they were asked even in the middle of these thoughts they could remember nothing at all of? Most men I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming I once knew a man that was bred a scholar and had no bad memory who told me he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances at least every one s acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dream ng

15 *Upon this hyp thesis the thoughts f a sleeping man ought to be m st rational* To think often and never to retain it so much as one moment is a very useless sort of thinking and the soul in such a state of thi king does very l ttle if at all excel that of a looking glass wh ch constantly rece ves variety of images or ideas but reta ns none they disappear and vanish and there remain no foot ...

... of the body are employed and made

[1] Cf. ch xxvii

[2] Cf. W James *Princpl s of Psychol gy* ch viii.

or thought doing ery l ttl but sl ep pl e here t eeds tseek f food nd is surrou ded th liqu al y equally ft, a d ar f th same temper wh e th s ha n l ght, and the ars so hut up are n t ery susceptibl of so nds and wh re ther is l ttle or n ar ty or chan f bjects, t mo e th s ns

The mi d th ks pr port t the m tter t gets f om per er to thi k b ut F llo a h ld from ts birth, a d bserve the alte t ns th t time makes, and yo hall find as th mind by the senses comes mor and m to be furnished th id as, t comes t be m e and mo e ak thinks mor the mor t has m tt r t think on. Afte some tim t begins t know th bje ts h t ha mad

t the through the s nses by outn ard objects o b ts n oper t o wh n it reflects th m This is the fir t st p a man makes toward th d s covery f any th g a d th groundwo k h reon t build ll th t on h ch e er h shall ha e natu ally this o ld All those subl me th ughts hich tow r abo e the clo ds and r ach as high a h n itself take th ir r se and footi g he e n all that gre t xte t wh ein the mi d and s n thos rem t specul t ns t may s m t be el ated th t stirs n t ne j t beyo d thos d as h ch s ns or fl t h e ff ed f ts co templ ti n.

25. *I the pt on f sempl d as the understand g is for the m t part passi* In this part the u d rst nd g s m rely pass and wh the r

obtrude th pa ticular id as po h the we ill o not a d th pe at o s f ur m nd all n t l t us be w th ut at l t s m bscu e n ti ns f th m. N man can be wh lly gn t f hat h does whe h thinks. Th mpl d as he offe ed t th mind th und rstand g can no mo e fuse to ha

prov these d d t th ise f those th f cul f large g e mp d g and bstr ct is d as, nd f ason g bout th m, d fl ti g po ll th f h h I hall ha occas t speak m r h aft

3 *A man b ns t have d as when he fi t has en sati n What ens t on* If t h ll be d ma ded then, *hen ma b gins t* ha y d as I think th tru ans is,— *hen he fir t has y ns t n*. For si ce th ppear t be ny de s in t mi d bef th senses ha yed y in I that d as th u d ta d g are coeval w th *ens t hich such an mp ss or on mad m part f th body as p duc som p rc pti th under t nd* I bo t th se m press on mad enses by utward bjects that th mind ms fi t empl y ts lf such oper ti as w call pe pt m mbe g cons d ti asoni g &c

4 *The orig al f ll our k wl d* I me the m nd comes fl ts own pe t bout the id as g t by sensat d th by to t self th w set f d as, wh ch I call d as f reflectio These re th mp ess that are mad on our senses by n ard bj ts that ar trins al to the mind d ts own pe ti ns, proceed g from powers tr ns cal d prope to tself wh h wh fl d by ts lf be com also bj ts f its co t mplati —ar as I ha said th ti al f all k owledge Thus the first cap ty f h man t ll is —that th mind is fitted to rece th imp ss ns mad

affect rg ns, the mi d is forced to e th impr ss ons and cann t a d the percep ti of thos d as that an d t them

Chap II *Of S mple Id s*

1 *Unc mp nd d pp ar nc* Th bette to un

that he is n s par ti n distan betw n th m yet t plai th d as they produ i th m d e t by the se simpl d nmi d F though th sight d touch fte tak in f m th sam bject, t th m tim d ff nt

Cf Bk. IV ch xvii. § 8
Cf ch ix. §

Cf H m *E t y C r g Hum Und stand g* Sect II
Cf h. ii § 7

For if it be not a self evident proposition it needs proof I would be glad also to learn from these men who so confidently pronounce that the human soul or which is all one that a man always thinks how they come to know it nay how they come to know that they themselves think when they themselves do not perceive it This I am afraid is to be sure without proofs and to know without perceiving It is I suspect a confused not on tal en up to serve an hypothesis and none of those clear truths that either their own evi dence forces us to admit or common experience makes it impudence to deny For the most that can be said of it is that it is possible the soul may

it should sometimes not think than that it should often think and that a long while together and not be conscious to itself the next moment after that it had thought

19 *Th t a m should be busy in th king and y t not r t in it the next moment very improb ble* To suppose the soul to think and the man not to perceive it is as has been said to make two per sons in one man And if one considers well these men s way of speaking one should be led into a suspicion that they do so For they who tell us that the *soul* always thinks do never that I re member say that a *man* always thinks Can the soul think and not the man? Or a man think and not be consc ous of it? This perhaps would be suspected of jargon in others If they say the man thinks always but is not always conscious of it they may as well say his body is extended without having parts For it is altogether as in tell gible to say that a body s extended without parts as that anything thinks without being con sc ous of it or perceiving that it does so They who talk thus may with as much reason if it be necessary to the r hypothesis say that a man s always hungry but that he does not always feel it whereas hunger cons sts in that very sensa tion as thinking cons sts in being consc ous that one thinks If they say that a man is always con scious to h mself of thinking I ask How they know it? Consciousness is the percept on of what passes in a man s own mind Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything when I perceive it not myself? No man s knowledge here can go beyond his experience Wake a man out of a sound sleep and ask him what he was that moment thinking of If he himself be con scious of nothing he then thought on he must be a notable di vner of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking May he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy and it cannot be less than revelation that discovers to another thoughts in my mind when I can find none there myself And they must needs have a penetrating sight who can certainly see that I think when I cannot perceive it myself and when I declare that I do not and yet can see that dogs or ele phants do not think when they give all the dem onstration of it imaginable except only tellin us that they do so This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians it seeming easier to make one s self invisible to others than to make another s thoughts vis ble to me which are not visible to himself But it is but defining the soul to be a substance that always thinks and the business is done If such definition be of any au thority I know not what it can serve for but to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking For no definitions that I know no suppositions of any sect are of force enough to destroy constant experience and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world

20 *No ideas but from sensation and reflection evi dent if we observe child en* I see no reason there fore to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on and as those are increased and retained so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of think ing in the several parts of it as well as after wards by compound ng those ideas and reflect ing on its own operations it increases its stock as well as facility in rememberin imagining reasoning and other modes of thinking

1 *St te of a ch ld in th m ther s womb* He that w ll suffer himself to be informed by observation and expe ence and not make his own hypothe sis the rule of nature w ll find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking in a new born ch ld and much fe er of any reasoning at all And yet it is hard to magine that the rational soul should think so much and not reason at all And he that will cons der that infants newly come into the world spend the greatest part of their time in sleep and are seldom a ake but when either hunger calls for the teat or some pain (the most importunate of all sensations) or some other violent impression on the body forces the mind to perceive and attend to it —he I say who con s ders this will perhaps f nd reason to imagine that a *fœtus* in the mother s womb differs not much from the state of a vegetable but passes the greatest part of its t me without perception

pottern to be admitted by n ther way to brin themselves into w and be perce ed by the understanding

The most considerabl f those belonging to the touch, are *heat and cold* and *solidity* all the rest, consisting almost wh lly in th sensibl configuration, as smooth and rough or lse more or less firm adhesion f th parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obv ous enou h.

2. *Few simple ideas have names* I think t will be needless to enumerat all the particular imple ideas belonging to each sense Nor indeed is it possibl if we would there being great many more f them belonging to most f the senses than we have names for Th var ty f smells, which ... of

smell of rose and viol t, both sweet, at cer tainly very distinct deas. Nor are th different tastes, that by our palates we eceive deas of much better prov ded w th names. Sweet, bitter sour harsh, and salt ar almost all th p thets w hav to denomina that numberless variety of relishes, whi h are be found distinct, not onl in almost every sort f creatures, but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same ma be said f colours and sounds. I shall, therefor in the ccount of simp ideas I am her gi in co tent myself to se down nly such as are most material to our present purpose, or are themselves less pt to be taken notice of though they ar very frequentl the ingredients of our complex ideas amongst which, I think, I may well ccoun solidity which therefore I shall treat of in th next chapter

Chap IV I[?] f Solidity

1. *We receive this idea from touch.* Th dea f *solidity* we receive by our ouch and arises from th resistance which w find in bod to th en trance f an ther bod into the *place* it possesses. till has lef t. There is no idea which we receive more constantl from sensation than solidity Whether w move or rest, in what posture soever we are we alwa feel something un der us tha pport us, and hind rs our further sinking downwards and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that, whilst they remain between them, they do, by an insur mountable force hinder the pproach of the parts of our hands that press them. *That which thus hinders the approach f two bodies when they are moved one towards another I call solidity* I will not dispute whether this acceptation of the word solid be nearer to ts original signification than that which math maticians use t in. It suffices that I think th common n tion of solid ty will allow if not justify this use f t but if any ne think t better to call t *impenetrability* h has my consent. Only I ha e thought th term solid ty the more proper to express this dea, not only because of

mat ly connected w th, and esse ual to body so as nowhere be t be found or imagined but only in matter And though our senses tak n notice of t, but in masses of matter of a bulk sufficient t cause sensation in us yet the mind, ha ing ce got this dea from such grosser sen sibl bodies, traces t further and cons ders t, as well as figur in th minutest particl f mat ter that can exist and finds t inseparab y inher ent in body wherever or however modified.

Solidity fills space This is the dea which be longs to body whereby we co ce e t to fill space The idea f wh ch filling of sp ce is,—that where we imagine any space taken up by solid sub stance, w co cei e t so to possess t, that t ex cl des all the solid substances and will for eve hinder any other two bodies, that move towards

3 *Distinct from space* This resistance, whereby t keeps ther bodies out f th space which t possesses, is so great, that no force, how great so ever can surmount t. All the bod es in th world, pressing a drop f water on all ides, will never be bl t overcome the resistance which t will make soft as t is, to th ir pproaching on an ther till t be removed out f their way where *by our idea f solidity* is distinguished both from pure space which is capabl neither of resistance nor motion and *from* the ordinary dea of hard ness. For man may concei e two bodies t a

solid ty For (not to go so far as annihilati n of any particular bod) I ask, whether a man can not ha e th idea f the motion f one singl body alone, w thout any other succeeding immediately into ts place. I think t is evident he can the

and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those *simple ideas* which being each in it If —
no
the
ide

2 *The mind can neither make nor dest oy them* These simple ideas the materials of all our knowledge are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned viz sensation and reflection [1] When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas it has the power to repeat compare and unite them even to an almost infinite variety and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas But it is not in the power of the most exalted v it or enlarged understanding by any quickness or variety of thought to *invent* or *frame* one new simple idea in the mind *not taken in* by the ways before mentioned *nor* can any force of the understanding *destroy* those that are there Th dom
v orld of
the sam
things w s power however managed by art and skill reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of nev matter or destroying one atom of what is already in being The same inability will every one find in himself v ho shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea not received in by his senses from external objects or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them I v ould have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt and when he can do this I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds

3 *Only the qual t es that ff ct the sens s are imaginable* This is the reason v hy—though we cannot believe it imposs ble to God to make a creature
1

v
p u e of any *man* to imagine any other qualities in bodies ho soever constituted whereby they can be taken notice of bes des sounds tastes smells visible and tangible qual ties And had mankind been made but with four senses the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice imagination and conception as now any belo m
six h

a is vast and stupendous universe may not have will be a m
deny He t
top of all th
of
fi
v o uo v ith may be apt to think that in other mansions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker I have here follov ed the common opinion of man s having but five senses though perhaps there may be justly counted more —but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose

[1] Cf ch u § ch 1 §§ 7–9

Chap III *Of Simple Ideas of Sense*

1 *Division of simple id as* The better to conceive the ideas we receive *from sensation* it may not be amiss for us to consider them in reference to the different v ays whereby *they make their* approaches to our minds and make themsel es perceivable by us

Fi st then There are some which come into our minds *by one sense only*

Secondly There are others that convey themselves into the mind *b m*

shall consider them apart under these several heads

Ide s f one sense There are some ideas v h ch have admittance *only through one sense* v hich is peculiarly adapted to receive them Thus light and colours as white red yellow blue ith their several degrees or shades and mixtures as green scarlet purple sea green and the rest come in only by the eyes All kinds of noises sounds and tones only by the ears The se eral *tastes and smells* by the nose and palate And if these organs or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain —the mind s presence room (as I may so call it)—are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions they have no

postern to be admitted by no ther way to bring themsel es into view and be perce ed by the understandin

The most consider bl f those belongin to the touch, are he t and cold and solid ty all the rest, consisting almost wh lly in th sens ble con guration, as smooth and rough or lse more or less firm adhes on of th parts, as hard and soft, tou h and brittl ar obv ous enou h.

Few simple ideas have names I think t will be needless to e umerat all the part cular imple

we ha e names for Th ar ty f sm lls, which

tastes, that by our palates we ece d as much better prov ded w th names. Sweet, bitter sour harsh, and sal ar almost all th p th ts we ha e t d nominat that numberless ariety of relishes, which are t be found distinct not onl in almost every sort f creatures, but in the differe t parts f the sam plant fruit, or animal. The same may be said f colours and sou ds. I shal, therefor in th ccount of simpl d as I am her gi ing co t t myself to set dow nly such as are most material t our prese t purpose, or are in themsel es less apt o be tak n tice f though they are ery frequ tly the ingredi nts of our complex d as amo st which I think, I may well ccoun solidity which therefore I shall treat f in th xt chapt

Chap IV *Id f Solidity*

1 *W re t d f m t uch* Th d f *solidity* we rece bv our ouch and t arises from the esistan which w find in bod t th en trance f any ther bod into th place t possesses, till has l ft t. Th is o d which w ece more constantly fr m sensation than solidity Whether w mo or rest, in wha posture soeve we ar we al a s feel someth g un der us t a support us, nd hi d rs our further sinking downwards nd th bod s which we daily handl make us perce e that, whilst th y remain between them, they do, by insur mou tabl force h nd th pp oach f th parts f our hands tha press th m. *That which thus hinders the pproach f t bodie when they are moved one towards another I call solidity* I will t

disput wh th r this acceptation of the word sol d to its original signification than that

suffici nt t cause sensat on in us et u e mind ha ing once got this idea from such grosse sen

longst body wh reby we co ce tt his spa e The idea f wh ch filling of space is,—that where we imagin any space taken up by a solid substance, w co ce e t so to possess t that t ex

5 *Dist nct from pac* This resistance whereby t keeps ther bodies out f th sp ce hich t possesses, is so great that n force how great soever can surmount t. All the bod es in the wo ld pressing drop f w t n all des, will ev be bl t ov rcom th esistance which t will mak soft as t is, to th ir pp oaching an th till t be removed out f th ir w where b our dea f solid ty is distinguished both from pure pace which is capabl n ther f esista ce nor motion nd from th rdinary d of hard ness. For man may co ce e two bod es t a distance so as they may appro ch an ther w thout t chi or displacing any solid thing till th ir superficies com t meet whereby I think we ha th cl ar d f space w thout solidity For (t to g so far as annihilation f

idea of motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another than the idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in another I do not ask whether bodies do so *exist* that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another To determine this either way is to beg the question for or against a *vacuum* But my question is —whether one cannot have the *idea* of one body moved whilst others are at rest? And I think this no one will deny If so then the place it deserted gives us the idea of pure space without solidity whereinto *any other body may enter* without either resistance or protrusion of any thing When the sucker in a pump is drawn the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker or not *nor does it imply a contradiction that* upon the motion of one body another that is only contiguous to it should not follow it The necessity of such a motion is built only on the supposition that the world is full but not on the distinct *ideas* of space and solidity which are as different as resistance and not resistance protrusion and not protrusion And that men have ideas of space without a body their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate as is shown in another place

dies out of the space it possesses but hardness in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter making up masses of a sensible bulk so that the whole does not easily change its figure And indeed hard and soft are names that we give to things only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies that being generally called hard by us which will put us to pain sooner than change

painful touch

But this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves or of the figure of the whole gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world than to the softest

is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water or resist more but because the parts of water being more easily separable from each other they will by a side motion be more easily removed and give way to

proach of these two pieces of marble as much as the diamond and it would be as impossible by *any force to surmount their resistance* as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond The softest body in the world will as invincibly resist the coming together of any other

ing soft body well with air or water will quickly find its resistance And he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands *from approaching one another may be pleased* to make a trial with the air inclosed in a football The experiment I have been told was made at Florence with a hollow globe of gold filled with water and exactly closed which further *shows the solidity of so soft a body as water* For the golden globe thus filled being put into a press which was driven by the extreme force of screws the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within got to the outside where it rose like a dew *and so fell in drops before the sides of the* globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it

5 *On solidity depend impulse resistance and protrusion* By this idea of solidity is the extension of body *distinguished from the extension of space* —the extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid separable movable parts and the extension of space the continuity of unsolid inseparable and immovable parts Upon the solidity of bodies also depend their mutual impulse resistance and protrusion Of *pure space then and solidity there are* several (amongst which I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas and that they can think on space without anything in it that resists or is protruded by body This is the idea of pure space which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have *of the extension of body the idea of* the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any solid parts between and

truded *by the impulse of other bodies, or resist*

Ch xiii. §§ 21–23

their motion. If there be others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not how men, who have the same idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name, can in that case talk with one another, any more than a man who, not being blind or deaf, has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet and the sound of a trumpet, could discourse concerning scarlet colour with the blind man I mentioned in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet.

6. *What solidity is.* If any one ask me *What this solidity is*, I send him to his senses to inform him. Let him put a flint or a football between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists, I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists, or explains to me what extension or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier. The simple ideas we have are such as experience teaches them us; but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking, and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall show in another place.

Chap. V. Of Simple Ideas of Divers Senses

Ideas received both by seeing and touching. The ideas we get by more than one sense are, of *space* or *extension*, *figure*, *rest* and *motion*. For these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

Chap. VI. Of Simple Ideas of Reflection

1. *Simple ideas are the operations of mind about its other ideas.* The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.

2. *The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.* The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two:—

> *Perception*, or *Thinking*, and
> *Volition*, or *Willing*.

The power of thinking is called the *Understanding*, and the power of volition is called the *Will*; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties.

Of some of the *modes* of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are *remembrance, discerning, reasoning, judging, knowledge, faith*, &c., I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

Chap. VII. Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection

1. *Ideas of pleasure and pain.* There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. *pleasure* or *delight*, and its opposite, *pain*, or *uneasiness*; *power*; *existence*; *unity*.

2. *Mix with almost all our other ideas.* Delight or [illegible]

molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction, d[illegible]

easiness, which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

3. *As motives of our actions.* The infinite wise Author of our being, having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of our body: having also given a power to our minds, in several instances, to choose, amongst its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of,—

Cf. Locke, *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet, p. 30.
Bk. III ch. ii. Ch. xiii, xv.

Cf. Bk. II ch. xxi. § 5.
See ch. x, xi, and Bk. IV ch. xvii, xix–xvi, xiii, xviii.

has been pleased to join to several thoughts and

reason to prefer one thought or action to another negligence to attention or motion to rest And so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds but

it) run adrift

and suffer the

ed shadows to make their appearances there as it happened without attending to them In which

lazy lethargic dream It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects and the ideas which we receive from them as also to several of our thoughts a concomitant pleasure and that in several objects to several degrees that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us

4 *An end and use of pain* Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to pursue this only this is worth our considerat on that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us This their near conjunction which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure gives us new occasion of ad iring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker who designing the preservation of our being has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies to warn us of the harm that they will do and as advices to withdraw from them But he not designing our preservation barely but the preservation of every part and

degree by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment and the most pleasant of all sens ble objects light itself if there be too much of it if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes causes a very painful sensation Which is v isely and favourably so ordered by nature that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future The consideration of those objects that produce it may v ell persuade us that this is the end or use of pain For though great light be insufferable to our eyes yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all d s ease them because that causing no disorderly motion in it leaves that curious organ unharmed

preservation of life and the exercise of the several functions of the body and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth or if you please a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds

5 *Another end* Beyond all this we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with —that we finding imperfection dissatisfaction and v ant of complete happiness in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him with whom there is fullness of joy and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore

6 *Goodness of God in annexi g pleasure and pa n to our other ideas* Though what I have here said may not, perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our ov n experience does v hich is the only way that we are capable of having them yet the consideration of the reason v hy they are annexed to so many other ideas serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries the knov ledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts and the proper business of all understandings

7 *Ideas of existence and unity Existence* and *Un ty* are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and e ery idea v ithin. When ideas are in our minds we consider them as being actually there as well as we consider things to be actually without us — which is that they exist or have existence[1] And whatever we can consider as one thing whether a real being or idea suggests to the understanding the idea of unity

8 *Idea of power Power* also is another of those s mple ideas which v e receive from sensation and reflect on For observing in ourselves that we do and can think and that v e can at pleas

[1] See chh xx and xx

[1] Cf Berkel y *Pr nc pl* § 89 also th lett r t S Bold (16 M y 1699)

are move several parts of our bodies which were t rest the effects, also, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another occurring every moment to our senses,—we both these ways get the idea of power

9. *Idea of succession.* Besides these there is another idea, which, though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered to us by what passes in our minds, and that is the idea of *succession*. For if we look immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming without intermission.

10. *Simple ideas the materials of all our knowledge.* These if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most considerable of these simple ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection.

Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its flight further than the stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible Inane. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any simple idea which is not received from one of those inlets before mentioned, or any complex idea not made out of those simple ones. Nor will it be so strange to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, or largest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind, if we consider how many words may be made out of the various composition of twenty-four letters; or if, going one step further, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, viz. number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians.

Chap. VIII *Some further considerations concerning our Simple Ideas of Sensation*

1. *Positive ideas from privative causes.* Concerning the simple ideas of Sensation, it is to be considered,—that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation of the subject.

2. *Ideas in the mind distinguished from that in things which gives rise to them.* Thus the ideas of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them are barely privations, in those subjects from whence our senses derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them: which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, [illegible]

[illegible]

and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.

3. *We may have the ideas when we are ignorant of their physical causes.* A painter or dyer who never inquired into their causes hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and [illegible]

than that of white, however the cause of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.

4. *Why a privative cause in nature may occasion a positive idea.* If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive idea; viz. that all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ.

Cf. ch. xxi, in which "simple modes" of the simple idea of power are described.

Cf. Introd. § 2

reason to prefer one thought or action to another negligence to attention or motion to rest And so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds but

it) run adrift

and suffer the

ed shadows to make their appearances there as it happened without attending to them In which state man however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will would be a very idle inactive creature and pass his time only in a lazy lethargic dream It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects and the ideas which we receive from them as also to several of our thoughts a concomitant pleasure and that in several objects to several degrees that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us

4 *An end and use of pain* Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to pursue this only this is worth our consideration that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us This their near conjunction wh ch makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker who designing the preservation of our being has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies to warn us of the harm that they will do and as advices to withdraw from them But he not designing our preservation barely but the preservation of every part and

degree by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment and the most pleasant of all sensible objects light itself if there be too much of it if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes causes a very painful sensation Which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation whose structures cannot but be very nice and del cate we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future The cons deration of

those objects that produce it may well persuade us that this is the end or use of pain For though great light be insufferable to our eyes yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them because that causing no disorderly motion in it leaves that curious organ unharmed in its natural state But yet excess of cold as well as heat pains us because it is equally destructive to that temper which is necessary to the preservation of life and the exercise of the several functions of the body and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth or if you please a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds

5 *Another end* Beyond all this we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with —that we finding imperfection dissatisfact on and want of com

fullness of joy and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore

6 *Goodness of God in annexi g pleasure and pain to our other ideas* Though what I have here said may not perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does which is the only way that we are capable of having them yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquir es the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts and the proper business of all understandings

7 *Id as of existence and unity* *Existence* and *U ity* are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there as well as we consider things to be actually without us — which is that they exist or have existence[2] And whatever we can consider as one thing whether a real being or idea suggests to the understanding the idea of unity

8 *Idea of power* *Power* also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection For observing in ourselves that we do and can think and that we can at pleas

[1] See chh xx and xxi

[2] Cf Berkeley *Pr ncipl s* § 89 also th letter t S Bold (16 May 1699)

ure move several parts of our bod es wh ch were rest th ffects, also that natu al bodies are abl to produce in one another occurri g every moment to our senses,—we both these ways get th id f power

9. *Id f succession.* Besides these th re is an other idea, which, tho h suggested by our senses, y t is more constantly ffered to us by hat passes in our mi ds and that is th d a f *successi n.* For if we look immed tely into ou sel es, and r flect on what is observabl there e shall find our id as alw ys, whilst we are ake or ha a y thought, pass ng in train, on going and an ther coming w thout inter miss on.

10. *Simpl id as the materials f all our knowl dg* These if they are not all, are at l ast (as I think) th most cons derabl f those impl d as which th mind has, and out f which is mad all its ther knowledg all which t ce es only by the two forementio ed ways of sensatio and flecti n.

N let any e think thes too nar ow bounds for the cap cious mind of man to exp tiate n hich takes ts flight furth th th tars and cannot be confined by th limits of th w ld that ext nd ts thoughts fte n beyo d the tmost expans on f M tt d makes cur ons into that incomp ch ns bl I I gr t all this, but desire any t ass gn y *simpl ide* which is not ece ved fr m f those f is befor mentioned any *ompl d* n t mad out f those simple es. N will t be s trange to think these few impl d as suffici nt to mploy th quickest thought, or large t ca p city and to furnish th mat ials f all th t var ous knowledge and m ar us fa cies and pini ns f all mankind f w cons d hov ma y wo ds may be mad out f th ar ous compositi of twenty four lett rs or if g g on step further we will but flect on th var ty of combinations that m y be mad w th barely on f th bove m nti ed d mber whose stock is inexhaustibl and truly infin te and what larg and imm nse fi ld d th extens on al afford th math maticians

Chap VIII *S m further c nsiderati ns concern g our S mpl Id as f S ns t*

P tive deas f om pri t us Co cern ing th simpl ideas f Sens t on t is t be co idered,—that whatsoe so constitut d n natur as t be bl by ffecting ur ns t cause any percepti n in th mind d th th by p oduce n th u d rstand g a s mple idea wh ch hates r be the e t rnal cause of it when t comes to be taken notice of by our dis cerni g faculty t is by the mind looked on and cons de ed th re to be a r al posit ve d a in th

Cf. ch. xxi. in which impl modes of th sim ple dea of power are described.

2 *Id s the m nd d stingui hed f om t ui th g u hi h gives ri e to them* Thus the deas f h at and cold light and darkness, white a d black, motion and rest, are equally cl ar and pos ti e d as in the mind though, perhaps, som of the causes which produce them are barely

but t the natur of the th gs existing w tho t us. These are two ry diff rent things, and carefully to be disti guished it being ne thi g t percei and kn w th d a of white or black, and qu te a oth to xamine what ki d of par ticles they must be, d how anged n the su pe f cies to make any obj ct appear wh t or black

3 *W m y have th d as when are gnor t f thei phy l caus* A pai t r or dyer wh ever nqu ed t their causes hath th d as f white and bl ck, and other colours, as cl arly per

th m is in ts caus pos tive or p ati e and th dea f black is less pos ti e in his mi d than th t of wh t how th cause f that colour n th ternal bject may be ly p vati n.

4 *Why p vat aus natur m y oc asi p sit ide* If t w th des gn f my p ese t u d rtaki g t inquir nto th n tural causes d mann f perc pti I ho ld ff r this as ason why privative cause might, n some cases t l ast, prod ce pos tive d iz that ll sensati being p od ced in us nly by d f f ent d gr es d modes of m ti n in our n mal pir ts, ar usly gitated by xtern l ob-

5 *Negative names need not be meaningless* But whether this be so or not I will not here determine but appeal to every one s own experience whether the shadow of a man though it consists of nothing but the absence of light (and the more the absence of light is the more discernible is the shadow) does not when a man looks on it cause as clear and positive idea in his mind as a man himself though covered over with clear sunshine? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing Indeed we have negative names which stand not directly for positive ideas but for their absence such as *insipid silence nihil* &c which words denote positive ideas v g *taste sound being* with a signification of their absence

6 *Whether any ideas are due to causes really privative* And thus one may truly be said to see darkness For supposing a hole perfectly dark from whence no light is reflected it is certain one may see the figure of it or it may be painted or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea is a question The privative causes I have here assigned of positive ideas are according to the common opinion but in truth it will be hard to determine whether there be really any *ideas from a privative cause* till it be determined whether rest be any more a privation than motion

7 *Ideas in the mind qualities in bodies* To discover the nature of our *ideas* the better and to discourse of them intelligibly it will be convenient to distinguish them *as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds* and *as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us* that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us

8 *Our ideas and the qualities of bodies* Whatsoever the mind perceives *in itself* or is the immediate object of perception thought or understanding that I call *idea* and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is Thus a snowball having the power to produce *in us the ideas of white* cold and round —the power to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snowball I call *qualities* and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings I call them *ideas* which ideas if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us

9 *Primary qualities of bodies* Qualities thus considered in bodies are

First such as are utterly inseparable from the body in what state soever it be and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers all the force can be used upon it it constantly keeps and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses v g Take a grain of wheat divide it into two parts each part has still solidity extension figure and mobility divide it again and it retains still the same qualities and so divide it on till the parts become insensible [1] they must retain still each of them all those qualities For division (which is all that a mill or pestle or any other body does upon another in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity extension figure or mobility from any body but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter of that which was but one before all which distinct masses reckoned as so many distinct bodies after division make a certain number These I call *original* or *primary qualities* of body which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us viz solidity extension figure motion or rest and number

10 *Secondary qualities of bodies* *Secondly* such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities i e by the bulk figure texture and motion of their insensible parts [2] as colours sounds tastes &c These I call *secondary qualities* To these might be added a *third* sort which are allowed to be barely powers though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I to comply with the common way of speaking call qualities but for distinction secondary qualities For the power in fire to produce a new colour or consistency in *wax* or *clay* —by its primary qualities is as much a quality in fire as the power it has to produce in me a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning which I felt not before —by the same primary qualities viz the bulk texture and motion of its insensible parts

11 *How bodies produce ideas in us* The next

[1] Cf Berkeley *Principles* §§ 123 etc
[2] Cf ch v § 8
Cf Bk IV ch § 11
Cf Locke *Reply to Second Letter* (1699) p 468 also Bk IV ch § 6

thing to be considered is, how bod es prod ce ideas in us and that is manif tl by impulse the only way which we can conce e bodies to oper in.

12. *By mot ns, external and our organism* If then external bjects be t united t our minds hen they prod d as ther in and yet we perce these *original* q alities in such of them as singly fall under our senses t is ev d t that some motion must be the ce co tt ed by our nerves, or animal spir ts, by som parts of our bodies, to the brains or the se t f sensation there to prod ce in our m ds th part cular ideas e ha f them. A d ce th t ns n, figure, umber and mot of bod es of a b-servab. bigness, may be perce ed t dis- som nel m

of them in us.

13. *H w secondary q ual produc their ideas* After the same manne that th d as f thes original qualities ar prod ced in us, may conceive that th d as of *secon ary* qualities ar also prod ced, iz. by th per tion of nsensi b. particles on our senses. For t be mani fest that there are bod es and good st re f bod es, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any f our senses discov th th bulk, figure, or m n —as is ev d t th particles f. air and wa and th rs tr m ly maller tha those pe haps as m ch small tha th particles f air and wa as th particles f air and wat are small than peas or hail t es —let us suppose t presen th t the different motions and figures, bulk and umbe f such particles, affecting th seve al organs f our senses, produce in us those diff nt sensations which we ha from th colours and smells f bodies g that let, by th impulse f such insensibl particles of matter f peculiar figures and bulks, and in diff ent degree and modifi cations of th ir m n ns, causes th id as f th blue colour and swe sce t f tha flow t be produced in our minds. It be g m im-possibl con e that God should annex such ideas to ch motions, with which th y ha e similitud than tha h should ann th dea of pain t th motio f p ece f teel d viding our flesh, w th which that dea hath esem blance

4. *They depend on the primary qual ti* What I ha said concerning colour and m lls may be understood also f tas es and sounds, and ther

th l k sensibl qual es wh ch wh tever r al ty we by mi tak attr but to th m, are i truth n th n th objects themsel es, but powers to prod ce ar us sensat ons n us and d pe d hose p imary qualities, iz. bulk figur

these second ry qual t es ha e no su e of them t all. Th re is thi l ke our d as, existi g n th bodies th msel es. They are in th bodies we d nomi te f m them, only a pow r t prod ce thos sensati s in us nd what is swe t, bl or warm in d a is but the certain bulk, figure nd motion of th nsens bl parts, in the bod es themsel es, which we call so

6 *Exampl s* Fl me is d minated h t and

us th o th perfect esembl ce of th other as they are in mirror and t would by most men be judged ery e tra va t if o should say th rwise And yet he that will cons der that th same fire that, t on dista ce prod ces in us th sensati n of warmth, does, t n ar r pp oach p od ce us th far di e t sensa ti of p in ought t bethink himself what rea son he has to sa —that this de f warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, *is act a y the fire* nd his id of pain, which th sam fir prod ced him th same way is *not* in th fire Why are whit ness nd cold ess in snow and pain n t, wh n t p oduces the and the oth r d in us and can d th r but by the bulk, figur numbe and m n f its sol d parts

7 *The ideas f the primary lone ally xist* The particular bulk umbe figur and mot on f th parts f fire or snow ar really n th m— wh th y o senses perce th m and th refore they may be called *al* qualities, because th y eall exist in those bod es But light, heat, whit ness, or cold ess, are n more eally in th m than ckness or pain is in manna. Tak w v th sensation f them l t not th eyes see light colours, or th ars h sounds l t the palate not tast nor the nose

Cf. ch. i. § 3. Cf. § 8.

Cf Hume *Enquiry Concerni g Human Under standing* sect. xii. pt.

smell and all colours tastes odours and sounds *as they are such particular ideas* vanish and cease and are reduced to their causes i e bulk figure and motion of parts

18 *The secondary exist in things only as modes of the primary* A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure and by being removed from one place to another the idea of motion This idea of motion represents it as it really is in manna moving a circle or square are the same whether in idea or existence in the mind or in the manna And this both motion and figure are really in the manna whether we take notice of them or no this everybody is ready to agree to Besides manna by the bulk figure texture and motion of its parts has a power to produce the sensations of sickness and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us That these ideas of sickness and pain are *not* in the manna but effects of its operations on us and are nowhere when we feel them not this also every one readily agrees to And yet men are hardly to be brought to think that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna which are but the effects of the operations of manna by the motion size and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate as the pain and sickness caused by manna are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts by the size motion and figure of its insensible parts (for by nothing else can a body operate as has been proved) as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas which in itself it has not as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach and thereby produce distinct ideas which in itself it has not These ideas being all effects of the operations of manna on several parts of our bodies by the size figure number and motion of its parts —why those produced by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the manna than those produced by the stomach and guts or why the pain and sickness ideas that are the effect of manna should be thought to be nowhere when they are not felt and yet the sweetness and whiteness effects of the same manna on other parts of the body by ways equally as unknown should be thought to exist in the manna when they are not seen or tasted would need some reason to explain

19 *Examples* Let us consider the red and white colours in porphyry Hinder light from striking on it and its colours vanish it no longer produces any such ideas in us upon the return of light it produces these appearances on us again Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyry in the light when it is plain *it has no colour in the dark*? It has indeed such a configuration of particles, both night and day as are apt by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone to produce in us the idea of redness and from others the idea of whiteness but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us

20 Pound an almond and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one and the sweet taste into an oily one What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body but an alteration of the texture of it?

21 *Explains how water felt as cold by one hand may be warm to the other* Ideas being thus distinguished and

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time ma

and of he by the other whereas it is impossible that the same water if those ideas were really in it should at the same time be both hot and cold For if we imagine *warmth* as it is in our hands to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits we may understand how it is possible that the same water may at the same time produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other which yet *figure* never does that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies caused by the corpuscles of any other body it is easy to be understood that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other if a body be applied to the two hands which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands and a less than in those of the other it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon

22 *A*

sensation a little understood and to make the difference between the *qualities* in bodies and the *ideas* produced by them in the mind to be distinctly conceived without which it were im

possible to discourse intelligibly of them.—I hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy, it being necessary in our present inquiry to distinguish the *primary* and *real* qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. solidity, extension, figure, number and motion, or rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discerned) from those *secondary* and *imputed* qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned;—whereby we may also come to know what ideas are and what are not, resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

23. *Three sorts of qualities in bodies.* The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts:—

First, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself; as is plain in artificial things. These I call *primary qualities*.

Secondly, The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called *sensible qualities*.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of *another body*, as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called *powers*.

The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities; because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not: and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things: which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

24. *The first are resemblances. The second thought to be resemblances, but are not. The third neither are nor are thought so.* But, though the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the *second* sort, viz. the powers to produce several ideas in us, by our senses, are looked upon as real qualities in the things thus affecting us: but the *third* sort are called and esteemed barely powers. E.g. The idea of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun, are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by powers in it. Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally *powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities*; whereby it is able, in the one case, so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid.

25. *Why the secondary are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and not for bare powers.* The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be

appear not, to our senses, to operate in their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves: since sensation discovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production; nor can reason show how bodies, *by their bulk, figure, and motion*, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, &c. But, in the other case, in the operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For, through receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun, we are apt to

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. §

Cf. ch. xxx. § 2.

think *it* is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun yet when we see wax or a fair face receive change of colour from the sun we cannot imagine *that* to be the reception or resemblance *of anything in the sun* because we find not those different colours in the sun itself For our senses being able to observe a likeness

not the communication of any quality which

unlikeness between the idea produced in us and the quality of the object producing it we are apt *to imagine* that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance

6 *Secondary qualities twofold first immediately perceivable secondly mediately perceivable* To conclude Besides those before mentioned primary *qualities in bodies viz bulk figure extension* number and motion of their solid parts all the rest whereby we take notice of bodies and distinguish them one from another are nothing else but several powers in them depending on those primary qualities whereby they are fitted either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us or else by operating on other bodies so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did The former of these I think may be called secondary qualities *immediately perceivable* the latter secondary qualities *mediately perceivable*

Chap IX *Of Perception*

1 *Perception the first simple idea of reflection* PERCEPTION as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection and is by some called thinking in general Though thinking in the propriety of the English tongue signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas wherein the mind *is* active where *it with* some degree of voluntary attention considers anything For in bare naked perception the mind *is for the most part* only passive and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving

Cf Bk IV ch § 2 h i § 14 &c S lso Bk II ch x § 5 for the different meanings of perception in the *Essay*

2 *Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is* What perception is every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself when he sees hears feels &c or thinks, than by any discourse of mine Whoever re

of it

3 *Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression* This is certain that whatever alterations are made in the body *if they reach* not the mind whatever impressions are made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within there is no perception Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain and there the sense of heat or idea of pain be produced in the mind wherein consists actual perception

4 *Impulse on the or an insufficient* How often may a man observe in himself that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation

of hearing with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be *on the organ but it* not reaching the observation of the mind there follows no perception and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear yet no sound is heard *Want of sensation* in this case is not through any defect in the organ or that the man s ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea *though conveyed in* by the usual organ not being taken notice of in the understanding and so imprinting no idea in the mind there follows no sensation So that wherever there *is sense or perception* there some idea is actually produced and present in the understanding

5 *Children though they have ideas in the womb have none innate* Therefore I doubt not but children by the exercise of their senses about ob- receive some

or else of those wants or diseases they s er amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two which probably are some of the first that chil

dre ha e and which they scarce er part th ain.

6. *Th effects f sensat on the womb* But thou h it be reasonabl t magin that children rece e some id as before they com in th world yet these imple id as are far from those *innat princ ple* hich some cont nd for and we abo e hav rejected These here mentioned being th effects of sensation, ar only from some affec tions f the bod which happen t them th e, and so depend on som thi g exter or t th m d no otherwise differing n th ir mann f production from th ideas d ed from sense but only in the precedency of time Wh reas those that princip es ar supposed to be quit f another natur not comin into th mind by an ccid tal alter tions or per u ns n t bod b t, as t were or gi al char cters m pressed pon t, in th ery first moment f its be n and constitut n.

7 *Which deas pear fir t, is t evident ar im portant* As ther ar some deas which we may reasonably suppose may be introd ced int th minds f children in th omb subserv e t t the necessities f th ir lif and bein there so after they are bo those d as are the earliest mprin ed hich happen to be th sens bl qual ties hich first occur to th m m gst which light is t th l ast cons derabl nor f the weakest fficacy And how covetous the mind is t be furnished w th all such d as as ha e no pain ccompanying th m, may be littl guessed by what is bservabl in childre new born who always turn their eyes t that part f m wh ce the light comes, lay th m how you pl ase. But the id as that are most f miliar t first, be various ccording to th di ers circumstances of child en first entertainment in th world, th order wherein th several d as come t first into the mind is ry various, d uncertain also th is t m ch ma ial t know t.

8. *Sensat ons ften hang d by the judgment* W ar further t consider co cerning pe ceptu hat the id as w rece by sensation are ft n in grown peopl altered by th j dgme t, w th out our taking tice f t. Wh n w set before our eyes round gl be f any unif rm colour g. gold, alabast or j t, t is certain that th idea thereby imprinted n our mind is f flat circl ariously shadowed w th several d grees of light and brightness coming t our yes But we ha ing by use, bee ccust med t perce e hat kind of ppearance co ex bodies are wo t to make in us what alt tions are mad in th reflections f light by the difference of th sens ble figures of bodies —th judgme t presently b an hab tual cust m alt rs th ppe r ces int th ir causes. So that f om th t wh ch is truly var ty f shado r col u coll ti g th figure t makes t pass for a mark of figure a d frames t tself th pe ception f co ex figure a d a unif m col ur wh n th de e e ce f m th ce is nl a plane variously col oured as is ev d t n p t e To which pur pose I shall here nsert problem of that ery re ous d tud ous promoter f real k o l edge th l arned and worthy M M lyneux, which he as pl ased t se d me a let som months since d t is thus — S ppose ma *born* bl d d now dult and ta ght by his *touch* t d t guish between cube d a sphe e

— h d them he could n w d

fects his t ch, yet he has n t yet obtai ed th xperi ce that what affects his touch so or so,

— he

how much he may be beholden t experi ce improvement and cquired not ons, where he thinks h had n t the l ast use f h lp from them. And the th because this bserving g d man further dds, that ha ing upon the occas f my book, proposed this t di ers ery ingeni u men, he hardly ever met w th one that firs ga e th answer t t which h thinks tru till by hearing his asons they were con inced

9. *This judgment pt to b mistaken for direct per pt on.* B t this is n t, I think, usual in any of our d as, but those ece ed by sight. Because sight, the most comp ehens f all our senses, co eying t ur minds th d as f light and colours, which are peculiar nly t that sense

think *it* is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun yet when we see wax or a fair face receive change of colour from the sun we cannot imagine *that* to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun because we find not those different colours in the sun itself For our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects we forwardly enough conclude the producton of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power and not the communication of any quality which was really in the efficient when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it But our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us and the quality of the object producing it we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance

6 *Secondary qualities twofold first immediately perceivable secondly mediately perceivable* To conclude Besides those before mentioned primary

tinguish them one from another are nothing else but several powers in them depending on those primary qualities whereby they are fitted either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us or else by operating on other bodies so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did The former of these I think may be called secondary qualities *immediately perceivable* the latter *secondary qualities mediately perceivable*

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some degree of voluntary attention considers anything For in bare naked perception the mind

Cf Bk IV ch 1 § 2 ch § 4 &c See also Bk. II ch xxi § 5 for three different meanings of perception in the *Essay*

is for the most part only passive and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving

Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself when he sees hears feels &c. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it And if he does not reflect all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it

3 *Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression* This is certain that whatever alterations are made in the body if they reach not the mind whatever impressions are made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within there is no perception Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain and there the sense of heat or idea of pain be produced in the mind wherein consists actual perception

4 *Impulse on the organ insufficient* How often may a man observe in himself that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects and curiously surveying some ideas that are there it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ but it not reaching the observation of the mind there follows no perception and though the motion d be made

the organ or that the man s ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea though conveyed in by the usual organ not being taken notice of in the understanding and so imprinting no idea in the mind there follows no sensation So that wherever there is sense or perception there some idea is actually produced and present in the understanding

5 *Children though they may have ideas in the womb have none innate* Therefore I doubt not but children by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas before they are born as the unavoidable effects either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two which probably are some of the first that chil

principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or an oyster I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three days, I wonder what difference there would be, in any intellectual perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.

15. *Perception the inlet of all materials of knowledge.* Perception then being the *first* step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them,—the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here,—that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine that it is perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in hand which way the learned shall determine of it.

Chap X. Of Retention

1. *Contemplation.* The next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways.

First, by keeping the idea which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is called *contemplation*.

2. *Memory.* The other way of retention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight. And thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet,—the object being removed. This is *memory*, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository, to lay up those ideas which, at another time, it might have use of. But, our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this,—that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that *it has had them before*. And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere;—but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty, that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings which, though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there.

3. *Attention, repetition, pleasure and pain, fix ideas.* Attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory. But those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impressions, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. The great business of the senses being, to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body, it is wisely ordered by nature, as has been shown, that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas; which, supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects with that haste which is necessary for their preservation; and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future.

4. *Ideas fade in the memory.* Concerning the several degrees of lasting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may observe,—that some of them have been produced in the understanding by an object affecting the senses once only, and no more than once; others, that have more than once offered themselves to the senses, have yet been little taken notice of: the mind, either heedless, as in children, or otherwise employed, as in men intent only on one thing; not setting the stamp deep into itself. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated impressions, either through the temper of the body or some other fault, the memory is very weak. In all these cases, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining

Cf. Bk. IV. ch. ix, xi.
Cf. § 9.

and also the far different ideas of space figure and motion the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object viz light and colours v e bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other This *in many cases by a* settled habit —in things whereof we have fre quent experience is performed so constantly and so quick that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment so that one viz that of sensation serves only to excite the other and is scarce taken no tice of itself —

attention and t

of the characte [illegible] but of the ideas that are excited in him by them

10 *How by habit ideas of sensation are uncon sciously changed into ideas of judgment* Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice if we consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed For as itself is thought to take up no space [1] to have no extension so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body Any one *may easily observe this in his own thoughts* who will take the pains to reflect on them H~

[illegible]

[illegible] o put it into words and step by step show it another? Secondly we shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice if we consider how the facil ity which v e get of doing things by a custom of *doing makes them often pass in us* v ithout our notice Habits especially such as a e begun very early come at last to produce actions in us which often escape our observatio [illegible]

[illegible] by custom have got the use of a by word do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds v hich though taken notice of by others they themselves neither hear nor observe And therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment and make one serve only to excite the other v ithout our taking notice of it

11 *Percepti n p is the d fference betwee animals and vegetables* This faculty of perception seems to me to be that which puts the distinction be twixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature For however vegetables have many of them some degrees of motion and upon the different application of other bodies to them do very briskly alter their figures and mot [illegible]

so h [illegible]

from [illegible]

[illegible] all the turning of a wild oat beard by the insinuation of the particles of mois ture or the shortening of a rope by the affusion of water *All which is done without any sensa* tion in the subject; or the having or receiving any ideas

12 *Perception in all an m l* [illegible]

lieve [illegible]

thou [illegible]

by n [illegible] the reception of sensations are so few and the perception they are received v ith so obscure and dull that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation *which is in other animals* but yet *it is sufficient* for and wisely adapted to the state and condi tion of that sort of animals v ho are thus made So that the v isdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric and all *the several degrees and ranks* of creatures in it

13 *According to their cond tion* We may I think from the make of an oyster or cockle reasona bly conclude that it has not so many *nor so quick senses as a man or several other animals* nor if it had would it in that state and inca pacity of transferring itself from one place to another be bettered by them What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself *to or from the objects* wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still v here chance has once placed it and there receive the afflux of *colder or v armer* clean or foul water as it hap pens to come to it?

14 *Decay f percept on in old age* But yet I can not but think there is some small dull percep tion whereby they are distinguished from [illegible]

[illegible] y of his past knov ledge and *clearly* v iped out the ideas h s mind v as formerly stored with and has by destroying his sight hearing and smell quite and his taste to a great degree stopped up almost all the passages for new ones *to enter or if there be some of the inlets yet half* open the impress ons made are scarcely per ceived *or not at all retained* How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of in

[1] Cf ch. xxvii § 2 on the 'place of spirits

calls for them, we e almost as good be u ut tem quite since they serv him t littl pur pose The dull man, who los s the opportunity hilst h is se ki g in his mind for those d as that should serve his turn, is n t much m re happy in his knowledg than n that is perf tly norant. It is th business the fore f th m m ory to furnish to the mind those dorma t d as hich it has present occas on for n the ha ng them eady t hand on all occas ons, consists that hich we call inventi n fancy and quick ness f parts.

9. *A d fect hich b long to the memory f man as fi ite* These ar d fects we may observe in the memory f e man compared w th another There is anoth d fect which we may co ce e to be in th mem ry of man in g e al —compared w th some super or created int llectual beings, which in this faculty may s far cel man that they may have *nstantly* vi w th whol sce f all th ir former ct ns, wh rein on f th thoughts th y ha e ev had may slip out of th ir ght. Th mnisci ce f God ho knows all things, past, present, and to come and to whom th thoughts of m n h arts al ys lie pen, may satisfy us f th poss bility of this. For wh can doubt but God may communicate to those glor ous pir ts, his immediate at t dants, any f his pe f ti ns n what p po tions h pl ases, as far as cr ated finit beings can be cap bl It is ported f that prodigy of parts, M ur Pascal that till th decay f his health had impaired his m mory h forgot noth f what h had d ad or thought, in any part f his ti al age. This is p l ge so little known t most m that t seems almost incred bl to those wh af th ord ary way measur all oth rs by th msel es but yet, wh cons de ed, may h lp us to nlarge ur thoughts towards gr ter pe fecti ns f t, in superi anks of spir ts. For this f M ns eur Pascal was till th the narrown ss that human minds ar n fined to here —of ha ing gre t vari ty f deas only by success on t all t once. Wher as the several degrees f ang ls may probably ha larg er ew and som f th m be d wed th cap cities bl to tain tog ther and constantly se befor them, as in picture, all th ir past knowled t once. This, w may conce e would be small advantag to th kn wledge f a thinki man —if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be *alw y* prese t t him. And therefore we may suppose t on f thos w ys, wh re n the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

10. *Brut ha e mem ry* This f culty of lay ng up and reta ni g the ideas that are brought nto the mind se eral ther n mals seem to ha e t a great degree as well as man For t pass by d the

ha e percepti n, and r tain id as th ir u or es, and use th m for patterns. F r it s ems t me mposs bl that they should e d a ur to conf rm th ir o ce to n te (as t is plain th y d) of hich th y had id as. For though I should grant sound may mechan cally cause a ce tain m ti n f th animal pir ts n th brains of those birds hilst the tu is ctually pl y ing and that m ti may be cont ued on to the muscles f the w gs, and so th bird me chan cally be dr en way by certai noises, be caus this may tend to th bird s preservat on

sho ld conform t to th n tes of a fore gn sound which imitation can be of no use to the b rd s p eservati n But, which is more t cannot with any ppearance of eason be supposed (much less proved) that birds, w thout sense and m m ory can approach their n tes near r and nearer by d gr es t tune play d yesterday which if they ha e dea f th ir memory is now nowhere nor can be a patt n f th m to imitate or which ny r peated ssays can b ing them nearer t Since th is no reason why the sound f p pe sh uld l e tr ces their b ns, which n t at first, but by th ir after-e dea ours, should prod ce the like sounds and why th sounds they mak themsel es, h uld t make tr ces which they hould f llow as well as those f the p pe is imposs bl to co ce e

Chap XI Of D scern ng nd other operat ons of the Mind

1. *N kno l dg u tho t d scernment* An ther faculty w may take tic f in our mi ds is that of *d scern g* and *di ti guishi g* betw en th eral d as t has. It is n t nough to ha a con

ar now and th mind were conti ually em

Cf. W James *Principles f Psychol gy* h XIII

characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there

5 *Causes of oblivion* Thus many of those ideas which were produced in the minds of children in the beginning of their sensation (some of which perhaps as of some pleasures and pains were before they were born and others in their infancy) if the future course of their lives they are not repeated again are quite lost without the least glimpse remaining of them This may be observed in those who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young in whom the ideas of colours having been but slightly taken notice of and ceasing to be repeated do quite wear out so that some years after there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds than in those of people born blind The memory of some men it is true is very tenacious even to a miracle But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas even of those which are struck deepest and in minds the most retentive so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned them the print wears out and at last there remains nothing to be seen Thus the ideas as well as children of our youth often die before us and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching where though the brass and marble remain yet the inscriptions are effaced by time and the imagery moulders away The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours and if not sometimes refreshed vanish and disappear How much the constitution of our bodies and the make of our animal spirits are concerned in this and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble in others like freestone and in others little better than sand I shall not here inquire though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble

6 *Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost* But concerning the ideas themselves it is easy to remark that those that are oftenest refreshed (amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them fix themselves best in the memory and remain clearest and longest there and therefore those which are of the original qualities of bodies, viz. solidity extension figure motion and rest and those that almost constantly affect our bodies as heat and cold and those which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as *existence, duration* and number which almost every object that affects our senses every thought which em

7 *In remembering the mind is often active* In this secondary perception as I may so call it or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive the appearance of those dormant pictures depending sometimes on the *will* The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it though sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own accord and offer themselves to the understanding and very often are roused and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight, by turbulent and tempestuous passions our affections bringing ideas to our memory which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded This further is to be observed concerning ideas lodged in the memory and upon occasion revived by the mind that they are not only (as the word *revive* imports) none of them new ones but also that the mind takes notice of them as of a former impression and renews its acquaintance with them as with ideas it had known before So that though ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly in view yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted i e in view and taken notice of before by the understanding

8 *Two defects in the memory oblivion and slowness* Memory in an intellectual creature is necessary in the next degree to perception It is of so great moment that where it is wanting all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless And we in our thoughts reasonings and knowledge could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories wherein there may be two defects —

First, That it loses the idea quite and so far it produces perfect ignorance For since we can know nothing further than we have the idea of it when that is gone we are in perfect ignorance

Secondly That it moves slowly and retrieves not the ideas that it has and are laid up in store quick enough to serve the mind upon occasion This if it be to a great degree is stupid

and useful only to abstract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.

6. *Compounding* The next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas is composition whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of composition may be reckoned also that of *enlarging* wherein, though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless putting several ideas together thou h f the same kind. Thus, by adding several units together we make the idea of dozen and p tun together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of furlong

Brutes com ound but l t In this also, I suppose brutes come far short of man. For though they take in, and retain together several combinations of sim le ideas, as possibly th shape smell, and voice of his master mak p the complex idea dog has f him, or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he know him yet I do not think they d f themsel es ever compound them, and mak complex id as. And perhaps even where we think they ha e complex ideas, it is onl one imp on that directs them in the knowledge

b

c

p

P s, you can bu g t them once t suck her so long that her milk ma go through them. And those animals which ha numerous brood of young, ones t once, ppear not t ha e any knowledge of their umber for though they are mightily concerned for an f their young that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing yet if one or two f them be stolen from them in their absence or w thout noise, they appear not to miss them, or to ha e any sense that their number is lessened.

8. *Naming* When children ha e b peated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin by degrees t learn the use of signs. And when they ha e got the skill to ppl the organs of speech t the framin f articulat sounds, they begin t mak use of words, to signify their id as to others. These verbal signs they sometimes borrow from thers, and sometimes make themsel es, as one ma bserv among the new and unusual names children often gi e to things in the first use f language.

9. *Abstraction* The use f words then being to

See ch. xiii–xx.

stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things,

they are in the mind such ppearances,—separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence as time, place, or any other concomitant id as. This is called ABSTRACTION whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind and their names general names, applicabl to whatever exists co formabl to such abstract ideas. S ch precise naked ppearances in th mind, w thout considerin how whe ce or w th what others they came there the understandi g la p (w th names commonl annexed to them) as th standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree w th these patterns, and to d nominate them ccordingly Thus the same colour bein bserved to-day in chalk or snow which the mind yesterday received from milk, t considers that ppearance alone, makes t representati e of all of that kind and ha ing given t the name *whiteness* t by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met w th and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are mad

10. *Brutes abstract not* If t may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their id as that wa t an degree this, I think, I may be positi e in,—that the power of bstractin is not t all in them and that the ha in f general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and bru es, and is an excell ncy which the f culties of brutes do by no means ttain to. For t is evident we bserve no footst ps in them of maki g use f general signs for universal id as from which we ha e reason to imagin that they ha e not th faculty of bstracting, or making general ideas, since they ha e no use of words, or an ther general signs.

Brutes bstract not yet t ot k but mach es Nor can t be imputed t their want of fit organs to fr me articulat sounds, that they ha e no use or knowledge of general words since man of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly nou h, but never w th an such pplication. And, on the ther side, men who, through some defect in the organs, want words, et fail not to express their uni ersal ideas b gns, which serve them in-

Cf. Bk. IV ch. xvii. § 8.

Cf. Bk. III. ch. iii. § 6 Bk. IV ch. vii. § 9.

ployed in thinking On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several even very general propositions which have passed for innate truths —because men overlooking the true cause why those *propositions find universal assent* impute it wholly to native uniform impressions whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind whereby it *perceives* two ideas to be the same or different But of this more hereafter

2 *The difference of wit and judgment* How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense or want of acuteness exercise or attention in the understanding *or hastiness and precipitancy natural to* some tempers I will not here examine it suffices to take notice that this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on and observe in itself It is of that consequence to its other knowledge that so far as this faculty is in itself dull or not rightly made use of for the distinguishing one thing from another —so far our notions are confused and our reason and judgment disturbed or misled If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand consists quickness of parts in this of having them unconfused and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another where there is but the least difference consists in a great measure the exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason which is to be observed in one man above another And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common observation —that men who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories have not always the clearest judgment or deepest reason For *wit* lying most in the assemblage of ideas and putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy *judgment* on the contrary lies quite on the other side in separating carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least difference thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another [1] This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy and therefore is so acceptable to all people because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labor of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The mind without looking any further rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture and the gaiety of the fancy And *it is a kind of affront to go about* to examine it, by the severe rules of truth and good reason whereby it appears that it consists *in something that is not perfectly conform*able to them.

3 *Clearness alone hinders confusion.* To the well distinguishing our ideas it chiefly contributes that they be *clear* and *determinate* And when they are so it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them though the senses should (as sometimes they do) convey them from the same object differently on different occasions and so seem to err For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste which at another [illegible]

only gall Nor does it make any more confusion [illegible]

than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet or white and round that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time And the ideas of orange-colour and azure that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of the infusion of *lignum nephriticum* are no less distinct ideas than those of the same colours taken from two very different bodies

4 *Comparing* The COMPARING them one with another in respect of extent degrees time place or any other circumstances is another operation of the mind about its ideas and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under *relation* which of how vast an extent it is I shall have occasion to consider hereafter [2]

5 *Brutes compare but imperfectly* How far brutes partake in this faculty is not easy to determine I imagine they have it not in any great degree for though they probably have several ideas distinct enough yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared And therefore I think beasts compare not their ideas further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves The other power of comparing which may be observed in men belonging to general ideas,

[1] Cf Bk IV chh xiv xv xvi.

[2] See chh. xx xvi i

n I must appeal to experience and observation whether I am in the right the best way to come to truth being to examine things as reall they are, and not to conclude they are as we fancy of ourselves, or have been taught by others to imagine

§ 4. ... To deal truly this is the only way that I can discover whereby the ideas of ... are brought into the understanding If other men have either innate ideas or infused principles, they have reason to enjoy them and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in myself, and is agreeable to those notions, which, if we will examine the whole course of men in their several ages, countries, and educations, seem to depend on those foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this method in all the parts and degrees thereof.

Dark room. I pretend not to teach, but to inquire and therefore cannot but confess here again—that external and internal sensation are the only passages I can find of knowledge to the understanding These alone as far as I can discover are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. For methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.

These are my guesses concerning the means whereby the understanding comes to have and retain simple ideas, and the modes of them, with some other operations about them.

I proceed now to examine some of these simple ideas and their modes a little more particularly.

Chap XII Of Complex Ideas

Made by the mind out of simple ones We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the others are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three (1) Combining several simple ideas into one compound one and thus all complex ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together and setting them by one another so as to take a view of them ... company them in their real existence this is called abstraction and thus all its general ideas are made. This shows man's power and its ways of operation, to be much the same in the material and intellectual world. For the materials in both being such as he has no power over either to make or destroy all that man can do is either to unite them together or to set them by one another or wholly separate them. I shall here begin with the first of these in the consideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them together Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together I call complex —such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army the universe which, though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing and signified by one name.

2. *Made voluntarily* In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with but all this still confined to those simple ideas which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions. For simple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind can have no more nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without by the senses nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself. But when it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what offers itself from without, it can, by its own power put together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received so united.

3. *Complex ideas are either of modes, substances, or relations* COMPLEX IDEAS, however compounded

Including God. Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. § 33.

stead of general words a faculty which we see beasts come short in And therefore I think we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly *separated and which at last widens to so vast a* distance For if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some would have them) we cannot *deny them to have some rea* son It seems as evident to me that they do some of them in certain instances reason as that they have sense but it is only in particular ideas just as they recei ed them from their senses They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction

1 *Idiots and madmen* How far idiots are con cerned in the want or weakness of any or all of the foregoing faculties an exact observation of their several ways of faultering would no doubt d scover For those who either perceive but dul *ly or retain the ideas that come into their minds* but ill who cannot readily excite or compound them will have little matter to think on Those who cannot distinguish compare and abstract would hardly be able to understand and make

And indeed any of the forementioned facult es

the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness activity and motion in the intellectual faculties whereby they are depri ed of reason whereas madmen on the other s de seem to suffer by the other extreme For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of rea son ng but having joined together some deas very wrongly they mistake them for truths and they err as men do that argue right from wrong princ ples For by the violence of their imagina *tions hav ng taken their fanc es for real ties they* make r ght deductions from them Thus you shall find a distracted m n fancying himself a king with a r ght inference requre suitable attend

ies Hence it comes to pass that a man who is very sober and of a right understanding in all other th ngs may in one part cular be as frantic as any in Bedlam f either by *any sudden very* strong impression or long fi ng his fancy upon one sort of thoughts incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to rema n united But there are degrees of madness, as of folly the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more and some less In short here seems to lie the difference bet een idiots and madmen that madmen put wrong ideas togeth er and so make wrong propositions but argue and reason right from them but idiots make very *few or no propositions and reason scarce* at all.

14 *Method follo ed in this explicat on f facu es* These I think are the first faculties and opera tions of the mind which it makes use of in un derstanding and though they are exercised about

faculties of the m nd to that of simple ideas[1] be fore I come to what I have to say concerning complex ones for these follo ing reasons —

First Because several of these faculties bein exercised at f rst principally about simple ideas,[2] we might, by follo ing nature in its *ordinary* method trace and discover them in their rise progress and gradual improvements

Secondly Because observing the *faculties of* the mind how they operate about simple ideas, —which are usually in most men s minds much *more clear precise and distinct than* complex ones —we may the better examine and learn ho the m nd extracts denominates compare and exercises in its other operations about those wh ch are complex wherein we are much more liable to mistake

Thirdly Because these ery operations of the mind about ideas received from sensations re themselves hen reflected on another set of ideas der ved from that other source of our knowl

fore f t to
ple ideas
in ab-

stracting &c *I ha e but just spoken* havin occas on to treat of them more at large in other places[3]

15 *The true begin n f human kn wled e* And thus I ha e gi en a short and I think true *l s t y f the fi st b g gs f human k wled e* — whence the mind has its first objects and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in and storing up those ideas out of h ch is to be framed all the kno ledge it s capable of where

mpl d —esp ially of ens t on — treat d f in h u—

Cf Bk IV ch § 2

Chh xi -xx § 6–8 Bk III ch. i &

Tl hist cal plain matter of fact method (Introd § 2)

— — mad) re extrem ties com w thi our reach nd th eye takes both from bod es a d col urs, whose bou d ar es ar wih n its wh re observ g how the xtremities terminate —e ther n stra ght lines which meet at discern ble angles or n crooked lines wherein n angles ca be per —s h rel to

those distinct simple modes of a d n a gross, a million.

2 *Li f Spac* I shall begin w th the mple idea of *pace* I ha showed bov chap V that get the d of sp ce both by our s ght d touch which, I think, is so ev d nt, that t would be as eedless to go to prove that men perce by their ht, distance between bod es f dif ferent colours, between the parts f th same body as that they see colours themsel es nor is t less bvious, that they can d so in the dark by feeling and t ch.

3 *Spac and extension.* This space cons dered barely in length betw en y two beings with out cons dering anything else between th m is called *distanc* if considered in length, bre dth, and thickness, I think t may be called *p city* (The term *xtension* is usually pplied t t in hat manner soever cons de ed)

4. *Immensity* Each d ffer nt distance is dif ferent modification f p ce d each d f any different distance, or sp ce is *simpl mod* of this idea. Men, for th use d by th cust m f measuring settl in th ir minds th d as f certain stated lengths,—such as are inch, foot, yard, fath m, mil diam t f th arth &c. hich are so many distinct deas mad p only f sp ce. When any such stated l gths or measures of sp ce ar mad familiar t m thoughts, they can, in th ir minds, repeat them as ften as they will, w thout mixing or j ining to them th d f body or anything lse and frame to themsel es th d as f l g squar cubic feet, yards f th ms, h m gst th bodies of the uni erse or lse beyo d th utmost bounds f all bod es and, by dding these till one to another nlarg their d as f pace as much as they please Th power f repe ting or doubling y de w ha f any distance and adding t to th f rm as ften as w will w th out bei g ever bl to com to any top sunt, let us enlarge t as m ch as we will, is that which gives us the id of *immensity*

5 *Figur* Th re is an ther modificati f this idea, which is thing but th l ti n which the parts of th terminati f xt ns on or cir cumscribed sp ce have mo ¬st th msel es. This the touch discovers in sensibl bodies, whose

the stock that th mi d has in its pov by varying the dea f sp ce and thereby making till new compositi ns, by repe ti g its own deas, and j ining th m as it pl ases, is perfectly inexhaustibl And so t can multiply f gures *finitum*

6 *Endl ss ariety f figur s* For th mind ha ing power to repeat th d a f y length directly —

o fourth, or what part it pleases w thout be ing ble t com to an e d f any such d is ons, t can make an angle f y b gness. So also th lines that are ts des, f what l gth t pl ases, which j ining gain to other lines, f d ffere t lengths, and t different angles, till t has wh lly enclosed any sp ce t is ev d nt that t can mul tiply figures, both in th ir shape and capacity *nfinitum* all which are but so many differe t simpl modes f p ce

Th sam that t can do w th stra ht lines t can also do w th crooked or crooked and straight togeth and th sam t can d in lines, t can also in superficies by which we may be led int farther thoughts f th dless ari ty f figures that th mind has power to make, and th by t multiply th simpl modes f sp ce

7 *Plac* Another dea coming under this head, —

and decompounded though their number be in finite and the variety endless wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men yet I think they may be all reduced under these three heads —

1 Modes
2 Substances
3 Relations

4 *Ideas of modes* First *Modes* I call such com plex ideas which however compounded con tain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves but are considered as dependences on or affections of substances —such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle gratitude murder &c And if in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification I beg pardon it being unavoida ble in discourses differing from the ordinary re ceived notions either to make new words or to use old words in somewhat a new signification the later whereof in our present case is perhaps the more tolerable of the two

5 *S mple a d mixed modes of simple ideas* Of these *modes* there are tv o sorts which deserve distinct consideration

First there are some which are only varia tions or different combinations of the same sim ple idea without the mixture of any other —as a dozen or score v hich are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together and these I call *simple modes* as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea

Secondly there are others compounded of sim ple ideas of several kinds put together to make one complex one —v g beauty consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure caus ing delight to the beholder theft which being the concealed change of the possess on of any thing without the consent of the proprietor con tains as s visible a comb nation of several ideas of several kinds and these I call *m x d modes* [2]

6 *Id as of subst nces single or coll ctive* Second ly the ideas of *S bstances* are such comb nations of s mple ideas as are taken to represent distinct

also there are tv o sorts of ideas —one of *si gle* substances as they exist separately as of a man or a sheep the other of several of those put to gether as an army of men or flock of sheep— which *collective* ideas of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one sin le idea as that of a man or an unit

7 *Ideas of relation* Thirdly the last sort of com plex ideas is that we call *Relation* which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another

Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order

8 *The abstrusest ideas we can have are all from two sources* If we trace the progress of our minds and with attention observe how it repeats adds to gether and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection it will lead us further than at first perhaps we should have imagined And I believe we shall find if v e v arily observe the originals of our notions that *even the most ab struse ideas* how remote soever they may seem from sense or from any operations of our o n minds are yet only such as the understandin frames to itself by repeating and joining to gether ideas that it had either from objects of sense or from its ov n operations about them so that those even large and abstract ideas are de rived from sensation or reflection being no other than v hat the mind by the ordinary use of its own faculties employed about ideas received from objects of sense or from the operations it observes in itself about them may and does at tain unto

This I shall endeavour to sho v in the ideas we have of space time and infinity and some fe others that seem the most remote from those originals

Chap XIII *Complex Ideas of Simple Modes —and First of the Simple Modes of the Idea of Space*

1 *Simple modes f s mple ideas* Though in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas which are truly the materials of all our kno vledge yet having treated of them there rather in the v ay that they come into the mind than as dist nguished from others more com

thought and reasoning jo ned to substance make the ordinary idea of a man Now of substances

[1] Treated in chapters xiii–xxi.
[2] See ch xxii.

without the help of any extrinsical object, or any fo e gn suggestion

Those modif cations of any *one* simple idea

some that ould persuad us, that body and extension are the sam thin who e ther change the gnification of words, which I would n t suspect them f —they ha ing so severely con demned the philosophy f thers, because it hath been too much pl ced in th uncertain meanin or dece tful bscur ty of doubtful or insignifi cant terms. If th efore they m an by body and extensio th sam that ther people do, viz. by *body* something that is solid d ext ded, whose parts are separabl and movabl differ t way and by *tens n*, nly th p ce that lies betwee th extr mities f those solid coher ent parts, and which is possessed by them,—they confound ery different ideas o w th an other for I ppeal to every man own thoughts heth r th d f pace be n t as distinct from that of solidity as t is from th id of scarlet colour It is true, solidity cann t exist w thout ens on, ne the can scarlet colour exist w th out xt nsion but this hinders t, but that they are distin t deas Many deas equire thers, as necessary to th ir xi t nce or conception, which yet are ery distinct d as. M ti can n ther be or be co ce ed, w thout space and yet motion is t space nor space motion, space can exist w thout t, and they are ery distinct ideas and so I think, are those f space and solidity Solidity is so inseparabl an idea from body that po that depe ds its fillin of space, its contact, impulse and communication f motion pon impulse And if t be reason to prove that sp rit is different from body because think in —

superficies where bef re there was a conti ty and ns der them as moved o e from the other which can only be d e in things cons d ered by the mind as cap ble f being separated and by separat on of equiring new disti ct su perficies, wh ch they th n ha not, but are ca pable f B t e ther of thes w ys of separation wheth real or mental is as I think, compati bl to pure sp ce.

It is tru a man may cons der so much of such a p ce as is answe bl or commensurat to a foot, w thout con dering th est, which is, indeed, partial cons der tion, but not so much as mental separation or d is on ince a man can no more mentally d id w thout cons der in two superficies separat one from the ther than h ca actually d d w thout maki g two superficies disj ined f m th other but partial con ideratio n is ot separating A man may cons der light in th su w thout its h at, or mobil y in body w thout ts extens n, w th out thinki g of th ir separation. On is o ly a partial cons der ti n, terminating in e alon and th ther is a cons deration f both, as exist in separately

needs be t perpetual est one am st an th

Thus th d termined d f simpl p ce dis-

body then nd ns n, t is ev d t, ar two distinct id as. For

12 *Extension not solidity* First, Extens on in cludes no solidity nor resistance to th m ti of body as bod does.

13. *The parts* *of space inseparable both* *ally and mentally* Secondly The parts of pure sp ce are insepar ble one from the other so that th continuity cannot be separated, neither really nor mental For I demand of any one to emove an part f from another with which t is continued, even so much as in thought. T divid and separ ctua it, as I think, by removing the parts one from another to make two supe ficies, where befor there was continuity and to divid mentally it, to make in the mind two

Cf. Bk. II ch. iv

5. *The definition f xtension plains t not* If an one ask me what this sp ce I speak of I will t ll him when h tells me what his exten on is. For to say as is usually d ne, that extens is to ha *partes extr part* is to say only that extension is extension. For what am I th better informed in the nature of extension, wh n I am told that extension is t have parts that are ex tended, exterior to parts that are extended, e. extensio cons sts f extended parts As if one, asking what fibr was, I should answer him,—that was a thing mad p of several fibres. Would he thereby be enabled to understand what fibre was better than he did before Or rather would he n t ha reason to think that my des gn was to mak sport w th him, rather than seriously to instruct him.

6 *Division f be* *o bodie and spirits proves not* *ace and body the same* Those who co tend

Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics* Part I Prop xv Schol.

same place but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points we say it hath changed its place though vulgarly speaking in the common notion of place we *do not always* exactly observe the distance from these precise points but from larger portions of sensible objects to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation and its distance from which we have *some reason to observe*

p D

pa

of ... here we left them we say they are all in the *same* place or unmoved *though perhaps* the chess board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another because we compared them only to the parts of the chess board which keep the same distance one with another The chess board we also say is in the same place *it was if it remain* in the same part of the cabin tho gh ...

the ship whic

ship is said to

kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring *land though perhaps* the earth hath turned round and so both chess men and board and ship have every one changed place in respect of remoter bodies which have kept the same distance one with another But yet the *distance from* certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the chess men and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chess board and the fixed parts of the earth that by which we determined the place of the ship —these things may be said to be in the same place in those respects though their distance from so ...

ter we did no

undoubtedly

we ourselves s ... think so when we *have occa*sion to compare them with those other

9 *Plac rel t ve to a present pu pos* But this modification of distance we call place being made by men for their common use th ...

be able to des

where they h

men consider ... determ ne of this place by reference to those adjacent things wh ch best served to their present purpose without considering other things which to another purpose would better determine the place of the same thing *Thus in the* chess board *the use of* the des gnation of the place of each chess man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood it would cro s that purpose to measure it by any thing else but when these very chess men are put up in a bag if any one should ask where the *black king is* it would be proper to determine the place by the part of the room it was in and not by the chess board there being another use of designing the place it is now in than ...

play

deter

ask ... e ... which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus it would be very improper to determine this place by saying they were in such a part of the earth or in *Bodley s library* but the right designation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil s works and the proper answer would be that these verses were about the m ddle of the ninth book of his Æneids and that they have been always *constantly* in the same place ever s nce *Virgil* was printed which is true though the book itself hath moved a thousand times the use of the *idea of place here being to know* in what part of the book that story is that so upon occasion we may *know where to find it* and have recourse to it for use

10 *Place of th un verse* That our idea of place is nothing else but such a relative position of anything as I have before mentioned I think is *plain* and will be easily admitted when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe though we can of *all* the *parts of* it because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed distinct particular beings in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance but all beyond it is one uniform *space or expansion wherein the m nd f nds* no variety no marks For to say that the world is somewhere means no more than that it does exist this though a phrase borrowed from place signifying only its existence not location and *when one* can find out and *frame* in h s mind clearly and distinctly the place of the universe *he will be able to tell us hether it mo es or* stands still in the und stingu shable ina e of in fin te space though it be true that the word place has sometim s a more confused sense and stands for that space which anybody takes up and so *the un erse is in a place*

The idea therefore of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space (*here* of this is but a particular l mited cons derat on) viz by our s ght and to ch by e ther of which we recei e ... to our m nds the ideas of extension or d stance

11 *Extens n nd body n t the same* There are

[1] Cf W James *Psychol gy* p 552

Bk. IX lines 176–502

some t.at would persuad us, that body and extension are the same thing who e ther change the gnification f words, which I would n t suspect them f—they ha ing so severely condemned the philosophy of thers, because it hath been too much placed in th uncertain meaning or deceitful bscurity f doubtful or ins nifica.t terms. If, therefore they mean by body and extension th same that other peopl do, iz. by *body* something that is solid d extended, hose parts are separable and movab. differ ent ways and by *extension*, only th space that lies between the extremities f those solid coher

xtension, ne the can scarl t colour exist w thout extension, but this hinders t, but that they are distinct deas. Many ideas require thers, as necessary to their existe ce or conceptu n, hich yet are very distinct id as. M tion can n ther be nor be conce ed, w thout pace and yet motion is t space or space motion space can exist thout t, and they are very distinct ideas and so I think, are those of space and solidity Solidity is so inseparabl n id from bod that pon that d pends ts fillin of space is contact, impulse and commur cation f motion upon impulse. And if t be reason t prov that spiri is different from body because think ing includes the id f xtension in th same reason will be as alid, I suppose, to prove

Bod hen and extens n t is ev dent, are two distinct id as. For

2. *Extension not sol dity* First, Ext ns in cludes no sol dity nor resistance to th motion of body as body does.

13. *Th parts f pac insepar le bo ally and men y* Second! The parts of pure space are inseparabl one from the ther so that th continuity cann t be separ ted n ther really nor mentally For I demand of an on to emov an part f from another with which t is continued, even so much as in thou ht. T di d and separ ctual is, as I think, by removin t. parts one from another to mak two s per ficies, here before ther was continuity and to divide mentally is, to make in th mind two

Cf. Ek. II. ch. iv

superficies, where bef re there was a continu ty and consider them as removed o e from th other which can only be do in things consid ered by the mind as capabl f being separated and by separation of acquiring new distinct su perficies, which they then ha e not, but are ca pabl of But ther f these ways of separat on, wh th real or mental is, as I think, comp tı ble to pure sp ce

It is true, a man may consider so much of such space as is answer ble or commensurate

in two superficies separat one from the other than he can ctually di d w thout making two superficies disjoined on from the other but a partial consid ration is n t separ ting A man may cons der light in the sun w thout its h t, or mobility in body w thout its ext n. n, w th out thinking f th ir separ t on. O is nly a partial cons d t n, terminatin in on al and the other is a consideratio of both as exist ing separately

14. *The parts f pace immova l* Thirdly The parts of pure sp ce are immovabl which fol lows from th ir insepar bility motı n being n thing but change f distance between any two things but this cannot be between p rts that are inseparable, which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest on amongst an .h

Thus th d termined dea f impl space distingu shes t plainly and sufficiently from body since ts parts ar inseparabl immovab and w thout esistance t th motion of bod

15. *The d fnit on f extension lains t not* If any o ask m hat this sp ce I peak of is I will t ll him wh n h t ls me what his extension is. For say as is usually do that xtens on is t ha e *part ex part* is to say onl that exten. is extens n. For what am I th better informed in th nature of extension, when I am told that xtens on is t ha e parts that ar ex tended, exterior t parts that are extended, extens con ists f extended parts As if one, aski g what fibre was, I should ansv er him,—that t as thing mad up f several fibres. Would h ther by be enabled *to understand* what a fibr was better than h did before Or rath would h n t ha e ason to think that my design was to mak sport w th him, rather than ser ousl t instru t him.

6 *Division f bo bodie and pirits pro es ot pac and body the same* Those who contend

Cf. Spinoza, *Eth.* Part I Prop xv Schol.

that space and body are the same bring this dilemma —either this space is something or nothing if nothing be between two bodies they *must necessarily touch* if it be allowed to be something they ask Whether it be body or spir it? To which I answer by another question Who told them that there was or could be nothing but *solid beings which could not think* and *thinking bein s that were not extended?*—which is all they mean by the terms *body* and *spi it*

17 *Substance* ...
space without bo ...
it is) whether ...
st nce or *accide* ... shall readily answer I know not nor shall be ashamed *to own my ignorance* till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance

18 *Different meanings of subst nce* I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by taking words for things It helps not our ig norance to feign a knowledge where we have none by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations Names made at *pleasure* neither alter the nature of things nor make us understand them but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables *substance* to consider whether applying it as they do to the infinite incom prehensible God to finite spirits and to body it be in the same sense and whether it stands for the same idea when each of those three so different beings are called substances If so whether it will thence follow—that God spirits and body agreeing n the same common nature of substance differ not any otherwise than in a bare different *m d fication* of that substance as a tree and a pebble being in the same sense body and agreeing in the common nature of body differ only in a bare modification of that com mon matter which will be a very harsh doc trine[1] If they say that they apply it to God finite sp rit and matter in three different s gni ficat ons and that it stands for one idea when God is said to be a substance for another when the soul is called substance and for a third when body is called so —if the name substance stands for three several dist nct ideas they would do well to make known those distinct ideas or at least to give three distinct names to them to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term which is so far from being suspected to have three dis tinct that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

19 *Substance and accidents of little use in philoso phy* They who first ran into the notion of *acci dents* as a sort of real beings that needed some thing to inhere in were forced to find out the word *substance* to support them Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it and a tortoise to support his ele phant the word substance would have done it effectually And he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher —that substance without knowing what it is is that which supports the earth as we take it for a sufficient answer and good doc trine from our European philosophers —that substance without knowing what it is is that which supports accidents So that of substance we have no idea of what it is but only a con fused obscure one of what it does

o *Sticking on and under propping* Whatever a learned man may do here an intelligent Amer ican who inquired into the nature of things would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if des ring to learn our architectu e he should be told that a pillar is a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar Would he not think himself mocked in stead of taught with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books and the things they contained if he should be told that all learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper and paper a thing that held forth letters a nota ble way of having clear ideas of letters and paper But were the Latin words *inhaere ti* and *sub st ntia* put into the plain English ones that an swer them and were called *st ck g on and under p ppi g* they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents and show of what use they are in deciding of questions n philosophy

21 *I vacu m b yond the utm st b nds of body* But to return to our idea of space If body be not supposed inf n te (which I think no one will affirm) I would ask wh ther if God placed a man at the extremity of corpo eal be ngs, he could not stretch his hand beyond h s body? If he could then he ould put his arm where there was before space without body and if there he

[1] Cf. Spinoza *Ethi s* Part I Pr p xiv

spread his fingers, there would still be p ce between them w thout body If h could t tr tch out his hand it must be because of some te nal hindrance (for we suppose him ali e w th such a power of moving the parts f his body that he hath ow which is not in tself impos

s

— ~ rd he substance r

f all bodies) body p t in motu may move n, as where there is thin between there two bodies must ecessarily touch. For pure space betwe is sufficient t tak w y th ecessity f mutual co tact but bare p n the way is not sufficient to top m ti n. The truth is, these men must ther own th t th y think body infinite though they are loth t peak t out, or else affirm that sp ce is t body For I vould fain meet w th that thinking man that can in his thoughts set any bound t p ce mor than h can to dur ti n or by thinking hope to arri at th end f ther And therefore, if his idea f t rnity be infin t so is his idea f immensity they are both finite infi nite alik

2 *The power f nnihilat on pr ve acuum* Farther those wh asse t th imposs bility f p ce existi g without matt must n t nly make body infinite but must also d y power in God to annihilate any part f matt N I suppose, will de y that God can put an e d to all motio that is in matter and fi all th bod ies of th uni erse in perfect qui t and rest, and contin th m so l g as h pleases Whoever th will allow that God can during such ge al rest, *annihil te* th this book th body f him that ds t, must cessarily ad m t the poss bility f cuum. F t is vid t that th sp ce th t was filled by th parts f th annihilated body will till main and be sp c without body F th circumamb nt bod es being in perfect est, ar wall f d mant and in tha tate mak t pe fect imposs bil ty f any ther body to get int that sp ce And indeed th ecessary motion f on particl f matt into th place from wh ce an th particl f matter is removed is but consequ ce from th supposition f plenitud which will there

fore need some better proof than a supposed mat

— can never mak

on betwe n sp ce and sol dity s ce w cal co ce e the n w thout th other And those wh *disp t for* against a acuum, do ther by confess they ha e disti ct *d as* of acuum and pl um, i that they ha e an id a f x tens n o d of solidity though they de y its *tenc* o else they disput about nothing at ll For th y who so much alter the signif catı n f words, as t call extens on body and consequ ntly make the whole esse ce of body to be nothing but pure extensi n w thout solid ty must talk absurdly whenever they speak f *vacuum* since t is imposs ble f r extens on to be w th ut e

—

view and ghbourhood seems to m plai ly t

a mustard seed be requisit to make room f th f motion f the parts f the di ded body within th bounds of ts superficies, wh th particles f matter are 100 000 000 less than mustard eed th must also be p ce d f solid matte as big as 00 000 000 p rt f mustard seed f r if t h ld in th o e t will h ld th other and so n *nfi tum* And l t this d sp ce be as l ttl as t will, it destroys th hy pothesis f plenitud For if ther can be a sp ce d f body equal to th smallest separ t par

24 *The ideas of space and body distinct* But the question being here —Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body?

there be a *vacuum* or no For if they had not the idea of space without body they could not make a question about its existence and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world and it would be as absurd to demand whether there were space without body as whether there were space without space or body without body since these were but different names of the same idea

25 *Extension being inseparable from body proves it not the same* It is true the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible and most tangible qualities that it suffers us to *see* no one or *feel* very few external objects without taking in impressions of extension too This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas has been the occasion I guess that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension which is not much to be wondered at since some have had their minds by their eyes and touch (the busiest of all our senses) so filled with the idea of extension and as it were wholly possessed with it that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension I shall not now argue with those men who take the measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and gross imaginations but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body

and touch nay had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst and several other pains they would have found that *they* included in them no idea of extension at all which is but an affection of body as well as the rest discoverable by our senses which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things

26 *Essences of things* If those ideas which are

out doubt the essence of everything not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently

27 *Ideas of space and solidity distinct* To conclude whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a *vacuum* this is plain to me—that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity as we have of solidity distinct from motion or motion from space We have not any two more distinct ideas and we can as easily conceive space without solidity as we can conceive body or space without motion though it be never so certain that neither body nor motion can exist without space But whether any one will take space to be only a *relation* resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King Solomon The heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St Paul In him we live move and have our being are to be understood in a literal sense I leave every one to consider only our idea of space is I think such as I have mentioned and distinct from that of body For whether we consider in matter itself the distance of its coherent solid parts and call it in respect of those solid parts extension or whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions we call it length breadth and thickness or else considering it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings without any consideration whether there be any matter or not between we call it distance —however named or considered it is always the same uniform simple idea of space taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant whereof having settled ideas in our minds we can revive repeat and add them one to another as often as we will and consider the space or distance so imagined either as filled with solid parts so that another body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before or else as void of solidity so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of anything that was there But to avoid confusion in discourses concerning this matter it were possibly to be wished that the name *extension* were applied only to matter or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies and the term *expansion* to space in general with or without solid matter possessing it —so as to say space is expanded and body extended But in this every one has his liberty I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking

28 *Men diffu t Ue l or simpl deas* The know precisely what our o ds stand for ould, I imagine in this as well as gre t many m F I am

perhaps conf und one an th r w u t names. I imagin that m n wh abstr ct their thoughts, and d well xami the d as f th ir own minds cann t m ch diff r in thinking how ever they may pe pl x th msel es th words, ccording to th vay f peaking of th se eral schools sects th y ha e bee bred up in tho gh amo st unthinking m who xami e t scrupulously and carefully th ir own id as nd strip th m t from th marks m n use f them, but confound th m with words, th must be endless disput wrangling and jargon especially if th y bel ar ed bookish m dev ted to som f d

ing imaginati in me brains is prese tly of that sort f id as I peak of It is n t asy for th mind to put ff those co fused ti ns and p j udices t has imb bed f m cust m, in d t ey and commo conversat on. It eq res p ns and assiduity to examin ts d as till t resol es th m into those cl ar nd d st t mpl es out f such they are compounded and t se which amo gst ts impl ones, ha e h e n t nec ssary con ex and d pend ce upon an her Till man d th thus in th primary d or ginal noti ns f thi gs, h builds upon fi t in and certa pri ciples and will fi find himself t loss.

Chap XIV *Id f Dur t and its S mpl M d*

Dur t on is f t tenn n. Th re is an th sort of distance l gth th d wh eof we g t t from th perma t parts f p ce but from th fleeting and perpetually perish g parts f su cess on. This w call *dur t on* th mple modes hereof ar any differ t l gths f t he eof we ha dis t d as, as *hour d y year* &c. *t m* and *tern ty*

Its d f om eft t on on the t ai f our deas Th answer f gre t man to e wh asked hat time was S no gas ntell g (which amou ts t this Th mo I set myself t think of t, th less I und rsta d t) might perhaps persuade o e that time wh ch reveals all other thi gs s tself n t to be d scovered Dur u time, a d et rn ty are n t w thout r aso th ught to ha e someth ng ery bstruse in th r natur But ho e e remote these may seem from our comprehens yet f trac them r ght t their or gi als, I d bt otbut o e f those so rces of ll our kn wledg iz sensat n nd eflec ti will be able to fur h us w th these d a as clear a d dist ct as many oth rs wh ch a e thought mu h less obscure and we sh ll f d that th dea of etern ty tself is der ed fr m the same comm n or ginal w th th rest of our deas.

3 *A tur and orig f the d f dur t* To u derstand *t m d tern ty* ar ght, we ght w th att t on to ons der what d it is w h e of *dur t* and how w came by t It is evid t to ny who will b t bserve what passes his wn mind that th e is a train of d as wh ch consta tly succeed e n ther his u d sta d g as l g as h awak R flection n these ppearances of seve al d as one aft n th r in our minds, that wh ch furnishes us w th the d f *succ ssi* d th dista ce between y parts f that success or between th appear ance f any two deas in our minds, is that w call *dur t on* For wh lst w are thinki g wh l t we rece success ely seve al deas in our minds, we know that do exist and so e call th existence the co tinu ti of th existe ce f oursel es, o nythi g els comm nsurate t th success on f y d as n our minds th d rati n f oursel es, or any su h th r thi g co-exist t with ur th king

4. *P f that t d g t f m fle t on the tra f our d as* Th t ha ur n ti n f su cess o and dur tio f m this or ginal, iz. from refl ti th tr f d as which we fi d t ppear af er othe n ur ow minds, seems plain t m th t we ha e o pe cept f dur tio but by cons dering th train f d as that tak th ir *turns* u und rsta dings Wh th t success f d as ceases, ur pe p- tio f dur ti n ase w th t which ev clearly expe me ts n himself whilst h sleeps soundly wh th an hour day m th a year f which dur ti n f things, hil he sleeps thinks n t h has percepti n at ll but t is qu t lost t him and th m m nt where n h l es ff t th nk, till the m m t h be gins t think in, se ms t him t h d s- tance And so I d bt t t would be t wak g man f w poss ble fo him to keep *only* *a* de in his mind w th ut ariati and th succes n of thers. And we see, that e wh

fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing so as to take but little notice of the *succession of* ideas that pass in his mind whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration and thinks that time shorter than it is But if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration *it is because during* that time we hav no

p ... ceptible in his mind one after an other he hath then during such dreaming a sense of duration and of the length of it By which it is to me very clear that men derive *their* ideas of duration from *their reflections on* the train of the ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings with out which observation they can have no notion of duration whatever may happen in the world

5 *The ide of duration applicable to things whilst we sleep* Indeed a man having from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts got the notion or idea of duration he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think as he that has got the idea of exten sion from bodies by his sight or touch can ap ply it to distances where no body is seen or felt And therefore though a *man has no* perception of the length of duration which passed whilst he slept or thought not yet having observed the revolution of days and nights and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regu lar and constant, he can upon the *supposition* that that *revolution has proceeded* after the same manner whilst he was asleep or thought not as it used to do at other times he can I say imag ine and make allowance for the length of dura tion whilst he slept But if Adam and Eve (when *they were alone in the world*) *instead* of their *ordinary* night s sleep had passed the whole twenty four hours in one continued sleep the duration of that twenty four hours had been ir recoverably lost to them and been for ever left out of their account of time

6 *The idea f successio t f m motion* Thus by reflecting on the appearing of var ous ideas one after another in our understandings, we get the notion of succession wh ch if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses *he will perhaps be of my* m d

tion at all unless that motion produces a con *stant train of* successive ideas e g *a man be* calmed at sea out of sight of land in a fair day may look on the sun or sea or ship a whole hour together and perceive no motion at all in either though it be certain that two and per haps all of them have moved during that time a great way But as soon as he perceives either *of them to* have changed *distance with some* other body as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him then he perceives that there has been motion But wherever a man is with all things
any
he h
ous i
appe
serve and find succession where he could observe no motion

7 *Very slow motions unperceived* And this *I think* is the reason why *motions very slow though they are constant* are not *perceived* by us because in their remove from one sensible part towards another their change of distance is so slow that it causes no new ideas in us but a good while one after another And so not causing a constant train *of new ideas to follow* one *another immed* iately *in our minds* we have no perception of motion which consisting in a constant succes sion we cannot perceive that success on with out a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it

8 *Very swift motions unperceived* On the con *trary* things that move so swift as not to affect the senses distinctly with several d stinguishable distances of their motion and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind are not also per ce ed For anything that moves round *about* in a circle *in less times* than our *ideas are wont* to succeed one another in our minds is not per ceived to move but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter or colour and not a part of a circle in motion

9 *The train f id s has a certain deg ee f quick ness* Hence I leave it *to others* to judge whether it be not probable that our ideas do whilst we are awake succeed one another in our minds at certa n distances not much unlike the images in the inside of a *lantern turned* round *by the heat of* a candle This *appearance of theirs* in train, though perh ps it may be sometimes faster and sometimes slower yet I guess[1] varies not very much in a wak ng man there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of

on a body really moving perceives yet no mo-

[1] Cf. W James *Psychology* pp 398–99

[1] guess —used by Lock for conjecture in several places (See ch xiii. § 25.)

the success on of those id as one to anoth r n our minds, beyo d which they can ne the delay nor hasten.

o. *F I succession in swift m h ns is thout ense f suc mon.* The reason I ha e f r this odd con jecture is, from bserving that, in th impressions mad po any f our senses, w can but to certain degree perce e ny success on which, if exceeding quick, the sense f successi n is lost, even in cases where t is ev dent that there is a real successi n. Let can bull t pass throu h room, and in ts way tak w th t any limb or fleshy parts f man, t is as clear as any demonstratio can be that it must tr ke successively the two sides f th oom t is also e de t that t must touch one part f th flesh first, and another after and so in successi n and yet, I believe n body who ev r felt the pain of such sh t, or h ard th blow gainst the two distant walls, could perce e n succession either in th pain or sound f so swift a strok S ch part of dur ti as thus, wh re n we percei e no success on, is that which we call an *instant* and is that which takes up the tim f onl one idea in our minds, w thout th succession of another wherein, therefore, we percei e no success t all.

11 *I slow m tions* This also happens where t motion is so slow as not t supply a constant train of fresh deas to th senses, as fast as the mind is capabl of rece g new o es int t and so other d as f our own thou hts, ha ing room to come into our minds between those f fered to our senses by th moving body there the sense f motion is los and the body though t really moves, yet, no changing perce abl distance with some other bodies as fast as the ideas f our own minds d naturally f llow one anot e in train, th thing seems t stand still as is evid in th hands f clocks, and shadows f sun-dials, and ther consta t but slow m ti ns, here, though af er certain intervals, we per ive, by the chang f distance that t hath moved, yet the mou tself we perce t.

Th train, th m ano f other succ ssions So that t me t seems, that th constant and regular success on f *d as* waking man, is, as t ere the measure and standard f all ther su cessions. Whereof if any one ther exceeds the pace of our ideas, as wh re two sounds or pains, &c., tak p in their succession th durati f but one id or else where any moti n or su cession is so slow as that t keeps t pace w th the ideas in our minds, or th quickness in which they take their turns, as wh any or more ideas in their ordinary course come int our mind between those which are offered to the sight by the diff rent perceptible distances of a body in moti n, or between sounds or smells f llowing n an ther —there also th sense of a constant continued success on is lost, and we perce t not, but with certain gaps of rest be tween.

13 *The m d can t fix long one invari bl d* If t be so that the d as of our minds, whilst w ha e any there, do constantly change and shift in continual success on, it would be impossible, may any e say for a man to think l of any on thing By which, if t be meant that a man may ha e one self-same singl d a a lo tim alone in his mind w thout any variation t all, I think in matter of fact, it is not poss bl F which (not knowing how the deas of ou minds are fr med of what materials they are mad wh nce they ha e their light, and how they com to mak their appearances) I ca gi e n th reason but experi nce and I would ha e any one try wh ther h can keep one un var ed ingl de in his mi d w thout any th for any cons d r bl time together

14. *Proof* F trial, l t him take any figure,

wary as h can.

5. *The xtent f our power over the succ ssion f our d as* All that is a man s power in this case I think, is only t mind and observe what the deas ar that take th ir turns in his und rstand in or lse to direct th sort, and call in such as h hath a desire or use f but hinder the con stant succession f fresh ones, I think he cann t, though h may commonly choose wh ther he will heedfully bserve and consid r th m.

16 *I as however made includ no sens f mot on.* Wh ther these sev ral d as n man mind be mad by certain motions, I will n t he dispute but this I am sure, that they includ no de f moti n in th ir appearance and if man had n t th dea f motio thers ise, I think h would ha e non t all, which is nough t my prese t purpose and sufficiently shows that the n tice we take f th deas f our own minds, ppearing th one after an ther is that which gi es us the d f success on and duration, w thout which we should ha e no such ideas t all. It is n t th m tion, but the constant train

Cf. James *Psyc ol* 72

of *ideas* in our minds whilst we are waking that furnishes us with the idea of duration whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas as I have before showed and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration by the train of other ideas succeeding one another in our minds without the idea of any motion as by the train of ideas caused by the *uninterrupted sensible change of distance between two bodies* which we have from motion and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration were there no sense of motion at all

17 *Time is duration set out by measures* Having thus got the idea of duration the next thing natural for the mind to do is to get some *measure* of this common duration whereby it might judge of its different lengths and consider the distinct order wherein several things exist without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused and a great part of history be rendered very useless This consideration of duration as *set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs* is that I think which most properly we call *time*

18 *A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods* In the measuring of extension there is nothing more required but the application of the standard or measure we make use of to the thing of whose extension we would be informed But in the measuring of duration this cannot be done because no two different parts of succession can be put together to measure one another And nothing being a measure of duration but duration as nothing is of extension but extension we cannot keep by us any standing unvarying measure of duration which consists in a constant fleeting succession as we can of certain lengths of extension as inches feet yards &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions by constantly repeated periods What portions of duration are not distinguished or considered as distinguished and measured by such periods come not so properly under the notion of time as appears by such phrases as these viz Before all time and When time shall be no more [1]

19 *The revolutions of the sun and moon the properest measures of time for mankind* The diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun as having been from the beginning of nature constant regular and universally observable by all mankind and supposed equal to one another have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration But the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun it has brought this mistake with it that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another For men in the measuring of the length of time having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes hours days months years, &c which they found themselves upon any mention of time or duration presently to think on all which portions of time were measured out by the *motion of those heavenly bodies* they were apt to confound time and motion or at least to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another Whereas any constant

well distinguished the intervals of time as those that have been made use of For supposing the sun which some have taken to be a fire had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian and then gone out again about twelve

such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it as well without as with motion? For if the appearances were constant universally observable in equidistant periods they would serve mankind for measure of time as well were the motion away

20 *But not by their motion but periodical appearances* For the freezing of water or the blowing of a plant returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth would as well serve men to reckon their years by as the motions of the sun and in effect we see that some people in America counted their years by the coming of certain *birds amongst them at their certain seasons* and leaving them at others For a fit of an ague the sense of hunger or thirst a smell or a taste or any other idea returning constantly at equidistant periods and making itself universally be taken notice of would not fail to measure out the course of succession and distinguish the distances of time *Thus we see that men born blind* count time well enough by years whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions that they perceive not. And I ask whether a blind man who distinguished his years either by the heat of summer or cold of winter by the smell of any flower of the spring or taste of any

[1] Cf § 24.

fruit of the a tumn, ould n t ha a bett measure f time than th R mans had befor th reformati f their calendar by Jul us Cæsar or many ther peopl whose years, notw th

tions counted by are hard t be known, u y differ g ery much from an th and I think I may say all f them from th precise motion of th sun. And if th sun m ed f m the cre tion t th flood constantly in th quat r and so equally dispersed ts light and h t t all t habitab pa ts f th arth in d s ll f t sam length, w thout ts an ual va iati ns to th trop cs, as lat in enious uthor supposes, I d t think t ery easy t imagi e that (notw thstanding th moti n f th sun) men should in th ant dilu ian w ld fr m th beginning count b years, or measure th ir tim by periods tha h d n sens bl marks ery obvious t distinguish th m by

N t r p rts f dur t on an b certainly known to b ad B t pe haps t will be said —w thout a regular moti such as f th su r some other how could t ever be known that such periods were equal. To which I answ er —the equality f any ther returning ppearances might be known by the sam that that of da was known, p esumed t be so t first which was nly by j dging f th m by th train f id as wh ch had passed m n m nds in the intervals by which tra f d as discovering inequality th natural d ys, but n the artificial d ys, th artificial d y νυχθημ ρα, er guessed t be equal hich was suffici t to mak th m serve f measur thou h cter search has ce discovered inequality th d urnal e l t ns f th sun, and w k ow t wh th th annual also be t unequal. These y t, by th ir presumed d ppar nt equality serv as well t eck tim by (though not m asur th parts f dur ti xactly) as if th could be pr ed t be xa tly equal. We must, theref carefully distinguish betw xt dur tion tself d th m asures we make use f jud f ts l gth. Duration in ts lf is t be cons dered as goin on in constant equal, uniform course bu n f th measures f t hich w mak use f can be *known* t d so, or ca be assured that h ir ass gned p ts or periods are eq al in dur tio on t an ther for two success e l gths f durati n, however me sured can never be dem nstrated to be equal. The moti n of th sun which the world used o lo g and so co fid tly for an xa t measu e of duration has, a I said been f nd ts sev ral parts unequal. And though m h e f late mad use f a pe dulum, as a more t dy and r gular motion than th t f th sun, o (t speak more truly) f th earth —yet f any should be asked how he certainly know that th two success swings of a pe dulum are equal it ould be ery hard to satisf him that th y ar infallibly so since w ca t be sur that th cau e f that m ti n which is u known t us, shall always oper t equally and ar sure th t th med um in whi h th pendulum mo es s n t constantly th s me e the f wh ch ary g may alter the equal ty of h pe ods, a d th reby destroy th ce ta ty nd exactness f th m asu by moti n, as ll as any th pe ods f th r ppearances the notio f dur tion till rema ning cl ar th gh our measures f t can t (y f them) be d m nstr ted t be xact. Since th n n tw po ti ns f success n can be brought togeth t is mposs bl eve ce tainly to know th equal ty All that we ca do for measure f tim is, t take such as h e co tinual success ppear ces t seemi gly equ distant pe od f whi h *seeming equality* we ha e no th m asure but such as th train f our own id as ha lodged our memor es w th the co cu re ce f th *prob bl* reasons, to persuade us of their equal ty

22 *Tim t the m sur f m tion* O th g seems stran t m —that whilst all men manifestly m asured tim by the m ti n f the gre t and is bl bod es f the ld tim yet hould be d fined t be th measure f m ti wh re as t is bvious t every o e wh reflects so littl on t, that t m *sure m ti* sp e is as necessary to be cons dered as time d those wh look l ttl farth will find also th bulk f th thin m ed ecessary to be tak n to th computation, by any wh will estimat m asur m tio so as t jud right f t N d ed does m ti n any oth rwise co d ce to th m asuring f dur ti n than as t consta tly brings bout th turn f certai sens bl deas, in seeming q dista t pe od For if th m ti n of th sun ere as un qual as f ship dr n by unst dy ds som times ry slow and t thers irr gularly ry swift o if being co stantly equally swift, t yet was n t circular and prod ced n t th sam ppearances,— t w uld ot t all h lp us t measur time, any mor than th seeming unequal m ti n f a comet does.

Thomas Burnet, in his *Theory f th Earth.*

3 *Minutes hours days and years not necessary measures of duration* Minutes hours days and years are then no more necessary to time or duration than inches feet yards and miles marked out in any matter are to extension For though we in this part of the universe by the constant use of them as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun or as known parts of such periods have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds which we apply to all parts of time whose lengths we would consider yet there may be other parts of the universe where they no more use these measures of ours than in Japan they do our inches feet or miles but yet something analogous to them there must be For without some regular periodical returns we could not measure ourselves or signify to others the length of any duration though at *the same time* the world were as full of motion as it is now but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time do not at all alter the notion of duration which is the thing to be measured no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extension to those who make use of *those different measures*

4 *Our measure of time applicable to duration before time* The mind having once got such a measure of time as the annual revolution of the sun can apply that measure to duration wherein that measure itself did not exist and with which in the reality of its being it had nothing to do For should one say that Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and twelfth year of *the Julian period* it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the world though there were so far back no motion of the sun nor any motion at all For though the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before *there were really* either days nights or years marked out by any revolutions of the sun —yet we reckon as right and thereby measure durations as well as if really at that time the sun had existed and kept the *same* ordinary motion it doth now The idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun is as easily *applicable* in our thoughts to duration where no sun or motion was as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies here can be applied in our thoughts to duration where no sun or motion was as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies *here can be applied in our* thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world where are no bodies at all

25 *As we can measure space in our thoughts where there is no body* For supposing it were 5639 miles or millions of miles from this place to the remotest body of the universe (for being finite it must be at a certain distance) as we suppose it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world —we can in our thoughts apply this measure of a year to duration *before the creation* or beyond the duration of bodies or motion as we can this measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies and by the one measure duration where there was no motion as well as by the other measure space *in our thoughts* where there is no body

26 *The assumption that the world is neither boundless nor eternal* If it be objected to me here that in this way of explaining of time I have begged what *I should not* viz that the world is neither eternal nor infinite I answer That to my present purpose it is not needful in this place to make use of arguments to evince the world to be finite both in duration and extension But it being at least as *conceivable as the contrary* I have certainly the liberty to suppose it as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion though not of all duration *and* so may come to a step and *non ultra* in his consideration of motion So also in his thoughts he *may set* limits to body and the extension be

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most bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind and all for the same reason as we shall see in another place

7 *Eternity* By the same means *therefore* and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time we have also that idea which we call Eternity viz having got the idea of succession and duration by reflecting on the train of our own ideas caused in us *either by the natural* appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking *thoughts* or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses and having from the revo*lutions of the sun got the* ideas of certain lengths of duration —we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another as often as we please and apply them so added to durations past or to come And thus we can continue to do so without bounds or limits, and proceed *in infinitum* and apply thus the length of the annual motion *of the sun to duration* supposed

before the sun s or any ther mou n had s be ng which is o more difficult r bsurd, than to ply the notion I have f the mo ing of a shadow one hour to-day upon th sun-dial to the duration of something last night, v g the burning of a candl which is now absolut ly separat from all actual motion and t is as im possib. for th duration f that flame for an hour last night to co-exist w th any m tion that now is, or for ever shall be, as for any part f duration, that was befor the beginning of th orld, to co-exist w th the motion of the sun now But yet this hinders n t but that, ha ing the i of the length f th mot f th shadow on dial between the marks f two hours, I can as distinctly measur in my thoughts th dur tion f that candl light last night, as I can the duratio f anything that does now xist and it is no mor than to think, that, had th sun shon then on the dial, and moved after th same rate t doth now the shadow n th dial would ha e passed from one hour line t an ther hilst that flame f th candl lasted.

28. *Our measur f durat on dependent our ideas* The notion f an hour day o year being only the id I ha f th l ngth f certain periodi cal egular m tions, ne ther f which motions do ever all t ce exist, but only th deas I ha e of them in my m mory deri ed from my senses or reflection I can w th th sam ease, and for th same eason, pply t in my thou hts to duration anteced t to all manner of moti as w ll as to anything that is but minut or a day anteced t to the motion that at this ery moment th sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly t rest and to this way of consid eration f them ar all on whether they were before th beginning f th world, or but yesterday the measuring f any duration by som motion d pending *no t all on th d co-exist* ence f that thing to that mou n, or any oth periods f evol u but th ha ing clear i f the l gth f some pe iod cal known motion, or ther interval f dur ti in my mind and pplying tha th duration f th thin I would measure

9. *The durat on f anything d not b co-exi tent with the motion m asur t by* Hence we see that some men imagin th durati f th world from is first exist ce t this present year 689, to ha been 5639 years, or equal t 5639 an ual revol tions f the sun, and others great deal mor as the Egyptians f old who in the time of Alexander coun ed 3 000 years from the reign of th sun and the Chinese ow wh account the world 3 269,000 years old, or mor which I e durat n of th orld ccording to their computation, though I should not be lieve to be true, yet I can equally imagin it w th them, and as truly understand and say one is longer than th ther as I understa d that M thusalem s lif was l ng r than Enoch s And if th common reckoning of 5639 should be true (as t may be as well as any ther ass gned) it hinders n t t all my imagining what thers mean when they mak the wo ld one thousand years older since every one may w th th same f cility imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be 5 000 years ld, as 5639 and may as well co ce the duration of 50 000 years as 5639 Whereby t ppears that, t the measuring the durati n of anything by time, t is not requis t that that thin sh uld be co-existent to th motion we *measur by or any ther periodical rev* olution but t suffices to this purpose, that we ha th de of the l ngth of *any* regular peri

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dur tion f l ght before th sun was created as so l g as (*f* th sun had moved the as t doth now) would ha bee equal t three of his d ur nal evolutions so by the sam w y I ca ha e an dea f th chaos, angels, be ng created before there was ther light or any continued m tion, minut an hour d y year one thousand years. For if I can but cons der dura

such parts f the sun revoluti ns, or any oth period whereof I ha e th dea) proceed *fini tum* and suppose durati n xceeding as many such periods as I can eckon, let me add whilst I will, which I think is th n tion we ha e of ternity f whose infinity we ha n other o tio than we ha e f th infinity f umber to which w can add f eve w th ut end.

31 *O gi f our ideas f duration, and f the measur f t* And thus I think t is plain that from those two fountains f all knowled e be fore menti ed iz. flect and sensation, w g t th deas f durati n, and th measures f t.

For First, by bserving what passes in our minds, how our d as there in train constantly som vanish and thers begin to appear we com by th d f *suc ssion*

Secondly by observing a distance in the parts of this succession we get the idea of *duration*

Thirdly by sensation observing certain appearances at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods we get the ideas of certain *lengths* or *measures of duration* as minutes hours days years &c

Fourthly by being able to repeat those measures of time or ideas of stated length of duration in our minds as often as we will we can come to imagine *duration where nothing does really endure or exist* and thus we imagine to morrow next year or seven years hence

Fifthly by being able to repeat ideas of any length of time as of a minute a year or an age as often as we will in our own thoughts and adding them one to another without ever coming to the end of such addition any nearer than we can to the end of number to which we can always add we come by the idea of *eternity* as the future eternal duration of our souls as well as the eternity of that infinite Being which must necessarily have always existed

Sixthly by considering any part of infinite duration as set out by periodical measures we come by the idea of what we call *time* in general

Chap XV *Ideas of Duration and Expansion considered together*

1 *Both capable of greater and less* Though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration yet they being ideas of general concernment that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together Distance or space in its simple abstract conception to avoid confusion I call *expansion* to distinguish it from extension which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter and so includes or at least intimates the idea of body whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing I prefer also the word expansion to space because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts which never exist together as well as to those which are permanent[2] In both these (viz expansion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths capable of greater or less quantities For a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day as of an inch and a foot.

[1] e g distance or space of duration Cf § 8
[2] Cf. ch xiii. § 2

Expansion not bounded by matter The mind having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion let it be a span or a pace or what length you will *can* as has been said repeat that idea and so adding it to the former enlarge its idea of length and make it equal to two spans or two paces and so as often as it will till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the sun or remotest star By such a progression as this setting out from the place where it is or any other place it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths and find nothing to stop its going on either in or without body It is true we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of *solid* extension the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at but when the mind is there it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion of that it can neither find nor conceive any end Nor let any one say that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all unless he will confine God within the limits of matter Solomon whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom seems to have other thoughts when he says Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee And he I think very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts further than God exists or imagine any expansion where He is not.

3 *Nor duration by motion* Just so is it in duration The mind having got the idea of any length of duration can double multiply and enlarge it not only beyond its own but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings and all the measures of time taken from the great bodies of all the world and their motions But yet every one easily admits that though we make duration boundless as certainly it is we cannot yet extend it beyond all being God every one easily allows fills eternity and it is hard to find a reason why any one should doubt that He likewise fills immensity His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say where there is no body there is nothing

4. *Why men more easily admit infinite duration than infinite expansion* Hence I think we may learn the reason why every one familiarly and without the least hesitation speaks of and supposes Eternity and sticks not to ascribe *infinity* to *duration* but it is with more doubting and reserve that many

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belonging to other beings, we easily conce e in God infinite dur tion, and e cann t a o d do- m so but, t attributing t Him ext ns on, but only to matter which is finit we are pter to doubt of the existence f expans n w thout mat ter of which al ne we commonly suppose t an ttribute. And, therefore wh men pursu th ir thoughts f space they ar pt to st p t th confines of bod as if sp ce w r there t an end too, and ched n furthe Or if their ideas, pon consider tion, carry them further yet they term what is beyo d th limits f th universe, imaginary space as if t were nothin because there is body existin in t. Wh reas dur tion antecedent t all body and t the mo- tions wh ch t is m asured by they never t rm imaginary because t is ev supposed o d f some other eal xistence And if the names f things ma t all di ect our thoughts towards the original f men s ideas, (as I am pt to think they ma ery much,) n may ha occas n to think by th name *dur tion* that th co ti ua tion f xistence, w th kind f resistance to any destructi force, and th co tinuat n f solid ty (which is pt t be confounded w th and if we ll look int th minut anatomical parts f matter is littl differe t f om, hardness) ere thought to ha e som analogy and ga occa sion to words so near f ki as *durar* and *durum esse* And that *durar* is pplied to th ide of hardness, as ell as that f existe ce, e ee in Horace, Epod. xvi. *ferr duravit secul* B t, be that as t will this is ce ta n, that whoe e pur sues his own thoughts, will find them som times launch out beyo d th e t t f body int th infinity f pace or xpans th dea whereof is distinct and separat fr m body and all th things which may (to those h please) be a sub ect of further med tation

5. *Tim to durat is as plac t pansion.* Tim gen ral is t dur ti as place t xpans n. They ar so much f those bou dless oc ans f ternity and imm ns ty as is set out and distin guished fr m th est, as t we by *landmarks* and so ar mad use f to den t th pos ti of *finite* eal beings, in respec t an th those uniform finite oceans of dur ti d sp ce. These, rightly con d ed are onl d as of d termin te distances fr m ce tain kn wn points, fixed in distinguishabl sens bl thi gs, and supposed to keep th sam distance on from another From such points fixed in sens bl be ings we eckon, and fr m th m we m asur our portions f those finite q antities which, so considered ar that which we call *tim* and *plac*

Cf. h. xiii. § 7

Fo duration and pace bein in themsel es u f rm and boundless, the order and pos ti of things, w thout such known settled po nts, would be lost n them and all things would li jumbled in an i cur bl confus n.

6 *T m and plac ar taken for much f either as ar set out by the xi tenc and moti f bodi* T me and place tak thus f r dete mi te distin guishabl porti ns of those nfin te abysses of space and durat on set out or supposed to be distinguished from th est, by marks and known boundar es, ha e ach of them a twof ld accep- tation

First Tim in ge e al is comm nly tak n for so much of infin t dur t as is measured by a d co-existent th th exist nce a d mot ns of th gre t bodies of th u erse as far as we

Place l kewise is taken sometimes for that po tion of infin te sp ce which is possessed by and comp h ded w thin th material world and is the by distinguished from th est f expan si though this may be more prope ly called ext s o than place W thi these two are co fined and by th observabl parts f them ar measured and determined the particular time or durati and th particular tensi n and place, f all corporeal beings.

7 *Somet m for much f either as u d si by ur asur s taken f om the bulk or m tion f bodi* See

cal moti ns of bod es, th t w e ppo ted from th beginning t be f signs and for season and f days and years, and ar ccord gly our measures f tim b t su h th po ti ns too f that infin t unif rm durati which w upon any occas d suppos eq al to certain l gths f m asured time and cons d them as bounded and d termined. For if we should suppose th cr tio fall f th ang ls, was t th begin ning f th Jul an pe od w sh uld speak p p- erly enough, d should be und rstood f w sa d, t is l g time ince th creati n of gels than th cr ti of th world by 764 years wher by we would mark out so m h f that undistinguished dur tio as we suppose equal t a d ould h dmitted 764 an al rev luti ns f th sun m g t th te t w does. And thu likewise we som t mes speak f pl ce distance bulk th gre t *inane* be

yond the confines of the world when we consider so much of that space as is equal to or capable to receive a body of any assigned dimensions as a cubic foot or do suppose a point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the universe

8 *They belong to all finite bein s Where* and *when* are questions belonging to all finite existences and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable *in it Without some such fixed parts or* periods the order of things would be lost, to our finite understandings in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion which comprehend in them all finite beings and in *their full extent belong only to the Deity And* therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not and do so often find our thoughts at a loss when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves or as any way attributed *to the first incomprehensible Being But when* applied to any particular finite beings the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space as the bulk of the body takes up And place is the position of any body when cons dered at a certain distance from some other *As the idea* of the particular duration of anything is an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing so the time when the thing existed is the idea of that space of duration *which passed between some known* and fixed period of duration and the being of that thing One shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the same thing as that it is a foot square or lasted two years the other shows the distance of it in place or existence from other fixed points of space or duration as that it was in the middle of Lincoln s Inn Fields or the first degree of Taurus and in the year of our Lord 1671 or the 1000th year of the Julian period All which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and *duration —as inches feet miles* and degrees and in the other minutes days and years &c

9 *All the p ts of ext nsio are extension and all the p ts f d ation re d at on* There is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great conformity and that is though they are justly reckoned amongst our *simple ideas yet none of* the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts but their parts being all of the same kind and without the mixture of *any other idea* hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas Could the mind as *in number come to so small* a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility *that* would be as it were the indivisible unit or idea by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration *But, since the mind is not* able to frame an idea of *any* space without parts instead thereof it makes use of the common measures which by familiar use in each country have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet or cubits and parasangs and *so seconds* minutes hours days and years in duration) —the mind makes use I say of such ideas as these as simple ones and these are the component parts of larger ideas [illegible]

mak [illegible]

whic [illegible]

the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions Though on *both sides both in addi*tion and division either of space or duration when the idea under consideration becomes very big or very small its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused and it is the *number* of its *repeated additions or* divisions that alone remains clear and distinct as will easily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expans on of space or divisibility of matter Every part of duration is duration too and every part of extension is extension both of them capable of addition or division *in infi itum* But *the least portions of eithe of them where we have clear a d distinct ideas* may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us as the *simple ideas* of that kind out of which our complex modes of space extension and duration are made up and into *which they can again be distinctly resolved* Such a small part in duration may be called a *m ment* and is the time of one idea in our minds in the train of their ordinary succession there The other wanting a proper name I know not whether I may be allowed to call a *sensible p t* meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can d scern which is *ordinarily about a minute* and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle whereof the eye is the centre [illegible]

[illegible]

yet their parts are not separable one from another no not *even in thought though the parts of* bodies from whence we take our *measure* of the one and the parts of motion or rather the succession of ideas in our mi ds from whence we

tak the *restort* of the ther may be interrupted and separated as th on is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.

11. Duration is as l expansion as solid. But there is this manifest difference between them, —That the ideas f length which we ha e of expansion are turned every way and so mak fig ure, and breadth, and thickness but duration is but as t were th l gth f one strai ht line, extended *in infinitum*, not capabl of multiplicity variation, *or figure* but is one commo measure of all existence whatsoever wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single bein and we may trul say they all exist *in the same mome t of time.* Whethe angels and spirits ha e any analogy to this, in respect to expansion, is beyond my comprehen sion and perhaps for us, who ha e und rstand ings and comprehensi ns suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own bein, but ot to the reality and extent of all othe beings, t is near as hard to conce e any exist ce or to have an idea of any real bein w th a perfect negation f all manner f expans on, as t is to have the id of any real exis ence w th perfect negation of all manner of duration. And there fore hat pirits ha e to d w th space, or how they communicate in t, we know n t. All that we know is, that bodies d each singly possess its proper portion of t, ccordin to th extent of so' d parts and th reby clud all ther bodies from ha ing any share in that particular portion of space whilst t remains there.

12. Duration has never two parts together expansion all together. *Duration*, and *time* which is part of t, is the idea we ha e of *perishing* distance, of which no two parts exist together but f llow each ther in successsion an *expansion* is th d of *lasting* distance, all whose parts exist together and are not capabl f succession. And there fore, thou h *we cann t conce e* any duration without succession, nor can put t together in our thoughts that any being does *now* exist tomorrow or possess t once more than the present mome t of duration ye we can conceive the eternal duratio f th Almi hty far different from ha of man, or any ther finite being Be use man comprehends in his know edge or power all past and f ture things his thoughts

all finite beings who thou h they may far exceed man in knowledge and power yet are no

edge and infinite power H sees all things, past and *to com* and they are no more distant from His knowledge no further removed from His sight, than the present they all lie under the same ew and there is n thing which He cannot mak exist each moment He pl ases. For th existence of all things, depending upon His good pleasure, all things exist every moment that He thinks fit

found in all that gre t ar ty we d or can conce e, and may afford matter to further specula tion.

Chap XVI *Ide of Number*

1 Number the simplest and mo t universal id Amongst all th ideas we ha e, as there no e suggested to the mind by more ways, so th re is non more simple, than that f *unity* o on it has no shadow of ari ty or composit n in t every bject our senses are employed bout every dea in our understandings every thought of our minds, brings this d al ng w th t. And the efore t is th most intimat to our thou hts, as well as t is, in ts reement to all other thi gs,

dea in our minds, and dding the repetiti ns together we com by th *compl* deas f th *modes* f t. Thus, by adding o to one, we ha e th complex d f a coupl by putting twel units togeth we ha e the complex dea of doze and so of a score, or million or any ther number

3. Each mode dis ct Th *simpl mod f number* are of all other th most distinct every th least variation, which is an unit, makin each combination as cl arly different from that which pproacheth earest t t, as th most rem t two being as distinct from one, as two hundred and the idea f two as distinct from th d f three, as the magnitud of th wh l earth is

Cf. ch. vii. § 7
*Cf. § 8 ch. xvii. § 9

from that of a mite This is not so in other simple modes in which it is not so easy nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt two ap proaching ideas which yet are really different For who will undertake to find a difference be tween the white of this paper and that of the next degree to it or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension?

4 *Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise* The clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others even those that approach nearest makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers if they are not more evident and exact than in extension yet they are more general in their use and more deter minate in their application Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguish able than in extension where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go as an unit and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered which is clear otherwise in number where as has been said 91 is as dis tinguishable from 90 as from 9000 though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90 But it is not

— h n

which appear of an equal length one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts nor can any one assign an angle which shall be the next biggest to a right one

— R h n ng

ti e idea marked by the name two And who-soever can do this and proceed on still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number and gave a name to it may count or have ideas for several collections of units distinguished one from another as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers and a memory to retain that series with their se eral names all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more and giving to the whole together as comprehended in one idea a new or distinct name or sign whereby to know it from those before and after and dist nguish it from e ery smaller or greater multitude of units So that he that can add one to one and so to two and so go on with his tale taking still with him the d stinct names belonging to e ery pro-gression and so again by subtracting an unit from each collection retreat and lessen them is capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compass of his language or for which he hath names though not perhaps of more For the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many conbinations of units which have no variety nor are capable of any other difference but more or less names or marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas For without such names or marks we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units which put together without a name or mark to distinguish that precise collection will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion

6 *Another reaso for the necessity of names to num bers* This I think to be the reason why some Americans I have spoken with (who were other wise of quick and rational parts enough) could not as we do by any means count to 1000 nor had any distinct idea of that number though they could reckon very well to o Because their language being scanty and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple life un acquainted either with trade or mathematics had no words in it to stand for 1000 so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers they would show the hairs of their head to express a great multitude which they could not number which inabil ty I suppose proceeded from their want of names The *Tou oupinambos* had no names for numbers above 5 any number beyond that they made out by sho ving their fingers and the fingers of others who were present And I doubt not but we our selves might distinctly number in words a great deal further than we usually do would we find out but some fit denominat ons to signify them by whereas in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of mill ons &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen or at most four and twenty decimal progressions without con fusion But to show ho v much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning or having useful ideas of numbers let us see all these follo ing figures in one continued line as the marks of one number v g

N l *l ns*	*O t l* *l ns*	*S pt l* *l ns*	*S xt l* *l ns*	*Q* *t ll s*
857324	162486	345896	437918	423147
Qua t l *l ns*	*T l* *l*	*B ll ns*	*M ll ns*	*U t*
248106	235421	261734	368 49	623137

H t d' V y ge f t l Terr d B i l par J n de Lery ch p xx pp 3 7–382

The ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating f millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, f millions, (which is th denomination of the second six figures) I which wa t will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number B t whether by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctl and id as f them both got more easily t ourselves, and more plainly si nified to others, I leave t to be considered. This I mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering w thout pretending to introduce new ones of my in vention.

Why ... number es earlier Thus children, either for want of names to mark the several progressions f numbers, or no having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in regular order and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning, d not begin to number very early nor proceed in it very far or steadily till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions f several other things, before they can tell twenty And some, through th default of th ir memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, w th their names, annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another are not bl all their lifetime to reckon, or regularl go over any moderat series of numbers. For h tha will count twenty or have any idea f that umber must know that nineteen went before with the distinct name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in

traction of *one* unit ( ) That t retain in memory the names or marks f the several combinations, from an unit to that number and that not confusedly and t random, but in that exact order tha the numbers follow one another In ther of which, if t trips, the whole business f umbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea f multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be ttained to.

8. *Number ... all measures ...* This further is observabl in number that t is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable, which principally are ... and *duration* and our dea of infinity even when pplied to those, seems to be nothin but the nfinity of number For what else are our ideas of Eternity and Immensity but the repeated additions of certain id as of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity f umber in which we can come to no nd of addition. For such an inexhaustible stock, number (of all ther our de...) most clearly furnishes us w th, as is obvious to every one. For let man collect int one sum as great a number as h pleases, this multitude, how gre t soever lessens not one jot the power of dding to t, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock f number where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this *endl ss addition* or ... (if any one like the word better) f numbers, so pparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity of which more in the following chapter

Chap XVII *Of Infinity*

1 *Infinity ... original ... attributed to space duration, and number* H that would know what kind of idea t is to which we give the name of *infinity* cannot do t better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediatly attributed and then how the mind comes to frame t.

Finite and *infinite* seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the *mode f quantity* and to be ttributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution by the ddition or subtraction f any the l ast part and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number which we have considered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, f whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite but yet, when we pply to that first and supreme Being our idea f infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do t primarily in respect to his duration and ubiquity and, I think, more figuratively to his power wisdom, and goodness, and other ttributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call *them* infinite, we have no ther id a of this infinity but what carries w th t some reflection on, and imitation ..., that number or extent of th acts or bjects of God power wisdom,

and goodness which can never be supposed so great or so many which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed let us multi ply them in our thoughts as far as we can with all the infinity of endless number I do not pre tend to say how these attributes are in God who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narro
pac
all
of c
infi

2 *The idea of finite easily got* Finite then and infinite being by the mind looked on as *modifi cations* of expansion and duration the next thing to be considered is —*How the m nd comes by them* As for the idea of finite there is no great difficulty The obvious portions of extension that affect our senses carry with them into the mind the idea of finite and the ordinary periods of *succession whereby we measure time and dura* tion as hours days and years are bounded lengths The difficulty is how we come by those *boundless ideas* of eternity and *immensity s nce* the objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largenes

3 *How*
that has a
as a foot f
joining it
feet and t ... uuuuon of a third three feet and so on without ever com ng *to an end of his* additions whether of the same idea of a foot or if he pleases of doubling it or any other idea he has of any length as a mile or diameter of the earth or of the *orbis magnus* for wh chever of these he takes and how often soever he doubles or any otherw ise multiplies it he finds that af *ter he has continued his doubling in his thoughts* and enlarged *his idea as much as he pleases* he has no mo
the end of
ting out th
by further
hence take ne uea of infinite space

4 *Ou idea f space boundless* This I think is the way whereby the mind gets the *ide* of n *finite space It is a quite different considerat on* to examine whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space *actually existin* since our ideas are not al ways proofs of the existence of things but yet since this comes here in our way I suppose I may *say that we are pt to th k that* space in itself is actually boundless to which im agination the idea of space or expans on of itself naturally leads us For it being cons dered by us either as the extension of body or as existing by itself without any solid *matter taking it up* (for of such a void space we have not only the idea but I have proved as I th k ...

... u ut it, or be stopped anywhere in its progress in this space, how far soever it ex tends its thoughts Any bounds made with body even adamantine walls, are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its further progress in space and extension that it rather facilitates and en larges it *For so far as that body reaches* so far no one can doubt of extension and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body what is there that can there put a stop and satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space when it per ceives that it is not nay when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For if it be neces sary for the motion of body that there should be an empty space though ever so little here amongst bodies and if it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space —nay it *is impossible for any particle of matter to move* but into an empty space the same possibility of a body
utmost
space
rema
space
all bou e ueing exactly the same differ ng not *in nature though in bulk and there being* noth ing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from all bod es it can in this uniform idea of space nowhere find any bounds any end and so must *necessarily* conclude it by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite

5 *And so of durat on* As by the pow er we find in ourselves of repeating as often as we ill any

... out it us with all the end less addition of number we *come by the idea of eter ity* Fo we find in oursel es we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas than e *can come* to the end of number which e ery one perce es he cannot But he e again it is an other question *qu te d fferent from our* having an *dea* of eternity to know whether there were *any re l be g* whose duration has been eternal *And as to* this I say he that considers some thing now existing must necessa ily come to Something eternal *But having spoke of this in* another place I shall say here no more of it,

Cf Bk IV ch x § 3

— som the consider tions of

If t th th d — deas, they our minds as th ther and yet n uouy hinks finfinit *sweetness, or nfinite whit ness*, though he can r pe t th d f swe t white, as fre- q tly as thos f yard o a day T which I answ —All the d as that are cons d red as ha ing parts, and are cap bl of incr ase by the ddiu f any equal or l ss p rts, fford us, by their epetit the d f infinity because, with this endless repetit th is co ti ed — — f wh h th e *an* be n d

increase but to th perfectest d l n th whitest whit ss, if I add the f less or equal whit ss, (d of whit than I ha I cannot dd th de) t makes o er ase — m d t all d th refore

ther parcel f ow you see to-d y d put th m tog th your mind they embody as t were, and ru into e, and the de f whit ess is t t all incr as d and if w add a less degree f whit ess t a gr ater e are so far from increasing that w diminish t. Those id as that consist t f parts ca ot be gment d to what pr ports m pl as or be str tched beyond wha th y h ce ed by their senses but space dur ti and n mber being cap ble f incr ase by petiti l th mind dea f ndless room for mo nor can we con ce e ywhere t p t a further dd ti n or progression and so those deas *alone* lead our minds towards the th gh f finity

7 *Difference b tw en finity f pac nd pace f t* Though ur dea f infin ty arise f m th co templati f quantity and th dl ss cr ase the mind is bl to mak in qua tity by the repe ted dd ti ns f what portions th eof pl ases yet I guess we caus gr t confus our thoughts, wh n w j in infinity to any supposed d a f quanti y the mind can be

th ght to ha e and so discourse or reason bout an infinit qua tity as an nfinite space or an infinite duration. For as our d a of infinity be g as I think, *an endl ss growi g d* but th n h m nd has, bei g at that

an ins gnificant su y *a*

car fully to distinguish betw en the d of the nfinity of pace and th d a f pace nfinite Th fir t is thin but s pposed ndless progress on f th mind er what *epeated d as of space* it pl ase but to ha e actually in the mind the de f sp ce infinite is to suppose th mind alr ady passed over and ctually t ha e ew of *all* those epeated deas of space which a *endl* repetiti n ca n er t tally r present t t which carr s in t a plain contradiction.

8 *It har no id f nfinite pac* This, per h ps, will be a littl plaine f we cons de it n numbers The infin ty f umbers, to the d f whose addition ev ry o perce es there is no app oach, easily ppears to any that r flects on t. But, how clear soe er this idea of the in

numbe l t th m be e so gre t, they ar still finit but wh n we suppose an inexhaust ble r mainder f om which we emo e all bounds, and wherein we allow th mind an ndless p ogression of thought, with ut ev compl ting the d the e we ha e our d f infinity wh ch thou h t seems t be pretty clear when we con s d thi g lse n t but th negati n of n end yet, whe we would fr me *in* our minds th d a of infinit p ce o dur tio that

it is plai th *mind e ts and terminat* n th t d which is co trary to the dea f infin ty which *consists suppo d endl ss pr gr n*. And th for I think t is that w are so asily con fou ded when we com to argue and aso about nfinit sp ce or dur ti &c. Because th parts f ch an d t being perce ed t be, as they ar inconsiste t, th on sid ther al w ys perple s, whateve consequences we dra f m th th as an d a I m tion n t pass g

Cf. Hume *Enquiry* sec xii.

on v ould perplex any one who should argue from such an idea which is not better than an idea of motion at rest And such another seems to me to be the idea of a space or (which is the same thing) a number infinite i e of a space or number which the mind actually has and so views and terminates in and of a space or num ber which in a constant and endless enlarging and progression it can in thought never attain to For how large soever an idea of space I have in my mind it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it though I be capable the next in stant to double it and so on *in i fi itum* for that alone is infinite which has no bounds and that the idea of infinity in which our thoughts can find none

9 *Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity* But of all other ideas it is number as I have said which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity v e are capable of For even in space and duration when the mind pursues the idea of infinity it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers as of mill ons and millions of miles or years which are so many d stinct ideas —kept best by num ber from running into a confused heap wherein the mind loses itself and when it has added to gether as many millions &c as it pleases of known lengths of space or duration the clearest idea it can get of infinity is the confused incom prehensible remainder of endless add ble num bers which affords no prospect of stop or boun dary

10 *Our d ffe ent conceptions of the infinity of num ber contrasted with those of du atio a d exp nsion* It will perhaps give us a l ttle further light into the idea we have of infinity and d scover to us that it is *nothing but the i finity of number ppl ed to det m n te parts of which we ha e in our minds the dist nct ideas* if we cons der that number is not generally thought by us infinite whereas dura t on and extension are apt to be so which ar ses from hence —that in number v e are at one end as it were for there be ng in number nothing *less* than an unit v e there stop and are at an end but in addition or increase of number we can set no bounds and so it is like a line where of one end terminating with us the other is ex tended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive But in space and duration it is other wise For in duration v e cons der it as if this l ne of number were extended *both* ways—to an un

turning this infinity of number both ways *à pa te ante* and *à parte post* as they speak For when we would consider eternity *à p te ante* v hat do we but beginning from ourselves and the pres ent time we are in repeat in our minds the ideas of years or ages or any other assignable portion of duration past with a prospect of proceeding in such addition v ith all the infinity of number and when we would consider eternity *à p te post* v e just after the same rate begin from our selves and reckon by multipl ed periods yet to come still extending that line of number as be fore And these two being put together are that infinite duration we call *Eternity* which as v e turn our view either way forwards or back ards appears infinite because we still turn that v ay the infinite end of number i e the pov er still of adding more

11 *How we conceive the i finity of space* The same happens also in space wherein conceiving our selves to be as it v ere in the centre we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number and reckoning any way from ourselves a yard mile diameter of the earth or *o bis ma nus* —by the infinity of number v e add others to them as often as we will And having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas than we have to set bounds to number we have that indeterminable idea of immensity

12 *Infinite divisibility* And since in any bulk of matter our thoughts can never arrive at the ut most divisibility therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that which has the infinity also of number but with this d fference —that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration v e only use addition of num bers v hereas this is like the di ision of an un t into its fractions wherein the mind also can pro ceed *in infinit m* as v ell as in the former addi tions it being indeed but the addition st ll of new numbers though in the addition of the one we can have no more the *posit ve* idea of a space

may say a gro ing or fugitive idea still in a boundless progress on that can stop nowhere

13 *N positi idea f finity* Though it be hard I think to f nd anyone so absurd as to say he has the *po it ve* idea of an actual infinite num ber —the infin ty whereof lies only in a power still of add ng any combination of units to any former number and that as long and as much as one ill the like also being in the infinity of space and duration which power l a es al ays to the mind room for endless add tions —yet

there be those who imagine they ha e positive d as f nfinit durati n and p ce It would, I t..nk, be no h to destroy any such pos ti e idea f finit.., to ask him that has t,—wh ther h could add to t or no which would asily show the mistak f such a pos ti e dea. We can, I think, ha e no pos ti e idea f any pace or dur tion which is t mad up f and commensura to, repe ted numbers of feet or yards, or da and years which are th common measures, whereof we ha the d as in ur minds, and whereby we judge of th greatness of this sort of quantities. And ther fore since an infin idea f space or durati n must needs be mad f infini e parts, i can ha e th infinity

miles, which possibly we double and mult ply several times. All that w thus amass together in our thoughts is pos ti e, and th assembl ge of a gre t number f pos ti e ideas f space or dura n a man having

let down large porti n ... he r aches n bot om. Whereby he kno s the d pth t be so ma y fathoms. nd mor but how much th more is, he hath no distinct n ti n at ll and could h al ays supply ne line and find th plummet always sink, w th ut ever s opping h ould be som thi g in the posture f th mind e ching af r compl te and pos ti e d ...h case let this line be ten or

is

therwise prod ce the d of ... as umber does which, consisting of ddition f finit units one to th suggests the idea of infini only by power we find we ha e of till increasing t.. sum, and dding more of the same kind w thout coming on y t arer the d of ch progression.

4. *How w annot have pos e de f ... ity ...* Th y wh would prove th ir dea f in fi.. to be positi e, seem t me t d t by a pl asant argume t, taken from th negati n f an end which be g negative the n gati n f t is positive. H th consid rs that th nd is, in bod but th tr mity or supe ficies of that body will not perhaps be forward grant that the end is bar negati and h that perce es th end f his pe is black or white, will be apt to think that t..e nd is something more than pur ... Nor is t, when pplied to dur tion, th bare negation f xistence but more properly th last mome t f t. B t if they will ha e the nd to be nothing but th ba ... tion I ess nce I am sur they can t d ny but the beginning is th first instant f being and is ot by any body conce ed to be bare negation and therefore by th ir own argu ment, th idea f ternal, *à parte a* or f a duration w thout beginni g is but negati e idea.

5. *What is pos e what ne ...* The idea f infini has, I confess, some thing of pos ti e in all those things w pply

When we would think f infin t pace or duration, we firs at p usually mak some ery large id a, as pe haps f millions of ... es, or

compr eh nds f any space it has positi ... of but n endea ouring to make t infinit — t bein always nlarging, always dvancin — th dea is still imperfect and incompl t So much pace as th mind takes a v ew of n its contemplation of greatness, is a clear picture and pos ti in the understanding but infin t is still greater t Then the dea f *so much* is pos ti e and cl ar Th dea f *gr ater* is also cl ar but t is but a compar ti e dea, the idea f *so much gr ter as can t be compr hended* 3 And this is plainly egati n t pos ti For h has no pos ti e cl ar dea f the largeness f any ext n on, (which is that sought for in th d a of infini e) that has n t comprehensi e id of the dimensions f t and such, body I think, p e t nd t in what is nfinit For to say ma has pos ti cl ar id f any quantity w thout knowin how gr t t is, is as reasonabl as to say he has th pos tive clear d a f th number f the sands on th se ... wh knows not how many ther be, but only that they are more than twe ty For just such pe fect and pos ti e id has he f an infinit space durati n, wh say t is *larger than* th exte t or dur ... of ten

bscur ty and has th and t ruminat confusion f a n gati e dea, wherein I know I ne ther do nor can compr h nd all I would, t being too large for finit and narrow capacity And that cannot but be ery far from positive compl t dea, wh rein t.. greatest part f what I would

Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Bk. 48.

comprehend is left out under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater For to say that having in any quantity measured so much or gone so far you are not yet at *the end* is *only* to say that that quantity is greater So that the negation of an end in any quantity is in other words *only to say that it is* bigger and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity and adding this *idea of still g eater* to *all* the ideas you have or can be supposed to have of quantity Now whether such an idea as that be positive I leave any one to consider

16 *We have no positive idea of an infinite du ation* I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity whether their idea of duration n ? ?

n

I p rhaps there *may* be others as well as I who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point and acknowledge that the notion they have *of duration forces* them to conceive that whatever has duration is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday *If* to avoid succession in external existence they return to the *punctum stans* of the schools I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession Besides that *punctum stans* if it signify anything being not *quantum* finite or infinite cannot belong to it But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any *duration whatsoe er* our idea of eternity can be nothing but of *nfin te succession of moments of du ation wherein anythi g does exist* and whether any one has *or can have* a positive idea of an actual infinite number I leave him to cons der till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no *more to it* and as long as he can increase it I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too scanty for positive infinity

17 *No complet idea f eternal being* I think it unavoidable for every cons der ng rational creature that will but examine his own or any other ex stence to have the notion of an eternal wise Being who had no beg nning and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a positive thing scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity which whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to I confess myself at a loss and I find I cannot *attain any clear com*prehension of it

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hen e are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness which will always be less than any *one whereof we* have the positive idea All our *positive* ideas of any quantity whether great or little have always bounds though our *comparative* idea whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other hath no bounds For that which remains either great or little not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have lies in obscurity and we have no other idea of it but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other *without ceasi g* A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to ind visibility as the acutest thought of a mathematician and a surveyor m

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hend it w uch is to have a positive *idea of it* He

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c 4 78 and so on *till he* has the idea in his thoughts of something very little but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce What remains of smallness is as far from his thoughts as when he first began and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness which is consequent to infinite d visibility

19 *What s po it ve what negat ve in our id a f i fi ite* Every one that looks to ards infinity does as I have said at first glance make some very large idea of that which he applies it to let it be *space or duration* and possibly he wearies h s thoughts by multiplying in his mind that first large idea but yet by that he comes no nearer to *the having a positive clear* dea of what remains to make up a positi e infinite than the country fellow had of the water wh ch was yet *to come* and pass *the channel of the ri er wh e* he stood

> *Rusticus e pe tat d m d fl t m is t ll*
> *Lab t t l b t mne vol b l aevum*

20 *S me th k they ha e a po it e id a f tern ty and t f i fi ite space* There a e some I have met that put so much d fference betw een infi

nite duratu n d infin p ce, that th y pe suad th msel s that th y ha pos u e dea f t rn ty but that th y ha n t, n r can ha e any d f infinit space The eason of which mistake I suppose to be this—th t finding by a d contemplation of caus and ff ts th t t n ss ry t adm t som Ete nal Be ng a d

Which onsequ ce I co collected because th xist n e f matt is no way ecessary t th exi t ce f p ce, no m re than th xist c f m tio th sun d be

bush l w th t co th h ll t d he m n ces

ou d f infin t p qu es th al us ce f mat t support t wh fi d th t ha as cl ar d f an inf t d t com as w h f fi t d t past? Thou h I ppo bod thi ks t ble th t anythi g does or has xis ed th t f ture dur t on Nor is t poss bl t j ou d f

dur on than f infinit p ce becaus t is past doub that God has existed f m all rnity but there is al matter co-e t d d w th fin p ce yet those philosophers who ar f p on that infinit sp ce is possessed by God f te mnipresence as well as nfi t dura

Cf. ch. xv § 4.

F r whatsoe r pos tive deas a ma has n his mi d f any qu tity he ca r pe t t and add it to the f rm r as asy as he can add tog the th d as f two days r two p ces hich are pos ti e d as f l ngths h has i his mi d and so on l g as h pl ases he ebv f a man had pos ti d a of fi te e th rd ratio r sp c, h ould add t o fin t es togeth r nay mak fin t i fin tely b gg r than an th r —absurd ties too gross t be confuted

f m s n ho ir pos

edg they h no uch) to be be u d by th ir commu cati n. For I ha e be n h th e to pt t think that th gre t a d inextr cabl d fficulties hich perpet ally ol all dis courses nce ni infin ty —wh th r f p e duratio d bil ty h e been th certa marks f a d f t i ur d as f fin ty d the di p po ti the nature th eof has to the comp h ns f ur narro cap c ties F hilst m talk a d disp t f nfi te sp ce r d u as if th y had as c mpl te d pos ti e d as f th m as they ha e f th n mes th y u e f th m or as th y ha e of a ya d or n hou any oth r det m nat qua t ty t s n d if th comp h ns ble natur f the thin they discou se f r aso abo t l ads th m nt pe pl xiti d co tr d ti ns, and the minds be o la d by an bject too large d mighty to be surv yed and man ged by th m.

All the ar mod f id as g t f m sens t nd fl ct If I ha dwelt pr tty l ng n th

m d gi m e cis t th thoughts of m n than those d I p t d t t tr t of them in th full latitude It suffice to my des gn to how h w the mi d ece es th m, such as th y ar from ensati n d fl cti n and how n th d w ha f infin ty how em t soe t may se m t be f om any bj t of sense o pe tion f our mi d has, neverth less as all our ther d as, ts inal th re. Some math maticians pe haps, f d anced pecul t ns may h e th w ys t introd ce into th ir mi ds d as f nfinity B t this hind n t but that th y th msel es, as w ll as all ther m n got th first d as which they had f infinity

comprehend is left out under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater For to say that having n ~
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negation of a i u in any quantity is in other words only to say that it is bigger and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you in all *the progressions your thoughts* shall make in quantity and adding this *idea of still greater* to *all* the ideas you have or can be *supposed* to have of quantity Now whether such an idea as that be positive I leave any one to consider

16 *We have no positive idea of an infinite duration* I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity whether their idea of duration includes *in it succession or not? If it does not* they ought to show the difference of their notion of duration when applied to an eternal Be ng and to a finite since perhaps there may be others as well as I who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point and acknowledge that the notion they have of durat on forces them to conceive that whatever *has duration* is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday If to avoid succession in external existence *they return to the punctum stans* of the schools I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter or help us to a more clear and positive idea of *infinite duration* there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession Besides that *punctum stans* if it signify anything being *not quantum* finite or infinite cannot belong to it But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever our idea of eternity can be nothing but of *infi ite success on of moments of d r ti n u he ein anythi g does exist* and whether any one has or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number I leave him to consider till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it and as long as he can increase it I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too scanty for positive infinity

17 *No c mblete idea f eternal being* I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature that will but examine his own or any *other* existence to have the notion of an eternal wise Being who had no beginning and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure *I have But this* negat on of a beginning being but the negat on of a positive thing scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity w h ch whenever *I endeavour* to extend my thoughts to I confess myself at a loss and I find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it

18 *No positive idea of infinite space* He that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space will when he considers it find that he can no more ha
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ide ... ss which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea All *our positive* ideas of any quantity whether great or little have always bounds though our *c m paratite* idea whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other hath no bounds For that which remains either great or little not being comprehended in that pos tive idea which we have lies in obscurity and we have no other idea of it but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other *with ut ceasi g* A pestle and mortar will as soon bri g any *particle of matter* to indivisibility as the acutest thought of a mathematician and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out *infinite space* as a *philosopher* by the quickest flight of mind reach it or by thinking comprehend it which is to have a pos tive idea of it He
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ca ... and so on till he has *the idea in his thoughts of something very* little but yet reach ...
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thoughts as when he first began and therefore he never comes at all *to* have a clear and positive idea of *that smallness which is* consequent to inf nite divisibility

19 *Wh t is positiv what negat ve in our id a f i finite* Every one that *looks towards* infinity does, as I have said at first glance make some very large idea of that wh ch he applies it to let it be *space or durat on* and possibly *he w earies* his thoughts by multiplying in his m nd that first large idea but yet by that he comes no nearer *to the having a positive* clear idea of what remains to make up a positive infinite than the country fellow had of the water which was yet to come and *pass the channel* of the r er where he stood

> *Rusticus pe tat d m d fl at m is t ll*
> *Lab t l l b t mne vol b l evum*

o *Some thi k th y ha e a p s t ve d a f etern ty and not of i fin te spa* There are some I have met that put so much difference betv een inf

nite duratio a d infini sp ce, that they pe suad themselves that th y ha pos ti e dea f t nity but that th y ha e t n can ha e y d f infinit space Th easo f hich mistake I suppose t be this—that finding by a

ter Which consequ ce I co ce e is ry ill collected because the xist ce f matt r is o ys ecessary t th exist ce f p ce no m re than th xist ce f m u the sun nec ed t be

t thousand years w thout any body so ld It seems as asy t m t ha th d f sp ce empty f body as to think f th cap city f bush l without co or the h ll w f a n t h ll thout k rnel in t t be g m es- sary that th re hould be xist g sol d body nfin ly tended becaus w h d of th infinity f p ce tha t is necessary th t th orld should be t rnal becau b id a f nfinit dur tion. A d why should thi k our d f infin t p ce equ es th al xist ce f matt t supp t t, h find th t ha as cl ar de f infi t d t t come as w ha e f fi t d u past. Thou h I suppose body thi ks t co ce bl th t ythi g does has xi ed n th t f tur duration Nor is t poss bl t j ur d f future dur ti w th prese t past exist ce, y more than t is poss bl t mak th d of yes erd y to-d y and to-m rrow t be the sam or bring ges past and f tur to ther and mak th m co t mporary But if these m n ar f th mi d that they h e cl ar id as f infi t dur on tha f infinit sp ce because t is past doubt that God has xisted from ll t rnity but there is al matt co-exte ded w th in finit sp ce yet those philosophers who ar f p tha infin te space is possessed by God fin te omnip esence as w ll as infinit dura tion by h t al xist ce must be allowed to ha e as cl ar an id f fin t sp ce as f in finite dur tion though th f them, I think, has any pos tive idea f infinity in either case.

Cf. ch. xv § 4.

Fo whatsoe er pos ti e deas a man has i his mind of a y qu tity he can repeat t and add it t th f m r as asy as h can add tog th the d as f two days, two paces hich are pos ti d as f l ngths h has his mind and f m

tak But yet it afte all this, u persuad thems l es that th y h e clear pos

co rses co cer g infin ty —wh th r f space durati r d is bility ha e be n the certain marks f a d f ct in our d as f nfinity a d th disp po ti n th tur th eof has to the comprehens of our narrow cap cit es For hilst m n talk d disput f fin t sp ce d ti n, as f th y had as compl t d pos t d as f them th y ha e f th mes th y use f them, as th y ha e f a yard a hour any th d t rminat qu tity t is no d f th incomp eh ns bl tur f the th th y discou se f ason bo t l ds th m t perpl xities d contr d cti ns, and th ir minds be ov laid by an object too large and m ghty t be surv yed and man g d by th m.

All the ar mode f d as g t f m ms t and fi t n. If I ha e dwelt p tty l g the cons derati f dur ti sp ce and numbe nd what arises f om th co templ t n of th m —Infinity t is poss bly n mor tha the mat ter quires th e being few imple d as hose *mod* gi e mo is to th thoughts f m n tha those d I p t d t to tr t f them n th ir full l t tud It suffices t my des gn t how how th mi d ec es th m ch as they ar fr m se sati d r fl ti and how n the d w ha f infinity how em t soe t may seem to be f m any bj ct f sens or pe tion f our mind has, neverth less, as ll our other id as, its ginal there. Som math matici ns pe haps f advan ed speculati ns may ha e th w ys t introd ce t th ir

from sensation and reflection in the method we have here set down

Chap XVIII *Other Simple Modes*

1 *Other simple modes of simple ideas of sensation* Though I have in the foregoing chapters shown how from simple ideas taken in by sensation the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity which however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible perception yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple ideas received into the mind by the senses and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas —Though I say these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation and suffice to show how the mind comes by them yet I shall for method s sake though briefly give an account of some few more and then proceed to more complex ideas

2 *Simple modes of motion* To slide roll tumble walk creep run dance leap skip and abundance of others that might be named are words which are no sooner heard but every one who understands English has presently in his mind distinct ideas which are all but the different modifications of motion Modes of motion answer those of extension swift and slow are two different ideas of motion the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion

3 *Modes of sounds* The like variety have we in sounds Every articulate word is a different modification of sound by which we see that from the sense of hearing by such modifications the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number Sounds also besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together which make that complex idea called a tune which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds so put together silently in his own fancy

4 *Modes of colours* Those of colours are also very various some we take notice of as the different degrees or as they were termed shades of

as in painting weaving needleworks &c — those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to *mixed modes* as being made up of ideas of divers kinds viz figure and colour such as beauty rainbow &c

5 *Modes of tastes* All compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses But they being such as generally we have no names for are less taken notice of and cannot be set down in writing and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader

6 *Some simple modes have no names* In general it may be observed that those simple modes which are considered but as different *degrees* of the same simple idea though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas yet have ordinarily no distinct names nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas where the difference is but very small between them Whether men have neglected these modes and given no names to them as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them or because when they were so distinguished that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use I leave it to the thoughts of others It is sufficient to my purpose to show that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection and that when the mind has them it can variously repeat and compound them and so make new complex ideas But though white red or sweet &c have not been modified or made into complex ideas by several combinations so as to be named and thereby ranked into species yet some others of the simple ideas viz those of unity duration and motion &c above instanced in as also power and thinking have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas with names belonging to them

7 *Why some modes have and others have not names* The reason whereof I suppose has been this — That the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another the knowledge of men and their actions and the signifying of them to one another was most necessary and therefore they made ideas of *actions* very nicely modified and gave those complex ideas names that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in without long ambages and circumlocutions and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about might be the easier and quicker understood That this is so and that men in framing different complex ideas and giving them names have been much governed by the end of speech in general (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another) is evident in the names which

in their direction or discourses bout them. Which ideas are not gene ally framed in the m ds f men not conversant bout these perations. And th ce the words that stand f them, by the gr test part f me f the sam lan u ge are t d rstood v g *coltsh drill filt t on o- kobat n*, are words stand g f r ce tain complex d s which being eld m the minds of any but those few whose particular empl yme ts d at every turn sugge t them to th ir thou hts, those names of th m are t generally unde stood but by smiths nd chymists who ha n framed the complex ideas which these words tand for and having gi en names to th m, or rece ed them from thers, upon h aring f these names in communicati n, dily co ce e those d as in th ir minds —as by *cohob* all the simpl deas of distilling and th pouring the liquor distilled from anything back pon the re maining matter and distilling t gain. Thus we see that there are great ari ties f simpl deas, as of tastes and smells, wh ch ha e n names nd f modes many m wh ch ther n t ha ing been ge erally en gh bserved else n t being f y gre t us t be tak n tice f in th affairs and co rs f m th y have n t had names gi en t th m a d pass n t for pecies. This we shall h occasi h reafter t consider more at large, when w me to speak f ords

Chap XIX. Of the Mod s of Think g

1 *Sensation emem b anc ontempl ti Etc mode f think g* Wh th mind turns ts view in ards pon tself d co t mpl tes ts wn ctions, *thinking* is th first that occurs In t th mind bserves gre t vari ty f modificati ns, and f m th ce ece es distinct d as. Thus the pe ception or thought wh ch ctually com p es, nd is nnexed t any impr ss th body mad by exte al bject, be g dis- tinct f m all th modifications f thinking furnishes th mind w th distn t d which e call *sensation* —whi h is, as it w e, th tual trance f any d t th und rstand g by th senses. Th sam d a, when t gain ecurs w thout th pe tio f th lik bject on th *ternal* sensory is *remem ance* if t be sou ht after by the mind d w th pain and n d ou fou d and brought gai in ew t is *ecollection* if t be held th l g und tt u e consider it t is *contemplation* wh n d as floa in our mind, w thout any eflection or re taken n t ce of and as it were regis e ed in the mem ry t is *attention* wh n the mind w th great arnestness, d of ch ce fixes its ew on y

w thout d ming is rest from all these d *dreaming* tself is th ha ing f d as (whil t th

s ts known occas on nor unde any ch ce or cond t f the u derstanding t all and wh th r that which we call *extasy* be not dr am ing w th the yes open I l a to be examined.

2 *Other modes f think g* These ar some fe instances f those arious modes f thinking which the mi d may bserve n itself and so ha e as distinct d as f as it hath f white nd red a square or a circl I d not pretend t enumerate th m all nor to tr t t Large of this set f deas which are got from refle ti n that would be t mak olum It suffices to my present purpose to ha e hown he e by some few examples, f what sort these d as ar and how th mi d comes by th m especially ince I shall have occas n her aft r t tr t more at large f *easoning judgi g vol t n*, and *knowl d* which ar som f th most cons der ble per ations f th mind and modes of thinking

3 *The arious d gr s f ttention th nki* But perh ps t may t be an u pard nabl d gres sio or wh lly impe tin nt to our p esent d sign, if we flect h re upon th different tat of the mind in thinking which those instan es of att ntion, eve e, d dre ming &c. before m tioned naturally ough suggest. Th t the e are d as, som or ther al ays present in the mind f waki g man ev ry n s expe ce co inces him th gh th mind mpl ys its lf bout them w th sev al d grees f att ti Som times th mind fi es tself w th so mu h arnestness on th to t mplati f som bjects that t turns th ir d as n all des marks th ir relat ns and circumsta ces and view every part so nicely and with such t nti that t huts

See Bk. III
I Bk. III ch. vi.
Cf. h. i. § 3.

sible perceptions at other times it barely observes *the train of ideas that succeed in the understand ing* without directing and pursuing any of them and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded as *faint shadows that make no im pression*

4 *Hence it is probable that thinking is the action not the essence of the soul* This difference of inten tion and remission of the mind in thinking with a great variety of degrees betw n and very near I think has e little further a u you find the mind in sleep re tired as it were from the senses and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense which at other times produce v d

(ut seeing the lightning or feeling the shaking of the house which are sensible enough to those who are waking But in this retirement of the mind from the senses it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking which we call dreaming And last of all sound sleep closes the scene quite and puts an end to all appearances This I think almost every one has experience of n h

t s that since the mind can sen sibly put on at several times several degrees of thinking and be sometimes even in a waking man so remiss as to have thoughts dim and ob scure to that degree that they are very little re moved from none at all and at last in the dark retirements of sound sleep loses the sight per fectly of all ideas whatsoever since I say this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant ex perience I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul? Since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission but the es sences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation But this by the by

Chap XX *Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain*

1 *Pleasure and pai simple ideas* Amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensa tion and reflection *p in* and *pleasure* are two ery considerable ones[1] For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself or accompanied with pain or pleasure so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain delight or trouble call it how you please These like other simple ideas, cannot be described nor their names defined the way of knowing them is as of the simple ideas *of the senses only by experience* For to define them by the presence of good or evil is no other wise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds as they are differently applied to or considered by us

Good and evil what Things then are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain That we call *good* which is apt to cause or increase pleasure or diminish pain in us or else to pro cure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil And on the con trary we name that *evil which is apt to produce* or increase any pain or diminish any pleasure in us or else to procure us any evil or deprive us of any good By pleasure and pain I must be understood to mean of body or mind as they are commonly distinguished though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mi d sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body sometimes by thoughts of the mind

3 *Our passions moved by good and evil* Pleasure and pain and that which causes them —good and evil are the hinges on which our passions turn And if we reflect on ourselves and observe how these und v

they produce in us we may thence form to our selves the ideas of our passions

4. *Love* Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present *or absent thing is apt to produce in him* has the idea we call *love* For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them or in spring when there are none that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes del ghts him let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the del ght of their taste and he then can be said to love grapes no longer

5 *H tred* On the contrary the thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us is what we call *hat ed* Were it my business here to inquire any further than into the bare ideas of our passions as they depend on different modif cations of pleasure and p n I should r m k h

t e i use and appl cat on any way to our senses though with the r destruct on But hatred or love

[1] Cf h i §§ 10–19.
[2] Cf ch vii §§ 1–6

to beings capabl of happiness or misery is often the uneasiness or d light which we find in our selves, arising from consideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man children or friends, producing con stant d light in him, he is said constantly to love them. Bu t suffices to note, that our deas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in gener al, however caused in us.

6. *Desire* The uneasiness a man finds in him self upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight w th t, is that we call *desire* which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is mor or less vehement. Where, by the by it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action is *uneasiness* For whatsoever good is proposed, if ts absence carries no displeasure or pain w th it, if man be easy and content without t, there is no desire of it, nor endea vour after t; there is n more but a bare velleity the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so littl uneasiness in the absence of anything that t carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts further were t seasonab. in this place.

7 *Joy* is d light of the mind, from the consideration f the present or assured pproachin possession of a good and we are then possessed of a good, when we ha t so in our power that we can use when we pl ase. Thus a man almost starved has joy t th arri al f relief even before he has the pl asure of using t and father in whom the very well being of his children causes delight, is alwa s, as long as his chil dren are in such state, in the possess f that good for he needs but to reflect on t, to have tha p easure.

8. *Sorrow* is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thou ht f good lost, which might ha been enjoyed longer or the sense f present evil.

9. *H* is tha pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself upon th thou ht of a probab. f ture enjoyment of thing which is pt to d light him.

10. *F ar* is an uneasiness f the mind, upon the though of futur evil lik ly to befal us.

Cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* Bk. i.

11 *Despair* is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men s minds, sometimes producin uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and ind lency

1 *Anger* is uneasiness or discomposure of th mind, upon the receipt of any injury w th a present purpose of revenge.

13. *Envy* is an uneasiness of the mind caused by the consideration of good we desire obtained by one we think should not ha e had it before us.

4. *What passions all men have* These two last, *envy* and *anger* not bein caused by pain and pleasure simply in themsel es, but having in them some mixed considerations of oursel es and others, are n t therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts, of aluing their mer ts, or intending revenge, is wantin in them. But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure are I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice and hope, only in respect of pleasure we hate, fear and grieve *only in espect f pain ultimately* In fine all these passions are moved by things, only as they ppear t be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have p easure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (t least, if a sensibl or ol untary agent) which has produced pain in us because the fear t lea es is constant pain but w d not so constantly lo e what has done us good because p easure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to ha e hope t will do so again. B t this by the by

15. *Pleasure and pain, what* By pleasure and

16 *Removal or lessening of either* It is further to be considered, that, in reference to the passions, *the removal or lessening of a pain is considered*, and operates, as a p easure and th loss or di minishing of pl asure, as pain.

Shame The pass ons too ha most f them, in most persons, operations on the bod and cause various changes in t which not bei g al wa sens b d not mak necessary part f the idea f ch passion. For *shame* which is an uneasiness f the mind pon th thought f ha ing d ne somethin which is indecent, or will lessen the alued esteem which thers ha e for us, has not always blushing ccompan in t.

18 *These instances to show how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection* I would not be mistaken here as if I meant this as a Dis course of the Passions they are many more than those I have here named and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse I have only mentioned these here as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more simple than these as the pain of hunger and thirst and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them the pain of teeth set on edge the pleasure of music pain from captious uninstructive wrangling and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend or of well-directed study in the search and dis covery of truth But the pass ons being of much more concernment to us I rather made choice to instance in them and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or re flection

Chap XXI *Of Power*

1 *This idea how got* The mind being every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be and another begins to exist which was not before reflecting also on what passes within tself and observing a constant change of its ideas sometimes by the impress on of out ward objects on the senses and sometimes by the determination of its own cho ce and con clud ng from what it has so constantly observed to have been that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents and by the like ways —considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed and in another the possibility of making that change and so comes by that idea wh ch we call *power* Thus we say Fire has a power to melt gold i e to destroy the cons st ency of its insens ble parts and consequently its hardness and make it fluid and gold has a power to be melted that the sun has a power to blanch wax and wax a power to be blanched by the sun whereby the yellowness s destroyed and white ness made to exist in its room In which and the like cases the power we cons der s in reference to the change of perceivable ideas For we can not observe any alterat on to be made in or op eration upon anything but by the observable change of its sensible ideas nor conceive any al teration to be made but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas

2 *Power active and passive* Power thus cons d ered is two fold viz as able to make or able to receive any change The one may be called *ac tive* and the other *passive* power Whether mat ter be not wholly destitute of active power [1] as its author God is truly above all passive pow er and whether the intermediate state of cre ated spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power may be worth consideration I shall not now enter into that inquiry my present business being not to search into the original of power but how we come by the *idea* of it [2] But since active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural sub- stances (as we shall see hereafter)[4] and I men tion them as such according to common appre hension yet they being not perhaps so truly *active* powers as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them I judge it not amiss by this in timation to direct our minds to the considera tion of God and spirits for the clearest idea of *active* power

3 *Power includes relation* I confess power in cludes in it some kind of *relation* (a relation to action or change) as indeed which of our ideas of what kind soever when attentively consid ered does not? For our ideas of extension dur ation and number do they not all conta n in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more vis bly And sensible qual ties as colours and smells &c what are they but the powers of different bod es in relat on to our perception &c ? And if cons dered in the things themsel es do they not depend on the bulk figure te ture and mot on of the parts?[5] All wh ch include some kind of relation in them Our idea therefore of power I think may well ha e a place amongst other *simple ideas* and be cons dered as one of them be ng one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances as we shall hereafter have occasion to obser e [6]

4 *The clearest idea of act e p wer had f om sp it* We a e abundantly furnished with the idea of *pass ve* powe by almost all sorts of sensible th ngs In most of them we cannot avoid observing their

Cf ch v §8 h x vi §1 Hum *Enq y* ect. vu p 472 fn 1 bel w ch. xi § 11 ch. x u

Cf Bk II ch xu § 8 Chh xxi xxvi §2 Bk IV chh ix x x lso Aristotl *M t phy ic* Bk

H me *T t* Bk I pt ect Bk. II h xxi §§ 7–11 also ch vul §§ 3–26

Ch §§ o 13 14.

Cl xxiu §8

sens ble qual ties, nay th ir ery substances, to be in contu ual flux. And ther for w th re so look th m as liable t ll t the same change. Nor ha we of *active* powe (which is th more p oper s gnificatio f th word po er) few instances. Since whatever cha g is b- served th mind must collect power somewh e b. to mak that change as well as poss bility th thing itself t ce e t. B t yet if we will cons d t tte ti ly bod es by our sens s, do not afford us so cl ar and distinct an d a f c ti pow as we ha fr m flectu o th operations f our minds. For all powe lating to actio and the e being but two so ts f a ti n hereof we ha e an dea, iz thinking and motion l t us consid wh ce we ha th cl arest id as f th powers which p od ce these ctions. (1) Of thinking body aff d us dea t all t is only from flection that w ha e th t. (2) N th have we fr m body any d f the beginning f moti n. A body at t affords us id f any tive power t move and when it set motio ts lf that m ti is rather pass o than an ti in t. F wh th ball bey th motion f a billiard tick t is ot any action f the ball, but bar pass n Also wh n by impulse t sets an th ball in m ti th t lay in ts w y t nly communicates th m tion t had ece ed from an th and loses in tself so much as th ther rece ed which gives us bu ery bscure d f an *act ve* power f moving in body whilst w bs ve t nly t *tr nsfer* but t *produce* any moti n. F t is but a ry bscur d f pow which ches t th producti f th ti but th ti uation of th pass n. For so is m ti body impelled by an th the tin ti of th alter tion mad in t from est t m ti be g littl mor an action, than th co tinuat on f th al ter ti f ts figur by th sam bl is tion. The id f th *b gi ning* f m t on w have only from reflecti on wh t passes in urselves here we find by xper ce that, barely by ill g t, barely by th ght f th mi d w can move the parts of our bodies, which we be for t est. So that t ms t m we ha from the bservati f th ope ti f bod es by our senses, but ery impe fect bscur d f *active* pow ince they afford us t any d in themsel es f th powe t begi any ction, either mot on thought. B t if f om th m pulse bod es ar bserved to mak pon an other any one thinks he has cl ar d f pow t serves as well t my purpose sensation be ing one of those way wh reby the mi d comes by its ideas only I thought t worth while to cons d her by the way wh ther the mind d th n t rece e ts idea of cti e powe clearer f m reflecti n o ts own perations than t d th fr m a y external s nsation.

5 *W ll and under tand n tw p wers m nd r sp rit* This, t least, I think ev dent,—That w find in ursel s a power to begin or f bear continu or nd several acti s of our minds, and m tions f our bodies, barely by a thought or prefere ce f the mi d order g r as it we commanding the d or not d g such such particular acti This power which the mi d has thus t orde th co s derati n f any id a, or th forbearing t co d it or to p fer the moti f any part f th body to its rest and n *er d* in any part cular nstanc is that which we call the *Will* Th tual ex cise of that pow by directi g any part cular cti ts f bearance is that which call *vol t on* or *will* The f bear ce f that a tio co sequ nt t such ord or comma d of the mind is called *voluntary* And whatsoever actio is pe formed thout such a th ht f th m d is called *involuntary* Th pow of percepti n is that which w call th *Under tand n* P cepti which w make th act f the u d rstand ing is of three sorts — Th pe ceptio f d as in our minds 2 The pe cepti f th gnifica ti n f gns. 3 Th percepti f the co exion or repugn cy agreeme t o disagreem t, th t there is between any f ur d as All these are attr buted to th u derstand g pe cepti e power though it be th two latter nly th t use allow us to say we u d tand

6 *Facult es not al being* These po ers of th — be so as t t breed any o fus n m thoughts, by bein supposed (as I suspect t has be) to ta d f som al beings n th soul that pe f rmed those acti ns f und rstand and voliti F when w say th *will* is th co manding and supe or f culty f th soul th t t is is t fr that t d t rmines th inf f culties that t f llows th d tates f th un d rstand g &c. —th gh these and th l ke press ons, by those that carefully tend t th own d as, and co d ct th ir tho ghts m by th ev d ce f things than th sou d f w d may be d rstood in cl ar and distin t sense —yet I suspect, I say that this way f pe ki g f *facult* has misled many int a confused no-

Cf. ch. vi. § 2.

tion of so many distinct agents in us which had their several provinces and authorities and did command obey and perform several actions as so many distinct beings which has been no small occasion of wrangling obscurity and uncertainty in questions relating to them

7 *Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity* Every one I think finds in *himself* a power to begin or forbear continue or put an end to several actions in himself From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man which everyone finds in himself arise the *ideas* of *liberty* and *necessity*

8 *Liberty what* All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves as has been said to these two viz thinking and motion so far as a man has power to think or not to think to move or not to move according to the preference or direction of his own mind so far is a man *free* Wherever any performance or forbe

mind directing it there he is not free though perhaps the action may be voluntary So that the idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular act on

or

is

is power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition there he is not at liberty that agent is under *necessity* So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought no vol tion no will but there may be thought there may be will there may be volit on where there is no liberty A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear

9 *Supposes understandin nd will* A tennis ball whether in motion by the stroke of a racket or lying still at rest is not by any one taken to be a free agent If we inqu re into the reason we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis ball to think and consequently not to have any volit on or *pr ference* of motion to rest or *v e versâ* and therefore has not liberty is not a free agent but all its both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary and are so called Likewise a man falling into the water (a b idge breaking under him) has not herein liberty is not a free agent. For though he has ol tion though he prefers his not falling to falling yet the forbearance of that motion not be

c u by

Cf Locke s l tter to Molyneux 20 J n 1693

ily every one pities him as acting by necessity and constraint

10 *Belongs not to volition* Again suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room wh

lay to going away I ask is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it and yet being locked fast in it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay he has not freedom to be gone So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do according as the mind shall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power and no farther For wherever restraint comes to check that power or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability to act or to forbear acting there liberty and our notion of it presently ceases

11 *Volunta y opposed to involu tary not to necessary* We have instances enough and often more than enough in our own bodies A man s heart beats and the blood circulates which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop and therefore in respect of these mot ons where rest depends not on his choice nor would follo the determination of his mind if it should prefer it he is not a free agent Convulsive motions agitate his legs so that though he wills it ever so much he cannot by any power of his mind stop their mot on (as in that odd d sease called *chorea sanct iti*) but he is perpetually dancing he is not at l

s ue a palsy or the stocks hinder h s legs from obeying the determinat on of his mind if it ould thereby transfer his body to another place In all these there is want of freedom though the sitting still even of a paralytic wh lst he prefers it to a removal is truly voluntary Voluntary then is not opposed to necessary but to involuntary For a man may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do the state he is in to its absence or change though necessity has made it in itself unalterable

1 *Liberty what* As it is in the motions of the body so it is in the thoughts of our minds where any one is such that e have power to take it up or lay it by according to the preference of

choice and then h is in espec ... s m ch at liberty as h is espect f bodies he rests on h can at pleasur rem himself from one t an th B t yet som deas to th mind hk some m u nst th body ar such as in cer tain circumstances t cann t d nor btain their abse ce by the utmost ffort t can use A man th r ck is n t t liberty t l y by the

bod es, w th ut le ing us th liber y in th things which w would ther choose. B t as soo as the mind gains the pow *t stop or co tin begin* f bear any f these mot ns f th body w thout or thoughts *thin*, ccording as t thinks fit to pr fer ther to th ther w th cons der th man as a *fr e gent* gain

Ther thou ht is wh l

ltion, wh th beginni g co tinu tion of a y tion is co trary to that p f ce f his mind is called compuls wh n th hindering or stopping any ctı is co trary to his li u t is called restraint. Age ts that ha n thought, ol tio t all, ar in everything *nec ssary gent*

4. *Liberty b l g t to the will* If this be so, (as I imagin t is,) I l ve t t be cons dered

tr bute or modification of the will, which is lso but po er

15. *V l t n.* Such is the difficulty f explain ing and gi ing clear notions of internal actions by sounds, that I must he e warn my reader that *orderi g di ecti g hoosing pr ferring* &c. which I ha made use f will n t distinctly e ough express l tion unless he will reflect on what h himself does when he wills. For exam pl preferring which seems perhaps best to ex press th act f ltı does it n t precisely Fo tho gh a man would p ef r flying to walk ing yet wh can say h e er *wills* t. Vol ti n it is plain is an ct f th mind knowingly exert ing that d mini t takes ts lf to ha e over any

or w th

to th p oducing co ti uing or stopping an y ctı as far as t d pends on us Fo can t be den ed that whate ge t has a powe to th nk on ts wn tions, and t p fer their doing

to d o f bear d ing y particular a ti ac cordin as ts do r forbear ce has the ctual pref ence in th mind which is th sam thing as t say cco din as he himself wills t.

16 *Po er b longs t gents* It is plain th th t th will is thin b t o po e or bility and *f d m* an th powe bility so that, to ask, wh th th will has freed m, is to ask wh th pow has an ther power bility an the bility a q estı at first ght too grossly bsurd t make a disp te o n ed an answe Fo wh is t th t sees n t th t pow ers bel g nly t g ts d ar ttr butes n ly f substa ces and n t f powers th ms l es So that this w y f putting th questi n (viz wheth the will be free) is in ffect t ask, whe ther th will be a substance an ge t, or t least

be g as l til ppl cabl t th will as sw ftness of motion is t leep or squar ness to irtu E ery would la gh at th bsurdity f such q estion as th f these because t is bv ous that the mod fications f mou n bel g t to cep nor the d ffer ce f figur t virtu and when well cons d rs t, I think h will as plai ly perce e that liberty which is but pow er belo gs nly to *gents* and cannot be an t

to prod ce forbear prod cing m tion in parts f his body by cho ce or pr fer ce which is that which d n min tes him free and is freed m tself B t if any ne should ask, whether fre d m were free, he would be suspected n t to u derstand w ll what h said and h would be thought to deserve Midas ars wh know that rich was de minati n f the possessi

of riches should demand whether riches them selves were rich

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e – r ... the will and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation that disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet the will in truth signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is barely as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a

will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking

18 *This way of talking causes confusion of thought* This way of talking nevertheless has prevailed and as I guess produced great confusion For these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions he exerts them as he thinks fit but the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing or the power of singing on the power of dancing as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive And yet this is it which we say when we thus speak that the will operates on the understanding or the understanding on the will

19 *Powers are relations not agents* I grant that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition or exercising the power a man has to choose or the actual choice of the mind the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing as the actual singing of such a tune may be the cause of dancing such a dance and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune But in all these it is not one *power* that operates on another but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers it is the man that does the action it is the agent that has power or is able to do For powers are relations not agents and that which has the power or not the power to operate is that alone which is or is not free and not the power itself For freedom or not freedom can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act

20 *Liberty b lo* ...

introducing into discourses concerning the mind

and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physic Not that I deny there are faculties both in the body and mind they both of them have their powers of operating else neither the one nor the other could operate For nothing can operate that is not able to operate and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate Nor do I deny that those words and the like are to have their place in the common

not a gaudy dress yet when it appears in public must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents For it being asked what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say that it was the *digestive faculty* What was it that made anything come out of the body? the *expulsive faculty* What moved? the *motive faculty* And

short to say that the ability to digest digested and the ability to move moved and the ability to understand understood For faculty ability and power I think are but different names of the same things which ways of speaking when put into more intelligible words will I think

ing by something bl t und rstand And in truth, t would be very strange if t sh uld be therwise as trange as t would be f r man to be free w thout being bl t be f

1 *But to t e ent or ma* To r turn then to th quiry bout liberty I think th questi n is t prope *hether the ill b f* but *whether an b f* Thu I think,

First, That so far as any one can by th direc on or ch ce f his mind pref rring th exist erce f any action t th n-exist ce f that ct and *n est mak t* xist o t ex st, so far *he* is free F if I ca by thought d recti g th mo f my fin er mak t m e he t was t est or *n ter d* t dent, that respect f that I am free d if I ca by lik thou ht of my min d pref rring t th ther prod ce th wo ds or il ce I m t liberty *peak or h ld my pea nd as far as this* pow re ches, f u n t ting by th d t rminati of his own th ght pr ferring ther so far is man f ee Fo h w can think any on f ee than t ha th pow t d what h ill And so far as any can by p ef rring an to is t being est t y act n, prod ce that t rest so far ca h d what he il. For such preferring f ct n to ts b- sence is th willi f t and we can scar t ll how t imagin any bein free than t be bl to d hat h wills So that espect f tions tain the ch f such power him, man seems as free as t is poss bl f freed m to mak him.

I fect f l g man not f But th inq mind f man will to sh ft ff f m himself as f h ca all thoughts f gu lt, hou h be by pu un *himself* orse tat han that ff tal ecess ty is t co t t th this freed m, *unless* t re ches f rther than this, ul serve th tur and t passe for good p a, tha ma is not f ee t ll f h be not *f to il as h is to act what he ll* Co ce g man l be ty th ret th for ised thus far h q estu n, *Wh ther m b f t ll?* Which I think is wh t is m ant whe is dis- p d hether th will be fr And as t that I ma ne

3 *H w man annot b f t u ll* Seco dly Tha ll g ol be g an t and t erdom cons ti g po f ct g t act g ma in espec f w ll g th et f ction wh y his pow is ce proposed to his thou hts as prese tl t be d ca not be free Th aso wh f is ery ma *ifest* For t be g na od bl that th u

CL W James *P ycho gy* p 8

d pe d g on his will should exist or not exist, d ts xi t ce n t exi tence f llowing pe fectly th determin t n d prefere ce of his ill he can ot a o d w ll g th existence or n -existe ce f that a ti t is abs l t ly n essary that h w ll th e r th the i pre- f th e t th th since of th m must necessarily f ll w and that which does f llow follows by th ch ce and d termination of his f h d d t

liberty consisting in pow t act or not a t which, in regard f ol t n, a man upon ch p posal has t. F r t u o d bly eces- sary t p f th d in or forbeara c f an ac ti in man s powe which is ce so p posed t *his th his man must necessarily will th e th ther of them pon which prefe nce* o ol t o th acti r is f bear ce cer tainl f llows nd is truly oluntary B t th et of l u pref rring f th two be g that hich h cann t o d a man in respect of that a t f willi is u d a ess ty and cann t be f ee unless ecess ty and freed m ca consist t g th and man can be f and bound t ce Bes des t mak man f ee afte this manner by making th eti n of willing t d pe d o his will, th must be anoth te ced t w ll t d t mi e th cts f this w ll and an ther t d t rmine that and so *in* *ton* f wherev t ps, the tions of the

such.

4. *Liberty f edom t cut what u ll d* This th n is ev dent Th t *man t l berty t ill or not t u ll anyth n f p er that f or ons der f* l berty consisting pov to ct t forbear ti g and that ly F ma that is till is sa d y t t be t l be ty be cause h can walk f h wills t. A ma that walks is a libe ty lso because h walks m es but beca se he can ta d till f h ills t. B t f man tti g till has n t pow t mo himself h is n t t l berty so likewise man falling down a p cip ce th h in moti n is

of riches should demand whether riches them selves were rich

17 *How the will instead of the man is called free* However the name *faculty* which men have giv en to this power called the will and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation that disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet the will in truth signifies noth ing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is barely as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as dis tinct beings that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty and a dancing faculty by which these actions are produced which are but sev eral modes of motion as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are pro duced which are but several modes of thinking And we may as properly say that it is the sing ing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understand ing conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as prop er and intelligible to say that the power of speak

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formed by something that is able to digest mo tion by something able to move and understand

me by something ble to understand. And, in ... would be very strange if it should be ... otherwise as strange as it would be for man to be free w thor ben ... be to be free

But to the event, or ... To return, then to the inquiry bo t Liberty I think the question is not proper ... *be free* but ... *be free* Thus, I think,

First, That so far as any one can, by the direc tion or choice of his mind, pre erri ... the exist ence I a ... ction t the non-exis nce of that action, and vice versa, make it t exist or not x ... so far he is free For if I can, by thought di- recting the motion of my finger mak ... move ... ben t was t rest or vice versa, t is evident, that in respect of that I am free and if I can, by like thought of m mind, preferring one to the other produce either words or silence I am t Liberty to speak or hold m pe ce and as far as this power reaches, of cting or not actin by the determination of his own though preferring i- ther so f ... is man free For how can we think a ... one freer than to have the power to d what ... And so far as a ... one can, by preferring any action to its no ben ... or rest t ... ction, produce th action or rest, so far can he d what he will. For such pre erring of ction to its b- sence is the willi ... f t and we can scarce ll how to imagine an bein freer tha ... be bl to d what he wills. So that in respect of ctions within the reach f such power in him man seems as free as is possible for freedom to mak him.

... for B ... he ... than that of fatal necessity is not con ... with this freedom, unless it reaches further than this, ... ll not serve the turn and ... passes for good ... he not

(

Which I think is what is meant, when is dis- cussed whether the will be free And as to that I imagine

3. How ... man cannot ... free to will. Secondl That willing or volition, bein an ction, and freedom consisting in power of acting, or not acting man in respect f willing or the ct of volition, wh n any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as present to be done cannot be free The reason whereof is very man- ... For ... being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist and its existence or not existence f llows pe fectly the determinatio and preference of his will he cannot ... oid willing the existence or non-existence f that ction t is abso ly nec essary that he will the one ... the other i.e. pre- fer the one t the other s nce one of them mus necessaril follow and that wh ch does f llow follow by the choice and determinat on of his mind that is, by his willing t for f he did not will t, t would not be So that, in respect f the act f willing a man ... such a case is not free liberty consisting in a power to ct or not ... ct ... non ... upon such a

of volition, or pre erring one of the two, being that which he cannot a oid, a man, in respect of that act of willing, is under necessity and so cannot be free unless necessity and freedom can consist together and man can be free and bound t once Besides t mak a man free af er this manner by making the ction of willi ... to depend on his will, there must be another ant cedent will, to d ermine the cts of this will and another to determine that, and so in infini tum for wherever one ... ops, the actions of the last will canno be free Nor is a ... bein as far I can comprehend beings bove me capabl of such freed m of will, that t can forbear to will, ... t prefer the being or not bein of anything in ts power which t has once considered as such.

4. Liberty is freedom to execute what is willed. This, then, is evident, Tha ... *is not at liberty to will, or not to will, anything in his power that he once considers of.* Libert consisting in power t act or forbear cting and in tha only For a man that sits still is said yet to be t Liberty be cause he can walk if he wills t. A man that walks is at liberty also not because he walks or moves but because he can stand still if he wills t. But if man sitting still has not power to remov himself, he is not t Liberty so likewise man falling down precipice though in motion, is not t Liberty because he cannot stop that mo- tion if he would. This bein so, t is plain that man that is walking, t whom t is proposed to give off walk ... is not t Liberty whether he will d ermine himself t walk, or give off walk ing or not. he must necessaril prefer one or the

Cf. W. James *Psychology* p. 8

of riches should demand whether riches themselves were rich

17 *How the will instead of the man is called free* However the name *faculty* which men have given to this power called the will and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation that disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet the will in truth signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is barely as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty and a dancing faculty by which these actions are produced which are but several modes of motion as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking

18 *This way of talking causes confusion of thought* This way of talking nevertheless has prevailed and as I guess produced great confusion For these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions he exerts them as he thinks fit but the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing or the power of singing on the power of dancing as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive And yet this is it which we say when we thus speak that the will operates on the understanding or the understanding on the will

19 *Powers are relations not agents* I grant, that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition or exercising the power a man has to choose or the actual choice of the mind the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing as the actual singing of such a tune may be the cause of dancing such a dance and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune But in all these it is not one *power* that operates on another but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers it is the man that does the action it is the agent that has power or is able to do For powers are relations not agents and that which has the power or not the power to operate is that alone which is or is not free and not the power itself For freedom or not freedom can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act.

20 *Liberty belongs not to the will* The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them has given occasion to this way of talking but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind with the name of faculties a notion of *their* operating has I suppose as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physic Not that I deny there are faculties both in the body and mind they both of them have their powers of operating else neither the one nor the other could operate For nothing can operate that is not able to operate and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate Nor do I deny that those words and the like are to have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by and philosophy itself though it likes not a gaudy dress yet when it appears in public must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents For it being asked what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say that it was the *digestive faculty* What was it that made anything come out of the body? the *expulsive faculty* What moved? the *motive faculty* And so in the mind the *intellectual faculty* or the understanding understood and the *elective faculty* or the will willed or commanded This is in short to say that the ability to digest digested and the ability to move moved and the ability to understand understood For faculty ability and power I think are but different names of the same things which ways of speaking when put into more intelligible words will I think amount to thus much —That digestion is performed by something that is able to digest motion by something able to move and understand

us non th change f state or pon an cu n, but som uneasiness. This is the gre t ive that works on th mind t p t t po c , which for shortness sak we will call de-ining f the will, which I shall more at large plain.

Will and desire must t b confoun d B t wa to t, t will be necessary t premis that, ugh I ha e bove endea oured t press th of olition, by choosing preferring, and th lik es, that s gnif desire as ll as olition for nt of ther words to mark that act of the mind ose proper nam is will g or vol t on yet t ng ery simp ct, whosoever desires to lerstand what t is, will better find t by on his own mind, and observing what t when t wills, than by any ari ty of artic te sounds whatsoever This cauti of being eful not to be misled by express ons that d enough keep up the difference between the and several cts of th mind that are quite inct from t, I think th more ecessary be-se I find the will ften confounded w th sev of the affections, especially d s and one for the other and that by men who would willingl be thought n t to ha e had ery act notions f things, and not to ha e writ clearly bout them. This, I imagine has no small occas on f bscurity and mistak is matter and therefore is, as much as may to be avoided. For h that shall turn his ights inwards upon what passes his mi d n h wills, shall see that the will or powe of ion is conversant bout nothing but our own ur terminates ther and reaches fur and that olition is nothing but that par ar determination f th mind whereby ly by thought, the mind end a ours t

he apprehends that th removal of the pai may transl te the noxious humour to more tal part his will is never determi ed to any one a tion that may serve to remove this pain. Whence t is evide t that desiring and willing are two distinct acts f the mind and consequently that th will which is but th powe of olition, is m ch more distinct f om desire.

31 U an e determ e t e will To return, th n, to the inquiry what is t that d t rmi es the w ll in regard to our acti ns And that, upo second thoughts, I am apt t imagin is not, as is ge erally supposed the greater good in iew but some (and for th most part th most pressing) uneasi e a man is t present under This is that which successi el d termines the will, and sets us upo those cti ns we perform. This uneasi ness we may call, as t is, desir which is an un easiness f the mind for want of some absent good

the want of an abse t good reference t any pain f lt, ase is that abse t good nd till that

there is another f bsent positi e good and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As m ch as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. B t h re all bse t good does not, ccording t the gre tness t has, or is a

su so m ch th is f uneasiness.

32 Desire is uneasiness That desire is a state f uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is th that has not f lt in d ire what the wise man says f hope, (which is not m ch different from t) that t being d ferred makes th heart sick' and that still pro-portionabl to the gre tness of th desir which sometimes raises th uneasiness to that p tch, that t makes peopl cry out, G e me children, gi e me the thin desired or I die." Lif tself

my des d ther and that contr m wh by no- finds a doziness h stomach h pain of p n, hilst

Cf. ch. xx. § also the letter Molyneux, 5 Jul 693.

Cf. Montaigne, Essay Bk. II. xii. p. 35.

Cf. §§ 48-53.

other of them walking or not walking And so it is in regard of all other actions *in our power* so proposed which are the far greater number For considering the vast number of voluntary act ons that succeed one another every moment *that we are awake in the course of our lives* there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will till the time they are to be done and in all such actions as I have shown the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act or not to act wherein consists liberty The mind in that case has not a power to forbear *willi* it cannot avoid some determination con cerning them let the consideration be as short the thought as quick as it will it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking or changes it continues the action, or puts an end to it Whereby it is manifest that it orders and directs one in preference to or with neglect of th other and thereby either the continuation or change becomes *unavoidably* voluntary

25 *The will determined by something without it* Since then it is plain that in most cases a man is not at liberty whether he will no (for when an action in his power is proposed to his thoughts he c ot forbear [illegible] one way or the other)

membered That freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of an action upon our *volition* of it and not in the dependence of any action or its contrary on our *preference* A man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea not because he has a power to do the contrary action which is to leap twenty yards upwards for that he cannot do but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap But if a greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down he is no longer free in that case because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power he that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square being at the north side of his chamber is at liberty to walk twenty feet south ward, because he can walk or not walk it but is not, at the same time at liberty *to do the contrary* i.e. to walk twenty feet northward

In this then consists *freedom* viz. in our being able to act or not to act according as we shall choose or will

28 *What volition and action mean* Secondly must remember that *volition* or *will* is an act of the mind directing its thought to the produc[tion]

might th r hy s ff [illegible]

speaking or silence which he pleases is to ask whether a man can will what he wills or be pleased *with what he is pleased with?* A question which I think needs no ans er and they who can make a quest on of it must suppose one will

fi ed To avoid these and the like absurdit es

t o were we fixed in our understand ngs and carried along with us in our m nds as they ought, through all the quest ons that are raised about them I suppose a great pa t of the d fficulties that perplex men s thoughts and entangle their understand ngs would be much easier resolved and we should perceive where the confused s g nification of terms or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity

27 *F eedom* First then it is carefully to be re

[1] Cf § 23

I wou [illegible] the[c]hend the forbearance too [illegible] to comprehend asitting still or holding one's peace, tion *proposed* by speaking are proposed that when walking or sp n [illegible] as much the determination of the will and [illegible] he contrary actions in their consequences as [illegible] well enough pa[ss] for may on that consideration [illegible] may not be [illegible] actions too but this I say that [illegible] peak thus taken if (for brevity s sake) I sp[eak] [illegible]

29 *Wh t d term es the will* Th[e] [illegible] ind to d rect being nothing but a po er in the m[ind] [illegible] the operati e facult es of a man to mo[tion] [illegible] as far as they depend on such direc[tion] [illegible] question What is it determines the [will] [illegible] and proper ans er is The mind For [illegible] determines the ge eral po er of d rect [illegible] but [illegible] or that particular direct on is nothin[g] [illegible] agent itself e ercising the po er it h t, it is [illegible] ticular way If this ans er sat sf es n[ot] [illegible] *the meaning of the question* What [illegible] the will? is th —What mov[es] [illegible] termine its general ery part cula insta ce to d that part cular mo po er of d rect ng to th[is] [illegible] r —The mot[ive] t on o rest? And to tham t te o action is on for cont nu g in the act on n t the mot[ive] [illegible] ly the present sat s[fact]ne uneas ss nothing set change is al ays so

ing us upon the change of sta or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness' sake we will call determining of the will, which I shall more at large explain.

31. *Will and desire must not be confounded.* But, in the way to it, I will be necessary to premise, that, though I have above endeavoured to express the act of volition, by *choosing, preferring*, and the like terms, that signify desire as well as volition, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind whose proper name is *willing* or *volition*; yet, it being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it

he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

31. *Uneasiness determines the will.* To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view: but some (and for the most part the most pressing) *uneasiness* a man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasi-

will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary, because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially *desire*, and one put for the other; and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing but our own actions; terminates there; and reaches no further; and that volition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind whereby barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to

the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire; nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good; and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire equal to itself: because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is anywhere of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it) though yet, whilst

32. *Desire is uneasiness.* That desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being deferred makes the heart sick; and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, "Give me children," give me the thing desired, or I die." Life itself

Cf. ch. xx. § also the letter to Molyneux, 5 Jul 693.

Cf. Montaigne, *Essays*, Bk. II. xii. p. 235.

Cf. §§ 48–53.

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For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will till the time they are to be done and in all such actions as I have shown the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act or not to act wherein consists liberty The mind in that case has not a power to forbear

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the man in the state he was before thinking or changes it continues the action, or puts an end to it Whereby it is manifest that *it* orders and directs one in preference to or with neglect of the other and thereby either the continuation or change becomes *unavoid bly* voluntary

25 *The will determined by something without it*

might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will For to ask whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence which he pleases is to ask whether a man can will what he wills or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A quest on which I think needs no answ er and they who can make a question of it must suppose one will

fined To avoid these and the l ke absurdities nothing can be of greater use than to establ sh in our m nds determ ned ideas of the things under cons deration If the ideas of liberty and vo

well fixed in our unde standings and with us in our m nds as they ought, e questions that are ra sed about e a great part of the diff cult es n s thoughts and entangle their ould be much easier resolved ceive where the confused sig the nature of the

fully to be re

membered That freedom consists in the depend ence of the existence or not existence of any action upon our *volition* of it and not in the d pendence of any action or its contrary on our *preference* A man standin on a cl ff is at liberty to leap twenty yards downw ards into the sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary ac tion which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do but he is therefore free because he has a power to leap or not to leap B t if a greater force than his either holds him fast,

that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square being at the north side of his chamber is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward because he can walk or not walk it but is not, at the same time at liberty to do the contrary i.e to walk tw enty feet north ard

In this then consists *f eedom* viz. in our being able to act or not to act according as we shall choose or will.

Secon dl we

tion of any action, and thereby exerti ng its po to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, er I d cra e lea e here under the word *action* I w ou tend the forbearance too of any ac

mere forbearances r*l* being as often eighty mination of the will an the contrary act ons in their consequences a ell enough pass for may on that consideration may not be mis actions too but this I say th eak thus taken if (for brevity s sake) rdly the will

9 *Wh t d term es the will* und to direct being nothing but a po er in th t on or rest, the operati e faculties of a man ion to the as far as they depend on such c ll the true quest on What s it determines t hat h ch and proper answ er is The m nd ng to this determ nes the general power of g but the or that pa ticular direction is that par agent tself exe cising the po t it is plain ticular way If this ans er sa t determines

power of dir ct n s I a sw er —The mot e tion or rest? An same state or actio is on for continuing action in it the motive to ly the present ne uneasiness nothing set change is alw

tin... us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness' sake we will call determining of the will, which I shall more at large explain.

30. *Will and desire must not be confounded.* But, in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that, though I have above endeavoured to express the act of volition, by *choosing*, *preferring*, and the like terms, that signify desire as well as volition, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind whose proper name is *willing* or *volition*; yet, it being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary, because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially *desire*, and one put for the other; and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing but our own actions; terminates there; and reaches no further; and that volition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire; which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it) though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

31. *Uneasiness determines the will.* To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view: but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, *desire*; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt; and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire; nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good; and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire equal to itself: because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is anywhere of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

32. *Desire is uneasiness.* That desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being "deferred makes the heart sick"; and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, "Give me children, give me the thing desired, or I die." Life itself

Cf. ch. xx, §; also the letter to Molyneux, 5 July 1693.

Cf. Montaigne, *Essays* Bk. II, xii, p. 255.

Cf. §§ 48–53.

and all its enjoyments is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness

33 *The uneasiness of desire determines the will* Good and evil present and absent it is true work upon the mind But that which *immediately* determines the will from time to time to every voluntary action is the *uneasiness of d sire* fixed on some absent good either negative as indolence to one in pain or positive as enjoyment of pleasure That it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the successive voluntary actions whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends I shall endeavour to show both from experience [1] and the reason of the thing [2]

34 *This is the sprin of action* When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in—which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness—what industry what action what will is there left but to continue in it? Of this every man s observation w ll satisfy him And thus we see our all wise Maker suitably to our constitution and frame and kno in what it is that determines the will has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst and other natural desires that return at their seasons to move and determine their wills for the preservation of themselves and the continuation of their species For I think we may conclude that if the *bare contemplation* of these good ends to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses had been sufficient to determine the will and set us on work we should have had none of these natural pa ns and perhaps in this world l ttle or no pain at all *It is better* to marry than to burn says St Paul where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal l fe A l ttle burning felt pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure

35 *The great st positive good determi es not the will but present u eas ne s lo e* It seems so established and settled a maxim by the general con

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subject I took it for granted and I imag i e t iat, by a great many I shall be thought more excusable for having then done so than tl at now I have ventured to recede from so recei ed an opinion But yet upon a stricter inquiry I am forced to conclude that *good* the *g eater good* though apprehended and acknowledged to be

so does not determine the will until our desire raised *proportionably to it* makes us uneasy in the want of it Convince a man never so much that plenty has its advantages over poverty make him see and own that the handsome conveni

the advantages of virtue that it is as necessary *to a man who has any great aims in this world* or hopes in the next as food to life yet till he hungers or thirsts after righteousness till he *feels an u easiness* in the want of it his *will* will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good but any other uneasiness he feels in himself shall take place and carry his will to other actions On the other side let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes discredit and d seases and the want of *all things even of his beloved drink attends him* in the course he follo s yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions the habitual thirst after his cups at the usual time drives him to the ta ern though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty and perhaps of the joys of another life the least of which is no incons der

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of viewing the greater good for he sees and acknowledges it and in the intervals of his drinking hours will take resolutions to pursue the greater good but when the uneas ness to miss his accustomed del ght returns the great acknowledged good loses its hold and the present uneasiness determ nes the will to the accustomed action wh ch *thereby gets stronger footing* to prevail against the next occasion though he at the same time makes secret promises to h mself that he will do so no more this is the last time he w ll act against the attainment of tl ose greater goods And thus he is from time to t me in the state of that unhappy complainer *I d o me l o p boque d teri a s quor* which sentence al

36 *Because the mo l of uneas ness is th f st step to happi ess* If we inqu re nto the reason of hat experience makes so evid nt in fact and examine why it s *uneasiness alon ope ates on the* will and determi es it in its cho ce e shall find that e being capable but of one determ nat on of the will to o e action at once the pres

[1] §§ 34–35. [2] §§ 36 &c

ent uneasiness that we are und does *naturally* determine the will, in order to that happ ness hich we all aim t in all our ctions. For as much as whilst we ar under any uneasiness, we cannot prehend oursel es happy or in the a to t pain and uneasiness bein by every one concluded and f lt to be inconsis t w th happiness, spoiling the relish even of those good things which we ha e a littl pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And there fore, that which f course d termines the choice of our will to the next action will alwa s be— the removing f pain, as lo as we ha e any left, as t first and ecessary st p towards happiness.

37 *Because uneasiness alone is present* Another reason why t is uneasiness alone determines the will, is this because that alon is present and t is against the natur of things, that what is b- sent should operate where t is not. It may be said that bsent good may by contemplation be brought home to the mind and mad present. The idea of t indeed may be in the mind and viewed as present there but nothing will be in the mind as present good, bl to counterbal ance t removal f any uneasiness which we are under til raises our desire and the uneasiness of that has the preval cy in d rmunin the will. Till then, th d a in th mind f what ever is good is ther onl lik ther deas, the bject of bar unactive peculation but oper ates no on th will, nor sets us on work the son hereof I shall show by and by How many are to be found that ha e had li ely representa tions set befor their minds f th unspeakabl joy f hea en, which they cknowled both possibl and probabl too wh yet would be content take p w th th ir happiness here And so th prevailing uneasiness of their desires, let loose af er the joyments f this lif take their turns in th d termining their wills and all tha hil they take not p ar not yet moved, towards th good things of another b considered as ever so gre t.

38. *Because all who allow the joy f heaven pos le pursue them* t Wer th will d termined by the ew f good, as t ppears in co tem plation greater or less t th understanding hich is th ta f all bse good and that hich, in the ece ed opini n, th will is supposed to move and to be moved by —I d no see how could ever get loose fr m th in finite eternal joy f h en, ce p posed and considered as poss ble. For all bse t good by uch alo barely proposed, and coming in view th will is thou ht t be determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible, but

keep constantly and ste dily in our course o- wards hea en, w th ut ever sta di g till or directing our actions t a y ther end th eter nal cond ti n of a future state infinitel out w ghing the expectati n of riches, or h nour or an other worldly pleasure which we can propose t oursel es, though we should grant these the more probabl to be obtained for n thing f ture is et in possess n, and so the expectation ev n of these may deceive us. If t were so that the greater good in ew determines the will, so great a good once proposed, could not but seize

the mind fixed to that good.

39. *But any gr at uneasiness is never neglect d* This would be the stat of th mind and regular ten dency f the will in all ts determinations, were t d termined by that wh ch is consid ed and in ew th gre ter good. B t that it is not so, is is bl in experience th infinitely greatest confessed good being often eglected, to satisfy the su cessi e uneasiness f our desires pursuing tri fles. B t, though th gre test allowed, even ever lasting unspeakabl good which has somet mes moved and affected th mind does not tedfast ly h ld the will, yet we see any very great and prevailing uneasiness ha ing once laid h ld the will, let t not go by which we may be co nced, what t is that d termines the will. Thus an ehement pain f th body th ungovern bl passio of man tly in love or the impatient desire f revenge keeps the will teady and in t and the will, thus determined, never l ts th understanding la by th object, but all the thoughts of th mind and pow ers f th body are uninterruptedly employed that way by the d t rminati of the will, influ nced b that topping uneasiness, as long as t lasts wh reby seems to me ev dent, that the will, or power f setting us upon ction in preference to all others, is d ermined in us by uneasiness and whether this be not so I desire every one to b- serve in himself

4 *Desire accompanies all uneasiness* I ha hith erto chi fly instanced in the *uneasiness* f desire as that which d termines th will because that is th chi f and most sensible and the will sel

dom orders any action nor is there any voluntary action performed without some desire accompanying it which I think is the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up or at least accompanies most of the other passions as wholly excluded in the case Aversion fear anger envy shame &c have each their uneasinesses too and thereby influence the will These passions are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone and wholly unmixed with others though usually in discourse and contemplation that carries the name which operates strongest and appears most in the present state of the mind Nay there is I think scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it I am sure wherever there is uneasiness there is desire For we constantly desire happiness and whatever we feel of uneasiness so much it is certain we want of happiness even in our own opinion let our state and condition otherwise be what it will Besides the present moment not being our eternity whatever our enjoyment be we look beyond the present and desire goes with our foresight and that still carries the will with it So *that even in joy itself that which keeps up the* act on *whereon the enjoyment depends is the* des re to continue it and fear to lose it and whenever a greater uneas ness than that takes *place in the mind the will presently is* by that determined to some new action and the present delight neglected

41 *The most p essin unea i ess naturally deter m ies the will* But we be ... with sundry u ... ent desires th ... Wh ch of them has the precedency n determining the will to the next action? and to that the answer is —That ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some act on for some end cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end only to lose its labour for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure they in that case put us not upon endeavours But these set apart, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel is that which ordinarily determines the will successively in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action that is constantly most felt and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action For this we must carry along with us that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else For we producing nothing by our willing it but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates and reaches no further

42 *All d sire happiness* If it be further asked —What it is moves desire? I answer —happiness, and that alone Happiness and m ...

... hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side and torment and sorrow on the other which for shortness sake I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body — With him is fulness of joy and pleasure for evermore Or to speak truly they are all of the mind though some have their rise in the mind from thought others in the body from certain modifications of motion

... are ... mo ... utr ... the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain and so much present pleasure as without which any one cannot be content Now because pleasure and pain are produced in us by th ... tion of ... bo ... ha ... we ... is apt to produce pain in us we call *evil* for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us wherein consists our happiness and misery Further though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure be in itself good and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort because when they come in competition the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference So that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil we shall find it lies much in comparison for the cause of every less degree of pain as well as every greater degree of pleasure has the nature of good and *vi e versâ*

44 *What good is d s d what not* Though th s be that which is called good and evil and all

good be the pr pe bject f d ır gen ral t all good e e seen a d co f ssed to be so ⁓ n rt cular man s ıs art e t d

ın eality or ppearanc ur wh looks n t t t m ke p t f that happiness wh w th h his p ese t thoughts ⁓ s t f himself H pp ess, u d thus w h t ed e

pass by and be u no-body I think, so sensel ss as to de y th t th r ıs pl asur in knowledg and fo the ple sures of sense, th y h too many foll w r t let t be questı ed wh th men a taken w th th m or N w l t ma place his sat f ct o n —

The eason iapp what isery but all bs nt good doe ı o mak a n cessary part of ur p esent happiness, nor th bs nce of t make a part of our misery If t d d w should be onsta tly and nf t ly miser bl th r be ng nfin t degrees f happ ness wh ch ar not ın our possess n All u eas ness th ref r be ng r moved a mode ate por tıon f good serves at present to content men and f degrees of pleasure n a success n of ord aryenjoyme ts make pa happ ness whe e they can be satisf ed If this wer not so th e could be n room for thos ı differ t a d ıs bly trifling a tions, to wh ch our wills re so of ten d termı ed and wh re n we voluntar ly wast so much f ou l es which ennıss ess could by n means consist w th a consta t d

d ed n this e pinessr ache so far as to ff d th m consta t tra f mod r te me n pleasu es, w thout any mı ture f un as ess a d y t they could be for er though th y can be a far here N y they cannot but se th t t ıs mo e possible than th attainm nt d cont u tıon f that p ttan fh ur r ch or pl asur wh ch th y pursu a d f wh ch they neglect that ter l tat B t y t, in f ll view f thus d ff ce sat ısfied f th poss bılıty f a perfect, secu e d lasting h ppın ss ın a futur stat a d u d a cl ar co vı t n that t t t be h d he — whıl t th y bound th h pp e w th n s m l ttl y m nt or aım f thı l f a d cl d th joys of hea e f m making y necessary part f t,—th ır d ır s are t mo ed by this gr t ppare t good their wills d t mıned t any ctıo or d a ur f ıts ttaın me t.

som food mes his w y And ın r d th p ur buckl t tudy when ham or th des to ecomm d himself to h mis-tress shall mak him asy ın th want f y sort f knowledg Thus, ho m h soe e m n ar at t and constant ın pur t f happ ess, y t they may h cl ar ew f good gr t and nf ssed good with t being n

ever ı dg d n ssary t their happ ess, as soon as y good ppears to mak part f th ır portı f h pp ess, they begin t des t.

45. *Why the g at t good not alway d s d* This, I th k, y may bser ın himself d th rs —That th gr t vıs bl good doe alway ause men desires ın p po tı to th greatn ss t ppears, d ıs cknowledged to ha e though every little troubl m es us

thır t, Heat, cold ss, w th l bour d leep ess, in th ıcconstant turns, &c To wh ch f bes des cıd tal harms, w dd th f ta t ıcal u as ss (as ıtch aft ho our pow ch s, &c.) wh h qu d habits by fash n xampl and d catı ha settled us d th usand th rre gular desires which cus-

dom orders any action nor is there any voluntary action performed without some desire accompanying it which I think is the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up or at least accompanies most of the other passions as wholly excluded in the case Aversion fear anger envy shame &c have each their uneasinesses too and thereby influence the will These passions are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone and wholly unmixed with others though usual

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is I think scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it I am sure wherever *there is uneasiness there is desire* For we constantly desire happiness and whatever we feel of uneasiness so much it is certain we want of happiness even in our own opinion let our state and condition otherwise be what it will Besides the present moment not being our eternity whatever our enjoyment be we look beyond the present and desire goes with our foresight and that still carries the will with it So that even in joy itself that which keeps up the action whereon the enjoyment depends is the desire to continue it and fear to lose it and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind the will presently is by that determined to some new action and the present delight neglected

41 *The m st pressing uneas ness naturally determ es the will* But we being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses distracted with differ

ll be —

ans er is — That ordinarily st pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action for some end cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end only to lose its labour for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure they in that case put us not

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uneasiness is the spur to action that is constantly most felt and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action For this we must carry along with us that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours and nothing else For we producing nothing by our willing it but some action in our power it is there the will *terminates* and *reaches no further*

42 *All desire happiness* If it be further asked — What it is moves desire? I answer — happiness and that alone Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not it is what eye hath not seen ear hath not heard nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions made *by several instances of delight and joy on the* one side and torment and sorrow on the other which for shortness sake I shall comprehend

for evermore Or to speak truly they are all of the mind though some have their rise in the mind from thought others in the body from certain modifications of motion

43 *Happiness and misery good and evil what they are Happiness* then in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of and *misery* the utmost pain and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain and so much present pleasure as without which *any one cannot be content Now because* pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects either on our minds or our bodies and in different degrees therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that *we call good* and *what is apt to produce pain in* us we call *evil* for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us wherein consists our happiness and misery Further though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure be in itself good and *what is apt to* produce any degree of pain be evil yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort because when they come in competition the degrees al

hether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from blow he sees comi it is as much perfection, that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good as that the power f acting should be determined by the will and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. N y were nd termined by anything, but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of an action, we were not free the very end of our freedom being that we ma ttain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put under necessity by his consti tion as an intelligent being to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do else he would be under the determination f some other than himself which is want f liberty And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is t say that man wills and acts for an nd that he would not have at the time that he wills and act for it. For if he prefers t in his present thoughts before any other t is plain he then thinks better f and would have before any other unless he can have and not have it, will and not will t the same time contradiction too manifest to be admitted.

50. *The freest mind to be determined.* If we look upon those superior beings above us, who njoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we and yet we have reason to think they are less happy or less free than are. And if were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say that God himself *cannot* choose what is not good he freedom f the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.

51. *A constant determination to pursue happiness no abridgment of liberty.* But to give right view of this mistaken part f liberty let me ask, —Would any one be a changeling because he is less determined by wise considerations than wise man Is worth the name f freedom t be liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon man self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment which keeps us from hoosing or doing the worse be liberty true liberty madmen and fools are the only freemen but yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty but he that is mad already The constant desire f happiness, and the constraint t puts upon us to act for it, nobody I think accounts an abridgment of liberty or t least an abridgment of liberty t be complained of God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy and the more an intelligent being is so the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That, in this state of ignorance we short sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity we are endowed with power to suspend any particular desire and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way x amination is consulting guide The determination of the will upon inquiry is following the direction of that guide and he that has power to act or not to act, according as such determination directs, is free Such determination abridges not that power wherein liberty consists. He that has his chains knocked off and the prison doors set open to him, is perfectly at liberty because he may either go or stay as he best likes though his preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather or want of other lodging. He ceases not to be free though the desire some convenience to be had there absolutely determines his preference and makes him stay in his prison.

52. *The necessity of pursuing true happiness the* ... therefore the highest perfection of our liberty The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit f happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which, as such, our desires always follow the more are we free from a necessary determination f our will any particular action, and from a necessary compliance with our desire, set upon any particular and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with, our real happiness and therefore till we are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter and the nature f the case demands, we are by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases.

53. *Power to suspend.* This is the hinge on which turns the *liberty* of intellectual beings, in their constant endeavours after and steady prosecution f true felicity —That they *can suspend* this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves

tom has made natural to us we shall find that a very little part of our life is so vacant from *these* uneasinesses as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good We are seldom at ease and free enough from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up *take the will in their turns* and *no sooner is one* action dispatched which by such a determination of the will we are set upon but *another uneasiness* is ready to set us on work For the removing of the pains we feel and are at present pressed with being the getting out of misery and consequently the first thing to be done in order to happiness —absent good though thought on *confessed* and *appearing to be good* not

peated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind given some relish of it and raised in us some desire which then beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness stands upon fair *terms with the rest to be satisfied* and so according to its greatness and pressure comes in its turn to determine the will

47 *Due consideration raises desire* And thus by a due consideration and examining any good proposed it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good *whereby in its turn and place it may come to* work upon the will and be pursued For good though appearing and allowed ever so great yet till it has raised desires in our minds and thereby made us uneasy in its want it reaches not our wills we are not within the sphere of its ac

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liciting and ready at hand to give the will its next determination The balancing when there is any in the mind being only which desire shall be next satisfied which uneasiness first removed Whereby *it comes to pass* that *as long as any* uneasiness any desire remains in our mind there is no room for good barely as such to come at the will or at all to determine it Because as has been said the *first* step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines of misery and to *feel no part of it* the will can be at leisure for nothing else till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed which in the multitude of wants and desires we are beset with in this imperfect state we are not like to be ever freed from in this world

48 *The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire makes way for consideration* There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will it is natural as I have said that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action and so it does for the most part but not always For the mind having in most cases as is evident in experience a power *to suspend* the execution *and satisfaction of any of its desires* and *so all one after another is at liberty to consider the* objects of them examine them on all sides and weigh them with others In this lies the liberty man has and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes errors and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives *and our endeavours after happiness whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills* and engage too soon before due examination To prevent this we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire as every one daily may experiment in himself This seems to me the source of all liberty in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called

suspension of any de

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done we have opportunity to examine view and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do and when upon due examination we *have judged* we have done our duty all that we *can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness* and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to desire will and act according to the last result of a fair examination

49 *To be determined by our own judgment is no restraint to liberty* This is so far from being *a restraint or diminution of freedom* that it is the very improvement and benefit of it it is not an abridgment it is the end and use of our liberty and the further we are removed from such a determination the nearer we are to misery and slavery A perfect indifference in the mind not *determinable by its last judgment of the good or* evil that is thought to attend its choice would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of indifferency to act or not to act *till determined by* ... *would be an imperfection on the othe*

imperfect ...

those dishes which are f ast to thers. Hence t as, I think, that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire wh ther summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily d li hts, or rtue, or con templatio and they might ha e as asonably disputed, whether th best relish w e to be found ... ples. lums, or nuts, and ha di ded them ... astes ... heir ... l t ... est

happiness consists in the ha ing those things which prod ce the gre est pleasure and th absence f those which cause any disturbance, an pain. Now these, to differ t men are ery different things. If therefore, men in this life only ha e h pe if in this lif only they can joy t is not strange or unr asonable, that they should se k their happiness by a oidi all things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that d light th m wherein t will be n wo der to find ar ty and difference. For if there be o prospect beyond th gra e th infere ce is cer tainly right— Let us t and drink, l t us enjoy hat e d light in, for to-morrow we shall die. This, I think, may serv t show us th ason hy though all men desires tend to happiness, yet they ar n t moved by th same bject. M may choose different things, and y t all choose right supposing them only lik company f poor insects wh eof som are bees, d lighted ...

57 *Power to suspend ol tion explains ponsib l ty for ill ho* These things, dul we ghed will gi us, as I think, cl ar ew in th stat f hu man liberty Liberty t is plain, consists in a power to do not to d to d forbear do- in *as w will* This can ot be d n ed. But this seeming to compr h d onl the ctions f man consecuti to lition, t is further inquired — Whether he be t liberty *to will* or n And to this t has been answered that, most cases, man is no t liberty t forbear the t f oli tion h must exert an ct f his will, whereby the action proposed is made t exist t is But yet there is case wherein man is lib- erty in respect of willing and that is th choosing f em t good as an nd t be pursued. Here man may *suspend* the act f his cho ce from being d termined *for* or gainst th thing proposed till h has examined whether be really f nature, in itself and consequences, to mak him happy or not. For when he has nce chosen t, and

ther by it is become part f his happiness t raises desire, and that proporti nably gi es him uneasiness which determines his will and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occa s ons that ffer And here we may see how it comes to pass that a man may justly i cur pun ishment, though t be certain that, in all the par ticular ctions that he wills, h does, and *neces-* sarily does, will that which he then judges to be good. F though his will be always *determined* by that which is judged good by his understand ing yet t excuses him not because by a too hasty ch ce f his own making he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil which, howeve false and fallacious, ha the same influence on all his future cond ct, as if they were tru and r ght. H has tiated h s own palate and must be answer bl to himself for th sickness and death that *follows* fr m t. Th eternal law and nature f things must not be altered to comply w th his ill-ordered cho ce If the neglect or buse f th liberty he had to mun what would r ally and truly mak for his happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that f llow on t must be imputed to his own election. *H had power to suspend h determ nation* it was gi e him, that he might examin and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not decei ed. And h could never judge that it was better t be dece ed than t, in a matter f so gr t and near concernme t.

58 *Why men choose what make t em m er bl* What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer differe t things, and pursue happiness by co trary courses. But yet, since m n ar always constant and in earnest in matters f happiness and misery th question still remains, How men come oft n to prefer the worse to th better and to choose that, which, by th ir own confession has mad them miserabl

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preference f each oluntary action ha e th ir rise

(1) *F om bodily pain* Som f them come from causes not in our power such as ar ften the pains f th body fr m want, disease, or out ward injur es, as th rack, &c. which, wh n prese t and iol t, perate for the most part f rcibly th will, and turn th courses f men li es from irtu p ty and li and what before they j dged to lead to happiness every on n t end uring or through disuse, not

whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end and make a real part of that which is their greatest good For the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to them to take care not to mistake or miss it and so necessarily puts them upon caution deliberation and wariness in the direction of their particular actions which are the means to obtain it Whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss *the same necessity with* the same force establishes suspense deliberation and scrutiny of each successive desire whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness and mislead us from it This as seems to me is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings and I desire it may be well considered whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have are capable of or can be useful to them and that whereon depends the turn of their actions does not lie in this — That they can suspend their d

... as the weight of the thing requires This we are able to do and when we have done it we have done our duty and *all that is in our power and indeed all that needs* For since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire What follows after that follows in a chain of consequences linked one to another all depending on the last determination of the judgment which whether it shall be upon a hasty and precipitate view or upon a due and mature examination *is in our power experience showing us that in most cases* we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire

54 *Government of our passions the right improvement of liberty* But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind as when the pain of the rack an impetuous uneasiness, as of love anger or any other violent passion running away with us allows us not the liberty of thought and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly —God who knows our frailty pities our weakness and requires of us no more than we are able to do and sees what was and what was not in our power will judge as a kind and merciful Father But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires the moderation and restraint of our passions so that our understandings may be free to examine and reason unbiassed give its judgment being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that

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ther ... consideration of its true *worth we have formed appetites in our minds* suitable to it and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it or in the fear of losing it And how *much this is in every one s power* by making resolutions to himself such as he may keep is easy for every one to try Nor let any one say he cannot govern his passions nor hinder them from breaking out and carrying him into action for what he can do before a prince or a great man he can do alone or in the presence of God if he will

55 *How men come to pursue different and often evil courses* From what has been said it is easy to give an account how it comes to pass that though all men desire happiness yet their wills carry them so contrarily and consequently some of them to what is evil And to this I say that the *various and contrary* choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue good but that the same thing is not good to *every man alike This variety of pursuits shows* that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing or choose the same way to it. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life why one followed study and knowledge and another hawking and hunting why one chose luxury and debauchery and another sobriety and riches would not be because every one of these did *not* aim at his own happiness but because their happiness was placed in different things And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes —If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good for you but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking

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pa ... *as fruitlessly* endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in) as you would to satisfy all men s hunger with cheese or lobsters which though very agreeable and delicious fare to some are to others extremely nauseous and offensive and many persons would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to

bette than a gre t d al to come a d so for small matters in possess on part w th gre ter ones in evers n But that this is a wro g judg

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but bar ly pl asur or pain.

Secondly B t becaus n t only present pl as- ur and pai but that also which is pt by its fficacy consequ ces to bri g t pon us t a distance is p oper bject f ur desires, and apt to move creature that has fo es ght there for th al *that d aw fter them pl asur and pain, ar nsider d as g od nd vil*

64. A *e hoo misery will gly b t nly by wrong judgment* Th wrong judgme t that misleads us, and makes th w ll ft fast n on the rses d lies misreporti g upo the various comparisons f th se Th w g judgm t I am h speaking f is t what man may think f th d termination f an ther but what every man himself must confess t be wro g F since

itself its full d m ns s, nu uisu us ful mistake who j dged f t by unequal m asures. We e the pl asure *f drinking* accompan ed th ry mom nt a man takes off his glass, w th that ck stomach d ch g h ad wh ch, n som m n ar sure to follow not many hours aft I think nobody whateve pl asure he had in h s cups would n these co d tions ev r let win touch his l p which yet h d ly swal lows, and th evil *sid comes to be chos n nly* by th fallacy of little difference time B t, f pleasur o pain can be so lessened only by a

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and the tak its tru *dim ns ns This is the* way we usually impose on oursel es, in e pect of bare pleasure and pai o th true degrees of happiness r misery th future loses its just proporti and what is present obtains th prefe ence as th gr te I m ti n n th re th wro g judgme t, whereby th bse t ar not only lesse ed but red ced to perfect thing wh n men enj y what th y can in present, and make su f that co cluding amiss that n evil will the

which scarce deserves th nat

dgm t but f that wr g j dgm t which ry man himself must confess to be so

65. *Men may err ompari g pr ent and futur* Ther for as to prese t pl asur d pain mind as has be said, mistak that ch is ally good evil that which is th ter pleasur or th gr ter pain, is ally just t ppears. B t, though pr se t pl asur and n show th d ffer ce d d gr es so plain as t t l oom t mistak yet, *when u par pr se t pl asur or pai u th futur* (which usually th ease in most impo tant d t min ns f th will) we ft mak wrong j d ents f them taki g our m asures f th m ter t pos ti ns f distance. Obj cts ar our ar pt t be th ght gr te than those f large iz that ar more mot And so t is th pl asures and pains th p esent is pt to ry t and those t dista ce ha th disad tag in th comparison. Thus most m n lik endthrift h irs, ar pt to judg littl in hand

66. *Caus f our judgi g am ss when u ompar pr ent pl sur and p u th f tur* Th cause f ur judging amiss, wh n w compare our present pl asur or pain w th f ture, seems to m t be *the u k and arr w const tuti f our m nds* W cann t w ll enj y two pleasures at *once* m ch less any pleasure almost, whilst pain possesses us. Th p ese t pl asure, if t be t ery lan d and almost t all, fills our narrow souls, and so tak up th wh l mind that t scarce l es any th ught f things bsent or f amo g our pl asur th re ar some which ar ot trong

n Cf. Bk. IV ch. xx.

Cf M taign *Ess y* p — If b tter sad ess cam t us befor drunkenness we w uld guard oursel es gainst drinking too m ch b *to* deceive us pleasure goes befor and hides fr m us what f llows.

being able by the contemplation of remote and future good to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily torments and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness A neighbouring country has been of late a tragical theatre from which we might fetch instances if there needed any and the world did not in all countries and ages furnish examples enough to confirm that received observation *Necessitas co it ad turpia* and therefore there is great reason for us to pray Lead us not into temptation

(2) *From wron desires arisin from wron judg ments* Other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good which desires always bear proportion to and depend on the judgment we make and the relish we have of any absent good in both which we are apt to be variously misled and that by our own fault.

60 *Our judgment of present good or evil always right* In the first place I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of *future* good and evil whereby their desires are misled For as to *present* happiness and misery when that alone comes into consideration and the consequences are quite removed a man never chooses amiss he ... him and that he actu ...

... or pleasure being just so gr... than it is felt the present good or evil is really so much as it appears And therefore were every action of ours concluded within itself and drew no consequences after it we should undoubtedly never err in our cho ce of good e should always infall bly prefer the best Were the pa ns of honest industry and of star ing with hunger and cold set together before us nobody would be in doubt which to choose were the satisfaction of a lust and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one s present possession he would not balance or err in the determination of his choice

61 *Our wrong judgments have reg rd to future good and evil only* But since our oluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance but are the precedent causes of good and evil which they draw after them and br ng upon us when they themsel es are past and cease to be our desires look beyond our present enjoyments and carry the mind out to *absent good* according to the necess ty h ch we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happi

ness It is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction without that, we are not moved by absent good For in this narrow scantling of capacity which we are accustomed to and sensible of here wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once which when all uneasiness is a ay is whilst it lasts sufficient to make us think ourselves happy it is not all remote and even apparent good that affects us Because the indolency and enjoyment we have sufficing for our present happiness we desire not to venture the change since we jud e that we are happy already being content and that *is enough. For* who is content is happy But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness

6 *From a wron jud ment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness* Their aptness therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it, is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest abse good. For whilst such thou hts possess them, the joys of a future state move them not they have little concern or uneasiness about them and the ill, from from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Cha ... but a man s view of these things let him see that virtue and religion are necessary to his h...

piness let him look into the future state of b... or misery and see there God the righteous Judge ready to ... render to every man according to his deeds to them ... who by patient continuance in well-doing seek ... glory and honour and immortality eternal life ... but unto every soul that doth evil ind gnation and wrath tribulation and angu sh To him I say ... ho hath a prospect of the d fferent state of perfect ... happiness or misery that attends all men after this life depend on their behaviour here the measures of good and evil that govern his cho ce are m ... For since noth ng of pleasure and pain in this life can bear any proportion to the endless happiness or exquis te misery of an immortal soul hereafter actions in h s power will have their preference not accord ng to the trans ... ure or pa n that accompanies or follows them here but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happ ness hereafter

63 *A m e pa t cul r acc unt f wro judgments* But to account more particularly for the misery that men often bring on themsel es notwithstanding that they do all in earnest p rsue happiness we must consider how things come to be

represented t our desires under dece tful ppear a ces and that is by th j dgment pronou cing wrongl concerning them. T see how far this reaches, and what are th causes f wrong judg —l

but barely f asur or pain.

Secondl But because not nly present pleasure and pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequ ces t bring t upon us at distance is a proper bject f our desires, and apt to move creature that has foresight there fore *t ings also that draw fter t em f asur and pa n, ar consider d as good and evil*

64. *W ong choo misery ingly but only by wrong judgment* Th wro g judgment that misleads us, and makes th will f fasten the worse sid lies in misreporting upon th various comparisons of these. Th wrong judgme t I am here speaking of is t what man may think f the d terminati f another but what every man himself must confess to be wro For since I la it for certain ground that every int lli ge t bein, reall seeks happiness, which consists in t e enjoyme t f pl asure w thout any con- ——

and th comp ting f his happiness, but nly by *wrong judgment* I shall not here speak f that mistak which is th consequence f *invincibl* error which scarce deserves th name f wrong judgment but f that wron judgmen which every man himself must confess t be so

65. *Men may err compari pr ent and futur* (I) Therefore as to present pleasure and pain, t mind, as has bee said, never mistakes that hich is reall good or evil that which is th greater pleasure, or the greater pain, is really just as it ppears. But, thou h present pleasure and pain show their difference nd degrees so plainly as ot to le e room t mistak yet, *when we com ar pr sent pl asur or pai w th fu r* (which is usualy th case in mos important d termin tions f the will.) we f en mak wrong j d ments of them taking our measures f them in different positions f distance Objects n ar our view are pt to be though gre er than those f larger size that are more remo And so t is th pl asures and pains th prese t is pt to carry and those t distance ha e th disad va tage in the comparison. Thus mos men, like spend thrifts, are pt to judge littl in hand better than a great deal to come and so for small matters in possession part w th greater ones in reversion. But that this is a wrong judg ment every one must allow let his pl asure consist in whatever t will since that which is future will certainly come t be present and th n, ha ing the sam d vantage of nearness, will show tself in ts full dimensions, and discove his wilful mistake wh j dged of t by unequal m asures. Were the pl asure of drinking ccompanied, the very mome t a man takes off his glass, w th that sick stomach and chi g head which, in some men, are sur t follow not many hours after I think nobod whatever pl asure h had in his cups, would on these conditions, ever let wine touch his lips[1] which yet he daily swal lows, and the evil de comes to be chosen onl by th fallacy of a littl difference in time. B t, if pl asure or pain can be so lessened only by a —— he —

way we usually impose on oursel es, in respect of bare pleasure and pain or the tru degrees of happiness or misery the futur loses ts just proportion, and what is present obtains the prefer ence as th gre ter I mention not here th wro g judgment, whereby the bsent are not only lessened but reduced to perfect n thing whe men enjoy what they can in present, and mak sure of that, concluding amiss that no evil will th ce f llow For that I es n t comparing th great ness of f ture good and evil, which is that we are here speaking f but in an ther sort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good or evil, as it is cons dered to be th cause and procurem t of p easure or pain that will f llow from t.

66 *Caus f our judgi amis when u compar pre ent pl asure and pai with futur* Th cause f our j dging amiss, wh n we compar our present pl asur or pain w th future, seems to me t be *t e w ak and arrow constitution f our m ds* We cann t well enjoy two pleasures t once much less an pl asure almost, whilst pain possesses us. Th prese t pl asure, if t be n t ery lan uid, and almost n ne t all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whol mind tha t scarce lea es any thought f things bsent. or if among our pleasures there are some which are not strong

Cf. Bk. IV ch. xx.

[1] Cf. Montaign *Essays* p 1 — If b tter sadness came us before drunkenness, we would guard oursel es gainst drinking too much but, deceive us, pleasure goes before and hides from us what follows.

enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures A little bitter mingled in our cup, leaves no relish of the sweet Hence it comes that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present evil which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal because under the present pain we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness Men s daily complaints are a loud proof of this the pain that any one actually feels is still of all other the worst and it is with anguish they cry out — Any rather than this nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer And therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil before all things as the first necessary condition to our happiness let what will follow Nothing as we passionately think can exceed or almost equal the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us And because the abstinence from a present pleasure that offers itself is a pain nay oftentimes a very great one the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object, it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does and lessens in our thoughts what is future and so forces us as it were blindfold into its embraces

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joyed v ith great pleasure and del ght at one time has proved insip d or nauseous at another and therefore they see noth ng in it for wh ch they should forego a present enjoyment But that this is a false vay of judging when appl ed to the happiness of another life they must confess unless they will say God cannot make those happy he des gns to be so For that be ng intended for a state of happiness it must certainly be agreeable to e ery one s ish and desire could v e suppose their relishes as different there as they are here yet the manna in heaven v ill suit e ery one s palate Thus much of the v rong judgment v e make of present and future pleasure and pain

when they are compared together and so the absent considered as future

68 *Wrong judgment in considering consequences of actions* (II) As to *things good or bad in their consequences* and by the aptness that is in them to procure us good or evil in the future we judge amiss several ways

1 When we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does.

2 When we judge that, though the consequence be of that moment yet it is not of that certainty but that it may otherwise fall out or else by some means be avoided as by industry address change repentance &c.

That these are wrong ways of judging v ere easy to show in every particular if I would examine them at large singly but I shall only mention this in general viz that it is a very v rong and irrational way of proceeding to venture a greater good for a less upon uncertain guesses and before a due examination be made proportionable to the weightiness of the matter and the concernment it is to us not to mistake This I think every one must confess especially if he considers the usual cause of this wrong judgment whereof these following are some —

69 *Causes of this* (1) *Ig orance* He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable cannot acquit himself of judging amiss

n m n a looks even

ments as mu a

were balancing an account and determining on which side the odds l e If therefore either side be huddled up in haste and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be over looked and left out this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance That which most commonly causes this is the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain he ghtened by our feeble passionate nature most strongly wrought on by vhat is present To check th s precip tancy our understanding and reason were gi en us if v e will make a right use of them to search and see and then judge thereupon W thout liberty the understanding ould be to no purpose and without understanding l berty (if it could be) would signify notl ing If a man sees what would do h m good or harm what v ould make him happy or miserable v ith out being able to move himself one step to vards or from it vhat s he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness what is his liberty better than if he v ere

driven up and down as a bubbl by th force of the wind Th being cted by blind impulse from w thout, or from w thin is littl odds. Th first, the f e, and gre t use f liberty is t hin d blind precip tancy the principal xercise f freedom is t stand till pe the eyes, look about, and tak a vi w of th conseq ence f wh t we are going t d as much as the w ght f t.e matter requires. How much sl th and negli gence, heat and pass n, the pr alency f fash io or cquired d pos tions do severally co dgments,

n e. Th r lish of the mind is as various as that f the body and lik that too may be altered and tis a mistake to think that men cannot change th displ asingness or indifferency that is in ac ti ns into pleasure and desire if they will do but what is n th ir power A due cons der tion will do t some cases and practice appl catı n, and cust m in most. B ead or t bacco may be neglected where they are shown to be useful t h alth, because of an ind fferency or d cons derati n at

To ll on, judgment f what s nece sary to our happine All m desir happiness, that is past doub but, as has been already bserved when they ar d f pain they ar pt to tak up w th any pl asur t hand or that custom has n deared to them t est satisfied in that and so being happy till som ew desire by making th m asy disturbs th t happiness and shows them that th y are t they look furth no is th ill d t rmined to any tion in pur suit f any th know n o ppar nt good. F since w find that w cann t j y all sorts of good, but excl des an th w d n t fix our desires ev ry ppare gr t good un less t be jud ed to be ecessary t ur happ ess if w think w can be happ w th ut t, it moves us not. This is th occas to me f judging g wh th y tak t that t be ecessary to th happ ess which eally is so This mistak misl ds us, both th ch ce f th good e aim at, and ery ft n in the means to t, wh t is emote good. But, which w y ever t be eith by placing t wh eally t is not, or by gl ting th m ans as t necessary to t,— hen a man misses his gr e d happ ness, h will cknowledg h judged n t ght. That which contributes to this mistak is th real or supposed unpl asantness f th ti ns which ar the ay to this nd se ming so pr poster ous thing to m t mak themsel es nh p py in ord to happiness, that they d t asily bring themsel es to t.

7 It an hang the gr blene or disagr bl ne thing Th las inq ry th for con cerning this matte is,—Wh ther t be man power to chang th pleasa t ess d unpl as an ness that accompan es any sort f ct And as t that, t is plain in many case h can M may and should correct th ir pal tes, and gi relish to what th has, or th y suppose has

w thout r f ce t any other end to which in cons d r tio of th pl asur there is in h alth and tr gth (to which that meat is subserv ent) may add a new *gusto* ble to make us swallow an ill lished pot on In th latter f these any actı is dered m or less pleasing only by

ti ns f asiness and pl asure into what we c custom oursel es to that w cannot fo bear to d o t least be asy in th omiss f tions, which habitual pr ctice has suited and th eby ecommends to us. Though this be ry is ble and every s expe ce shows him he can d so yet t is part in th cond ct of m tov ards th ir happ ess, glected t d gree that t w ll be poss bly nt rtained as a par d if t be said that men can *mak* things ct ns m or less pl asing t th msel es and the by r m edy that, t which on may justly imp t gre t d al f th ir wand ing Fashi n and th com m op ni ha ing settled wr g n ti ns, and ed cati n and custom ll hab ts, th just al es f things ar mispl ced and th palat f m n corrup ed. Pains should be taken to tify th se d contrary hab ts change our pl asures, and gi lish t th t which is necessary con d t our h ppiness. This ery must confess h can d and wh n happiness is lost, and misery ov rtakes him, h will confess he did

amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it and I ask every one whether he has not often done so?

7 *Preference of vice to virtue a manifest wron judgment* I shall not now enlarge any further on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power whereby men mislead themselves This would make a volume and is not my business But whatever false notions or shameful neglect of what is in their power may put men out of their way to happiness and d stract them as we see into so different courses of life this yet is certain that morality established upon its true foundations cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider and he that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect ser — must at use ls and

punishments of another life which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of his law are of weight enough to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility which nobody can make any doubt of He that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one must own himself to judge very much amiss if he does not con 1 d —That a virtuous life with the certain ex —

evidently so though the u nothing but pain and the vicious cont nual pleasure which yet is for the most part quite otherwise and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of even in the r present possession nay all things rightly cons dered ha e I think even the worse part here But when infinite happiness is put into one scale against infinite misery in the other if the worst that comes to the p ous man if he mistakes be the best that the wicked can attain to if he be in the right who can with out madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a poss b lity of in f nite m sery which if he miss there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the d the sober man ventures nothing —

if the wicked man be in the right he is not hap-

the preference is to be given? I have forborne to mention anything of the certainty or probability of a future state designing here to show the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes upon his own principles laid how he pleases who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration whilst he knows and cannot but be certain that a future life is at least possible

73 *Recapitul tion—liberty of indifferency* To conclude this inquiry into *human liberty* which as it stood before I myself from the beginning fearing and a very judicious friend of mine since the publication suspecting to have some mistake in it though he could not particularly sho it me I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I had made in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another that discovery opened to me this present view which here in this second edition I submit to the learned world and which in short is this *Liberty* is a power to act or not to act according as the mind directs A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the *will* That which in the train of our voluntary actions determ nes the will to any change of operation is *some pre e t u eas ss* which is or at least is always accompanied with that of *des re* Desire is always moved by evil to fly it because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness but every good nay every greater good does not constantly move desire because it may not make or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness For all that we des re is only to be happy But though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably yet the satisfaction of any part cular desire c *be suspend d* from determining the will to any subservient act on till we ha e maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then des re makes a part of our real happiness or be co s stent or incon stent with it. The result of our judgment upon that exam — d m h man

Cf Lock l tt to Moly eu 15th J ly 1693 also Molyn u t Lock August 12 nd Locke s r ply August 23

placed in an indifferency of the man antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish they who lay so much stress on such an antecedent indifferency as they call it, had told us plainly whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to state it between them, i.e. immediately *after* the judgment of the understanding and *before* the determination of the will because the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding and to place liberty in an indifferency antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say anything of it. Least places it in a subject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty but in consequence of thought and judgment. I am not nice about phrases, and therefore consent to say with those that love to speak so, that liberty is placed in indifferency but it is an indifferency which remains after the judgment of the understanding, yea, even after the determination of the will and that is an indifferency not of the man (for after he has once judged which is best, viz. to do or forbear, he is no longer indifferent,) but an indifferency of the *operative powers of the man*, which remaining equally able to operate or to forbear operating after as before the decree of the will, are in a state which, if one pleases, may be called indifferency and as far as this indifferency reaches, the man is free, and no further e.g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it rest that operative power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand. I am then, in that respect perfectly free my will determines that operative power to rest I am yet free because the indifferency of that my operative power to act, or not to act, still remains the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which at present orders rest the indifferency of that power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before as will appear if the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary. But if, during the rest of my hand, it be seized with a sudden palsy the indifferency of that operative power is gone, and with it my liberty I have no longer freedom in that respect, but am under a necessity of letting my hand rest. On the other side, if my hand be put into motion by a convulsion, the indifferency of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion and my liberty in that case is lost, for I am under a necessity of having my hand move. I have added this, to show in what sort of indifferency liberty seems to me to consist and not in any other real or imaginary.

72. *Active and passive power in motions and in thinking*. True notions concerning the nature and extent of *liberty* are of so great importance that I hope I shall be pardoned this digression, which my attempt to explain it has led me into. The ideas of will, volition, liberty and necessity in this Chapter of Power came naturally in my way. In a former edition of this Treatise I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had. And now as a *lover of truth, and not a worshipper of my own doctrines*, I own some change of my opinion which I think I have discovered ground for. In what I first writ, I with an unbiassed indifferency followed truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of blemishing my reputation, I have, with the same sincere design for truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a severer inquiry has suggested. It is not impossible but that some may think my former notions right and some (as I have already found) these latter and some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this variety in men's opinions, impartial deductions of reason in controverted points being so rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy especially if of any length. And, therefore I should think myself not a little beholden to any one who would, upon these, or any other grounds, fairly clear this subject of *liberty* from any difficulties that may yet remain.

Before I close this chapter it may perhaps be to our purpose, and help to give us clearer conceptions about *power* if we make our thoughts take a little more exact survey of *action*. I have said above that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion and thinking. These in truth, though called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be always ...

... tions are consequently so far the effects barely of *passive power* in those subjects, which yet on their accounts are thought agents. For in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought receives the impression, whereby it is put into this action, purely from without, and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent and such power is not properly an active power but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Some

Cf. Locke's letter to Molyneux, Jan. 20, 1693.

amiss in neglecting it and condemn himself for it and I ask every one whether he has not often done so?

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are of weight enough to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility which nobody can make any doubt of He that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here and the contrary state

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evidently so though the virtuous life here had *nothing but pain and the vicious continual pleasure* which yet is for the most part quite otherwise and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of even in their present possession nay all things rightly considered have I think even the worse part here But when infinite happiness is put into one scale against infinite misery in the other if the worst that comes to the pious *man if he mistakes* be the best that the wicked can attain to if he be in the right who can without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery which if he miss there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other side the sober man ventures nothing

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here in this second edition I submit to the learned world and which in short is this *Liberty* is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the *will* That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is *some present uneasiness* which is or at least is always accompanied with that of *desire* Desire is always moved by evil to fly it because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness but every good nay every greater good *does not constantly move desire because it may* not make or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness For all that we desire is only to be happy But though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably yet the satisfaction of any particular desire *can be suspended* from determining the will to any subservient action till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man who could not be *free* if his will were determined by anything but his own desire guided by his own judgment I know that liberty by some is

Cf Locke letter to Molyneux 15th July 1693 also Molyneux to Locke August 12 and Locke's reply August 23

modes, being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.

2. *Made by the mind.* That the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive and receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as sensation or reflection offers them,

different. The mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations. For it being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is that these ideas are called *notions*, as if they had their original, and constant existence, more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding without considering whether they had any real being; though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined, as they are put together in the understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of *hypocrisy* might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not, or else have framed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For it is evident that, in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of men, before they existed anywhere else; and that many names that stood for such complex ideas were in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.

3. *Sometimes got by the explication of their names.* Indeed, now that languages are made, and abound with words standing for such combinations, an usual way of getting these complex ideas is, by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For consisting of a company of simple ideas combined, they may, by words standing for those simple ideas, be represented to the

mind of one who understands those words, though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of *sacrilege* or *murder* by enumerating to him the simple ideas which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.

4. *The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.* Every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire, Whence it has its unity, and how such precise multitude comes to make but one idea, since *that combination does not always exist together in nature.* To which I answer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one *name* given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any num-

killing a man of their, yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of *parricide* to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

5. *The cause of making mixed modes.* If we should inquire a little further, to see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled modes, and neglect others, which in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined and make distinct ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language; which being to mark, or communicate men's thoughts to one another with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make *such collections of ideas into complex* modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that tie them together: *they* rather choosing to enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

Cf. Bk. III. ch. §§ 5, 6, where Locke gives examples of his meaning

times the substance or agent puts itself into action by its own power and this is properly *active power* Whatsoever modification a substance has whereby it produces any effect that is called action v g a solid substance by motion operates on or alters the sensible ideas of another substance and therefore this modification of motion we call action But yet this motion in that solid substance is when rightly considered but a passion if it received it only from some external agent So that the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself or in another substance when at rest So likewise in thinking a power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of any external substance is called a power of thinking but this is but a passive power or capacity But to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at one s own choice and to compare which of them one thinks fit this is an active power This reflection may be of some use to preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions which grammar and the common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into Since what is signified by verbs that grammarians call active does not always signify action v g this proposition I *see* the moon or a star or I *feel* the heat of the sun though expressed by a verb active does not signify any action in me whereby I operate on those substances but only the reception of the ideas of light roundness and heat wherein I am not active but barely passive and cannot in that position of my eyes or body avoid receiving them But when I turn my eyes another way or remove my body out of the sunbeams I am properly active because of my own choice by a power within myself I put myself into that motion Such an action is the product of active power

75 *Summary of our original ideas* And thus I have in a short draught given a view of *our original ideas* from whence all the rest are derived and of which they are made up which if I would consider as a philosopher and examine on what causes they depend and of what they are made I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones viz

Extension
Solidity
Mobility or the power of being moved which by our senses we receive from body
Perceptivity or the power of perception or thinking
Motivity or the power of moving which by reflection we receive from *our minds*

I crave leave to make use of these two new words to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal

To which if we add
Existence
Duration
Number

which belong both to the one and the other we have perhaps all the original ideas on which the rest depend For by these I imagine might be *explained* the nature of colours sounds tastes smells and *all other ideas we have* if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us But my present purpose being only to inquire into the knowledge the mind has of things by those ideas and appearances which God has fitted it to receive from them and how the mind comes by that knowledge rather than into their causes or manner of production I shall not contrary to the design of this Essay set myself to inquire philosophically into the peculiar constitution of *bodies* and the configuration of parts whereby *they* have the power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities I shall not enter any further into that disquisition it sufficing to my purpose to observe that gold or saffron has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow and snow or milk the idea of white which we can only have by our sight without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies or the particular figures or motion of the particles which rebound from them to cause in us that particular sensation though when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds and would inquire into their causes we cannot conceive anything else to be in any sensible object whereby it produces different ideas in us but the different bulk figure number texture and motion of its insensible parts

Chap XXII *Of Mixed Modes*

1 *Mixed modes what* Having treated of *simple modes* in the foregoing chapters and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them to show what they are and how we come by them we are now in the next place to

[1] Cf Bk IV ch ii § 6

less, that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone afford us. How far, then, mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas, received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

10. *How thinking, motion, and power have been most modified.* It is worth our observing which of all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them. And those have been these three: *thinking* and *motion* (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action,) and *power*, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them; without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorders repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas, with names to them: and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in their minds, of modes of actions, distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; and also of their powers fitted for those actions: v.g. *boldness* is the power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, παρρησία: which power or ability in man of doing anything, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name *habit*; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it *disposition*. Thus, *testiness* is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v.g. *consideration* and *assent*, which are actions of the mind; *running* and *speaking*, which are actions of the body; *revenge* and *murder*, which are actions of both together: and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which, together, make up the complex ones signified by those names.

11. *Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect.* Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called *causes*, and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called *effects*. The *efficacy* whereby the new substance or idea is produced is called, in the subject exerting that power, *action*; but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called *passion*: which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two. For whatever sort of action besides these produces any effects, I confess myself to have no notion nor idea of; and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man. And therefore many words which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action or *modus operandi* at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating: v.g. *creation*, *annihilation*, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, though the word *freezing* seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

12. *Mixed modes made also of other simple ideas than those of power and action.* I think I shall not need to remark here that, though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men, yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled,

Cf. Bk. II. ch. vii. }
Cf. Bk. II. ch. vii. } 4.

Cf. ch. viii. § 23.
Cf. ch. xxi. § 2.
Cf. ch. xxi. § 2.

6 *Why words in one language have none answering in another* This shows us how it comes to pass that there are in every language many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another For the several fashions customs and manners of one nation making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one which another people have had never an occasion to make or perhaps so much as take notice of names come of course to be annexed to them to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in *their* minds Thus ὀστρακισμὸς amongst the Greeks and *proscriptio* amongst the Romans were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the men of other nations Where there was no such custom there was no notion of any such actions no use of such combinations of ideas as were united and as it were tied together by those terms and therefore in other countries there were no names for them

7 *And languages change* Hence also we may see the reason why languages constantly change take up new and lay by old terms Because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about new names to avoid long descriptions are annexed to them and so they become new species of complex modes What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved any one will see who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either *reprieve* or *appeal* stand for and instead of either of those names use a periphrasis to make any one understand their meaning

8 *Mixed modes where they exist* Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when I come to treat of Words and their use[1] yet I could not avoid to take this much notice here of the *names of mixed modes* which being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas which have but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men and there too have no longer any existence than whilst they are thought on have not so much anywhere the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their names which are therefore in this sort of ideas very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves For if we should inquire where the idea of a *triumph* or *apotheosis* exists it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves being actions that required time to their performance and so could never all exist together and as to the minds of men where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged they have there too a very uncertain existence and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us

[1] In Book III

9 *How we get the ideas of mixed modes* There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes —(1) By experience and *observation* of things themselves thus by seeing two men wrestle or fence we get the idea of wrestling or fencing (2) By *invention* or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds so he that first invented printing or etching had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed (3) Which is the most usual way by *explaining the names* of actions we never saw or motions we cannot see and by enumerating and thereby as it were setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up and are the constituent parts of them For having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas and by use got the names that stand for them we can by those means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows and has with us the same name for For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas of which they are compounded and originally made up though perhaps their immediate ingredients as I may so say are also complex ideas Thus the mixed mode which the word *lie* stands for is made of these simple ideas —(1) Articulate sounds ( ) Certain ideas — l ( ) Tho rds the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker I think I need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas And it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one which from what has been said he cannot but be able to make out to himself The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever which however compounded and decompounded may at last be resolved into simple ideas which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have or can have Nor shall we have reason to

4. A cl ar or dist nct d f sub tanc gen ral H ce wh we talk or think of ny partic ular sort of corporeal substances, as h rse t ne, &c. though th d a we ha e f e the f th m be but th complicati n coll ct n f thos se ral imple deas of sens ble qual t es, which used t find united n th thi g called hors or ston yet, b aus w cann t nc how they hou d r bsist alor or ne another we suppose them xisting in and suppo ted by some com m subj ct which support we denote by the nam substance, though t be ce tai e ha e no clear distinct dea of that thing we s ppose support

5 A cl ar an d f f t al sub tance f co p al substanc Th sam th g happens con c rnin th per ti ns f th mind iz think ing reasoni g fear g &c. whi h we c ncl d g t to subsist f themsel nor app h d g how th y can bel t body or be produced by t, we are pt t th k these th ti ns f som ther sub tanc wh h we call p rit wh by yet t is d t that, ha in n th r d o notion f matt r but som thing wh in those many sens bl qual t es which ffect our senses do subsist by suppos g bstance wh e n thinking knowing d bting and a power of moving &c. d subs st, w ha e as cl ar a o- ti f th substance f pir t, as w ha e f body th on being supposed t be (w th t knowing

bstanc matt is as m t f m our co p- l h

substance f matte as say th is pir t, because we have cl ar and distin t d f th substance f p ri

6 Our d as f part cular sort f sub t nc What ev therefor be th secr t bstr t natur f substance ge al all th d as w ha f

g lse, that w represe part cular sorts f sub ta ces t oursel es such ar th id as we ha

of their sev ral species in our minds and such only do we, by th specific names, s gnify t oth rs, g man horse sun w ter ron upon h a ing which words, every on who understands the l nguag frames n his mind a combinat n of those se e al simpl id as which h has usual ly observed or fa cied t exist together under that den minati n all which he supposes to rest in nd be, as it we e, adh rent t that unknown comm n subject, which nh res not in nything lse Th ugh, in the meantime the ma fest, and ery one upon inquiry into his own tho ghts, will fi d that h has no other idea of any sub- ta ce, v g fet t be g ld h rse ron man tr ol br ad but hat he has barely f those sensi h re w th

which h has observed t exis

Thus, the dea of the s n,—what is t but an ag greg t of thos several simple deas, bright, hot, r u dish, ha g a constant r gular mot n, t a certain distance from us, and perhaps som the as h wh thinks d discourses f the sun h been mo e less ccur te n bservin those

amo g wh ch ar t be cl ed is actu pow rs, and pass e cap cities, which though n t simpl d as, y t in this espect, f r br ty sak may co ently nough be cek ed am gst them. Th th powe f dr w ng ir iso f th deas of the compl o f that substance we call loadst and power to be so dr wn is part f th compl e w call ir n wh ch pow rs pass for nherent qualit es those sub- jects. Because every subst ce, be g as pt, by the powers we bserve in t, to change som sen bl qualities in th subj cts, as t is t pro- d ce us those simpl deas which w ce immediately f om t, does, by those ew sens bl qualities introduced to ther subjects disco e to us those powers which d th by mediat ly affect ur senses, as gularly as its sens bl qual ties d t immediat ly v g we immediately by our senses perce e in fir its heat and lour which are, if ghtly considered nothing but pow rs t t prod ce those d as in us w lso by our senses perce th colour and br ttl ness f harcoal, wh reby we come by th knowledg f an th powe n fire which t has to chang th

with names to them That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity ethics law and politics and several other sciences All that is requisite to my present design is to show what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes how the mind comes by them and that they are com positions made up of simple ideas got from sen sation and reflection \ hich I suppose I have done

Chap XXIII

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances

1 *Ideas of particular substances how made* The

by reflection on its own operations takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together which being presumed to belong to one thing and words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick dispatch are called so united in one sub

many ideas together because as I have sa d not imagining how these simple ideas can sub-*sist by themselves we accustom ourselves to sup pose some substratum* wherein they do subs st and from which they do result which therefore \ e call *substance*

2 *Our obscure idea of substance in general* So that if any one will examine himself concerning his

n general he will find

nly a sup

t[1] of such

lucing simple

nonly called

ked vhat is

n colour or weight inheres he

lid extend

what is it

that solidity and extension adhere in he would not be in a much better case than the Ind an be fore mentioned[2] who saying that the \ orld was supported by a great elephant was asked what the elephant rested on to wh ch h s answer \ as —a great tortoise but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad backed tortoise replied—*something he knew not what* And thus here as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas we talk like children who being questioned what such

children or men but that they know not \ hat and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of is what they have no distinct idea of at all and so are perfectly ignorant of it and in the dark The idea then we have to \ hich we give the *general* name substance being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing which \ e imagine can not subsist *sine re substante* without something to support them we call that support *substantia* \ hich according to the true import of the word is in plain English standing under or upholding

3 *Of the sorts of substances* An obscure and rel ative idea of *substance in general* being thus made we come to have the ideas of *particul r sorts of substances* by collecting *such* combinations of sim ple ideas as are by experience and observation of men s senses taken notice of to exist together and are therefore supposed to flow from the par ticular internal constitution or unkno n essence of that substance Thus we come to have *the ideas of a man horse gold water &c. of \ hich substances whether any one has any other cle r idea further than of certain simple ideas co-ex istent together I appeal to every one s o n ex* perience It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron or a diamond put together that make the true complex idea of those substances \ hich a smith or a je eller commonly knows better than a philosopher who whatever *substantial forms* he may talk of has no other idea of those substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas hich are to be found in them only we must take notice that our com plex ideas of substances bes des all those simple ideas they are made up of have always the con fused idea of something to \ h ch they belong and in which they subs st [3] and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance we say *it is a* thing having such or such qualit es as body is a th ng that is extended figured and capable of motion sp rit a th ng capable of thinking and so hardness friab lity and po er to draw iron we say are qual ties to be found in a loadstone These and the like fashions of speaking inti mate that the substance s supposed al ays *some thi g besides* the extension figure sol dity mo-tion think ng or other observable ideas though we know not hat it is

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Cf Bk III ch § 15

Cf Lock s F t *Letter* to Stillingfleet pp 32

altern as it were the proportion f th bul of the min te parts f coloured bject t u usu al s ht, produces different deas from what t did before Thus, sand or pounded glass, which opaque and wh to th naked eye is pellu cid in microscope and hair seen n this way loses its former colour and is, in a great measure pell cid, w th mixture f some bright spark lin colours, such as ppear from the refraction of diamonds, and th pell c d bod es Blood, to the naked eye ppears all red but by good microscope wherein its lesser parts appear shows only some few gl bules f red, swimming in a pellucid liquor and how these red globules would ppear if glasses could be found that could yet magnify them thousand o t n thousand times more, is uncertain.

Our facu es for d scovery f the q al ti and power f sub ance suit d t our stat Th infin te wise Contri er of us, and all things bout us, hath fitted our senses, f culties, and organs, t the conveniences f lif and the bus ness we ha e to do here. W are ble, by our senses, t know and distinguish things and to exami th m so far as to apply them to our uses, and several wa s to ccommodat th exige ces f this life. W ha e insight enou h into th dmirabl contrivances and wo derful ffects, to dmire and magnify th wisd m, power and good ess f th ir A thor ch knowledge as this, h ch is suit ed to our prese t cond ti we wan t f cul ties to ttain. Bu ppears t th t God tended we should ha e perfect, cl ar and d quate knowledge f them that perhaps is ot in the comp eh ns on f any fin be g W are furnished w th faculties (d ll and weak as they are) to discover nou h th cre tures to lead us t the knowledge f th Cr to nd th knowled of our d ty and we are fitted well enough th bilities to prov d for th co en iences f l ing these ar our business in this world. Bu were our senses al ered and mad much qui ker and cu th ppearance and outward scheme f thi gs would ha e qu t an ther f ce to us and, I am pt t think, would be inconsiste w th our be or l ast well bei g in this part f th un erse which we in habit. H that considers how l ttl our constitu tion is bl bear remov to parts f this air not much higher than that we commonly bre th in, will ha e ason to be satisfied that in this gl be f arth al t ed for our mans the all-wise Archi ect has su ed our organs and the bodies that ar ffec th m, one t an th er If our se se f hearin were but thousand times qu ker than t is, how ould a pe petual no e distr ct us. And we should in the quietest retirem nt be less ble to sleep or meditat than in th middl of a se fight. Nay if that most in struct e f our senses, seeing were in any man thousand or h ndred thousand times mor cut than t is by the best microscope, th gs sev e al milli ns f times less than the smallest b ject f his ht now would th n be is ble to his naked eyes, and so h would come neare to t discovery f the t ture and motu n f the n t parts of corporeal thi gs and in many f them, probably g t deas f the internal cons tut ns but th he would be in a q t d ffer nt wo ld from other peopl nothing would appear the same to him and others th isible deas of everything would be differe t. So that I doubt wh th he and th rest of men could discourse co cerning th objects of sight, or ha e any communicati n abo t colours, the ppear ances being so wholly diff rent. And perhaps such a quickness and t derness f ght could n t endure bright sunshin or so much as pen d ylight no take in but a ery small part of any bject t nce, and that too nly t a ery

would n t mak any great d a tag by the hange, if such an cut ght would n t serve t co d ct him to th market and xchan f h could n t see things he was to o d at co eni nt distance or disti gui h things he had t d w th by those sens ble qualities others do H that was sharp- ghted nough t se the configurati of th minut particles f th sprin of a clock, a d observe upo what peculia tructure and impulse ts lastic m tion d pe ds w uld no doubt discov som th g ery dmi bl but if eyes so framed could n t ev t once th hand and th char ters f th hour pl t and th by t distance see what o clock t was th ir owner could not be m h be fited by th t cu ess which, whilst t discovered th secr t co tr ance f th parts f th mach e mad him lose its use

3 *Co jectu about the corpor l organs f ome pint* And here gi e me l e t propose an tra agant conjecture of mi ne. That ince w ha some reaso (if there be any credit t be gi t th report f thi gs that our philosophy *cannot* ccount for) imagine that Spir ts can assume t themsel es bod es f differ t bulk, figur and *conformat* f parts—wh th o great d antage som f them ha e ove us may

'Cf I troduction, § 5.

colour and consistency of *wood* By the former fire immediately by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several powers which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire and so make them a part of the complex idea of it For all those powers that we take cognizance of terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the complex ones of the sort of substances though these powers considered in themselves are truly complex ideas And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood when I name any of these *potentialities* among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of *p rticular substances* For the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances

8 *And why* Nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances since their secondary qual ties are those which in most of them erve principally to distinguish substances[2] one from another and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them For our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk texture and figure of the minute parts of bodies on which *their real constitutions and differences depend*[3] we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristical notes and marks whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds and distinguish them one from another all which secondary qualities as has been shown are nothing but bare powers For the colour and taste of opium are as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues mere powers depending on its pr mary qualities whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bod es

9 *Th ee sorts f ideas make our complex ones f corporeal substances* The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances are of these three sorts First the ideas of the primary qual it es of things which are discovered by our sens

which depending on these are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses which ideas are not in the things themselves otherwise than as anything is in its cause Thirdly the aptness we consider in any substance to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before these are called active and passive powers all which powers as far as we have any notice or notion of them terminate only in sensible simple ideas For whatever alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron did not its sensible motion discover it and I doubt not but there are a thousand changes that bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another which we never suspect because they never appear in sensible effects

10 *Powers thus make a great part of our complex ideas f particul r substances Powers* therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances He that will examine his complex idea of gold will find se eral of its ideas that make it up to be only powers *as the power of* being melted but of not spending itself in the fire of being dissolved in *aqua regia* are ideas as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold as its colour and weight which if duly considered *are also nothing* but different po ers For

heat which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun is no more really in the sun than the white colour it introduces into wax These are both equally powers in the sun operating by

in a man the idea of white

11 *The now seco da y qualities of bodies would*

1 substances *m ter l* ubst nces not *p t l* are what h has in vi w n §§ 7–14

Cf Bk II ch v §§ 10 13 14 23–26

Cf Bk II h viii. §§ o 13 14 23–26

4 Cf Bk. IV h iii. § 11

naked eyes produces a c rtai colour s by thus augment ng the acute ess of our senses d scovered to be quite a different thing and the th s

colours, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

17. *Cohesion of solid parts and impulse the primary ideas peculiar to body.* The primary ideas we have peculiar to body as contradistinguished to spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable, parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse. These, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the consequence of finite extension.

18. *Thinking and motivity the primary ideas peculiar to spirit.* The ideas we have belonging and peculiar to spirit, are thinking, and will, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, and, which is consequent to it, liberty. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body which it meets with at rest, so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The ideas of existence, duration, and mobility are common to them both.

19. *Spirits capable of motion.* There is no reason why it should be thought strange that I make mobility belong to spirit; for having no other idea of motion, but change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest; and finding that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are; and that spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits (for of the Infinite Spirit I speak not here). For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body, or being, as body itself; and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly conceive a distance and a change of distance between two spirits; and so conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another.

20. *Proof of this.* Every one finds in himself that his soul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is, but cannot operate on a body, or in a place, an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody can imagine that his soul can think or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that, being united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and I think may be said to be truly all that while in motion: or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will: for to consider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.

21. *God immoveable because infinite.* If it be said by any one that it cannot change place because it hath none, for the spirits are not *in loco* but *ubi*; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reason to show that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God; not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit.

22. *Our complex idea of an immaterial spirit and our complex idea of body compared.* Let us compare, then, our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other, and in which most. Our idea of body, as I

thinks, has a power of exciting motion in body, by will or thought. These, I think, are our complex ideas of soul and body as contradistinguished; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know that people whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them, are apt to say they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

23. *Cohesion of solid parts in body as hard to be conceived as thinking in a soul.* If any one says he knows not what it is thinks in him, he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the sub-

Cf. ch. xiii. § 3, and the enumeration of the real or primary qualities of matter in ch. viii. § 9.
Cf. ch. xxi.
Cf. ch. xxi. § 3.
Cf. ch. xxi. § 5; also ch. xv. § on the place of spirits, and their relations to space.

not lie in this that they can so frame and shape *to themselves organs of sensation* or perception as to suit them to their present design and the circumstances of the object they would consider For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes that one sense as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vis*ion which the assistance of glasses* (casually at first lighted on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects as to see when he pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood and other juices of animals as distinctly as he does at other times the shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us in our present state unalterable organs so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of *the minute parts of bodies* whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them would perhaps be of no advantage God has no doubt *made them so as is best for us* in our present condition He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us and we have to do with and though we cannot, by the faculties we have attain to a perfect knowledge of things yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above mentioned which are our great concernment *I beg my reader s pardon for laying be*fore him so wild a fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us but how extravagant soever it be I doubt whether we can imagine anything about the knowledge of angels but after this manner some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves And though we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them than what we have yet our thoughts can go no further than our own so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection The supposition at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies,

mo n

is unknown to us

14 *Our specific ideas of subst nces* But to return to the matter in hand —the ideas we have of substances and the ways we come by them. I say our *specific* ideas of substances are nothing else but *a collection of certain number of s mple ideas considered as united in one thing* These ideas of substances though they are commonly simple

nd h n m of th m s mple

fies by the name swan is white colour long neck, red beak black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size with a power of *swimming in* the water and making a certain kind of noise and perhaps to a man who has long observed this kind of birds some other properties which all terminate in sensible simple ideas all united in one common subject.

15 *Our ideas of spiritual substances as clear as of bodily substances* Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances of which I have last spoken —by the simple ideas we have *taken from those operat ons of our own minds,* which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking understanding willing knowing and power of beginning motion &c. *co-existing in some* substance we are able to frame the *complex idea f an imm terial spirit* And thus by putting together the ideas of thinking perceiving *liberty* and power of moving themsel es and other things we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing or the power of mo ing or quieting corpor

coherent solid parts and a power of being i ed joined *with substance of which like* ise we have no positive idea we have the idea of matter The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other the idea of thinking and *moving a* body being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extens on solidity and being moved For our idea of substance is equally obscure or d I know

to think that our senses show us noth ng but ma terial things Every act of sensat on when duly cons dered gives us an equal view of both parts of nature the corporeal and sp ritual For whilst I kno v by seeing or hearing &c that there is some corporeal being ithout me the object of that sensat on I do more certainly know that there is some sp ritual be ng within me that sees and hears This I must be convinced cannot be the act on of bare insensible matter nor e er could be without an immaterial thinking being [1]

16 *No idea of abst ct subst nce either in body or spirit* By the complex idea of extended f gured

[1] Cf Bk IV chh ix nd xi
Cf. Bk IV h § 6

er their perpetual motion, we must allow th m to ha e no cohesion one w th a.other and yet let b t s.arp cold come, and t..ev unite they consoldate these litl toms cohere, and are no ..out great force separabl H that could find t.. bonds that tie these heaps f loose litl bodies tog-ther so firml h that could mak known t.. cement that makes them stick so fast one to another would discover a great and yet u..known secret and yet when that was done would h- be far enou..h from makin th exten sion of bod (which is t.. cohesion of ts solid parts) i..tell..ible, till h could show wherein consisted t.. u..ion, or consoudatio f th parts of those bonds, or f that cement, or f th least partic.. of matter that exists. Whereby t p- pears that this primary and supposed obv ous qu..ity of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensibl as anything belong i..g to our minds, and solid ext nded substance as hard to be conceived as thinkin immaterial on.. whatever difficulties some would raise against t.

71 —

ble as the co..esion tself. For if matter be considered, as no doubt t is, fin e, l t any one send his contemplation to th extremities f the universe, and there see what concei abl hoops, what bond he can imagin to hold this mass f matter in so close pressure together from whence teel has ts firmness, and the parts of diamond their hard..ess and indissol bility If matter be finite it must ha e ts extremes and there must be somet...g to hinder from scattering asunder I., to avoid this difficulty any on will throw himself into the supposition and byss f in..nite matter let him consider what li..ht he thereby bri..gs to t.. cohesion of body and whether h be ever th earer makin intelligibl by re solving t into supposition the most bsurd and most i..comprehe..s ble of all t..-r so far is our ex -nsion of body (which is nothing b- t th cohesion of so..d parts) from being clearer or more distinct, hen we would inquire into th nature cause or manner f t, than th d f thinking

8. *Communication f motion by impuls or by t ug t, ..ually intell gi le* Another id we ha e f body is, *t..e power f communica..on f motion by impulse* and of our souls, *the power f xciting motion by t..ought.* These ideas, th one f bod th other of our m..nds, every day experience clear ly furnishes us with bu if here gain we inquire how this is done, we are e- ually in the dark. For in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the ther which is th ordinariest case, we can ha e o other concep on, but of th passin of motion out of one body into another which, I think, is as obscure and inconcei ab. as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. Th increase of motion by impulse which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be unders..ood. We ha e by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse a..d by thought b- t the manner how hardly comes within our comprehens on we are equally t a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion, and ts communication, either from bod or spirit, the idea which be..ongs to spirit is t least as clear as that which belongs to body And if w- consider the ctive power of moving or as I ma call t, motivity t is much clearer in pirit than body since two bodies, placed by one another t rest, will never afford us th idea of a power in the o-e to move th other but by a borrowed motion whereas t. mind every day affords us ideas of an ctive pow er f movin of bodies and therefore t is wort.. our consid-ration, whet..er acti e power be no the proper ttribute of spirits, and passi e pow er of matter Hence may be conectured that created spiri.s are not totally separa.e from mat ter because they are both ctive and passi e Pure spirit, viz. God is only ctive pure matter

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t.. communication f motion by thou ht, which we ttribut to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse which we ascribe to body Constant experience makes us sensibl f both these t..ough our narrow understandings can comprehend nei ther For when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or reflecti n, and pen trat into th ir causes, and manner of production, we find stil t discovers nothing but ts own short-sightedness.

29. *Summary* T conclude. Sensation convinces us that t..ere are solid extended substances and re..ection, that there are t..inkin ones experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath powe to move body b impulse, the ther by thou..ht this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say every moment fur

stance is of that solid thing Further if he says he knows not how he thinks I answer Neither knows he how he is extended how the solid parts of body are united or cohere together to make *extension For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter that are grosser than the* particles of air and have pores less than the corpuscles of air yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves And —

bodies yet it cannot make bonds for *itself* and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis* So that that hypothesis how ingeniously soever explained by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies reaches not the parts of the æther itself and by how much the more evident it proves that the parts of other bodies are held *together by the external pressure of the æther and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union by so much the more it leaves* us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the æther itself which we can neither conceive without parts they being bodies and divisible nor yet how their parts cohere they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies

24 *Not explained by an ambient fluid* But in truth the pressure of any ambient fluid how great soever can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished *superficies one from another in a line perpendicular to them as in the experiment of two polished marbles* yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion in a line parallel to those surfaces Because the ambient fluid having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space deserted by a lateral motion resists such a motion of bodies so joined no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid and touched no other body and therefore if there were no other cause of cohesion *all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion For if the pressure of the æther* be the adequate cause of cohesion wherever that cause operates not there can be no cohesion And since it cannot operate against a lateral separation (as has been shown) therefore in every imaginary plane intersecting any mass of matter there could be ... of two polished surfaces.

another So that perhaps how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, *he that shall well consider it in his mind may have reason to conclude That it is as easy for* him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks as how body is extended For since body is no further nor otherwise extended than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking and how it is performed

5 *We can as little understand how the parts cohere in extension as how our spirits perceive or move* I allow it is usual for most people to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe Do we not see (will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick *firmly together? Is there anything more common? And what doubt can there be made of it?* And the like I say concerning thinking and voluntary motion Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear I confess but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done there I think we are at a loss both in the one and the other and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere as how we ourselves perceive or move *I would have any one intelligibly explain to me*

come in a few moments to be so ... here so strongly one to another that the utmost force of men s arms cannot separate them? A considering man will I suppose be here at a loss to satisfy his own or another man s understanding

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... extended sub ... it com ... remely ... who

by a microscope (and yet I have ... of some that have magnified to ten thousand nay to much above a hundred thousand times) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk figure or motion and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another that the least force sensibly separates them Nay if we consid

of the simpl ideas we receive from reflecti n g having from what we experime t in our sel es, got the ideas f exist ce and durati n of knowledge and po er of pleasure and happ ness and of several ther qualities and powers, which t is bette to have than t be w th ut hen we would fram an dea the most suitabl e can to the S preme Being we nlarge ery on of these w th our id f infinity and so p t ing them tog th mak our complex idea of God. F that the mind has such pow of n larg n som f ts deas, recei ed fr m sensa

tion we rece e from th operation of our own minds we can ttribute to spirits no ther but what we rece e from thence and all th diff ce we can put between them, in our co t m plation of spirits, is only in the several ext ts and d grees f their kn wledge powe durati happiness, &c. For that in our deas as well f pirits as of ther things, we are restrained t *thos u ceive f om sens t and flection*, is ev d t from h ce —That, in our deas f p rits, how much soeve d anced in perfecti n be yo d those f bodies, even to that f infinite we cann t yet ha e any d f th manner whe ein th y discover their thoughts to an th though we must necessarily conclud that sep- ar te pirits, which are beings that ha e per fecter kn wledg and gr ter happiness than w must needs ha e also a perfect way of com municating th ir thou hts than we ha h ar fain to mak use of corporeal signs, and par ticular sounds which are th fore f most g n eral use as being th best and quickest e ar capabl of B t f immediat commu cati n ha ing n experim t in oursel es, and conse q ntly no n tion f t t all, we ha e no d how spirits, which use not words, can w th qu ck ness, much less how spirits that ha e bodies can be mast rs f th ir own thoughts, and com municate or conceal them t pleasur though we cann t but ecessarily suppose they ha such a pow

37 *Recapitulation.* And thus e ha e se n what k

The same also I can d of knowing them more perfectly all th ir qualities, powers, causes consequences, and lati ns, &c. till all be pe fectly known that is in them, r can any way late to them and thus frame th d f infinite or boundless knowledge Th sam may also be done of power till we come to that we call in finite and also of th dur ti f exist ce w th out beginning or d and so frame the d f an eternal being Th degrees or extent wherein ascribe exist ce pow wisdom, and all the perfections (which we can ha any id as of) to that sovere gn Be g which we call God being all boundless and infinite, w frame the best idea f him our minds are cap bl f all which is d e, I say by enlargi g those imple ideas e ha e tak from th pe ti ns f our own minds, by effectio by our senses, fr m exterior things, to that astness to which infinity can extend th m.

35 *God his own essence ... g as bl* For t is infinity which, joined to ur deas f existe ce power knowledg &c. makes that comple idea, whereby w represe t to ursel es th best we can, the S preme Being For though in his own essence (which certainly w d t know not knowing th real esse ce of a pebbl fly or f our own sel es) God be impl and un compou ded yet I think I may say we ha e no oth dea of him, but a compl x e of exis- tence knowledge power happiness, &c. infinit and ternal hich are all distinct id as, nd some f them, being relati e are gain com pounded f oth rs all which being as has been sho n, originally got from sensati n and reflec tion go to mak up the dea r notion we ha e f God.

36 *N deas our mpl deas f spirits but*

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Cf. Berk ley *Principle* § th xagger tio f our blindness as t th tru and real na ture of things. Cf. Bk. IV chh. ix, x, xi.

Cf Bk. I h iii. §§ 8– 7 Bk II ch. xv §§ Bk. IV ch. xvii. § regarding our complex idea nd knowledge f God, in its gradual develop- ment.

nishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other But beyond these ideas as received from their proper sources our faculties will not reach If we would inquire further into their nature causes and manner we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking If we would explain them any further one is as easy as the other and there is no more difficulty to conceive how *a substance we know not* should by thought set body into motion than how *a substance we know not* should by impulse set body into motion So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit From whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts beyond which the mind whatever efforts it would make is not able to advance one jot nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas

30 *Our idea of spirit and our idea of body compared* So that in short the idea we have of spirit compared with the idea we have of body stands thus the substance of spirits is unknown to us and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us Two primary qualities or properties of body viz solid coherent parts and impulse we have distinct clear ideas of so likewise we know and have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or properties of spirit viz h l ng nd [illegible]

ideas of them which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts and their motion We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz believing doubting intending fearing hoping all which are but the several modes of thinking We have also the ideas of willing and moving the body consequent to it and with the body itself too for as has been shown spirit is capable of motion

31 *The notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of body* Lastly if this notion of immaterial spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it not easily to be explained we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us For I would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed or nearer a contradiction than the very notion of body includes in it the divisibility *in infinitum* of any finite extension involving us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance

32 *We know nothing of things beyond our simple ideas of them* Which we are not at all to wonder at since we having but some few superficial ideas of things discovered to us only by the senses from without or by the mind reflecting on what it experiments in itself within have no knowledge beyond that much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge and the power of voluntary motion as certainly as we experiment or discover in things without us the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit as with our notion of body and the existence of the one as well as the other For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity i e immaterial to exist as a solid thing without thinking i.e matter to exist especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter than how matter should think For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature of things we fall presently into darkness and obscurity perplexedness and difficulties and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection and so is it of all our other ideas of substances even of God himself

33 *Our complex idea of God* For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being we shall find that we come by it the same way and that the complex ideas we have both of God and separate spirits, are made

of the simple ideas we receive from reflection g. ha ing from what we experiment in our ves, got the ideas of existence and dur tion of knowledge and power of pleasur and happ ness and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to ha e than to be w thout when we would f ame an idea the most suitable we can to the S pr me Being w enlarg every one of these with our idea f nfinity and so put ting them together make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has such a pow of en larging some f ts ideas, eceı ed from sensa

or a l, perhaps imperfectly I can frame an idea of kno ing twice as many which I can double again, as f en as I can dd to umber and thus enlarg my idea of knowled by extending ts comprehension to all things existing or possible. The same also I ca do of knowing them mor perfectly i.e. all their qualities, powers, causes consequences, and lations &c. till all be per fectly known that is in them, or can any way e 6

other perfections (which w can ha e any ideas of) to that sovereign Being, which w call God being all boundless and infinite we frame th best idea f him our minds ar capabl of all hich is done, I say by enlarging those simpl ideas we ha take from the ope ations f our own minds, by flectio by our senses, from exterior things, to that astness to which infinity can extend them.

35 *God in his own sence ne g sable* For t is infinity which, joined to our ideas f existence power knowledg &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to oursel es, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For though in his own essence (which certainly w do not know not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or fly or f our own sel es) God be imple and un

compounded yet I think I may say we have no other d a f him, but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power happ ness, &c. infinite and ternal which are all distinct ideas, and some f them, being relative are again compounded of others all which being as has been shown, originally got from sensation and eflec tion, go to mak up the idea or notion we ha of God

36 *N deas i our ompl ideas f pirits but*

tion we rece e from t e operation of our own minds we can attribute to spirits no other but what we recei from th nce and all the diff ence we can put between them, *in our contem* plation of spirits, is only in th several extents and d grees of their knowledg power duration happiness, &c. For that n our ideas as w ll f spirits as f other things, we are restrained to *those w ces f om sensation and efle tion*, is ev d t from hence —That, in our ideas of pirits, how much soever dvanced in perfection be yond those of bod es even to that of nfinite we cannot yet ha e any idea of th manner wher n they discover their thoughts one to another though we must necessarily conclud that separate spirits, which are beings that ha e per fecter knowledg and greater happiness than w must needs ha also perfecter way f communicating their thoughts than we ha who ar fain to make use of corporeal s gns, and par ticular sounds which ar therefor *f most g n* eral use as being the best and quickest we ar capabl f. B t f immediate communication having n experiment in oursel es, and conse quently no notion of t t all, w have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quick ness or much less how spirits that ha no bodies can be masters of their *own thoughts, and com*municate or conceal them t pleasure though we cannot but necessarily suppose they ha e such power

37 *Recapitulation.* And thus we ha seen what kind f ideas w ha e of *substanc f all k ds* wherein they consist, and how w came by them. From whence I think, t is ery evident,

First, That all our ideas of the several *sort* f

Cf. Locke' letter to Anthony Collins June 9, 1 Molyneux' to Locke March 693 and Locke' reply March 8

Cf. ch. xvii. §§ 8- 3-2

Cf. Augustine, *Con ions* Bk. x. par 8- Bk. xi. par 6

Cf. Berkeley *Principle* § on the exag eration of our *blindness* as to the true and real nature of things. Cf. Bk. IV chh. ix, x, xi.

Cf. Bk. I ch. iii. §§ 8- 7 B II ch. xv §§ Bk. IV ch. xvii. § egarding our complex idea and knowledge of God, in its gradual development.

nishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other But beyond these ideas as received from their proper sources our faculties will not reach If we would inquire further into their nature causes and manner we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking If we would explain them any further one is as easy as the other and there is no more difficulty to conceive how *a substance we know not* should by thought set body into motion than how *a substance we know not* should by impulse set body into motion So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist than those belonging to spirit From whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts beyond which the mind whatever efforts it would make is not able to advance one jot nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas

30 *Our idea of spirit and our idea of body compa ed* So that in short the idea we have of spirit compared with the idea we have of body stands thus the substance of spirits is unknown to us and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us Two primary qualities or properties of body viz solid coherent parts and impulse we have distinct clear ideas of so likewise we know and have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or propert es of spirit viz thinking and a power of action i e a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions We have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies and have the clear distinct ideas of them which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts and their motion We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz believing doubting intending fearing hoping all which are but the several modes of thinking We have also the ideas of willing and moving the body consequent to it and with the body itself too for as has been shown spirit is capable of motion

31 *The notion of spirit involves mo e difficulty in it than that of body* Lastly if this notion of immaterial spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it not easily to be explained we have therefore no mo e reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because the notion of body is cumbered with some d fficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us For I would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it the divisibility *in infinitum* of any finite extension involving us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance

3 *We know nothing of things beyond our simple ideas of them* Which we are not at all to wonder at since we having but some few superficial ideas of things discovered to us only by the senses from without or by the mind reflecting on what it experiments in itself within have no knowledge beyond that much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things bein destitute of faculties to attain it And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge and the power of voluntary motion as certainly as we experiment or discover in things without us the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit as with our notion of body and the existence of the one as well as the other For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking they being both but simple ideas, in [illegible] d having as clear [illegible] to exist especially since it is not hard [illegible] ceive how thinking should exist without matter than how matter should think For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas [illegible] have from sensation and reflection and d[illegible] further into the nature of things we fall presently into darkness and obscurity perplexedness and difficulties and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance *But which*ever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensat on or reflection and so is it of all our other ideas of substances even of God himself

33 *Our complex idea of God* For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being we shall find that we come by it the same way and that the complex ideas we have both of God and separate spirits, are made

of the simple ideas we receive from reflection ... having, from what we experiment in our selves, got the ideas of existence and duration of knowledge and power of pleasure and happiness, and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity and so put ting them together make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has such a power of en larging some of its ideas, received from sensa tion and reflection, has been already shown.

34. *Our complex idea of God as ...* If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all perhaps imperfectly I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many which I can double again, as often as I can add to number and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge by extending its comprehension to all things existing or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly i.e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations, &c., till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power till we come to that we call infinite and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end, and so frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that sovereign Being which we call God being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of all which is done, I say by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection by our senses, from exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

35. *God in his own essence incognisable.* For it is infinity which, joined to our ideas of existence, power knowledge, &c., makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to ourselves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For though in his own essence (which certainly we do not know not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly or of our own selves) God be simple and un compounded yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of existence knowledge, power happiness, &c., infinite and eternal which are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being relative are again compounded of others: all which being, as has been shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

36. ... *ideas in our complex ideas of spirits but* ...

tion we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge power duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection, is evident from hence,—That, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such power

37. *Recapitulation.* And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of substances of all kinds wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our ideas of the several sorts of

Cf. Locke letter to Anthony Collins, June 20, 1703 and

Bk. ii, par 6.

Cf. Berkeley *Principles* § ... on the exaggeration of our blindness as to the true and real nature of things. Cf. Bk. IV chh. ix, x, xi.

Cf. Bk. I, ch. iii §§ 8–17 Bk. II ch. xv §§ Bk. IV ch. xvii § regarding our complex idea and knowledge of God, in its gradual development.

substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas with a supposition of *something* to which they belong and in which they subsist though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all

Secondly That all the simple ideas that thus united in one common *substratum* make up our complex ideas of several *sorts* of substances are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions we cannot go beyond those simple ideas And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection or discover by sensation in other things we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas which we originally received from sensation or reflection as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels and particularly of God himself

Thirdly That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances when truly considered are only *powers* however we are apt to take them for positive qualities v g the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of *gold* are yellowness great weight ductility fusibility and solubility in *aqua regia* &c all united together in an unknown *substratum* all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances and are not really in the gold considered barely in itself though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution whereby it has a fitness differently to operate and be operated on by several other substances [1]

Chap XXIV *Of Collective Ideas of Substances*

1 *A collective idea is one idea* Besides these complex ideas of several *single* substances as

up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea and which so joined are looked on as one v g the idea of such great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name *world* is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it it sufficing to the unity of any idea that it be considered as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars

2 *Made by the power of composing in the mind* These collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of composition and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas united in one substance And as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity makes the collective mode or complex idea of any number as a score or a gross &c —so by putting together several particular substances it makes collective ideas of substances as a troop an army a swarm a city a fleet each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea in one view and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man and consider them all together as one

3 *Artificial things that are made up of distinct substances are our collective ideas* Amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances and in truth if we consider all these collective ideas aright as *army constellation universe* as they are united into so many single ideas they are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things very remote and independent on one another into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception and signified by one name For there are no things so remote nor so contrary which the mind cannot by this art of composition bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*

Chap XXV *Of Relation*

1 *Relation what* Besides the ideas whether simple or complex that the mind has of things as they are in themselves there are others it gets from their comparison one with another The understanding in the consideration of anything is not confined to that precise object it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself or at least look

[1] Cf I v § 13

Bk I i § i ... III h v Bk IV hh ix–xi

beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity t a th When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it and set it by an other and carries its view from one to the other— this is, as the words import, *lation* and *espect* and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it are what we call *relative* and the things so brought together *related* Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being it takes in thing but that idea but what really exists in Caius v g when I consider him as a man I have in thing in my mind but the complex d f th species, man. So likewise when I say Caius is a white man, I have in thin but the bare consideration f man wh hath that white colour But when I give Caius the name *husband* I intimate some other person and when I give him the name *whiter* I intimate some other thing in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into considera tion. And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together and as it were takes view of them at once, though still considered as distinct ther f any of u d as may be t for d tu f rel tu As n th bo m n tio ed insta ce th co tr t d cer m f marriage with Sempronia is the occasion f the den minati and lati f husband and the colour whi th occasio why h is said to be whiter than free st ne

I as f l ns u th at ert l t terms not ea y per hen d These and the like l tions, expressed by relative terms that ha others an swering them, with reciprocal intimation, as fa ther and son, bigger and less, cause and effect, are very obvious every e, and everybody t first sh perce es th lation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such th correlative terms, se m so arly belo to an th and throu h cust m, d so readil chime and an swer one another in people memories, that, upon the namin f ther f th m, th thou hts are prese tl carried beyond the th n so named and nobod ove looks or doubts f latu n, whe is so plainl intima ed B wher langua es ha failed to give corr lative names, there the relati is t al ays so asily tak n n tice C *Concubine* is, doubt, lative name, as well as *wife* bu in languages wher this and th lik words have no correlative term, there peopl are no so p tak them to be so, as wa ti tha evid mark f relati which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another and not to be ble to exist, but together Hence it is, that ma y of those names, which, duly co sidered, do incl d evident relat ns, ha e been called *external denominations* But all names that are more tha mpty sounds must s gn f some d h th e t which i name

t cludes relation.

3 *Som t er y hold terms contain ns* Another so t f elative terms there is, which re not looked on t be ther elati e or so much as xt rnal d nominations wh ch yet, under the form and ppeara ce of signifying something b solut in the subject, d conce l a tacit, though less bservabl r lation S ch are th seem ngl pos ti e t rms *old, gr t imperfect* &c. where of I shall ha e occasio t speak more at large the f llow g chapters.

4 *F la on d ferent f om t e t s d* This furth may be bserved That the id as f l tion ma be the same n men who ha e far dif f re t id as f the th gs that are related or that ar thus compared g those who ha e far d f ferent id as of a man may y t agree in the no tio of a f ther which is a otion super nd ced

5 *Chang f a on may be ou any ha t a t dued* Th nature therefore f relation con ts in the referrin or comparing two th on to nother from which compariso one or both comes to be d ominated And f e t e of those things be moved or ceas t be the re lati ceases, and the denominati n conseq t t t, thou h th ther ece e in itself o al era tion t ll v g Caius, whom I consider to-d as father ceases t be so to-morrow nl by the death f his son, w thout any al ration mad n himself. \ barely by the m nd s cha g th bject to which compares an thing th same thin is cap bl f ha ing co trary d nom na ti s t t same time g Caius, compared t several persons, ma be truly be said to be lder and younger stron er and weaker &c.

6 *Rel on y between two t* Whatsoeve d th or can exist, or be considered as on thin is pos ti and so not nly simpl deas and sub ces, b modes ls re po ti beings thou h th parts f which they consist are ery

tinct idea at all

Secondly That all the simple ideas that thus united in one common *substratum* make up our complex ideas of several *sorts* of substances are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acqua nted with and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions we cannot go be

ceive in ourselves by reflection or discover by

dent in the complex ideas we have of angels and particularly of God himself

Thirdly That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances when *truly considered are only powers* however we are apt to take them for positive qualities v g the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of *gold* are yellowness great weight ductility fusibility and solubility in *aqu regia* &c all united together in an unknown *subst a t m* all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances and are not really in the gold considered barely in itself though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution whereby it *has a fitness differently to operate* and be operated on by several other substances

Chap XXIV *Of Collective Ideas of Substances*

1 *A collective idea is one idea* Besides these complex ideas of several *single* substances as

up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea and which so

as much one idea as the idea of a ma and

Cf ch v § 13

Bk I ch § III ch vi Bk IV chh ix–xi.

great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name *world* is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it it sufficing to the unity of any idea that it be considered as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars

2 *Made by the power of composin in the mind* These collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of composition and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas united in one substance And as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity makes the collective mode or complex idea of any number as a score or a gross &c —so by putting together several particular substances it makes collective ideas of substances as a troop an army a swarm a city a fleet each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea in one view and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man and consider them all together as one

3 *A tificial things that are made up of distinct substances re ou collect ve ideas* Amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances and in truth if we consider all these collective ideas aright as *rmy con stell t on universe* as they are united into so many single ideas they are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things very remote and independent on one another into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception and signified by one name For there are no things so remote nor so contrary which the mind cannot by this art of composition bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*

Chap XXV *Of Relation*

1 *Relati n uh t* Besides the ideas whether simple or complex that the mind has of things as they are in themselves there are others it gets *from their comparison one with another* The understanding in the consideration of anything *is not confined to that precise object* it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself or at least look

beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity t... ther Whe the mind so cons ders o th g that t does as t were brin t to and set t by an other and carries ts ew ... ther—

... ed t something uttu ... so brought

man. So likewi wh I sa Caiu a man, I ha e thin but th bare cons derat n ... man wh hath that whit colour But when I give Caius t name husband I timat some the perso and wh n I g h m th nam ... I intima some ther thin in both cases my thou ht is led t som thing beyo d Ca s, and there are two things brought int consdera on. And since any d a, wh the impl or com p ex, may be th occas n why th mi d thus brings two th es together and as t wer takes a view of them t though still cons dered as d... theref any I d as may be the fou d u n f rel ti As th bo m n tio ed tata ce th tra and cerem f marriage w h Sempronia is the occas f the denominatio and relation f husband and the co u whi th occas wh h is sa d be fr er than free-sto

H as f I ns without orr lat terms not ... hended These and the lik relations, expressed by relati erms tha ha e others an swerin them, w th reciprocal intimation, as fa ther and son ba er and less, cause and ffect, are ... by ous to ery e, and every bod t first h perce es th relati For father and son, husband and wi and the other correlati e terms, se m so arl bel ng ne to another and throu h cust m, d so dil chime and an swer one another in peopl memories, tha p- on the namin f th f th m, th thou hts are prese tl carr ed beyond the thin so named and nobody erlooks or doubts I relatio where so plainly intima ed B t where langua es ha e failed to gi e correlati e names, there the relati is alw so asily tak n tice of *Concubine* is, doubt, latu e name, as well as ... but in languages where this and th lik ... words ha e no correlative term, there peopl ar no so p tak them to be so as wantin tha evid mark of relatio which is between

correlat es, whi h seem to xpla n one an ther and not to be able to exist, but together Hence t is, that ma y of those names, which, duly co... dered do incl de evid nt relations, ha e been ... are a, me ed ch m dis- h n

t includes a relatio

3 *Som ... y ... terms relat ...* Another sort f relati terms there is, wh ch are not looked on to be ther relati e or so much as xt rnal d nomina tions wh ch ... under t e form and ppearance f s gnifying something b- sol t in the subject, d conceal a tacit, though less obser ... latio S th are the term th positi e *terms of old gr ... perfect*, &c. whe f I shall ha e occasion t speak more at larg in the f llowing chapters

4 *R ... d ffe ent from the th...* This furthe may be bserved That the id as f rel tion ma be the same men who ha e far d f f re t d as f the things that are related or that are thus compared g those who ha far dif fere t deas of man may y t agree the no- n f f ther which is u n superind ced to the substance, or man, and refers I to n ct f that thing called ma whereby he co tr b- ted o th gener tion f ne f his own kind, l t man be what t will

5 *Cha- f ... may b ... out any han...* t th g ... The nature therefore of relat on consists in th ferring or comparing two thi ... o t anoth from which compariso on r both comes t be denominated. And f the f those thi ... be moved, or cease to be the re lati n ceases, and th denomination conseque t t t, though th ther ... e in tself no al ra tion t all g Caius, whom I cons der o-d father ceases t be so to-morrow o l by the d th f his so w thout an al ration mad n himself ... barely by the mind chan... the bject t which t compares an thi g th sam thin is cap bl f ha in co trary d nomin ... t th same time g Ca us, compared to several persons, ma be truly be said t be lder and younger stro g and weaker &c.

6 *Relation only betwixt two t...* Whatsoever d th or can exist, be cons dered as on thing is positi e and so not only simpl d as and sub-... ces but modes I re po ti e beings thou h th parts f which they consist are very

often relative one to another but the whole together considered as one thing and producing in us the complex idea of one thing which idea is in our minds as one picture though an aggregate of divers parts and under one name it is a positive or absolute thing or idea Thus a triangle though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea The same may be said of a family a tune &c for there can be no relation but betwixt *two th ngs considered as two things* There must always be in relation two ideas or things either in themselves really separate or considered as distinct and then a ground or occasion for their comparison

7 *All things capable of relation* Concerning relation in general these things may be considered

First That there is no one thing whether simple idea substance mode or relation or name

part of men s thoughts and words v g one single man may at once be concerned in and sustain all these following relations and *many more* viz father brother son grandfather grandson father in law son in law husband friend enemy subject general judge patron client professor European Englishman islander servant master possessor captain superior inferior bigger less older younger contemporary like unlike &c to an almost infin te number he being capable of as many relations as there can be occa

from that compar son and sometimes giv ing even the relation itself a name

8 *Our ideas of rel tio s often clearer th n of the subjects related* Secondly This further may be considered concerning relation that though it be not contained in the real ex stence of things but something extraneous and superinduced yet the deas which relati e words *stand for are often* clearer and more distinct than of those substances to which they do belong The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we l ave of a man or if you w ill *patern ty* is a thing hereof it is eas er to have a clear idea than of *huma ty* and I can much easier conceive w hat a friend is than w hat God because the knowledge of one action or one simple idea is oftentimes suffic ent to give me the notion of a relation but to the knov ing of any

substantial being an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary A man if he compares two things together can hardly be *supposed not to*

in, *more perfect and d stinct in our minds than those of substances* Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on or have a name for v g comparing two men

easy

and those being all either simple or made up of simple ones it suffices for the knov ing the precise

o ha e a clear

to Thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other v as hatched I have a clear idea of the relation of *dam* and *chick* betv een the two cassiowaries in St James s Park though perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves

Thirdly

another and so a multitude of relations yet they all terminate in and are concerned about those simple ideas either of sensation or reflection w h ch I think to be the w hole materials of all our kno ledge To clear this I shall shov it in the most considerable relations that we have any no-

the most re

past doubt that the notions v e have of them are

than are supposed really to e st in t ings to which the v ords are applied are relati e words v g a ma black m r y tho ghtful thi sty a g y ca ex tend d these and the like are all absolute because they ne ther signify nor int mate anything but w hat does or s supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated *but f ther b other ki g hus*

ba. *Harder morter* &c. are words which, together th the thing they den minate imply al so something lse separat and exterior to the ex istence f that thing

11 *All relations made p of simpl s. as* Ha in laid down these premises concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to show in some in stances, how all the ideas we ha e of relation are mad p as the thers are only of simple id as and that they all, how refi ed o rem t from sense soever they seem, terminat at last in sim he most comprehen

from the two fountains f ll our know ge sensati and reflecti I shall in the next place consider

Chap XXVI Of Cause and Effect and ther Rel ons

1 *Whence the ideas f cause an effect get* In the notice that our senses tak f th constant cissi tud f things, we cannot but observe that sev

general name, *cause* and that h is produc d *effect* Thus, finding that that substance which e call wax, fluidity which is simpl d a that as not in t before is constantly produced by the pplication of certain degree of heat we call

wood we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes, as ffect So that whatever is considered by us to cond ce perate t th producing any particular simpl d a, or collec tio of simpl id as, whether substance or mode, which did befor exist, hath thereby in our minds th relation of cause and so is denominated by us.

2 *Creation, generation, making alteration.* Ha in thus, from what our senses ar bl to disco er

in the perations of bodies on one an ther got the n tion of cause and effect, that a cause is that wh ch makes an other thin ther s imple idea, substance or mod begin t be and an ffect is that which had its beginning from some other thing the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish th several originals of things t two sorts —

we call *cr at on.*

Secondly When a thing is mad up of particles, which did all of th m before exist but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles, which considered all together mak p such a collection of simpl id as, had not any existence before as this man this egg rose or cherry &c. And this, when referred to substance produced in the ord nary course of nature by n ternal principl but set on work by and rece ed from, some external agent, or cause and work ing by insens ble way which we percei e not, we call *generation.* When the cause is extrinsical and the effect prod ced by a sensible separation or ju ta positi n of discernible parts, we call t *mak ing* and such are all artificial thi gs. When any simpl idea is prod ced which was n t in that subject before we call t *alter tion.* Thus a man

which were n t there before are effects and those things wh ch perated to th xiste ce causes. In which, and all ther cases, w may observ that th noti n of cause and ffect has its rise from ideas recei ed by sensation or reflection and that this relation, how comprehensive soever terminates t last in them. For to ha e th idea of cause and ffect, t suffices t cons d any simpl idea or substance as beginning t exist, by the operation of som othe w thout knowing the *manner* f that peration.

3 *R lations f me* Time and place are also the foundations of very large relati ns and all finit beings t least are co cerned in them. But ha ing alre dy shown in an ther place how we get those ideas, t may suffice here t intimat that most of the d ominations of things received from *time* are only la ns. Thus, when any one says th t Q een Eliz beth l ed ixty and reigned forty fi e years, these words import only

Cf. ch. xx. §§ 4 also th *First Letter* to Stillingfleet, p. 35.
Cf. Bk. IV ch. x.

Cf. Bk IV hh x, xi.
Cf. ch. § ch. vii. § 9 chh. xiii and xi

the relation of that duration to some other and mean no more but this That the duration of her existence was equal to sixty nine and the duration of her government to forty five annual revolutions of the sun and so are all words answering *How Lon ?* Again William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066 which means this That taking the duration from our Saviour s time till now for one entire great length of time it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes and so do all words of time answering to the question *When* which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer duration from which we measure and to which we thereby consider it as related

4 *Some ideas of time supposed positive nd found to be relative* There are yet besides those other words of time that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas which yet w ll when considered be found to be relative such as are young old &c which include and intimate the relation anything has to a certain length of duration whereof we have the idea in our minds Thus having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years when we say a man is *youn* we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to and when we denom nate him *old* we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed And so it is but comparing the particular age or duration of th s or that man to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals which is plain in the application of these names to other things for a man is called young at twenty years and very young at seven years old but yet a horse we call old at twenty and a dog at seven years because in each of these we compare their age to different ideas of duration which are settled in our minds as belonging to these several sorts of animals in the ordinary course of nature But the sun and stars though they have outlasted several generations of men we call not old because we do not know what per od God hath set to that sort of be ngs This term belonging properly to those th ngs which we can observe in the ord nary course of things by a natural decay to come do to a ruby or a diamond things whose usual periods we know not.

5 *Relations of place and extension* The relat on also that things have to one another in their *plac s* and distances is very obvious to observe as above below a mile distant from Charing cross in England and in London But as in duration so in extension and bulk there are some ideas that are relative which we signify by names that are thought positive as *great* and *l ttle* are truly relations For here also having by observation settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things from those we have been most accustomed to we make them as it were the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others Thus we call a great apple such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to and a little horse such a one as comes not up to the s ze of that idea which we have in our minds to belong ord narily to horses and that will be a great horse to a Welchman which is but a little one to a Fleming they two having from the different breed of their countries taken several sized ideas to which they compare and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little

6 *Absolute terms ften stand for relations* So likewise weak and strong are but relati e denominations of pov er compared to some ideas we have at that time of greater or less power Thus when we say a weak man we mean one that has not so much strength or po er to move as usually men have or usually those of h s size have wh ch is a comparing h s strength to the idea we ha e of the usual strength of men or men of such a size The like when we say the creatures are all weak things eak there is but a relati e term s gnifying the disproportion there is in the po er of God and the creatures And so abundance of words in ordinary speech stand only for relations (and perhaps the greatest part) wh ch at first sight seem to ha e no such significat on g *the ship has necessary stores Nec ss y and stores* are both relative words one having a relat on to the accomplishing the voyage intended and the other to future use All wh ch relations ho they are confi ed to and termi ate in ideas derived from se sation or reflect on is too obvious to need any explication

Chap XXVII *Of Identity and Diversity*[1]

its lf ist g t a ther t me and thereon form the

[1] See Lock s l tt rs to M ly ux Aug 23 1693 nd M rch 8 695

ideas of *dertily* and *d ernty* Wh n we see any thing t be in any pla n a y instant f time, ᵉe ar sur (be t what t will) that it is that very thing and t an th r which at that sam time xists in an th r pla e how like and u distı guishabl soever it may be in all oth r espects and in this consists *ident ty* when th d as it is attributed t ary ot at all f m what they w re that mome t wherein we cons der th r f rmer existe ce and t which we compare the present. For ve finding n r co ce ving t poss ble, that tw things f th same ki d should xist in th same place at th same tum we ghtly con cl d that, whatever exists anywh r at any time, excl d all of th same ki d a d is th r itself alon Wh ther for we demand wh th r a y thi g be th *same* or o t fers al ys t some thing that existed such time in such a place hich t was certain t that instant, was the same w th tself and no ther F m wh nce it f llows, *that thing ca* *tha* two beginn gs f e- istence, tw things o begin g t being imposs bl for tw thi gs f th sam kind t be xist in th m t nt, in th ery sam pla d the same th g in d ff re t places. That, ther f that had e beginning th sam thing and that wh ch had a d ffer t beginning in tum and place fr m that, is not th same, but d erse Th t which has mad the difficulty bout this latio has be th little car and tte tion used in ha ing p ecise n ti ns of th things t wh ch t is ttr buted

2 *Ident ty f sub tance* W ha th deas but of three sorts f substances 1 *God.* 2 *F nite n- tell gences* 3 *Bod*

First, *God* is w thout beginning ternal, un alt bl and rywh and th f con cerning his d tuty th can be no d bt.

sta ces, or anyth ng else o e from another[1] For example could two bod es be i the same place at the sam time th n those two parcels of mat ter must be one and the same tak them gre t or littl nay all bod es must be one a d the same For by the sam reason th t two particles of mat te may be n o e place all bod es may be n n pl ce wh h wh n it ca be supposed takes vay th distıncti n of de t ty a d d ers ty of o e d *more* nd re ders it r d culous. B t t be g a contr d ction that two or more should be ne de t ty a d d ersity are r latı ns and ways f comp ring well founded a d of use to the u d rsta ding

Identity f mod s and r l t ons All oth thi gs being but modes o elations lumately t rm nated n substa ces, th id uty a d d ers ty f each particular ex te ce of them too will be by th same w y d termined only as t th ngs w l ose exist nce is *succession* such as are the *ctions* of fi t bei gs v g *m t* and *th ght* both wh ch consist in co ti ued train of succession co cerning *their* d ers ty there can be no q es- ti because ach perishi g the mome t t be gins, they can t exist n diff re t times, or diffe nt places, a perma ent beings can t dif fer nt times exist distant pl ces a d theref re no motion or thought, cons d ed as t d ffere t times, can be th same, e ch part thereof ha g a d ffe ent begi ing f e iste ce.

3 *Princip um Ind vıduat onı* From what has been said t s easy to discover what is so much quired afte the *princip um ind vıduat onıs* d that, t is plain is xist ce tself which d t mines being f any sort to a particular time a d pl ce, commun cabl t tw beings of the s m ki d This, though t eems as to co ce n

t exists.

Thirdly Th same will hold *f ev ry partıcl f matter* to which dd tion or subtr ti f matt be g m d t is the me F th gh these thr so ts f substan es, as w te m them, d t cl d an th *ou* f th sam place y t w can co ce but th t they must ces- sarily ch f th m cl d any f th am ki d out f th sam pl or lse th t and names f d i y and d y would be ain, and th could be ch distin ti ns f sub-

mutabl pe fi s e ist g a d t mined tim d place t is evid t, that, cons dered n *any insta* t of ts xist ce t is that ta t th sam w th is lf Fo be g at that insta t what t i and thing ls t i th same, a d so must continue as l g as ts xist nce s co tin u d f l g t will be the sam and th In lik ma f tw mo e t ms be j d togeth to th sam mass, ry f those toms will be the same by th for g ing rule and whilst th y xist united t geth the mass, con ti g f th m t ms, must be the sam

Cf Bk I ch. iii. §§ 4-5 on th origin f th idea f den ty

Cf. h xxiii also Bk. IV chh ix, xi.

[1] Cf ch xx ii, §§ 9-2 as t Lock me g where h supposes *pir ts* be subject t la ions f place d pe ks f God mn present

mass or the same body let the parts be ever so

of living creatures their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles but on something else For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity an oak growing from a plant to a great tree and then lopped is still the same oak and a colt grown up to a horse sometimes fat, sometimes lean is all the while the same horse though in both these cases there may be a manifest change of the parts so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter though they be truly one of them the same oak and the other the same horse The reason whereof is that, in these two cases—a *mass of matter* and a *living body*—identity is not applied to the same thing

4 *Identity of vegetables* We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter and that seems to me to be in this that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment so as to continue and frame the wood bark and leaves &c of an oak in which consists the vegetable life That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants For this organization being at any one instant in any one collection of matter is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other and is that individual life which existing constantly from that

identity which makes the same plant and all the parts of it parts of the same plant during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united

5 *Identity of anim ls* The case is not so much different in *brutes* but that any one may hence see what makes an animal and cont nues it the same Something we have like this in machines and may serve to illustrate it For example what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end which when a sufficient force is added to it,

ished by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts with one common life we should have something very much like the body of an animal with this difference That in an animal *the fitness of the organization and the motion* wherein life consists begin together the motion coming from within but in machines the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order and well fitted to receive it

6 *The identity of man* This also shows wherein the identity of the same *man* consists viz in nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession vitally united to the same organized body He that shall place the identity of man in any thing else but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body taken in any one instant

make an embryo one of years mad and sober the *same* man by any supposition that will not make it possible for Seth Ismael Socrates Pilate St Austin and Cæsar Borgia to be the same man For if the identity of *soul alo e* makes the same *man* and there be nothing in the nature of

ferent tempers may have been the same man which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration and are of opinion that the souls of men may for their miscarriages be detruded into the bodies of beasts as f t habitations with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal incl nations But yet I think nobody could he be sure that the *soul* of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs would yet say that hog were a *man* or

is applied to stand for

the same *subst nce* another the same *man* and a third the same *pers n* if *person m* and *subst nce* are three names standing for three different

ideas —for such as is th dea belonging to that name, such must be th d ntity which, f th d been littl more carefully ttended to, would possibly ha e prevented gre t d al of that con fusio hich often occurs about this matter w th no small seeming difficulties, especially concern ing *person l* id tity which therefore we shall in the next place a littl consid r

8. *Sam man* An animal is a li in organized body and conseq e tly th sam animal as we have bserved is th sam continued *l f* com municated to differe t particles f matter as they happen successi ly to be united to that organ ized living body And whatever is talked of ther definitions, ingen ou observatio puts t past doubt, that the d a in our minds, of which th sound man in our mouths is the s gn is n thing else but f an animal f such certain form. S ce I think I may be confident, that, whoeve should see a creature f hi own sh pe or make, though t had no more reaso all ts lif than a cat or a parrot, would call him till *man* or whoeve should hear cat parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but *cat* o a *parr t* and say the on was dull irrational man and th th r ery int ll ge t rational parrot. A relation we ha e in an uthor f gre t note, is suffici t to countenance the *supposti f a rational parrot*.

His words are I had mind to kn w from Prince M urice s wn mouth, the ccount f commo but m ch ered ted t ry th t I had heard so f fr m many thers, f an ld par rot h had in Brazil during his governm t th re, that pok and asked d answ red common questi ns, lik reaso abl cr tur so that those of his trai there g er lly cl ded t t be w chery or possess and f h ch pl ins, hol ed l g af erwards H lla d w uld ev er from that tim dure parrot, but sa d they all had devil them. I had h ard many par ticulars f this t ry d ass ed by people hard to be discred ted which mad m ask Prince Maurice *what th was I t. H* said w th his usual plainness and dryness in talk, there was something tru but gr t d al false f what had been reported. I d ired to kn w f him what ther was f th first. H t ld m short and cold ly that h had heard f such an ld parr t when h had be t B azil and th gh h beli ed nothing f t, and t was good w y ff yet he had so m ch cur os ty as t end for t th t it was ery gr t and ery ld and when it came first into the room wh re the prince was, w th a great many Dutchmen bout him, t sa d presently *What company f ere men er her* They asked it, wh t it th ught that man was, po ting to th p ince It answered *Some General or* *er* When they brought it close to h m, h asked t, *D ou tenez-vous* It answered *De Mari nan*. The Prince *À qui* *e-vous* The Parrot *A un Portugais* The Pr ce *Que fais t là* Parrot, *J gard l poull* Th Pri ce laughed and sa d *Vous gardez l poull* Th Parrot answered *Oui moi t j sai bien fair* and mad the chuck four or fi e times that people use t make to chick ns whe they call them. I set down the words of this worthy dialogu i French, just as Pr ce Mau rice sa d them to me I asked him in what lan guage the parrot spok and h said n Brazilian. I asked wh the h understood Brazilian he sa d No, but h had taken care to ha e two int rpret ers by him, th on a Dutchman that spoke B

r ck

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and what may pass for good one for I dare say this Prince at l ast believed himself n all h told *me ha ing er passed for* ery honest and p ous man I lea e t to naturalists to reaso nd t oth m n t bel eve, as th y pl ase upo t howev r t is not, perhaps, miss to relieve or enli n busy sce sometimes w th such d gres-sions, wh ther to th purpose or no.

I ha e take care that the re der should ha th story t large in th thor s ow words, because he seems t m not to ha e thought t incredibl for t cannot be imagined that so bl a man as he wh had suff ci cy ough t warrant all the testim es h g es of him self should tak so m ch pains, pla wh re t had thing to do, to pin so close t only ma wh m h menti ns as his fri nd but o Prince in whom he ackno ledges ery gr t honesty and p ty tory which, if he h ms lf thought incred bl h could n t but also think d culous. Th Prince t is pla who ou hes this story and our uthor who lates t f m him, both f them call this talk parrot and

Th parrot was asked, Whence com ye It

Sir William Templ his *Mem f what passed in Christend m f om 67 to 679* p 66.

I ask any one else who thinks such a story fit to be told whether if this parrot and all of its kind had always talked as we have a prince's word for it this one did —whether I say they would not have passed for a race of *rational animals* but yet whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be men and not *parrots*? For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the *idea of a man* in most people's sense but of a body so and so shaped joined to it and if that be the idea of a man the same successive body not shifted all at once must as well as the same immaterial spirit go to the making of the same man

9 *Personal identity* This being premised to find wherein personal identity consists we must consider what *person* stands for —which I think is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that consciousness[1] which is inseparable from thinking and as it seems to me essential to it it being impossible for any one to perceive without *perceiving* that he does perceive When we see hear smell taste feel meditate or will anything we know that we do so Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions and by this every one is to himself that which he calls *self* —it not being considered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances For since consciousness always accompanies thinking and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self and thereby distinguishes him self from all other thinking things in this alone consists personal identity i e the sameness of a rational being and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought so far reaches the identity of that person it is the same self now it was then and it is by the same self with this present one that

reason to doubt of if these perceptions with their consciousness always remained present in the mind whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present and as would be thought, evidently the same to itself But that which seems to make *the difficulty is this* that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another [2] and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves being intent on our present thoughts and in sound sleep having no *thoughts at all or at least none with that* consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts [3]—I say in all these cases our consciousness being interrupted and we losing the sight of our past selves doubts are raised wheth

The question being what makes the same person and not whether it be the same identical substance which always thinks in the same person which in this case matters not at all different substances by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity *of one continued life For it being the same* consciousness that makes a man be himself to him self personal identity depends on that only whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance or can be continued in a succession of several substances For as far as any intelligent being *can* repeat the idea of any past action with *the same consciousness it had of it at first* and with the same consciousness it has of any present action so far it is the same personal self For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is *self to itself* now and so will be the same self as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come and would be by distance of time or change of *substance* no more two persons than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday with a long or a short sleep between the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person whatever substances contributed to their production

11 *Personal identity in change of substances* That this is so we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies all whose particles whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self so that *we feel* when they are touched and are affected

are to every one a part of himself he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off a hand and thereby separate it from that consciousness he

[1] Cf. ch. i. §§ 10–19.

[2] Cf. ch. x. § 9.

[3] Cf. ch. i. §§ 10–17

had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus, we see the substance whereof personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

12. *Personality in change of substance.* But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons.

And to this I answer: First, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies: unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

13. *Whether in the change of thinking substances there can be one person.* But next, as to the first part of the question, Whether, if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person. I answer, that cannot be resolved but by those who know what kind of substances they are that do think, and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant were the same consciousness the same individual action it could not: but it being a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent—why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true—will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God; who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that, if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.

Cf. ch. xxiii. §§ 5, 5, etc.

14. *Whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there can be two persons.* As to the second part of the question, Whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two distinct persons; which question seems to me to be built on this,—Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again: and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that *cannot* reach beyond this new state. All those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind; since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body; and if they should not, it is plain experience would be against them. So that personal identity reaching no further than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence, must needs make different persons. Suppose a Christian Platonist or a Pythagorean should, upon God having ended all

his works of creation the seventh day think his soul hath existed ever since and should imagine it has revolved in several human bodies as I once met with one who was persuaded his had been the *soul* of Socrates (how reasonably I will not dispute this I know that in the post he filled which was no inconsiderable one he passed for a very rational man and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning)—would any one say that he being not conscious of any of Socrates s actions or thoughts could be the same *person* with Socrates? Let any one reflect up on himself and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him and in the constant change of his body keeps him the same and is that which he calls *himself* let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or Thersites at the siege of Troy (for souls being as far as we know anything of them in their nature indifferent to any parcel of matter the supposition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been as well as it is now the soul of any other man but he now having *no consciousness of* any *of the actions* either of Nestor or Thersites does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himself or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men he is no more one *self* with either of them than if the soul or immaterial spirit that now informs him had been created and began to exist, when it began to inform his present body though it were —d

more make him the same person with Nestor than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part of Nestor were now a part of this man the same immaterial substance without the same consciousness no more making *the* same person by being united to any body than the same particle of matter without consciousness united to any body makes the same person But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor he then finds himself the same person with Nestor

15 *The body as well as the soul goes to the m king of a m n* And thus may we be able without any difficulty to conceive the same person at the resurrection [1] though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here —the same consciousness go ng along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone in the change of bodies would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man be enough to make the same man For should the soul of a prince carrying with it the consciousness of the prince s past life enter and inform the body of a cobbler as soon as deserted by his own soul every one sees he would be the same *person* with the prince accountable *only for the prince s actions* but who would say it was the same *man*? The body too goes to the making the man and would I guess to everybody determine the man in this case wherein the soul with all its princely

of speaking the same person and the same man stand for one and the same thing And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit and change them as often as he pleases But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same *spirit man* or *person* we *must fix the ideas of spirit, man or person in our* minds and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them it will not be hard to deter mine in either of them or the like when it is the same and when not

16 *Consciousness alone unites actions into the s me person* But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone wherever it be and in whatsoever state make the same *man* yet it is plain consciousness as far as ever it can be ex tended—should it be to ages past—unites exist ences and actions very remote in time into the same *person* as well as it does the e istences and actions of the immediately preced ng moment so that whatever has the consciousness of present *and past actions is the same person to whom they* both belong Had I the same consc ousness that I saw the ark and Noah s flood as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter or as that I write now *I could no more doubt that I who*

in what *subst ce* you please—than *that I who* write this am the same *mys lf* now whilst I write (whether I cons st of all the same substance ma ter al or immater al or no) that I was yesterday For as to this point of being the same self it mat ters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—I be ng as much concerned and as justly accountable for any ac tion that as done a thousand years since ap-

[1] Cf. Bk IV ch xviii § 7

[2] Cf § 6

m oriated to me ow by this s lf-c nscıou ness

tak of the same consc ousness Socrates wakı g a d sl ep ng ıs not the same person. And to pun ısh Socr tes wak ng for what sleepı g Socrates tho ght, and waking Socr tes was nev r co scious f would be no mo e f r ght, than to pun ısh one twın for what hıs brotl er tw nd d where of h knev n thı g because th r outs des were so lıke that they could not be dıstınguıshed for

co cerned lor ıs ds ıı ıs tends. Thus e y fi ds that, whılst c m pr he ded d that consc o sn ss the l ttle fing ıs as much a part of hımself as hat ıs most so Upo separatı of thıs l ttl finger sh uld thıs conscıou ess go al g w th th l ttle finger

tho gh I ha e ow forgot them? I o wh n I swe that we must here take n tıc what the

h on part ıs separ t fr m an th h ıı makes th sam person, and const tutes thıs bstances

as far as th t conscıous ess eaches, and no fur ther as very wh refl ts wıll perce e

y ıs co e tering what becomes f any sub t nc n t j ıned t or aff ted w th that onsc ous ess Fo as t ıs d t ın the ınstance I g b t w ıf th consc us ess w t al g w th th lıttl fing wh t was cut ff th t would be th sam elf hıch was co ce d f th wh l body y ster day as making part f tself whose tı ns th n t cann t but dmıt as ıts own now Though f th sam body should tıll lı d ımmedıat ly from th separ t f th lıttl fing r ha ts own pecul us es wh f the l ttl finger knew thıng t w uld t t all be on cerned for t, as part f tself could own any f ıs t have any of th m mp t d t hım.

9 Which ho s heres per onal dent ty nsısts
This may show us wh personal d ntıty co ısts t ın th d t ty f bsta but, as I ha saıd ın th d tıty of consciousness where ın ıf Socr tes and th present mayo f Q ın borough gr e, they are the sam p rso f th same Socr tes waking and le ping do t par ted as ıf thos who now r at least fir t used th m, thought that s lf was changed th self sam perso was no l ge ın that man

21 *Differenc b tı en dent ty f man and f per on*
B t y t t ıs hard to co ce that Socrat the sam nd dual man hould be two persons T help us lıttl ın thıs w must cons der what ıs m ant by Socr tes or th m ındıvıd al m

First, t must be e th the same ınd vıdual ımmat ıal th kı g substa ce ın sho t, the same umer cal soul and nothıng lse.

Seco dly o th am an mal without any e gard to an ımmat ıal soul.

Thirdly th same ımmate al pırıt un ted to th sam an mal

N w tak wh h f thes supp u n y u pl as t ıs mposs bl t make pers nal de tıty

F curıous cases f d bl d f alternat personal ty James *Psy hol gy* pp 244 ff

to consist in anything but consciousness or reach any further than that does

For by the first of them it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women and in distant times may be the same man A way *of speaking which whoever admits must allow* it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons as any two that have lived in different *ages without the knowledge of one another s* thoughts

By the second and third Socrates, in this life and after it cannot be the same man any way but by the same consciousness and so making human identity to consist in the same thing *wherein we place personal identity there will be* no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person But then they who place human *identity in consciousness only and not in some*thing else must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after *the resurrection But whatsoever to some men* makes a man and cons quently the same indi vidual man wherein perhaps few are agreed per*sonal identity can by us be placed in nothing but* consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*) without involving us in great *absurdities*

2 But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk though he be never after wards conscious of it? Just as much the same per son as a man that walks and does other things in his sleep is the same person and is answer able for any mischief he shall do in it Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to *their* way of knowledge —because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real what counterfeit and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea For though punishment be annexed to personality and per

it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of but shall receive his doom his conscience accusing or excusing him

3 *Conscious ess alone unites remote existences into*

stance there is however framed without consciousness there is no person and a carcass may be a person as well as any sort of substance be so without consciousness

Could we suppose two distinct incommunica*ble consciousnesses acting the same body* the one constantly by day the other by night and on the other side the same consciousness acting by *intervals two distinct bodies I ask in the first* case whether the day and the night—man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and *Plato? And whether in the second case* there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct *clothings? Nor is it at all material to say* that this same and this distinct consciousness in the cases above mentioned is owing to the same and *distinct immaterial substances, bringing it with* them to those bodies which whether true or no alters not the case since it is evident the person*al identity would equally be determined* by the consciousness whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial sub*stance or no For granting that the thinking*

sciousness and be restored to it again as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness which it had lost for twenty years together Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance which it can not be sure of [2] but only by identity of conscious ness

4. *Not the substance with which the consciousness may be united* Indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up to have existed formerly united in the same conscious being but consciousness removed that substance is no

heat or cold or other affections having no longer any consciousness it is no more of a man s self than any other matter of the universe In like

part of its existence which I cannot upon recol

[1] Cf Locke letters to Molyneux Jan. 19 1694 and May 26 1694.

[2] Cf. § 13

m m with th t pr t c n c o ness ed t the present thi k ng bei g is a part of that f vth ng united to

has thought d e which I ca t and by my conscious ess mak my ow n thought and ction, t will n m e bel g t m wh ch er a part f me thought o d d t, tha if it h d been thought or do by any other immat rial bein anywhere existi g

25. *Consciousness unit sub tanc m terial or spi ... with the same per nal ty* I gree the m probabl opinion is, that this conscious ess is an n ed to and th affects n f d vidual im material substance

B t l t m d g to their d er hy potheses, resol e f that as they pl as This every int lligent being sens bl f happiness o misery must grant—that th is som thi g that s *him self* that h is co cerned f nd w uld ha e happy that this self has exist d in continued dura more than on nstant, and theref re t is poss bl may exist, as t has d e, mo ths and years t com w th ut ny certain bounds to be set to ts durati and may be th same self, by th same consc ous ess conti ued on for th f tur And thus, by th s conscious ess h finds himself to be th sam lf which did such and such an t n som years s ce, by which h comes to be happy or miser bl now I all which ccou t f self th sam *numerical sub stanc* is not cons dered as making the same self but th same co ti ed *consciousness* in which sev eral substa ces may ha been united and gain

sel es but pon separ tion f om th tal un on by which tha conscious ess is communicated, that which mom ince was part f oursel es, is ow no more so than part f an th man lf is part f m and is n impos bl but in littl time may bec m al part f an th person. And so w ha th sam umerical sub stance become part f two diff nt persons and the same perso preserved u d th chang f arious bstances Co ld w suppos any piri wholly tr pped f all its m mory or co sciousness f past actu ns, as we find our minds alw ys are of grea part f ours, and sometimes f them all the union or separ ti f such piritual substance would mak ariati f personal identity any more than that f any par ticle f matter does. Any substance vitally unit

then a d now — Pers as I take t

tends its lf bey u p past only by co s ousness —wh reby t be ... d ccou tabl owns a d m

ctions t can t eco cil or *appropr* ... present self by consciousness it ca be n more concerned in tha if they had never bee do and t rece e pl asure or pa n, i e eward or punishme t, on th accou t f any such ct on is all e as t be mad happy o mise bl i its first be ng w thout any d er t at all. F r sup posing *man* punished ow for what he had d e ... could be mad to h ...

apostl t lls us, th t, at th gr t day wh n every o hall rece e c rding t his d ngs the secrets f all h arts shall be laid pe Th sen tence shall be justified by th consc ous ess all persons shall ha e, that *they thems l* in what bodies soe th y appe or what substances soever that consciousness dh re t are th *sam* that committed those ctions, and deserve that pu ishment for th m.

7 *Suppos t ons that look t ang or pardonabl* ...

th y ar such as pard nabl th no- ance we are in f th natur f that thinki g thing that is n us, and h ch we look on as *our l* D d we know what t was, or how t was tied to ertain yst m of fleeting nimal pir ts wh th t could or could not perform its pe

Cf. § 9. Cf. § 18.
Cf. Bk. IV ch. ix.

tions of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is and whether it has pleased God that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one such body upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made But taking as we ordinarily now do (in the dark concerning these matters) the soul of a man for an immaterial substance independent from matter and indifferent alike to it all there can from the nature of things be no absurdity at all to suppose that the same *soul* may at different times be united to different *bodies* and with them make up for that time one *man* as well as we suppose a part of a sheep s body yesterday should be a part of a man s body to morrow and in that union make a vital part of Melibœus himself as well as it did of his ram

28 *The difficulty from ill use of names* To conclude Whatever substance begins to exist it must during its existence necessarily be the same whatever compositions of substances begin to exist during the union of those substances the concrete must be the same whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence it is the same and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes the same rule holds Whereby it will appear that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill used than from any obscurity of anything into the same and divers will easily be conceived and there can arise no doubt about it

9 *Continuance of that which we have made to be our complex idea of man makes the same man* For supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a *man* it is easy to know what is the same man viz the same spirit—whether separate or in a body—will be the *same man* Supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts though continued in a fleeting successive body remains it will be the *same man* But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape as long as that vital union and shape remain in a concrete no otherwise the same but by a continued succession of fleeting particles it will be the *same man* For whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is made when ever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination *the same existence continued* preserves it the *same* individual under the same denomination ¹

Chap XXVIII *Of Other Relations*

1 *Ideas of proportional relations* Besides the before mentioned occasions of time place and causality of comparing or referring things one to another there are as I have said infinite others, some whereof I shall mention

First The first I shall name is some one simple idea which being capable of parts or de

more &c. These relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea in several subjects may be called if one will *proportional* and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection is so evident that nothing need be said to evince it.

2 *Natural relation* Secondly Another occasion of comparing things together or considering one thing so as to include in that consideration some other thing is the circumstances of their origin or beginning which being not afterwards to be altered make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong v g father and son brothers, cousin germans &c. which have their relations by one community of blood wherein they partake in several degrees countrymen i e those who were born in the same country or tract of ground and these I call *natural relations* wherein we may observe that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life and not to the truth and extent of things For it is certain that, in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten in the several races of other animals as well as men but yet it is seldom said this bull is the grandfather of such a calf or that two pigeons are cousin germans It is very convenient that, by distinct names these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind there being occasion obligations of several duties amongst men i ere as in brutes men having very little or no cause to mind these relations they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names This by the way may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages which being suited only to the convenience of communi

¹ Cf Bk. IV ch ix.

cation, are proporti ned to th n ti ns men have, and the commerce f thoughts familiar amo gst them and n t to the r al ty or xt nt f things, nor to the various respects might be found among them no the diffe e t bstract considerations might be framed bout them. Where they had no philosophical notions, there they had no terms to xpress them and t is no ond r me should ha framed no name for those things they found o occas n to discourse of. From wh nce t is easy to imagi e why as in some countries, they may ha e not so much as the name for horse and in others, where th y are more careful of the pedigrees f their horses, than f th ir own, that there they may ha e not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred e to anoth r

3. *Ideas f institut d or voluntary lat ons* Third ly Sometimes the foundation of cons d ring things, w th reference to o another is some act whereby any n comes by a moral ight, power or bligation to d something Thus, a general is on that hath power to command an army and an army und a g neral is a coll c tion f armed men, bliged to bey one man. A citizen, or burgher is ne who has a right to certain pri il ges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon men s wills, or agreement in soci ty I call *institut d* or *voluntary* and may be distinguished from th natural, in that they are most if n t all f them, som way o ther alter ble and separ bl from th persons to whom th y ha sometimes bel ged though either f th substances, so related be destroyed. Now though these ar all ecip ocal, as well as th est, and co tain in them a reference of two things to th ther yet, because f th two things ften wants relati e nam import ing that reference men usually tak n tice f t, and th lation is commonly overlooked g patron and clien ar easily allowed to be ela tions, but constabl dictato ar n t so eadily t first hearing considered as such. Be cause th is n ~~peculiar name for those~~ who ar under the command f a dictator r con stable, exp essing relation to e ther f th m though t be certain that th of them hath a certain power er some thers, and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his cli t, or general to his army

4. *Ideas f moral lat ns* Fourthly Th is another sort f relation, which is the conformity or disagr eme t m *voluntary act ons* ha to a *rul* to which they ar ef rred and by which they are judged f which, I think, *may be* call d *oral lat on*, as being that which d minates our moral act ons, and deserves well to be ex mined th re being no part f knowledge where

var ous e us, j

stances, they are framed to dist nct compl x deas, are as has been shown so many *mix d modes* a great part wh reof ha e names an exed to them. Thus, suppos ng gratitud to be a ead iness to acknowledge and r turn kindness re ce ed polygamy to be the having more w es than o e at o ce when w f ame these noti ns thus in our m nds, we ha e ther so many de

what name bel g to such and such combina tions f id as. W have *a further and greater* concernm nt, and that is, to know wheth r such actions, so made up are morally good or bad

5. *Moral good and evil* Good and evil as hath been shown, (Bk. II chap xx. § 2 and chap xxi. §43) are n thing but pleasure or pa n, or that which occas ns or procures pl asure or pain t us. *Moral good and evil* the is only *the formity or dis gr ement f our voluntary acti ns t ome law wher by good or evil is drawn on us from*

6. *Moral rules* Of these moral rules r laws, to which m n gene ally ref and by which they judge f th rectitude r pr ity f their actions, there seem to me to be *thr sorts* with their three diff rent enforcem nts, or rewards and punish me ts. For since it would be utterly ain to suppose a rule set to th free actions f men w thout annexing to it som enforcement of good and evil to determin his will, we must, wher ever we suppose law suppose also some re ward or punishm nt ann xed to that law It would be in vain for one intellig nt being to set rul to th acti ns f another f h had t not in his powe to reward the compliance w th and punish d iati from his rule, by som good and il that is n t th n tural p oduct and consequence f th action tself F that, being a natural con eni nce or incon eni ce, would per t f tself, w thout a law This, if I mistak n t, is th tru nature f all law p p- erly so called.

7. *Law* Th laws that men generally ref their actions to to judge f th ir ectitud or

Cf. ch. xxxi. Cf. § 7

obliquity seem to me to be these three — 1 The *divine* law 2 The *civil* law 3 The law of *opinion* or *reputation* if I may so call it By the relation they bear to the first of these men judge whether their actions are sins or duties by the second whether they be criminal or innocent and by the third whether they be virtues or vices

8 *Divine law the measure of sin and duty* First, the *divine law* whereby that law which God has set to the actions of men —whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny He has a right to do it we are his creatures he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life for nobody can take us out of his hands This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude and by comparing them to this law it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions that is whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the ALMIGHTY

9 *Civil law the measure of crimes and innocence* Secondly the *civil law*—the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it—is another rule to which men refer their actions to judge whether they be criminal or no This law nobody overlooks the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand and suitable to the power that makes it which is the force of the Commonwealth engaged to protect the lives liberties and possessions of those who live according to its laws and has power to take away life liberty or goods from him who disobeys which is the punishment of offences committed against his law

10 *Philosophical law the measure of virtue and vice* Thirdly the *law of opinion or reputation* Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong and as far as they really are so applied they so far are coincident with the divine law above mentioned But yet what ever is pretended this is visible that these names virtue and vice in the particular instances of their application through the several nations and *societies* of men in the world are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange that men everywhere should give the name of virtue to those actions which amongst them are judged praiseworthy and call that vice which they account blamable since otherwise they would condemn themselves if they should think anything right to which they allowed not commendation anything wrong which they let pass without blame Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed *virtue and vice is this approbation* or dislike praise or blame which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies tribes and clubs of men in the world whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them according to the judgment maxims or fashion of that place For though men uniting into politic societies have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force so that they cannot employ it against any fellow citizens any further than the law of the country directs yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst and converse with and by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice

11 *The measure that men commonly apply to determine what they call virtue and vice* That this is the common *measure* of virtue and vice [2] will appear to any one who considers that though that passes for vice in one country which is counted a virtue or at least not vice in another yet *everywhere virtue and praise* vice and blame go together Virtue is everywhere that which is thought praiseworthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is called virtue [3] Virtue and praise are so united that they are called often by the same name *Sunt sua praemia laudi* says Virgil [4] and so Cicero *Nihil habet natura praestantius quam honestatem quam laudem quam dignitatem quam decus* which he tells you are all names for the same thing This is the language of the heathen philosophers who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted And though perhaps by the different temper education fashion maxims or interest of different sorts of men it fell out that what was thought praiseworthy in one place escaped not censure in another and so in different *societies virtues and vices* were changed yet as to the main they for the most part kept the same everywhere For since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one

Cf Bk IV ch xx § 4

[2] Cf Locke's letter to Tyrrell Aug 4 1690

[3] See Epistle to the Reader where he refers to the criticisms of Mr Lowde

[4] Cf Virgil *Aeneid* I. 461

finds his advantage and to blame and discoun
... esteem

law of God hath established there be... n th
ma that so directl and visibl secures and ad vances the general good f mankind in this world as bedience to the laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and con fusion, as the neglect f them. And therefore men, without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their commendation and blame on that sid that real deserved t not. N even those men whose practice was otherwise failed not to give their pprobation right, few being d praved to that degree as not to condemn, t least in others, the faults they themselves were guilty of where by even in the corruption f manners, the true boundaries f the law of nature which o ht to be the rule f virtu and vi e, were pretty well preferred. So that even the exhortations of in spired teachers, ha e not f ared to appeal to common repu Whatsoever is lovel whatso ever is of good report, if there be any irtue, if there be any praise &c. (Phil. 4. 8.)

2. *Its enforcement is commendation and discredit.* If any one shall imagine that I ha e forgot my own notion f law when I mak the law whereby men judge of irtu and ce to be nothin else but the consent f private men, who have not author ty enou h to mak laws es pecially wanting tha which is so necessary and essential t law power to nforce t I think I ma say that h who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives t men to accommodate themsel es t the opinions and rules f t ose w ... h

it of God, or the magistra Th penalties tha ttend the breach f God laws some, nay perhaps most men, seld m seriously reflect on and amongst those that do, man whilst they break th law en ertain thoughts of f ture rec onciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. And as to the punishments d e from the law of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves w th the hopes of impunity But no man escapes the punishment f their censure and dislike who offends against the fashion nd op nion of the company he keeps, and would recommend h mself to Nor is ther one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enou h, to bear up under the consta t disl k and condemnation of his own cl b. He must be of trange and unusual co stitution, who can cont t himself to li e constant disgrace nd disreput w th his own particular soci ty Sol tud many men ha e sought, and been recon ciled t but nobody that has the l as thou ht or sense of ma about him, can li e in soci ty under t consta t dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those h co verses w th. This is a burden too hea y for human sufferance a d he must be mad up of irreconcileabl contradic tions, who can tak pleasure in compan and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

3. *These three laws the rules of moral good and evil.* These three then, first, the law f God second the law of pol tic societies thirdly the law f fashion, or privat censure are those to which men variously compare their actions and it is by their conformity to one of these law that they take th ir measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

4. *Morality is the relation of voluntary actions to these rules.* Whether th ru to which, as to a to ch stone, we bring our voluntary ctions, to examine them by and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them, which is, as it were, the mark of the value we set upon them, whether I say we tak that rule from the fashion of the country or the will f a law make the mind is easily bl to observe the relation any ction ...

formity or not conformity f any action to that rule and there ore is of en called moral recti tude. This rul being nothin but collection of several sim l ideas, the conformity the eto is but so ordering the ction, that the simple id as belonging to t may correspond t those which the law requires. And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on, and termi nated in, these simple ideas we ha e rece ed from sensation or reflection. For exampl let us consider the comp ex dea we signify by the word murder and when we ha e taken t asun der and examined all the particulars, we shall find t m t amount to collection of simple ideas derived from reflection or sensation, viz. First, from reflection on the operations of our own

Cf. Bk. I. ch. ii. § 5.

motion Secondly from *sensation* we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man and of some action whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder This collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame I call the action virtuous or vicious if I have the will of a supreme invisible Lawgiver for my rule then as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God I call it good or evil sin or duty and if I compare it to the civil law the rule made by the legislative power of the country I call it lawful or unlawful a crime or no crime So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices they consist only and are made up of collections of simple ideas which we originally received from sense or reflection and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law

15 *Moral actions may be regarded either absolutely or as ideas of relation* To conceive rightly of moral actions we must take notice of them under this two fold consideration First as they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple ideas Thus drunkenness or lying signify such or such a collection of simple ideas which I call

h m h

this respect they are *rel t ve* it being their conformity to or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular good or bad and so as far as they are compared with a rule and thereupon denominated they come under relation Thus the challenging and fighting with a man as it is a certain positi e mode

God will deserve the name of sin to the law of fashion in some countries valour and virtue and to the municipal laws of some governments a capital crime In this case when the positi e mode has one name and another name as it stands in relation to the law the distinct on may as easily be observed as it is in substances where one name v g *man* is used to signify the thing another v g *father* to signify the relation

16 *The denominations of actions often mislead us* But because very frequently the positive idea of the action and its moral relation are comprehended together under one name and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action and its moral rectitude or obliquity therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action and the reference it has to a rule By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds and are forward to take names for things are often misled in their judgment of actions Thus the taking from another what is his without his knowledge or allowance is properly called *stealing* but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action and to denote its contrariety to the law men are

though it be properly denominated stealing as the name of such a mixed mode yet when compared to the law of God and considered in its

siderable here mentioned And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law which therefore I call *mo al relations*

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of *relations* it is not therefore to be expected that I should here mention them all It suffices to our present purpose to show by these what the ideas are we ha e of this comprehensive considerat on called *relation* Which is so various and the occasions of it so many (as many as there can be of comparing th ngs one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules or under just heads Those I have mentioned I think are some of the most cons derable and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our deas of relations and wherein they are founded But before I quit this argument from what has been said give me leave to observe

18 *All relations termi ate in s mple ideas* First That it is evident that all relation terminates in and is ultimately founded on those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection so that all we ha e in our thoughts ourselves (if we think of anyth ng or have any meaning) or would s g

nf to others, w en we use word standi g for relations, is nothing but some simpl deas, o col lections of simpl ideas, compared ne w th an other This is so manifest in that sort called proportion I hat nothing can be more For when a

all the rest: though, where they are compounded, or decompounded, th simpl ideas they are mad up of, are, perhaps, seld m taken n tice f g when th word father is mentioned first, there is meant that particular species, o collecti e a, signified by the word man secondly those sensibl simpl ideas, signified by th word generation and, thirdly the effects f t, and all th simp ideas signified by th word child. So the word friend, being taken for man wh loves and is ready to d good to another has all these f owing ideas to th making of t up first, all the simp ideas, comprehended in th word man, or intelligent being secondly the dea of love thirdly th d of re d ness or dispos n fourth the d of ction, which is any kind f thought or motion fifthly the idea f good, which signifies anything that may ad ance his happ ness, and terminates t last, f examined, in particular simpl d as, of which th word good in general signifies any one but, if removed from all simp deas quite, t signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminat t last, though perhaps more remot ly in a collectio of simp deas th immediat signification f relati e words, being ery of ther supposed known relations which, if traced one to another still end in simpl deas.

19. *Il have ordinarily as cl ar notion f t e relation, as f the simpl id s in th on which it is found ed.* Second That in relations, we ha e for th most part, if not always, as clear notion f t e *rel on as we ha e f t e simpl eas wherein it is found*. agreement or disagreement, whereon relatio d pends, being things whereof we ha e commonly as clear ideas as f any th whatsoever t being but the distinguishing simpl ideas, or their degrees one from another w thout which w could ha e no distinct knowledge at all. For if I ha e clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I ha e, too f equal, or more or less, of ch of these if I know what t is for one man t be born f woman, iz. Sempronia I know wha t is for a ther man to be born of th same woman Sempronia a d so ha e as clear a notion of brothers as f births, and perhaps clearer For if I believed that Sempronia digged Titus ou of the parsley-bed, (as they used to tell chil dren) and thereby became his mother and that afterward in th same manner sh d gged Caius out of the parsley bed I had as clear notion of th relation f brothers between them, as if I had all th skill f a midwif the n t on th t

I grounded the relati n and that they a e u n that circumstance of birth, l t t be what t will The comparing them then in th ir descent from th same person, w thout knowing th particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found m noti n of t ir ha ing or not ha ing the re

d termin t than those of substances yet the names belo ging to relation are f en of as doubtful nd uncertain signification as those f substances or mixed modes and much more than those f simpl id as. Because relative words, being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by men s thoughts, and is an d only

spond w th those of others using th same name.

20. *The notion f relation is t e same whet er t e rule any action is com ared to be true or fal* Thirdly That in these I call *moral elations* I ha e a tru notion of relation, by comparing th ction w th th rule, whether th rul be tru or false For f I measure anything by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard though perhaps th yard I measure by be not exactly th tandard which indeed is another inquiry For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in t yet the greement or disagreement bservabl in that which I compar w h mak m pe th l t n. Though, m asuring by a wrong rule I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of ts moral rectitude because I ha e tried t by that which is n t th true rule yet I am not mistak in the relation which that ction bears to that rul I compare t to which is agreement or disagreement

Chap XXIX Of Cl ar and Obscur D st ct and Confus d Id as

minds we have the ideas of willing considering purposing beforehand malice or wishing ill to another and also of life or perception and self motion Secondly from *sensation* we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man and of some action whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder This collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame I call the action virtuous or vicious if I have the will of a supreme invisible Lawgiver for my rule then as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God I call it good or evil sin or duty and if I compare it to the civil law the rule made by the legislative power of the country I call it lawful or unlawful a crime or no crime So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices they consist only and are made up of collections of simple ideas which we originally received from sense or reflection and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law

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though it be properly denominated stealing as the name of such a mixed mode yet when compared to the law of God and considered in its

17 *Relations innumerable and only the most considerable here mentioned* And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law which therefore I call *moral relations*

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of *relations* it is not therefore to be expected that I should here mention them all It suffices to our present purpose to show by these what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration called *relation* Which is so various and the occasions of it so many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules or under just heads Those I have mentioned I think are some of the most considerable and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations and wherein they are founded But before I quit this argument from what has been said give me leave to observe First

all we have in our thoughts ourselves (if we think of anything or have any meaning) or would sig

nam are left out. Thus, h that has an de mad p of barely th impl o es of a beast h spots, has but confused de f a l pard t n t be g thereby ufficie tly distinguished from a lynx, and several ther sorts f beasts that are spotted. So that such an d though t hath th peculiar nam leopard is n t distin guishabl from those des gned by th name lynx or panther and may as well come under th name lynx as leopard. How m ch th custom of d fin f words by g n ral t rms contributes to mak th deas e would press by th m confused and undet rmined I l e others t con d This is ev d t, that confused d as are such as render th use of words uncertain and tak ay the benefit f distinct names. When the id as, for which we use d ff re t terms, ha t a difference answerabl t th ir distinct names and so cann t be distinguished by them, ther t is that they ar truly confused

8 *Their simple e jumbl d d orderly to ther* Secondly An th f ult hich makes our d as confused is, when, though th particulars that make p any idea ar in numbe nough, yet they ar so jumbled togeth that t is t asily discernibl wh ther t mor bel gs to th name hat is gi en t tha to y th Th is th- ing prope to mak us co ce e this confusion than sort f p ctures, usually shown as surpris- ing p eces f art, wh in th colours, as they are laid by th pe cil on th tabl tself mark out ery odd and u usual figures, and ha n dis- cern bl order in th ir pos tion. This draught, thus mad p f parts wh in n symm try or ord ppears, is in tself no mor a confused thin tha th p tur f cloudy ky wh rein, though there be as l ttl rder f colours or fig ures to be fou d yet nobody thinks confused p ture Wha is t, the that makes t be thought confused in th want f symmetry does not. As t is plain does t for th dra ght mad barely in imita f this could n t be

nam man or Cæsar than to th nam baboo or P mpey which ar supposed t stand for dif fer ideas fr m those gnified by man or Cæ sar B wh cyli drical mirror placed right, had ed ced those irregular lines on the tabl into th ir d order and proporti n, th th confusio ceases, and the eye prese tly sees that

it is ma o Cæsar e th t t belongs t those names and that t is suff ciently distinguishabl f om baboo o Pompey i.e from the d as s gnified by thos mes Just thus t is with ou id as, which ar as t were th p ctures f things. N o e of these me tal draughts, however th parts are put togeth r can be called co fused (for they are plai ly discern ble as they are) till t be ranked under som ordinary name to wh ch t cann t be discerned to belong any mo e than t does t some ther name f an allowed d f fer nt gn ficat on.

9. *Their simpl re mutabl and und term ned* Th rd A third d fect that frequ ntly gi es the

learned th ir precise s g nifica de they mak this or that term tand for al

p is said to ha e a confused d a u, r th church thou h this be still for th same son as the form r ix because a mutable dea (f we will allow t to be dea) can ot bel g to o name ther than oth and so loses th di tinction that distinct names are des gned for

Cor usion is thout freenc to name hardly oncen bl By what has been said we may ob- serv ho m ch *name* as supposed teady s gns f things, d by th ir differ nce to stand for and keep things distin t that n th mselves ar diff ent, ar th occas n f denominating d as distinct nfused, by seer t and un bserved reference th mind makes f ts deas to su h

for wh n man designs, by any nam a sort of things or any particular thing distin t from all thers, th complex dea h annexes to that nam is th more distin t, th mo partic ular th id as are, and th gr t d mor d terminat the number and der f them is, whe f t is mad up For th mor t has f these th more t has till f th pe ce ble dif fer nces, whe by t is k pt separate and dis-

Cf. h xxii. § 7 also Bk. III ch. x. §§ 3 4.

plex and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes substances and relations—all which I think is necessary to be done by any one who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things—it will perhaps be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of *ideas* I must nevertheless crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them

The first is that some are *clear* and others *obscure* some *d stinct* and others *confused* [1]

2 *Clear and obscure explained by sight* The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight we shall best understand what is meant by *clear* and *obscure* in our ideas by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight Light being that which discovers to us visible objects we give the name of *obscure* to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it and which in a better light would be discernible In like manner our simple ideas are *cle r* when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken did or might in a well ordered sensation or perception present them Whilst the memory retains them thus and can produce them to the mind whenever it has occasion to consider them they are clear ideas So far as they either want anything of the orig nal exactness or have lost any of their first freshness and are as it were faded or tarnished by time so far are they obscure Complex ideas as they are made up of simple ones so they are clear when the ideas that go to their composition are clear and the number and order of those simple ideas that are the ingredients of any complex one is determinate and certa n

3 *Causes of obscurity* The causes of obscurity in simple ideas seem to be either dull organs or very slight and trans ent impressions made by the objects or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received For to return again to visible objects to help us to apprehend this matter If the organs or faculties of perception like wax over hardened with cold will not receive the impress on of the seal from the usual impulse wont to imprint it or like wax of a temper too soft will not hold it well when well imprinted or else supposing the wax of a temper fit but the seal not applied w th a sufficient force to make a clear impression [2] in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure This I suppose needs no application to make it plainer

4 *Distinct and co fused what* As a clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-d sposed organ so a *distinct* idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other and a *confused idea is such an one as is not sufficiently dis*tinguishable from another from which it ought to be different.

5 *Objection* If no idea be confused but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it should be different it will be hard may any one say to find anywhere a *confused* idea For let any idea be as it will it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas which cannot be other i e different without being perceived to be so No idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself for from all other it is evidently d fferent.

6 *Co fusion of ideas is in reference to their names* To remove this difficulty and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with we must consider that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguished that so each sort by its pecul ar name may be marked and d scoursed of apart upon any occas on and there is nothing more evident than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for d fferent things Now every idea a man has being visibly what it is and d stinct from all other ideas but itself that which makes it confused is when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two d fferent names) distinct and makes some of them belong rather to the one and some of them to the other of those names being left out and so the distinction which was intended to be kept up by those

[1] On th T ms lear and distinct cf Epistle to the Reader

[2] Cf Plato *Theaetetus*

Complex Ideas mad up f t o few s mple nes First when any complex idea (for it is complex ideas that are most liable to co fusion) is made up of too small a number of s mple ideas and such only as are common to other things whereby the differences that make it deserve a different

scure, we are pt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from t in the obscure part of ts signification, as confidently as we d from th ther

5. *Instance eternity* Having frequently in our mouths the name Et rnity we are apt to think we have positi e comprehens e dea of t, hich is as much as to say that th r is no part l *contained*

f

any duration l t t be as g eat as *stent tog ther f duratio ther he suppos no end* that part f his dea, which is still beyond the bounds f that large duration h represe ts to his own thoughts, is very bscure and undeter mined. And hence t is that in disputes and rea sonings concerning eternity or any ther infi nite, we are ery apt to blunder and in ol e ourselves in manifest absurdities.

senses and therefore, when we talk ... bility f matter *in infinitum*, though we ha e clear ideas f d vis n and divisibility and ha also cl ar ideas f parts mad out of whol by di vision yet we ha e but ery obscure and con fused id as of corpuscles, or minut bodies, so to be divided when, by former di is ons, they are red ced to smallness much xceeding th per ... senses and so all that we

the smallest tom f dust he ever saw he has any distinct dea (bating still th numbe which concerns not ext nsi) betwixt th oo oooth and th 1 ooo oooth part f t. Or if h think he can refine his deas to that degree, without losing sight f them, let him add ten cyph rs to each f those numbers. Such a degree f small ness is not unreasonable to be supposed ince a di isio carried on so far brings t no nearer the nd f infinite di ision, than th first division in to two hal es does. I must confess, for my part, I ha e no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension f those bodies, ha ing but very bscure one of either f them. So that, I think,

when we talk f d vis on of bodies *i i finitum* our dea of th ir distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of d is on, comes, after a little progressi n, to be confounded and al most lost n obscurity Fo that dea which is to epresent nly bigness must be very obscure and confused which we cann t *distinguish from one* ten times as big but only by number so that we have clear distinct id as, we may say of ten and on but no distinct deas of two such extens ons. It is plain from hence, that, when we talk of infi nite divis bility of body or ext nsion, our distinct and clear deas are only of numbers but the clear distinct ideas of extension after some progress of division, are quit lost and f such minute parts we ha e n distinct deas t all but it returns, as all our deas of infinite do, at last to that of *num ber always to b added* but thereby never amounts to any distinct ide of *actual fin t parts* W ha e t is tru clea id ea of d ision, as often as we think of t but ther by we ha e n more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter than we have a l ar dea f an infin te number by being ble

added (*wherein consists his ...*) ... bscure, imperfect, and confused idea from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or cl arness, no more than we can in ar thmetic, about number f which we have n such distinct d a as we ha e f 4 or 100 but only this relati e bscur one, that compared to any ther t is still bigger and we have no more a clear pos i e dea f t, when we say or con cei e t is bigger or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40 or 4 400, 000 000 ha ing no nearer a proportion to th end of ddition or numbe than 4. For he that ... proceed ... h ll soon

eternity h that has an idea ... but ... years, has as much pos ti e complete dea of ternity as h that has of 400 000,000 of years for what remains of ternity beyond ther f these two numbers of years, is as cl ar to the one as the ther e, ne ther f th m has any clear posi ti e dea f t t all. For h that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity as he that adds 400 000,000 f years, and so on

tinct from all ideas belonging to other names even those that approach nearest to it and there by all confusion with them is avoided

11 *C nfusion concerns always two ideas* Confusion making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated concerns always t o idea and those most which most approach one another Whenever therefore e suspect any idea to be confused we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from and that ill always be found an idea belonging to another name and so should be a different thing from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct being either the same with it or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name as the other it is ranked under and so keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different names import.

12 *Causes of co fused ideas* This I think is the confusion proper to ideas which still carries ith it a secret reference to names At least if there be any other confusion of ideas this is that hich most of all disorders men s thoughts and discourses ideas as ranked under names being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves and always those which they commune about with other And therefore where there are supposed t o different ideas marked by t o different names which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them there never fails to be confus on and where any ideas are distinct as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by there can be between them no confusion The way to prevent it is to collect and unite into one complex idea as precisely as is possible all those ingred ents whereby it is differenced from others and to them so united in a determinate number and order apply steadily the same name But this neither accommodating men s ease or van ty nor serving any design but that of naked truth which is not always the thing aimed at such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for And since the loose application of names to undetermined variable and almost no ideas serves *both to cover our* own ignorance as well as to perplex and confound others which goes for learning and su*periority in knowledge it is no wonder that most* men should use it themselves hilst they complain of it in others Though I think no small part *of* the confusion to be found in the notions of men might by care and ingenuity be a oided

[illegible]

retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name much less are we able constantly to divine for hat precise complex idea such a name stands in another man s use of it. From the first of these follo s confusion in a man s o n reasonings and opinions ithin himself from the latter frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others But having more at large treated of Words their defects, and abuses in the following Book I shall here say no more of it

13 *Complex ideas may be distinct in one part and confused in another* Our complex ideas being made up of collections and so variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and d stinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another In a man who speaks of a *chiliaedron* or a body of a thousand sides the ideas of the figure may be very confused though that of the number be very distinct so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea hich depends upon the number of thousand he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a *chiliaedron* though it be plain he has no precise idea of its figure so as to distinguish it by that from one that has but 999 sides the not observing whereof causes no small error in men s thoughts and confusion in their discourses

[illegible]

take another parcel of the same uniform mat

[illegible]

another by the number of sides and reason and argue dist nctly about them whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas which is contained in their numbers as that the sides of the one could be di ided into two equal numbers and of the others not &c. But hen he goes about to d stingu sh them by their figure he ill there be presently at a loss and not be able I think to frame in his m nd t o *ideas one of them* distinct from the other by the bare figure of these t o p eces of gold as he could if the same parcels of gold ere made one into a cube the other a figure of five sides In which incomplete ideas e are very apt to impose on ourselves and rangle with others especially where they have particular and familiar names For being satisfied in that part of the idea h ch we have clear and the name wh ch is famil ar to us, being applied to the whole containing that part also which is imperfect and ob-

to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or complex idea of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of these, having the name courage given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea; but the other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to anything but itself.

5. *Complex ideas of substances are real, when they agree with the existence of things.* Thirdly, Our complex ideas of substances, being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended to be representations of substances as they really are, are no further real than as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any substance: v.g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the centaurs are described: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed, but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances, being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.

Chap XXXI *Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas*

Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes. Of our real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call *adequate*, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from: which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate ideas* are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Simple ideas all adequate. First, that *all our simple ideas are adequate.* Because being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For, if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple idea); and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those ideas were real beings in them. For, though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire, more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that sense be understood, when I speak of secondary qualities as being in things; or of their ideas as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood, yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensations or ideas in us. Since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or sun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world than there would be pain if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount Ætna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no: and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no further into it, but proceed to show what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

Cf. ch. viii § 23.

or if he please doubles the increase as often as he will the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions as it is from the length of a day or an hour For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite and therefore our ideas which are all finite cannot bear any Thus it is also in our idea of exten ion when we increase it by addition as well as when we diminish it by division and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space After a few doublings of those ideas of extension which are the largest *we are accustomed to have* we lose the clear distinct idea of that space it becomes a confusedly great one with a surplus of still greater about which when we would argue or reason we shall always find ourselves at a loss confused ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused always leading us into confusion

Chap XXX *Of Real and Fantastical Ideas*

1 *Ideas considered in r ference to their archetypes* Besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas other considerations belong to them in reference to *thi s from whence they are taken* or *which they may be supposed to represent*[1] and thus I think they may come under a threefold distinction and are —

First either real or fantastical
Secondly adequate or inadequate
Thirdly true or false

I

such as have no foundation in nature nor have *any conformity with that reality of being to which* they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes If we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned we shall find that,

the images or rep esentations of what does exist the contrary whereof in all but the primary qualities of bodies hath been already shown But, though *whiteness and coldness are no more in* snow than pain is yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness pa n &c being in us the effects of powers in things without us ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations they are *real ideas in us* whereby we dist nguish the qualities that are really in things themselves For these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things *which we have to do with our ideas* do as well serve us to that purpose and are as real distinguishing characters whether they be only *constant effects* or else *exact resemblances* of something in the things themselves the reality *lying in that steady correspondence they have* with the distinct constitutions of real beings But whether they answer to those constitutions as to causes or patterns it matters not it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus *our simple ideas are all real and true* because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds that being all that is requisite to make them real and not fictions at pleasure For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea more than what it has received

3 *Complex ideas are voluntary combinations*

... pect of

united under one general name it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas how else comes it to pass that one man s idea of gold or justice is different from another s but because he has put in or left out of his some simple idea which the other has not? The question then is Which of these are real and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things and what not? And to this I say that,

the minds of men there is nothing more requ ...
to this kind of ideas to make them real but that they be so framed that there be a possib lity of existing conformable to them These ideas themselves *being archetypes* cannot differ from their archetypes and so cannot be chimer cal unless any one will jumble together in them incon ist ent ideas Indeed as any of them ha e the names

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man would give the name of justice to that ... which common use calls liberality But this fantasticalness relates more to propr ety of speech than real ty of ideas For a man to be undisturbed in danger sedately to consider what is fittest

[1] Cf Bk IV chh ι ι x xi.
[2] Cf Berkeley *Principle* § 89.

as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specific essences of substances, which each individual in its several kinds is made conformable to and partakes of, is so far from needing proof that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss if it should be doubted whether he called himself a man, with any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of substances are, as it has been shown, certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance; for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines including a space. But it is plain that in our complex ideas of substances are not contained such ideas, on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them do depend. The common idea men have of iron is, a body of a certain colour, weight, and hardness; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connection with that complex idea, or any part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour, weight, and hardness, than that that colour or that weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of matter which makes the ring I have on my finger is forwardly by most men supposed to have a real essence, whereby it is gold; and from whence those qualities flow which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight

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touch of mercury, &c. This essence, from which all these properties flow, when I inquire into it and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the furthest I can go is, only to presume that, it being nothing but body, its real essence or internal constitution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, size, and connexion of its solid parts; of neither of which having any distinct perception at all can I have any idea of its essence: which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness, a greater weight than anything I know of the same bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement or connexion of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular *form*, I am further from having any idea of its real essence than I was before. For I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But, when I am told that something besides the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of that body is its essence, something called *substantial form*, of that I confess I have no idea at all, but only of the sound form; which is far enough from an idea of its real essence or constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences I confess I have no distinct ideas at all; and, I am apt to suppose, others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

7. *Because men know not the real essence of substances.* Now, then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger a general name already in use, and denominate it gold, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name, as belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real internal essence; by having of which essence this particular substance comes to be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name by which things are marked as having that essence must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the idea to which that name is given must be referred also to that essence, and be intended to represent it.

3 *Modes are all adequate* Secondly *our complex ideas of modes* being voluntary collections of simple ideas which the mind puts together with out reference to any real archetypes or standing patterns existing anywhere are and cannot but be *adequate ideas* Because they not being intended for copies of things really existing but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by cannot want anything they having each of them that combination of ideas and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should so that the mind acquiesces in them and can find nothing wanting Thus by having the idea of a figure with three sides meeting at three angles I have a complete idea wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea is plain in that it does not conceive that any understanding hath or can have a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle supposing it to exist than itself has in that complex idea of three sides and three angles in which is contained all that is or can be essential to it or necessary to complete it wherever or however it exists But in our *ideas of substances* it is otherwise For there desiring to copy things as they really do exist and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend

adequate but [illegible]

at first put together the idea of danger perceived absence of disorder from fear sedate consideration of what was justly to be done and executing that without disturbance or being deterred by the danger of it had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination and intending it to be nothing else but what is nor to have in it any other simple ideas but what it hath it could not also but be an adequate idea and laying this up in his memory with the name *courage* annexed to it to signify to others and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by as they agreed to it. This idea thus made and laid up for a pattern must necessarily be adequate being referred to nothing else but itself nor made by any other original but the good liking and will of him that first made this combination

4 *Modes in reference to settled names may be inadequate* Indeed another coming after and in conversation learning from him the word *cour*

idea in thinking should be conformable to the other s idea as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his from whom he learned it his idea may be very wrong and inadequate because in this case making the other man s idea the pattern of his idea in thinking as the other man s word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking his idea is so far defective and inadequate as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it which name he would have to be a sign of the other man s idea (to which in its proper use it is primarily annexed) and of his own as agreeing to it to which if his own does not exactly correspond it is faulty and inadequate

5 *Because then meant in propriety of speech to correspond to the ideas in some other mind* Therefore these complex ideas of *modes* which they are referred by the mind and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being expressed by the names we apply to them they may be very deficient, wrong and inadequate because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern in which respect only any idea of modes can be wrong imperfect or inadequate And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other but this refers more to proper speaking than knowing right.

6 *Ideas of substances as referred to real essences not adequate* Thirdly what *ideas we have of substances* I have above shown Now those ideas have in the mind a double reference 1 Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things 2 Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations [illegible] of things that do exist by

originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate

First it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things as supposed to have certain real essences whereby they are of this or that species and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men s minds they must constantly refer their ideas to such real essences

Ch xxxi.

as to th ir archetype That m (espe ally such as ha bee br d p th learn g ta ght i this part of th ld) d s ppose c rtai specific sse ce f substa ces wh ch ea h n d d al in ts se ral ki ds is made co f rm b to and partak s f s so far from n eding proof that t will be thought strange f a y should d thers se And th th y d ar ly pply th specifi am th y ank part cular substances under to th gs as d t guished by such specifi real essenc s Wh is th almost h ould t tak t am f t sh ld be doubted wheth h called h ms lf a ma w th any ther m aning th n as h ing the r al essence f a man And yet f you d m d wh t those real esse es ar t pla m ar gn ant, and kn w them t. F om h c tf ll w that the d as th y ha th ir mi ds being referred t al esse ces, as t arch types which ar unknown must be far f m be g ade q te that they cann t be pposed t be any repres tati f th m at all Th mple d as ha f substan es ar as t has be shown certain coll ct ns f impl d as that h be n observed or supposed consta tly t xi t t g th

But such compl d cann t be th al sse f any substa f th the p perties e discov th t body would d pe d n that compl dea, and be ded bl f m t, and th ir ecessary co xi w th t be kn n as all pr pert f tr gl d pe d d as far as they ar disco e bl ar d d c bl from th comple d f thr l es el d g a p ce. B t t is plai that in our mplex deas f substances ar t tai ed su h d as o h h all th th q al ties th t ar t be f d them d d pe d Th comm n d men h fir is, body f certa colour we ght, d hardness and prope ty that th y look as belonging t t, is mall bl ss B t yet th pr perty has ecessary conn xi w th that complex d a, or any part f t and the is no more easo t think that mall bl ess d pe ds that colou w ht d hard ess tha th t colour th t w ght d pe ds ts mall bl ess. And y t, th h w k ow th f these al essen es here that t ter forw y most m supposed t ha eal essence, h by t is gold and fr m wh nce those qual ties flow which I find in t, iz ts peculi c l w ght h d f b l ty fixed ess, and hang f c lour po light

Chap xxiii.

to ch of mercury &c. Th s essence from wh ch all these prope t es flo h n I q e to it d search after it I plai ly pe ce I ca t disco the furthest I ca g i o ly t pre sum that, t be g noth g but body its e l esse o t rnal const tuti wh ch these q l ti s d pe d ca be th g but th f gure s d co f ts sol d parts of ne th r of hich h g y dist ct perceptio t all ca I ha e y d f ts ess ce which is the ca s th t th that particular sh g y llow ness gr t ght than anyth g I k ow f the s m b lk d a fit ess t h e its col ur cha ged by th tou h of q cks l er If a y o e w ll say that the r l essence and i t rnal co tuti wh ch these p pert es d pe d s t th figu s a d arrangem t or con n of its s l d parts, b t som th g lse

th particul figur e p ti g t g th of parts, wh by th qual ties abov m t ed are p od ced wh ch q al t I find i th t p t cular n cel f m r h

t rm which far e ough f m an d f ts

ne Now th n, wh m n pply to th par t cular parcel *f matt* my fing ge al m alr ady use d d mi t t *g ld* d

ti la taill is gi must be f rr d also to that essence and be intended to present t.

Which essence since they who so use the names know not their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should

8 *Ideas of substances when regarded as collections of their qualities are all inadequate* Secondly those who neglecting that useless supposition of un known real essences whereby they are distin guished endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities which are found co existing in them though they come much nearer a likeness of them than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their minds nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes Because those qualities and powers of substances where of we make their complex ideas are so many and various that no man s complex idea con tains them all That our complex ideas of sub stances do not contain in them *ll* the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves is evident in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it Because en deavouring to make the signification of their names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can they make their spec fic ideas of the sorts of substance for the most part of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them but these having no original precedency or right to be put in and make the specific idea more than others that are left out it is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate The simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers which being relations to other sub- stances we can never be sure that we know *all* the powers that are in any one body till we have tried what changes it is fitted to gi e to or re ceive from other substances in their several ways of application wh ch being i npossible to be

properties

9 *Their powers usually make up our complex ideas of subst nces* Whosoever first lighted on a parcel

h d no h th wo d

real essence or internal constitut on Therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body but its peculiar colour perhaps, and weight were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species Which both are but powers the one to affect our eyes after such a manner and to produce in us that idea we call yellow and the other to force up- wards any other body of equal bulk they being put into a pair of equal scales one against an other Another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness two other passive powers in relation to the operation of fire upon it another its ductility and solubility in *aqua regia* two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies in changing its outward figure or separation of it into insensible parts These or parts of these put together usually make the complex idea in men s minds of that sort of body we call *gold*

10 *Substances have innumerable p wers n t con t ined in our complex ideas of them* But no one who hath considered the properties of bodies in gen eral or this sort in particular can doubt that this called *gold* has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea Some who ha e examined this species more accurately could I believe enumerate ten times as many properties in gold all of them as inseparable from its in

d

there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold as any one man yet has in his and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be di co ered in it The changes that that one body is apt to recei e and make in other bodies upon a due applica tion exceeding far not only hat we know but what we are apt to imagine Wh ch will not appear so much a paradox to any one who will but cons der how far men are yet from kno ing all the properties of that one no very compound figure a triangle though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians disco ered of it

11 *Ideas f subst nces be ng g t o ly by c llecti th i qualit es a ll i deq te* So that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate Which would be so also in mathe

compl x

imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other dea of it but some fe of ts prop ert es? Whe eas hav ng in our pla n dea the *wh l* es ence of that figure e from thence d s-

cover those properties, nd demonstr tı ly see how they flow and are inseparabl fr m t.

12 *Sim d as* ectypa, *and adequat* Thus the mind has thre sorts of bstr ct ideas nom nal esse ces

First, simpl ideas, which are ectypa or cop es but yet certainly dequ te. Because be g in t ded t xpress n thing but the power in things t prod ce in th mind such sensati that sensati n wh t is p od ced cann t but be th effect f that powe So th p per I writ th power in th light (I speak c

t

th power to prod ce any

and being me t f thing else but th ffect f such powe that simpl d is real and deq t th sensation f what in my mind bein th ffect f that powe which is in th p pe t prod ce t, is perfectly dequat t tha power or lse that powe would produce diff t id a.

3 *I as f sub tanc ar* ectypa, *id ad qua* Secondly th *compl* d as f r *bstanc* ar ec types, cop es too but t perfect ones, t ad quat which is ry d t to th mind in that plainly perce es, that whatev collecti n f impl d as t makes f any substance that ex ists, cann t be sure that t xactly answers all tha are in that substance Since, t having tr ed all th pera ns f all oth substances po t, and found all th alt r ti ns t would rece e from, or cause in, ther substances, t cannot ha e an xact dequ t collecti f all ts u e and pass cap cities and so t ha e an dequat complex dea f th powers of any substance xisting nd ts elati ns which is tha sort f compl dea of substances we h e. And af all f we would ha and ctually h d our complex id an xact collecti f all the secondary quali es pow rs f any sub ta ce w hould t yet th by ha an d f th *nc* f tha thing For since th powers

4. *Ideas f mod and l I ons ar arch types and cannot b ad quat* Thirdly *comple* ideas *f mode* *nd l tions* ar or ginals, and arch types are n t p es, nor mad aft r th p ttern f any real xist nce to which the mind intends them t be conformable and exactly t answer These be g such collecti ns of simple deas that the mind tself puts togeth r d such collect ns th t e ch of them contains in t p ecisely all th t th mi d nt ds that t should they ar arch types and esse ces of modes that may exist nd so a designed only fo and belong only to such modes as, wh n th y do exi t, ha e an exact conf rmity w th thos complex d as. The deas, th refore of modes and relations cannot but be dequate.

Chap XXXII *Of True a d False Ide s*

pr posi

ls hood

pr posi

tions yet *ideas* ar true or false (as what ords are there that are not used w th gr t lat tud and with some d iat n f t)

t

th reason f that den minati n. I oui u as, bein thing but bare *ppearanc s* o percep- d mol

tru or false.

2 *Ideas and words may b ad t b tru nasmuch as they ally ar t s and u d* Ind ed both deas and words may be said to be true in a m ta phy cal sense f th word truth as ll oth things that any w y xist ar said t be tru i.e.

tak n tice f

3 *N id as pp arance the m nd either true or fal* B t is no in that m taphys cal sense

minds, bei g nly so many percepti ns o p- pearances th re n n f th m ar fals th d a of a centaur ha ing no more falsehood in t wh n

it appears in our minds than the name centaur has falsehood in it when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation mental or verbal our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment on them that is affirms or denies something of them

4 *Ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false* Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them they are then capable to be called true or false Be cause the mind in such a reference makes a

[illegible]

denominated The most usual cases wherein this happens are these following

5 *Other men s ide s real existence and supposed real essences are what men usually refer their ideas to* First when the mind supposes any idea it has *conformable* to that in *other men s minds* called by the same common name v g when the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice temper ance religion to be the same with what other men give those names to

Secondly when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself to be *conformable* to some *real exist ence* Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur supposed to be the ideas of real substances are the one true and the other false the one having a conformity to what has really existed the other not

Thirdly when the mind *refers* any of its ideas to that *real* constitution and *essence* of anything whereon all its properties depend and thus the greatest part if not all our ideas of substances are false

6 *The cause of such reference* These suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas But yet if we will examine it we shall find it is chiefly if not only concerning its *abstract* complex ideas For the natural tendency

[illegible]

shorten its way to knowledge and make each perception more comprehensive the first thing it does as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know or con ference with others about them is to bind them into bundles and rank them so into sorts that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business knowledge This as I have elsewhere shown is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas with names annexed to them into genera and species i e into kinds and sorts

7 *Names of things supposed to carry in them knowl edge of their essences* If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowl edge we shall I think find that the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse the first thing it does is to abstract it and then get a name to it and so lay it up in its storehouse the memory as containing the essence of a sort of things of which that name is always to be the mark Hence it is that we may often observe that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not he presently asks what it is meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species or the essence of it whereof it is in deed used as the mark and is generally sup posed annexed to it

8 *How men suppose that their ideas must corre spond to things and to the customary meanings of names* But this *abstract idea* being something in the mind between the thing that exists and the name that is given to it it is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge and the propriety and intelligibleness of our speaking consists And hence it is that men are so forward to suppose that the abstract ideas they have in their minds are such as agree to the things exist ing without them to which they are referred and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong For without this double con formity of their ideas they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves and talk of them unintelligibly to others

9 *Simple ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name but are least liable to be so* First then I say that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have and commonly signify by the same name they may be any of them false But yet *simple ideas* are least of all

[illegible]

their several names that are in common use stand for they being but few in number and such as if he doubts or mistakes in he may eas-

Cf Bk III [illegible] also Bk IV ch xvii § 8

ily rectify by th bjects they are to be found in. Therefore t is seld m that any mi takes in his names f imple deas or pplies th nam red t th idea gree o th name sweet t th id bitter much less are m n pt to confound th names f id as bel nging to different senses, and call colour by th name f taste &c. Whereby t is ev dent that the imple d as they call by any name are commonl th same that others ha and mean hen they use th same

f *mixed mode* much more than those stances because in substances (especially those which th commo and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) some remarkabl sens b qualities, serving ordinarily t distinguish one sort from anothe easily preserve those wh tak y care in th use f their words, from pplying them to sorts f substances to which they d t all bel g B t in mixed modes e are much more uncertain t being n t so

we express by th word *justi* may perhaps be that which ou ht to ha e an ther nam

1 *Or at least t b thou ht false* But wh ther or no our deas f mixed modes are more liabl than an sort to be diff re t from those f ther men, which are marked by the same names, this t least is ertain, That this sort f falsehood is much mor familiarly ttributed to our id as of mixed modes than t any ther Wh n man is thought to ha e false d f *justice* or *grati tude* *glory* t is for no th ason, but that his grees not w th the d as which each f those names are th gns f in ther m n.

And hy Th reason whereof seems to me be his That the bstract deas f mixed modes, be g ir oluntary combinati ns f such a precise collection of impl ideas, and so th essence f ch species being mad by men al ne, whereof e ha e no ther sens bl standard ex isting anywhere but th name tself, th d finition f that name we ha ing nothing lse t fer these our ideas f mixed modes to, as standard to which we would conform them, but th id as f those who are thought t use those names in their most proper significations and, so as our ideas conform or *differ from them* they pass for tru or false. And thus m ch concern

ing th truth and falsehood f our deas, in reference t th ir names.

stances.

ppearances as ar produced in us, and must be suitabl t those powers he has placed exter nal objects lse they could n t be prod ced in us a d thus answering those powers, they are

God in his wisd m ha in set them as marks f distincti n in things, whereby we may be ble t discern thin from another and so choose any f them for our uses as we ha e occas on t alters not th n ture f our simple d a, wheth r we think that th d a f blue be i the let t

bject, by regular and constant peration producing th same d of bl e in us, t serves us to distinguish, by ur eyes, that f m any ther

is equally from that ppearance to be d minated bl e, wh the t be that real colour or nly peculiar texture in t, that causes us that dea ince the name *blue* n tes p ope ly n thing but that mark of distin ti n that is in a iol t, discernibl only by our eyes, whatever t consists in that bein beyond our cap cities distin tly t know and perhaps would be f less use to us, if we had f culties to discern.

5. *Though one man ide f bl should b differ ent f om another* Ne ther would t carry any imputati f falsehood t our simpl d as, if by th different structur f our organs t were so ordered, that *th same object should produce ev eral men' minds d fferent ideas* at the same time

it appears in our minds than the name centaur has falsehood in it when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation mental or verbal our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment on them that is affirms or denies something of them

4 *Ideas referred to anythin extraneous to them may be true or false* Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them they are then capable to be called true or false Be cause the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing which supposition as it happens to be true or false so the ideas themselves come to be denominated The most usual cases wherein this happens are these following

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the r minds are such as agree to the things exist ing without them to which they are referred and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong For without th s double con formity of their ideas they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves and talk of them unintell gibly to others

judged of by the conform ty they have to the ideas which other men have and commonly signify by the same name they may be any of them false But yet *simple ideas* are least of all l able to be so mistaken Because a man by h s senses and every day s observation *may eas ly* satisfy himself what the simple ideas are which their several names that are in common use stand for they being but few in number and such as *if he doubts or mistakes in he may eas*

[1] Cf Bk III ch lso Bk IV ch xvii. § 8

h mpl th d a of pe fe t abso- — de as l th t uit w th j in —

ar d

p ta t, t ut t h gn j d par t d a c d g to th gr m t d gr m t f th thi gs th y tand f Th gns we hu fly u ar th d as w ds wh ew th w m k e th tal b l pr pos t Truth l e so j m g separ u g th r pr tat e as th thi gs th y stand f d th msel gr e d gr d fal hood th trary as hall be m fully h wn h ft

2 *Id th ms l ther true or f l* A y d th wh h w h our m d wh th co f rmabl t to th t f th gs — h m can t

t be thought fals be g xa t p tat ns f someth g or y t f th y h yth g th m d fi ing f m th l ty f thi gs can hey p pe ly be d be false p tat ns d as f th gs th y d t p t. But th istak d fals hood

B ar f l —uh judg d g bl t noth r

22 *When judg d t gr e t re l ext t nce hen they d t* ( ) When t havi g c mpl idea mad p f su h a coll ct n f s mple on s s *d* it to agr e when b l ty *to* (3) rta st to- t

wh ch e lly t d as fs bsta ce yellow m lle ble most hea y and f ble t tak s th t compl x d a to be the c mpl t id f gold when yet its pecul ar fix ed ss and l b l ty *qua g* are as ns p- ar bl fr m those ther deas o q al ti s of th t body as they are o e fr m anothe

4 *Wh jud d t p t th t s nc* (4) The mistak is y t gr t r h n I *jud* that tl compl d c nt ns t th r al ce f any body t g wh n t l a t t conta ns but some f w of thos p pert es which flo f om ts r al se ce d c nstut t I y ly me few f thos p pert s for th p pert e on ting mostly the ct e d pas e pow rs t has t r fer t othe th ngs all that ar vulgarly k wn f y n body of h ch th c mpl d f th t kind f th gs is usually mad are but ry few n mpar so of h t a man that has ev al w ys tr d d exam d t knows f that t f th g nd all that th m t xpe t m n k ws ar but f w in c mpar on of wh t ar re lly n th t body and d p d n its int nal o s nt al co stitut on Th esse of tr angl lie n a y l ttl com pas co ts n ry f deas thr e l s n cl d g a sp ce make up that e nce but the p pert e that fl w f m thus ss ar m than ca be as ly know m t d S I mag t is subst ce th eal e cesl l ttl compas th gh th p pe ties flow g f m th t te al nstitut n ar dl ss

5 *Id uh all d f l* T cl d a man ha g n t n f a ythi g w th t h m but by th d h has f t his mi d (wh h dea he has pow r t call by what m h ple se) —

ios usual mistak in m d mod th gh h d as also liabl to t.

Cf Bk IV h xxi. § 4.
Cf Bk IV ch — viii.

dea h has f t g wh I frame an d of
Cf Bk III h vi.

v g if the idea that a violet produced in one man s mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man s and *vice versâ* For since this could never be known because one man s mind could not pass into another man s body to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs neither the ideas hereby nor the names would be at all confounded or any falsehood be in either For all things that had the texture of a violet producing constantly the idea that he called blue and those which had the texture of a marigold producing constantly the idea which he as constantly called yellow whatever those appearances were in his mind he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the name blue and yellow as if the appearances or ideas in his mind received from those two flowers were exactly the

minds are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike For which opinion I think there might be many reasons offered but that being besides my present business I shall not trouble my reader with them but only mind him that the contrary supposition if it could be proved is of little use either for the improvement of our knowledge or conveniency of life and so ... ble ourselves to examine it

these appearances or perceptions ... consisting as has been said only in their being answerable to the po ers in external objects to

alone it represents it cannot upon that a co or as referred to such a pattern be false Blue and yellow bitter or sweet can never be false ideas these perceptions in the m nd are just such as they are there ans ering the po vers appointed by God to produce them and so are truly what they are and are intended to be Indeed the names may be misapplied but that in this respect makes no falsehood in the ideas as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple scarlet.

17 *Modes not false cannot be false in reference to essences of things* Secondly neither can our complex ideas of modes in reference to the essence of anything really existing be false because whatever complex ideas I have of any mode it hath no reference to any pattern existing and made by nature it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath nor to represent anything but such a complication of ideas as it does [2] Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man who forbears to afford himself such meat drink and clothing and other conveniences of life as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply and his station requires I have no false idea but such an one as represents an action either as I find or imagine it and so is ... falsehood But when ... be supposed to agree with that idea to which in propriety of speech the name of frugality doth belong or to be conformable to that law which is the standard of virtue and vice

there needs nothing to be said of it I shall ... fore pass over that chimerical supposition [3] and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things of which patterns they are the supposed copies and in this reference of them to the existence of ... ence of things ... ther in a horse is ... e power of ... s however put together into one in the mind were never united in nature and this therefore may be called a false idea of a horse (2) *Ideas of substances are in this respect also false* when from ... collection of simple ideas that do always ex... ly joined with them ... ity fusibility the peculiar weight ness and yellow colour of gold any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of f edness than is in lead or copper he may be said to have a false complex idea as well as when he joins to

[1] *Cf* § 14, closely followed in § 15

[2] *Cf.* Bk. III ch iv § 17 ix. § 19.

[3] *Cf* ch xxxi. § 6

t all f kin come to be so

m ed th wh le van ai

t.emsel es toe ther

6 *Th xenon m by custom* This tro g combination f id as, not al ed by nature th mind makes in itself ther oluntarily or by chance and h ce t comes in d ff re t men t be ery different, ecordin t th ir differe t in clinati ns, educati in ests, &c. Custom t tles habits f thinkin in th understand g as w ll as f determini in th will, and of motions in th bod a d which seems t be but trains of motions in the animal spirits, which, ce set g ing continu in th same t ps they h used t which, by f en tre din are worn into mooth p th d th motio in t becomes eas and as t were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking thus deas seem t be prod ced in our minds if they are n t, this may serve explain th ir f llowing one th in an habitual train, wh ce they ar put into t ir track, as well as does t explain such motions f th body A mus cia used t y tune will find that, l t but once begi in his head, th id as f th several notes f t will f llow o o her orderl in his nd rstanding w hout any care or tt tion, as regularly as his fin ers move orderl over the key f th organ t play ou t tu he has begu though his unattenti e thou hts be lsewh re wandering Wh ther t natural cause f these d as, as well as f that regular dancin f his fingers be the motion f his animal spir ts, I will t determin how probbl soever by this instance t ppears be so bu this ma help us littl to conce e f in l lectual habits, and f the tyin o ther f ideas.

bl in men, wh h work as trongl nd prod ce as regular ffects as if they were natural and are therefor called so, thou h they t first had no ther original but the cid tal connex f two id as, which t the tr ngth f the first impression or f ture indul ence so unit ed, ha hey alwa s af erwards kept company toge her that man mind, as if they were but on idea. I say most f th an pathies, I d not say all for som f th m are trul natural d pend po our original const tution and ar born w thus but a gre t part of those which are cou t ed natural, would ha e been known to be from unheeded though perhaps earl impressions, r anton fancies t first, which wou d ha e been cknow ledged the or ginal f th m, if they had been waril observed. A grown person sur f ein th honey n soo hears th name f t, but his fancy immediat l carries ckness and m h nd h cann t bear th nd ck y t, nd nce to dat this w akness, and ca u got this h m by n me ould ted natural.

8. *I f re f as ociation t b watched duc t your Flares.* I me tio this, not out f gre t necessity there is in this prese t argument t distinguish nicely between n tural and acqu red antipathies but I tak n tice f t for an ther purpose viz. that those h ha e childr n or th charg f th ir ed cati would think t worth th whil dilige tly t watch, and carefully t prevent the undu conn xi f d as in th minds f young peopl This is the time most susceptibl f lasting impress ns and thou h those relating t th health f th bod are by discreet peopl mi ded and f nced gainst, et h rel mor

suspect, been by most men h lly er ou eu.

9. *A xion f deas gr t cau f error* This wro g connexi n in ou minds of deas in themsel es loose and ind pend t f one anoth er has su h an infl nce nd is f so gr at f ce t set us wry in our ti ns, as ell moral s natural, pass ns, asonings, and noti ns themsel es that perhaps th is t any thin that deserves more to be looked after

10. *I stan* Th d as f goblins and p es ha e really o more t d w th darkness than

frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he ca no more bear th on than th oth

the legs arms and body of a man and join to this a horse s head and neck, I do not make a false idea of anything because it represents nothing without me But when I call it a *man* or *Tartar* and imagine it to represent some real being without me or to be the same idea that others call by the same name in either of these cases I may err And upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a false idea though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental proposition wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an idea in my mind without thinking either that existence or the name *man* or *Tartar* belongs to it, I will call it *man* or *Tartar* I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming but not erroneous in my judgment nor the idea any way false

26 *More properly to be called right or wrong* Upon the whole matter I think that our ideas as they are considered by the mind —either in reference to the proper signification of their names or in reference to the reality of things —may very fitly be called *right* or *wrong* ideas according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred But if any one had rather call them true or false it is fit he use a liberty which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best though in propriety of speech *truth* or *falsehood* will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they some way or other virtually contain in them some mental proposition The ideas that are in a man s mind simply considered cannot be wrong unless complex ones wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together All other ideas are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge but when we come to refer them to anything as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong as far as they disagree with such archetypes

Chap XXXIII *Of the Association of Ideas*[1]

1 *Something unreasonable in most men* There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions reasonings and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind if at all different from his own every one s quick

in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives and will very hardly if at all be convinced of

[1] Cf. Hobbes *Leviathan*, I. iii.

2 *Not wholly from self-love* This proceeds not wholly from self love though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds and not given up to the overweening of self flattery are frequently guilty of it and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason though laid before him as clear as daylight.

3 *Not from education* This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises or where it lies Education is often rightly assigned for the cause and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself but yet, I think, he ought to look a little further who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds and where it consists

4. *A degree of madness found in most men* I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name and is really madness and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always on all occasions argue or do as in some cases he constantly does would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion but in the steady calm course of his life That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind is that, inquiring a little by the bye into the nature of madness (Bk. II ch. xi. § 13) I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of This consideration of the thing itself at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure

5. *From a wrong connexion of ideas* Some of our ideas have a *natural correspondence* and connexion one with another it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings Besides this there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to *chance* or *custom* Id as that in

n t all f kin come t be s

s

ted th wh l g g a
th msel es too th

6 *Th mn n m d by cu t m* This tr g mbinatu f d as n t all ed by ature the mi d makes ts lf her l ntarily by ch ce d h t com n d ffe t m t be ery differe t, ccording t th ir d ffere t cl u ns, ed cat o t ts, &c. *Cust m* t derst d g as

useu

mooth p th d th m t t bec mes as d as t we tu al As far as w can

h b tual tr h th y ar p th ir tr k, as w ll as t doe t xpla such mo- u ns f th body A mus ia sed to y tune w ll find that, l t t but o begi his h ad th d as f th se al t f t w ll f llow e th ord ly h u d rsta d g thout y car tt u as gularly as his fingers mov ord ly th key f th org t pl y

su h associati ns f th m mad b cu m, in th

bl m wh h w k as tr gly and p o- d as gular ff ts as f th y w tu al nd th for called so though they t first h d th ginal but th cid tal nne.

I w d as wh h th th stre gth f th f rst mp ess or f tu d l ce so nited th th y al ay ft rwards k pt company tog th th t m mi d as if they we but d a. I say most f th t p th es I d n t

s y all f r som f them are truly natur l de pe d po ur gi ale nst tuti n a d are bo n w th us but a gre t part f those wh ch e co nt ed tural would h bee known t be f om unhe ded tho gh pe haps a ly impress ons or wanton f n s at fir t, wh h uld ha e been k o ledged the or g al of them, f they had been ar ly bserved. A grown person sur w th h ey no soo e he rs th n m f

n tural.

purpos iz th t thos h ha chil th charg f th ir ed cat ould th k t th th r hil dil g tly to wat h and car fully to p ev t the und co xi f d as

discr t peopl mi ded d f ced ag nst, y t I m pt t d bt, that thos wh ch l t m peculiarly t th mi d a d t mi t n the n d rstand g pas ns ha be n m ch les h ed d tha th thi g deserve nay thos l u pu ly t th und rstand g ha e I suspect, bee by most m wh lly e looked

9 *It g xion f d as g t aus f error*

T

n tural pas ns aso gs a d t ns th m sel s, that pe haps th t any thin that d erves mo to be looked aft

A nstanc Th d as f g blin d p t h e ally m t d w th darkness tha li ht yet l t but fool h ma d culcat th ften th mi d f child and aise th m th r tog th pos bly h hall ev be bl t p- ar t th m main so lo g as h l es but dark n ss hall ev afterwards b g w th t thos frightf l d as, d th y shall be so j ed th t h can mor bear th o than th ther

11 *Another instance* A man receives a sensible injury from another thinks on the man and that action over and over and by ruminating on them strongly or much in his mind so cements those two ideas together that he makes them almost one never thinks on the man but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it so that he scarce distinguishes them but has as much an aversion for the one as the other Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions and quarrels propagated and continued in the world

12 *A third instance* A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place he saw his friend die in

pression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it he confounds them in his mind and can as little bear the one as the other

13 *Why time cures some disorders in the mind which reason cannot cure* When this combination is settled and while it lasts it is not in the power of reason to help us and relieve us from the effects of it Ideas in our minds when they are there will operate according to their natures and circumstances And here we see the cause why time cures certain affections which reason though in the right and allowed to be so has not power over nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases The death of a child that was the daily delight of its mother s eyes and joy of her soul rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life and gives her all the torment imaginable use the consolations of reason in this case and you were as

separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss from the idea of the child returning to her memory all representations though ever so reasonable are in vain and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved spend their lives in mourning and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves

14 *Another instance of the effect of the association of ideas* A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation The gentleman who was thus recovered with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment owned the cure all his life after as the greatest obligation he could have received but what

ony which he suffered from his hands which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure

15 *More instances* Many children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after and thus reading becomes a torment to them which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives There are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in and fashions of vessels which though ever so clean and commodious they cannot drink out of and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them and make them offensive and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him but because having once on some occasion got the ascendant the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person and he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them

young gentleman who having learnt to dance and that to great perfection there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well yet it was only whilst that trunk was there nor could he perform well in any other place unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances a little beyond precise nature I answer for myself that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man upon his own knowledge as I report it and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this who have not met with accounts if not examples of this nature that may parallel or at least justify this

17 *Influence of association on intellectual habits* Intellectual habits and defects this way contracted are not less frequent and powerful though less observed Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought whilst these are still combined in the mind what notions what reasonings will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God and what absurdities will that

mind be Labl to bout the De ts Let the idea f inf.Libality be inseparabl joined t any per son, and these two constantl to ther possess t.. mind and then one body in two places t once shall unexamined be swallowed for cer tain truth, by an implicit faith, h.never that imagined infallibl person dictates and demands asse t w thout inquiry

8. *Obser le in the one ation betw en different sect f phil sophy and f el ion.* Some such wrong and unnatural combinations f ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilabl pposition betwee different sects f philosoph and religion for we cannot imagi.. every ne of their f llowers to impose wilfully on himself and knowingly refuse truth ffered by plain reason. I terest, though t does great deal in the case yet cannot be thought o work wh l soci ties f men to so uni — perverseness, as that every on of them

understandings, and makes them not see the *falsehood f wha they embrace for al truth.* That which thus capti a es their reasons, and leads men f sincerity blindfold from common sense will, whe examined, be found to be what we are speakin f some ind pendent ideas, f

there together and they can no more separ t them in th ir thou hts than if they were but ne id a, and they perat as if they were so This gi es sense to jargon demonstration to bsurdities, and consis ency to nonsense and is the foun dation of th greatest, I had almost said f all th errors in the world or if t does not reach

so far t is t l ast the most dangerous one since so far as t obtains, t hinders men from seeing and examinin When two things, in themsel es disjoined appear to th ght constantly uni ed if t.. eye sees these thi.. gs ri eted which are loose where will you begin t rectify the mistakes that follo in two ideas that they ha e been ccustomed so to jo in their minds as to substitut o e for th other and as I am apt t think, of en w thout perce ing t th msel es. This, whilst they are under the dece t f it, makes them incapabl of con ction, and they applaud themsel es as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error nd the confusion of two different id as, which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath t them mad in ffect but ne fills th ir heads w h false ews, and their reasonings w th false consequences.

19. *Conclusion.* Ha ing thus gi en an account of th original sorts, and extent of our IDEAS, w th several ther cons derations bout these (I know not whether I may say) instrume ts, or materials of our knowledge the method I at *first proposed t m self would now require that* I should immediately proceed to show what use th understanding makes of them, and what KNOWLEDGE we ha e b t.. m. This was that hich, in the first general ew I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should ha e to d but, upo nearer pproach, I find that there so close con. xion between d as and ORDS, and our bstract id as and general words ha e so constant relation one t an ther that t impossibl to speak clearly and distin tl f our knowledge, whi h all consists in propositions, w thout consideri g first, the nature use and signification f La guage which, therefore must be the business f the next Book.

BOOK III Of Words

Chap I Of Words or Langua in Gener l

Man fitted to form articul.. sounds God, ha ing designed ma. for sociab creature mad him not only w th an inclination, and under ecess ty to ha e f llowship w th those f his own kind, bu furnished him also with language hich was t be the grea instrume t and common tie f society Man, therefore had by na .. his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to fram articulat sounds, which we call words. But this was no enough to produce language for par .., and several ther birds, will be taught to

mak articula sounds distinct nough, which et by n means are capabl f language.

T.. t se sounds as si s f ideas Besides ar ticula sounds, t.. fore t was furth necessa ry that he should be ble use these sounds as s ns f internal conceptions and to mak them stand as marks for the ideas w thin his own mind whereby they mi ht be mad known to th rs, and th thoughts f m n minds be con eyed fr m t another

3 *T mak t.. m general signs* But neither was this suffi t to mak words so useful as they

Cf. ch. ii. § 2.

11 *Another instance* A man receives a sensible injury from another thinks on the man and that action over and over and by ruminating on them strongly or much in his mind so cements those two ideas together that he makes them almost one never thinks on the man but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it so that he scarce distinguishes them but has as much an aversion for the one as the other Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions and quarrels propagated and continued in the world

1 *A third instance* A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place he saw his friend die in such a room though these have in nature nothing to do one with another yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it he confounds them in his mind and can as little bear the one as the other

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separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss from the idea of the child returning to her memory all representations though ever so reasonable are in vain and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved spend their lives in mourning and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves

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15 *More instances* Many children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after and thus reading becomes a torment to them which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives There are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in and fashions of vessels which though ever so clean and commodious they cannot drink out of and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them and make them offensive and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him but because having once on some occas on got the ascendant the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person and he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them

16 *A curious instance* Instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere that if I add one more it is only for the pleasant oddness of it It is of a young gentleman who having learnt to dance and that to great perfection there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well yet it was only whilst that trunk was there nor could he perform well in any other place unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances a little beyond precise nature I answer for myself that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man upon his own knowledge as I report it and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this who have not met with accounts if not examples of this nature that may parallel or at least justify this

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tion of thoughts, twas ecessary that man should f d out som external sens ble ns, wh reof t ose in bl d wh h his thou hts are mad up of might be mad known to others. For this purpose nothi was o fit th for p enty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which w th so m ch ease and ariety he found himself abl to make. Thus e ma conce e how which were by nature so w ll adapted t purpose came to be mad use of by men as the signs of their idea n t by any natural connexio that t ere is betwee particular articu la so ds and rtain d as fo th n th re would be but one language amongst all men but by oluntary imposition, whereby such word is mad arbitrarily th mark of such an idea. Th use then, of words, is to be sensibl marks of de a and t d as they stand for are their proper and immediat signification.

It ... seen le ... Th use men have of these marks being either t record their own th hts f th as istan f th own memory or as t were to brin ou their ideas, and lay them before t ew of others words, in th ir primary mmed t signifi u n stand for nothing bu t ... how imperfectly soever carelessly t ose ideas are collected from th things which t ey ar supposed rep es nt. Wh man peaks to another is that h ma be under ood and th end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, ma mak known his deas to th hear er Tha then which words are the marks f are the ideas of t speaker nor can any o pply them as marks, immediatel to anything lse but the ideas that h himself hath for this would be mak them signs of his own conceptu ns, and et ppl them to ther ideas wh h would be to mak them signs and not signs of his ideas t th same time and so in effect to ha e no signifi cation all. Words being oluntary signs, they an be l tary signs imposed b him things h kn ws t. Tha w uld be t mak them ns of no hing sounds w thou significa tion. A man canno mak his words th gns ei ther of qualities in things, or of co ceptions in t mind of another whereof h has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot ppose them correspond with th concepti s of another man nor can he use any signs for them f ther ma n can h use any ns for hem for thus they would be the gns of he knows no wha which is in truth to be the gns of noth g B t when h ep esents t himself ther men ideas by some of his own, if h consent to give them the same names that other men do, it ... deas that he has, and

... n the ... owing

and the ignorant, the learned ... rned use th words they speak (w th any meaning) all alike. They in every man s mo th, stand fo the deas h has nd wh h he would xpres by them. A child ha ing taken notice of n thing n the m tal h h rs called *g ld* but th b ght shining ellow colour he appl es the w rd g ld onl t his wn d f that colour a d noth else a d therefore calls th same col ur in pea cock tail gold Anoth r th t hath better observed adds to shinin llow gre t w ght, and th n the sound gold, when he uses t, tands for a comple dea f ining y llow and a ery weighty substance An ther dds to those qual ities fusibility and then th word gold signifies t him body bri ht, yellow fus ble and ery hea y Another dds malleability Each of these uses equally th word g ld, when they ha e oc ca n to express the dea which they ha p- plied t t but t is evident that each can pply t nl to his own dea nor can h mak t tand as a sign of such complex dea as he has n t.

are in the mind of the speaker yet they in their th hts gi th m secr t f ce t tw ther things.

First, *They s ... marks f ... communicat* for lse they sh uld talk in ain, and could not be understood if th sounds they p- plied t ne dea were such as by th heare were pplied to another which is to speak two lan guages. B t t this men tand n t usually t ex amine, wh ther th dea they and those they dis- course w th have in their minds be the same but think t enough that they use the word, as they imagin in th common cceptati f that lan- gua in whi h they suppose that the dea they mak t sign of is precisely th same to which th u derstanding men f that country pply that name.

5. *T ... al ty f* Secondly Because men would not be thought t talk barely of their own imaginati n, but of things as really they ar therefore they often suppose th *ords to tand also for the al y f thing* B t this relatin more parti cularly to substances and their names, as perhap the former does to simpl ideas and modes, we

ought to be It is not enough for the perfection of language that sounds can be made signs of ideas unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by To remedy this inconvenience language had yet a further improvement in the use of *gener l terms* whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of those names becoming general which are *made to stand for general ideas* and those remaining particular where the *ideas* they are used for are *particular*

4 *To m ke them si nify the absence of positive ideas* Besides these names which stand for ideas there be other words which men make use of not to signify any idea but the want or absence of some ideas simple or complex or all ideas together

[illegible] o ild be per late to pos [illegible]

5 *W rds ultimately de ived fr m such as signify sen s ble ideas* It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our not ons and knowledge if we [illegible]

quite removed from sense have their rise from thence and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significat ons and made to stand for deas that come not under the cogn zance of our senses v g to *ima e pp e hend comp he d dhere con eit in til d sgust dis tu ba ce tranq ill ty* &c are all words taken from the operations of sensible things and appl ed to certain modes of thinking *Spirit* in its pr mary [illegible]

sible ideas By which we may give so [illegible] guess what kind of notions they were and whence derived which filled the r minds who were the first beginners of languages and how nature even in the naming of things una ares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge whilst to gi e names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves or any other ideas that came not under their senses they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of sensation by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those *operations* they *experimented* in themselves which made no outward sensible appearances and then when they had got known and agreed names to signify those internal operations of their own minds they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their other ideas since they could consist of nothing but either of outward sensible perceptions or of the inward operations of their *minds about them we having as has been* proved no ideas at all but what originally come either from sensible objects without or what we feel within ourselves from the inward workings of our own spirits of which we are conscious to *ourselves within*

6 *Distribution of subjects to be treated of* But to understand better the use and force of Language as subservient to instruction and knowled e it will be convenient to consider

First *To what it is that names in the use f lan gua e are immedi tely applied*

Secondly Since all (except proper) names are general and so stand not particularly for this or that s ngle thing but for sorts and ranks of things it will be necessary to cons der in the next place [illegible]

shall the better come to find the right [illegible] of ords the natural ad antages and defects of language and the remedies that ought to be used to avoid the inconven ences of obscurity or uncerta nty in the signification of words without wh ch it is impossible to discourse with any clearness or order concerning knowledge which being conversant about propositions and those most commonly universal ones has greater connexion with words than perhaps is suspected

These considerations therefore shall be the matter of the following chapters [2]

Chap II *Of the Signifi ation of Words*

1 *Wo ds are sensible signs nece sa y f r commu ic ti n f ideas* Man though he ha e great variety of thoughts and such from wh ch others as ell as himself m ght recei e profit and del gh t yet they are all within h s own b east *invisible and* h *dden from others* nor can of themselves be made to appear The comfort and advantage of society not be ng to be had without communica

[1] Cf Bk II ch vi i §§ 1–6

[2] Cf Lock s l tt r to M lyn u J n 20 1693

tious understanding If t be looked o as an in stance of a prodigious memory that som gen erals ha e been ble t call every sold er th ir arm by his proper name we may easily find reason why men have never attempted to gi e names to each sheep in th ir flock, or crow that — every leaf

cause t would not se to th —
guage Men would in ain he p up names of par ticular things, that would t serve them to com municate their thou hts. M learn names, and use them in talk w th thers, only that they may be understood which is then nly don when, by use or conse t, th sou d I mak by th or gans f speech excites in an ther man mind an

p t cular th gs l ges ts lf by g n l iew to which things red ced into sorts, und general names, are prope ly subservie t. These, th th names bel ging to them, com thin some compass, and d t multiply every mo ment, beyond what ther th mind ca contain, or use q ire And th f these men ha e for the most part stopped but t t so as to hinder themsel es from distinguishing parti ular hings by ppropriated names, where co en ce d ma ds t. And th ref re th ir own pecies, which they ha e most t d w th, and wherein they ha e oft occasion t mention par ticular persons, they mak use f proper names and there distinct indi iduals ha distu ct d nominations.

5 *What th have proper name and why* Besides persons, countries also cities, ri ers, mountains, and ther he lik distinctions f place ha e usu all found peculiar names, and that for the sam ason they being such as me ha e f n an oc casion to mark particularly and as t were set before others in their discourses w th them. And I doubt no but, if we had reason t me tio par ticular horses as often as we ha e to menti n par t cular men we should ha e proper names f — her nd Buceph Alexan jockeys, own and erva ts occasi hen he
is out f sight.

6 *How general words are made* Th next thing to be cons dered is,—How general words come to be made. Fo since all things that exist are only particulars, how come w by gen ral terms or where find e those gen ral natures they are supposed t stand for Words becom general by bein mad the s gns f ge ral d and d become general by separating from them th eir cumsta ces f time and place nd any othe — m th or that

di duals than on each f which ha ing t conformity to that abstract dea is (as we call t) f that sort.

7 *Shown by the way we enlarg our compl . s f om f ncy* B t, to deduce this l ttle more dis tinctly t ill n t perhaps be amiss to trace our noti ns and names from the beg nning nd b serve by what degrees we proceed and by what steps we enlarge our d as from our first inf ncy h

minds and like p tures f them there, repre sent only those indi duals. The names they first ga e to them are co fined t these ind duals and th names f *nurse* and *mamma* th child uses, det rmin themsel es t thos persons After wards, wh n tim and a l rg r acqu ta ce ha e mad them observe that there ar a great many other th gs in th o ld th t some commo greem ts f shape and several the qualities, resembl th ir fath and mother and those persons they ha e been used t they fram an idea, which they find those many particulars d partak in and t that th y give w th others, the name *man* for examp And thus they com to h g al n m d g l d a. Wh rein they make n thing new but nly l out f th compl id a they had f P ter nd

Bk. II ch. xi. §§ Bk IV h. vii. § 9.
Cf Berk ley *Princ. f Human Knowledg* In trod. § 6 Also f. Bk. II ch. xi. §§ 9.

shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in particular though give me leave here to say that it is a perverting the use of words and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification whenever we make them stand for any thing but those ideas we have in our own minds

6 *Words by use readily excite ideas of their objects* Concerning words also it is further to be considered

First that they being immediately the signs of men s ideas and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts there comes by constant use to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for that the names heard almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves which are apt to produce them did actually affect the senses Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us

7 *Words are often used without sig fication a d why* Secondly That though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker yet because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly and have them readily on our tongues and always at hand in our memories but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their significations perfectly it often happens that men even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration do set their thoughts more on words than things Nay because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which *they stand therefore some not only children but* men speak several words no otherwise than parrots do only because they have learned them and have been accustomed to those sounds But so far as words are of use and signification so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea and a designation that the one stands for the other without which application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant noise

8 *Their s gnific tio perfectly arbit ary t the con*

tween them But that they signify only men s peculiar ideas and that *by a perfect a b t ary impost tion* is evident in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of and every man has so *inviolable a liberty to make words* stand for what ideas he pleases that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has when they use the same words that he does And therefore the great Augustus himself in the possess on of that power which ruled the world acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word which was as much

It is true common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages which so far limits the signification of that sound that unless a man applies it to the same idea he does not speak properly and let me add that unless a man s words excite the *same ideas in the hearer which he makes them* stand for in speaking he does not speak intelligibly But whatever be the consequence of any man s using of words differently either from their general mean ng or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them this is certain their signification in his use of them is *limited to his ideas and they can be signs of nothing else*

Chap III *Of General Terms*

1 *The greatest part of words are gener l terms* All things that exist being particulars it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words which ought to be conformed to things should be so too —I mean in the r signification but yet we find quite the contrary The far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms which has not been the effect of neglect or *chance but of reason and necess ty*

2 *Th t every particul r thi g sh uld h ve a nam for itself is impossible* First It is imposs ble that every particular thing should have a distinct pecul ar name For the signif cation and use of words depending on that connexion wh ch the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them it is necessary in the appl cation of names to things that the m nd should have dist nct ideas of the things and reta n also the particular name that belongs to every one with

B t it is ame ilar

things we meet with every bird and beast men saw every tree and plant that affected the senses could not find a place in the most capa

Ad anc me t f Learni g 14 11

by several others, so that th meani g d a t stands for may be certainly kn wn langu ges ... so mad d g t th rules

h ther w ds r d as W us al has be sa d wh n used for s gns f ge al d as, and so ar ppl cabl d ff tly to ma y particular things d d as ar g ral wh n th y are set up as the p ese tati es f ma y articular thi gs but un rsality bel gs ot t

t t n d ns as

wh ch makes nything to be of that speci a d th co f rmity to th de t wh ch the name is an ed being that wh ch gi es a r ght t that name the ha g the essence nd th ha g that f rmity must ed be th sam th g since to be f any pecies nd to ha e a right to th n me f that pec es, is all e As, fo x ample, t be a *man* or of the *p ci* man nd to ha ht t th *name* man is the s me thi g Ag t be a man o f the species man a d ha e th *ence* f a man the same th g No s ce thi g can be a man r ha ght to th me ma but what has conf rm ty to th abstr ct d the n me man tands for nor any thing be a ma ha e a ight to the speci s ma but what has th es nce f that species t f llow that th abstr ct d f r wh ch th n me sta ds and th esse ce f th pec es, is one a d the sam From h e t is asy to bs rve that the esse ces f the sorts f th ngs, a d cons q ntly th so t g f things, is th wo kman hip f the u d tand g that bstr ts and m kes thos ge eral d as

th g ral natur be g th g p city they ar p t to by th und rstand g f gn fying or prese ting ma y particulars. F th gn ficati they h is th g but l ti that, by th mind f man is dded to th m.

Ab tract d as ar the er f g er and f ci Th thing th f t be cons d ed is, Wha k d f gnifica t is that g al words h F as t is ev d that they d t gnif bar ly particular thi g f th th y ould be g eral t rms, bu pr pe names, so on th th d t as d t they d t

f is *or* f things and ch f th m does th t, by being gn f an bstr ct id th d hi h dea, as things xisti g ar f d gr so they m to be nked d that m or wh ch is all be f that so Wh bv ev d that th *enc* f th sorts f th Lati word pl ase be te *peci* f thi gs, ar noth lse bu these bstr ct d as F th ha ing th esse ce f any pecies, being that

m bv us e pecially n th r ce o and all th ngs p op ated by s d But et I think we may say *th ort f them der names is the workm nsh p f th nder t nd g t ki g oc asion f m the sim l tud t b erv am g t them t mak b t act g eral id as* and set them p in th mi d w th mes nnex d t th m, as p tt rns or f rms (f n that s ns th w d *form* has ry p pe gn ficat) to whi h as particu lar things xi t g are f d to gr th y com to be of that spe h that d mi ti n ar put th t *lassi* Fo h n w say this is m that h rse this ju that cru lty this w t h, th t j ck what d w lse but nk things u d d ff t pe f c names, as greeing t those bstr t d as of which w h mad those m th gns A d hat are th ssence f those pecies t ut and marked by n mes but those abst act d as th m d

abstr deas are th med m that un te th m so that th sse ce f pec es, as dis ingu hed and d min t d by us n th r ar ca be

Cf. Bk IV h. xxi, § 4.

Cf § 3.

See Bk III ch vi. lso *Thi d Letter* to Stilling fleet, p 356

James Mary and Jane that which is peculiar to each and retain only what is common to them all

8 *And further enlarge our complex ideas by still leaving out properties contained in them* By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of *man* they easily advance to more general names and notions For observing that several things that differ from their idea of man and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man by retaining only those qualities and uniting them into one idea they have again another and more general idea to which having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension which new idea is made not by any new addition but only as before by leaving out the shape and some other properties signified by the name man and retaining only a body with life sense and spontaneous motion comprehended under the name animal

9 *General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones* That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas and general names to them I think is so evident that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man s self or others and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge And he that thinks *general natures* or *notions* are anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular existences will I fear be at a loss where to find them For let any one effect and then tell me wherein does his idea of *man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul* or his idea of *horse* from that of *Bucephalus* but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names *man* and *horse* leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ and retaining only those wherein they agree and of those making a new distinct complex idea and giving the name *animal* to it one has a more general term that comprehends with man several other creatures Leave out of the idea of *animal* sense and spontaneous motion and the remaining complex idea made up of the remaining simple ones of body life and nourishment becomes a more general one under the more comprehensive

to *being thing* and such universal terms which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever To conclude this whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools and are with justice so little regarded out of them is nothing else but *abstract ideas* more or less comprehensive with names annexed to them In all which this is constant and unvariable That every more general term stands for such an idea and is but a part of any of those contained under it

10 *Why the genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions* This may show us the reason why in the defining of words which is nothing but declaring their signification we make use of the *genus* or next general word that comprehends it Which is not out of necessity but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or *genus* stands for or perhaps sometimes the shame of not being able to do it But though defining by *genus* and *differentia* (I crave leave to use these terms of art though originally Latin since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to) I say though defining by the *genus* be the shortest way yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best This I am sure it is not the only and so not absolutely necessary For definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined and if instead of such an enumeration men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term it has not been out of necessity or for greater clearness but for quickness and dispatch sake For I think that to one who desired to know what idea the word *man* stood for if it should be said that man was a solid extended substance having life sense spontaneous motion and the faculty of reasoning I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood and the idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known as when it is defined to be a rational animal which by the several definitions of *animal vivens* and *corpus* resolves itself into those enumerated ideas I have in explaining the term *man* followed here the ordinary definition of the schools which though perhaps not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose And one may in this instance see what gave occasion to the rule that a definition must consist of *genus* and *differentia* and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is of such a rule or advantage in the strict observing of it For definitions as has been said being only the explaining of one word

bv several thers, so that the meaning or d a t ands f may be certainly k wn langu ges ... lwa s so mad a cordin t th rules

trar or lse those wh ha e mad uus ... d ill, that they ha gi us so fev d fini tions conformabl to it. B t f definitions more in th ext chapter

General and un er al ar cr tur f the under stand and b g t to the al xistenc f th

T turn to gen al w ds t is pla n, by what has been said that *general* nd *uni ersal* bel g t to th real existe ce f things but are th en ti ns and cre tures f th understand g made by t for ts own use and concern nly ms, hether words or d as. Words ar g neral as has bee said when used for gns f g eral d as, and so are pplicabl ind ffer ntly to many particular things d d as ar gen al wh n they ar set p as th p esentatives f many particular thi gs but ni ersality bel s to things thems l es, which are all f th m partu ular in their existence those w ds and ideas whi h in th ir significatio are ge ral. Whe therefor w quit particulars, th g erals tha est are nly cr tures f our own makin th ir g neral nature bein thi but th ca pacity they are pu into, by th understanding f ifying or representing many part culars. For th gn ficati they h is n thing but lati that, by th mind f man is dded to th m.

Abstract d as ar the sser f gener and er Th ex thi g th for t be ns d red is, Wha kind f gnificati t is tha ge al ords ha F as is ev d tha they d t nif barely part cular thing for th they ould t be g al rms, but p pe names, so, on th th d is as ev den they d t signif plurality f *man* nd *men* would th gnif th same nd th distı cti f umbers (as th grammarians call th m) would be per fluous nd useless Tha th which g al words nify is ort f things nd each f them does hat, by being gn f an bstract id in th mind hich dea, as th gs xisting ar found to agree so they com t be ranked d that name or hich is all be f that sort. Wh re by is ev d th th *sser* f th sorts or if h Latin word pleases bett *pec* f th s, ar nothi lse but these bstr t d as. F th ha ing he essence f any species, being that whi h makes anything to be f that species and th conformity t th de to which the name is an e ed be g that wh ch gi es a right t that name th ha g the essence a d th ha g that conf rmity must needs be th sam thing s ce t be f any spec es and to ha e right to the name of that species, is all e As, f r ex ample, to be a *man*, or f the *p ci* man and to ha r ht t th *nam* man is the same thi Aga to be ma or f the pecies man and ha e th *enc* of a man th sam th g Now s c thing can be a ma or ha e a ght to th nam man but what has a co f rmity t the abstr ct d th n m man sta ds f or any thing be a man o ha e r ght t th spec es man but what has th esse ce of that species it f llows, that th bstract d for which th name tands, d th esse ce f th pecies, is o and the sam From h nce t is asy t bserve that the essences f the sorts of th gs, nd conse qu tly th sorti f th gs, is th wo kma ship f the und rsta d g that bstr cts and makes those ge ral d as.

13 *They ar the kmansh p f the under t ndi g but h t a fo d t the mil tud f th g*

I would t h be th ht t forg t, m ch less to deny that N ture in th prod cti n of things, makes sev al of th m alik ther is thin more bv ous, especially in th ace of animals and all th gs pr p g ted by e d But yet I think w may say *th ort f them under nam is the orkmansh p f th under tand g t k ng oc asion f om the sim l tud t b tw am t them to mak b tract g neral d as* d set them up n the mind w th names ann ed t them, as patt rns or f rms, (f in that sen th o d *f rm* has a ery p pe nificati) to which as part cu lar things exi ting are fou d to agree so they com t be f that species, ha that d mina ti n, are put into th t *lassis* F wh w say this is ma th t horse thi justi th t eru lty this wa h, th t j k wha d lse but rank th gs und d fer t pecifi names, as greeing to those bstract d as, of which we ha mad thos mes th gns And hat ar th esse es f those species se ut and marked by n mes, but those bstr ct d as th mind which as t we th bo ds betw n par ticular things that xist, and th names they ar to be ranked und And wh n g neral ames ha y conn xi n w th particular be gs, these bstr ct deas ar th med um that un tes them so tha th esse ces f pecies, as distinguished and d min ed by us, n ther are nor can be

Cf. Bk. IV ch. xxi. § 4.
Cf. § 3.

See Bk. III ch. vi. also *Third Letter* t Stilling fleet, p 3 6

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to *being thing* and such universal terms which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever To conclude this whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools and are with justice so little regarded out of them is nothing else but *abstract ideas* more or less comprehensive *with names annexed to them* In all which this is constant and unvariable That every more general term stands for such an idea and is but a part of any of those contained under it

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by several others, so that the mea... or idea t... stands for ma... be certainly known langua es are not always so made ccording t th rules of logic, that every term can have its significa tion exact, and clearl expressed by two thers. Experience sufficient satisfies us t the contrary or lse those who ha e mad this rul ha e done ill, that they ha e given us so few d finitions conformabl to it But of d finitions more in the next chapter

General and universal are creatures of the understanding and belong not to the existence of things. T return to general words is plain, by what has been said, that general and universal belong not to the real existence f things b t are the in ventions and creatures of the understandin mad for its own use, and concern onl signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicab indifferentl to man particular things and ideas are general when they are set up as the representati es of many particular things bu universality belongs not to things themse es, which are all f them partic ular in their existence even those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When therefore we quit particulars, the generals tha rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the ca pacity they are pu into, by the understanding of signifying or representing man particulars. For the signification they ha e is no hin bu a relation that, by the mind of man, is added to them.

Abstract ideas are the essences of genera and species. The next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind f signification is that general words ha For as is evident that they d not signif bare one particular thing for then they would not be general erms, bu pr per names, so on he ther d is as evident they d not signif plurality for man and men would then signify the same and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be super fluous and useless. Tha then which general words ... is ... of things and ach of them does ha by being sign of an abstract idea in the mind ...ch idea, as things existing are found to agree so they come to be ranked under that name or which is all one, be of that sort. Where- by evident that the essence of the sorts, or if the Latin word pleases better ... f things, is nothing lse but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, bei... that which makes any thing to be of that species and the conformity t the id a to which the name is annexed bei... that which gi es a right to that name the ha in the essence and th ha ing that conformity must needs be the same thin since t be of a... species, and t have right to the name of that species, is all one As, for ex ample, t be man, or of the ... man, and to ha e ri ht to the name man, is the same thin Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the esse... f a man, is the same thi... Now since nothin can be a man, or ha e a ri ht to the name man, but what has conformity to the abstract id a the nam man stands for nor any thin be a man, or ha e right t the species man, bu what has the essence f that species t follows, that the bstract dea for which the name stands, and the essence f the species, is one and the same. From whence t is easy to observe that the essences f the sorts of things, and, cons qu ntl the sorting of things, is the workman- ship f the understandin that abstracts and makes those general deas.

13 *They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.* I would not here be thou ht t forget, much less to den that Nature in the prod ction f things, makes several of them alike there is nothing more bvious, especial in th race f animals, and all things propaga ed by seed. B t et I think we ma sa *the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas,* and set them up in the mind, w th names annexed to them, as pat erns or forms. (for in that sense the word *form* has ery proper signification.) t which as particu lar things existin are found to agree so they come to be o. that species, ha e that d nomina tion, or are put int that *classis* For when we say this is man, that horse this justice, that cru lty this watch, tha jack what d we o bu rank things under different speci... names, as agreeing to those bstract ideas, of which we ha e mad those names the ... And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, bu those bstract ideas in th mind which are, as t were the bonds between pa... ticular things that xist, and th names they are to be ranked under And when general names ha e an connexion w th particular beings, these bstract ideas are the medium that uni es them, so tha the essences of species, as distinguished and d nomina ed by us, ne ther are nor can be

Cf. Bk. IV ch. xxi, § 4.
Cf. § 3.

See Bk. III. ch. vi. also *Third Letter* to Stilling fleet, p. 3 6

anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds And therefore the supposed real essences of substances if different from our abstract ideas cannot be the essences of the species *we* rank things into For two species may be one as rationally as two different essences be the essence of one species and I demand what are the alterations [which] may or may not be made in a *horse* or *lead* without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by *our* abstract ideas this is easy to resolve but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed *real* essences he will I suppose be at a loss and he will never be able to know when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a *horse* or *lead*

14 *Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence* Nor will any one wonder that I say these essences or abstract ideas (which are the measures of name and the boundaries of species) are the workmanship of the understanding who considers that at least the complex ones are often in several men different collections of simple ideas and therefore that is *covetousness* to one man which is not so to another Nay even in substances where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves they are not constantly the same no not in that species which is most familiar to us and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance it having been more than once doubted whether the *fœtus* born of a woman were a *man* even so far as that it hath been debated whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized which could not be if the abstract idea or essence to which the name man belonged were of nature s making and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas which the understanding put together and then abstracting it, affixed a name to it So that in truth every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat and rain is as essentially different from snow as water from earth that abstract idea which is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the other And thus any two abstract ideas that in any part vary one

But since the essences of things are thought by some (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word *essence*

Real essences First Essence may be taken for the very being of anything whereby it is what it is [2] And thus the real internal but generally (in substances) unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend may be called their essence This is the proper orig-

it is still used when we speak of the essence of particular things without giving them any name

Nominal essences Secondly The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about *genus* and *species* the word *essence* has almost lost its primary signification and instead of the real constitution of things has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of *genus* and *species* It is true there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution on which any collection of simple ideas co existing must depend But it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species only as they agree to certain abstract ideas to which we have annexed those names the essence of each *genus* or sort comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort as I do general from genus) name stands for And this we shall find to be that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use

These two sorts of essences, I suppose may not unfitly be termed the one the *real* the other *nominal essence*

16 *Constant connexion between the name and nominal essence* Between the *nominal essence* and the *name* there is so near a connexion that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence whereby it answers that abstract idea whereof that name is the sign

17 *Supposition that species are distinguished by their real essences useless* Concerning the *real essences* of corporeal substances (to mention these only) there are if I mistake not two opinions. The one is of those who using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences according to which all natural things are made and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake and so become

Cf ch xxi § 6
[2] Cf *First Letter* to Stillingfleet pp 172-213

Cf Aristotl *Metaphysics* iv c 4

f this or that species Th other and more ed ess, &c which makes t to be g ld, or g es
u nal pin is f those ho look n all atural

cas on to rank them into sorts u der comm n d omin tions Th former f these p ns, which supposes these essences as a certain num be f forms or moulds wherein all natural things that exist are cast, and d equally partake has, I imagin ery m ch perplexed the know ledge f natural things. The freq t prod ctions of m nst rs all the spe es f a mals a d f changelings and th trange issues f h man b th carry th th m difficulties n t poss ble t consist w th this hypothesis since t is as im poss bl th t t o thi gs partaking exactly f th sam real esse ce h uld ha d ff t proper ties, as that two figu es p rtaking f th same real esse ce f circl sh ld ha d ff t proper

to mak us lay t by and co t t urselves w th

8 *R al and om nal ence the am simpl d as nd mod d ffer t sub t* Ess es being th dist guish d t mi l d al we may f rth bserv that, in th spec es f simpl d as and modes, they are always th sam but in substances alw y q t differe t. Th s, fig re incl d g a p between th ee li es is th real as w ll as minal esse ce f a triangl t being t nly th bstra t dea t which th g eral nam is exed b t th ry *sent* or be- g f th thing tself that f d u from which all ts propert es flow nd to wh ch they are all nsepar bly an exed. B t t is f th rwise co cerni g that parcel f m

k ow not, and so h ving par ticular id of havi g nam that is th gn of t. B t yet t is ts col ur w ight, fusibility fix

an exed. B t this distu tu f esse ces, bel g i g p rticularly t s bstances we shall when we com t ns de th r n mes, ha e occas n t tre t f more fully

19 *E en gener bl nd nc rrupt bl* That such abstract d as, th names to them as we h been speaking f are esse ces, may fu ther ppea by what e t ld cern g esse ces, viz. th t they are all inge erable a d corrupt ble. Which cann t be true of the real co t tu t s f th gs h ch b g n d p ish th th m. All thi gs th t exist, bes des th A th are all liabl to ch g especially those th gs w are q ted w th, and ha e ranked into b ds u d dist t n mes o s gns Thus th t h h w gr ss t -day is t mo the flesh of sheep and w thin f w days after be comes part f man in all which and th lik hanges, t is ev d t th l essence— e that constitut n wh reo th properties of these sev eral things depe ded—is destroyed and perishes with th m. B t esse ces be g taken f id as es- tablished the mind with names annexed to th m, they are supposed t remain ste dily th sam hates mutatio th p ticul sub- tances are liabl to F whatever becomes f *Al nder* and *Buc phalus* the deas to huch m and h are annexed ar pposed ev th less t rema n th sam and so th esse ces f those pe es ar p es rv d wh le d u dest y d hates changes happen t any r all f the in di duals of those species By this m ns the es- se of spe es rests saf d ti e, w th t th exist ce f som ch as o ind dual f that kind F w re h re

is n cease to be as p tt rn to d termine which f th p rticul figures w meet th ha e h e t right to th *nam* circl d so t sh w whi h f th m, by ha g that esse e was f that species. And th gh th e n the w re nor h d been nature su h beast as an *ni orn* such fish as *mermaid* y t, pposing thos names to ta d for compl bstra t d as that co tained inconsist cy th m, th essence f mermaid is as int lligibl as that f a man and th d f u corn as ce tai teady and

I h. vi.

Cf. Aristotl *M taphysic* vii.

permanent as that of a horse From what has been said it is evident that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas and is founded on the relation established between them and certain sounds as signs of them and will always be true as long as the same name can have the same signification

20 *Recapitulation* To conclude This is that which in short I would say viz that all the great business of *genera* and *species* and their *essences* amounts to no more but this —That men making abstract ideas and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them do thereby enable themselves to consider things and discourse of them as it were in bundles for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars

Chap IV *Of the Names of Simple Ideas*

1 *Names of simple ideas modes and substances have each somethin peculiar* Though all words as I have shown signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker yet upon a nearer survey we shall find the names of *simple ideas mixed modes* (under which I comprise *relations* too) and *natural substa ces* have each of them something peculiar and different from the other For example

2 *Names of simple ideas and of substances intimate real existence* First the names of *simple ideas* and *substances* with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately s gnify intimate also some real existence from which was derived their original pattern But the names of *mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind* and lead not the thoughts any further as we shall see more at large in the following chapter

3 *N mes of simple ideas and modes signify alw ys both re l a d nomi l essences* Secondly The names of simple ideas and modes signify alw ays the real as well as nominal essence of their species But the names of natural substances signify rarely if e er anything but barely the nominal essences of those species as we shall sho n the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular

H Th dl

It has not that I know been yet observed by any body what words are and what are not capable of being def ned the want hereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occas on of great wrangling and obscurity in men s discourses whilst some demand definitions of terms that can not be defined and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art by a genus and difference) hen even after such definition made according to rule those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the ord than they had before This at least I think that the sho ing what words are and what are not capable of definitions and wherein consists a good definition is not wholly besides our present purpose and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas as to deserve a more particular consideration

5 *If all names were definable it would be a process in infi itum* I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable from that pro ress in i fi it m which it will visibly lead us into if we should allow that all names could be defined For if the terms of one definition ere still to be defined by another where at last should we stop? But I shall from the nature of our ideas and the signification of our ords sho *why some names can and others cannot be d fined* and *which they are*

6 *What a definition is* I think it is agreed that a *definition* is nothing else but *the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms* The meaning of ords being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them the meaning of any term is then sho ed or the ord is defined when by other words the idea it is *made the sign of* and *anne ed to in the mind* of the speaker is as it ere represented or set before the view of another and thus its s gnif ca tion is ascertained This is the only use and end of def nitions and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good def n tion

7 *Simple ideas why undefinable* This being premised I say that the *n mes of simple ide s and those only e ncap ble of b i g d fi ed* The reason here of is this That t e se eral terms of a def nition s gnifying several ideas they can all together by no means represent an idea hich has no com pos tion at all and therefore a definition hich is properly nothing but the sho ing the meaning of one ord by several others not s gn fying each the same thing can in the names of simple ideas ha e no place

8 *Inst nc s sch l stic d fi t ons of moti n* The not observing this difference in our ideas and their names has produced that eminent trifling in the schools hich is so easy to be observed in the definitions they g e us of some fe of these simple ideas For as to the greatest part of them even those masters of definitions ere fain to lea e

them unto hed m ly by the imposs bil ty Wh t mo q is t jargon h d ts ld d is, n hould ha ece ea uus p language, that twas tus tis pot tiaqua s pote tia I ask h ther any e ca magin h could ther by ha u derstood what th word *be g g* gnifi d h guessed wh t d a D t hman rd ily h d his mind and would nify t an th wh nh used that sou d

9 *Moder d fi t ns f m t* N h e th mod rn philosoph rs who ha dea ured to throw ff th jarg f th schools, d peak in llimbly m ch bett succeeded d fining m p d as, wh th by plaini g th ir causes, or any th rwise Th tomists h defin m ti n to be passag f m pla t th r what d they mor than put syn nous w d f th Fo wh *pass g* th than *m t on* And f th w re asked what passag was, h would th bett d fin t than by m t For t t l ast as p per d nificant t say Passa m t fr m pla t th r as to sa M t n is passag &c. This is t tr nslate and to d fin wh w chang two w rd f th sam gn ficau for an th wh h, wh is better u d tood than th th may serv t disco what d th un known ta ds f but is ery f from d fin u nl ss w ll say ev ry E glish w rd in th d nary is th d fin u f th Latin w rd t nsw rs d tha m u is d finiti of *m tus* N will th success e pplicati f th parts of th superficies of body those of an ther wh ch th Cart sians gi us, pr m ch bet d finiti f moti wh n well xamined

Definitions f l ght Th t f persp cu us as far forth as persp cuous is an th P p tic d fin f impl d which though n t more bsurd tha th form f moti y t be y is l d gn fi y mor plainly because peri ce will asily co ince any on tha ca t mak th mea g of th w *d l ght* (h h t p t ds t d fin) t all und rstood by blind man but th d finiti f m tio ppears t t first s ght so useless because t escapes this w y f trial For this simpl dea entering by the touch as well as s ght, it is m poss bl to show xampl f y o e wh has ort th d of mot on but bar d tn tue e e simpl d as f o sense, ar tw deas and w id as so diff t and dista t e f m a ther that no tw can be mor so And th f e hould Descartes gl bules strike ne r so l g n the r tina f a man wh as blind by *gutt serena* h w uld th by nev ha e any d of light, r anythi g pp chi g t, though h unde stood ev so w ll hat l ttl gl bules we e, d h t triki g n an th body as And th r f th Carte ans ry ll di tinguish betwe n that light wh ch is th cause f th t sensation us, and th de hich is p odu ed in us by t, and is that wh ch is p pe ly l ght.

t *Simpl d u hy und finabl further plai d* Simpl d as as has be n h n ar nly t be got by those mpress ns bjects th msel mak n ur mi ds, by th p pe nl ts ppo ted t ch so t. If th y ar ot ec d th s w y ll the w rds in th world mad use f t expl d fin any f th ir names, will nev be bl top o- d us th d t sta ds f For ords being sounds, can produce us n th impl deas than of thos ry sound xcite any n us, but by that l tary co xi n h ch is known t be betw th m and those impl d as whi h common use has mad th m th ns of H that thinks th rwis l t him try f any w ds can gi him th tast f pin ppl and mak him ha th tru d f th l h f that l br ted d licious fruit. So far as h is t ld t has a esem blance w th any tas es wh eof h has th d as

Cf. Aristotl *Metaphysic* xi. 9.

Bew eg g is th Du h for movem t (so German *Bewegung*)

Cf Aristotl *O th Soul* ii. 3.

Cf. Bk. II ch

permanent as that of a horse From what has been said it is evident that the doctrine of the immu tability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas and is founded on the relation es tablished between them and certain sounds as signs of them and will always be true as long as the same name can have the same signification

20 *Recapitulation* To conclude This is that which in short I would say viz that all the great business of *genera* and *species* and their *essences* amounts to no more but this —That men mak ing abstract ideas and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them do thereby enable themselves to consider things and dis course of them as it were in bundles for the eas ier and readier improvement and communica tion of their knowledge which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts con fined only to particulars

Chap IV *Of the Names of Simple Ideas*

1 *Names of simple ideas modes and substances have each something peculiar* Though all words as I have shown signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker yet upon a nearer survey we shall find the names of *simple ideas mixed modes* (under which I comprise *relations* too) and *natural substances* have each of them something peculiar and different from the other For example

2 *Names of simple ideas and of substances intimate real existence* First the names of *simple ideas* and *substances* with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify intimate also some real existence from which was derived their original pattern But the names of *mixed modes* terminate in the idea that is in the mind and lead not the thoughts any further as we shall see more at large in the following chapter

as well as nominal essence of their species But the names of natural substances signify rarely if ever anything but barely the nominal essences of those species as we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular

4 *Names of simple ideas are undefinable* Thirdly The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition the names of all complex ideas are It has not that I know been yet observed by any body what words are and what are not capable of being defined the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men s discourses whilst some demand definitions of terms that can not be defined and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art by a genus and difference) when even after such definition made according to rule those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before This at least I think that the showing what words are and what are not capable of definitions and wherein consists a good definition is not wholly besides our present purpose and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas as to deserve a more particular consideration

5 *If all names were definable it would be a process in infinitum* I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable from that progress *in infinitum* which it will visibly lead us into if we should allow that all names could be defined For if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another where at last should we stop? But I shall from the nature of our ideas and the signification of our words show *why some names can and others cannot be defined* and *which they are*

6 *What a definition is* I think it is agreed that a *definition* is nothing else but *the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms* The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them the meaning of any term is then showed or the word is defined when by other words the idea it is made the sign of and annexed to in the mind of the speaker is as it were represented or set before the view of another and thus its signification is ascertained This is the only use and end of definitions and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good definition

7 *Simple ideas why undefinable* This being premised I say that the *names of simple ideas and those only are incapable of being defined* The reason whereof is this That the several terms of a definition signifying several ideas they can all together by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all and therefore a definition which is properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing can in the names of simple ideas have no place

8 *Instances schoolmen's definitions of motion* The not observing this difference in our ideas and their names has produced that eminent trifling in the schools which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas For as to the greatest part of them even those masters of definitions were fain to leave

stands for an idea ma is equai ted w th but th t term is th gn of t, then

l t

only for o mpl perceptu m part easily and pe fectly gree in th ir gnifca ti and ther is l ttl room f mistak and wrangling bout their m anin H that know .ce that whiteness is th name f th t colour h has bserved in snow o milk, will ot be apt to misapply that word as lo as h tains that idea which whe h has quit lost, h is t pt

u f th name is known t once and usisu no of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the id may be aried and so th on fication f name be bscure, or unce tain.

6 *Simpl ideas hav few ent in l ned pr dica* ... Fifthly This further may be bserved concerning impl d as and their names, that they ha e but few asce ts *l ned predicament...*

g one name is th ge us f th th two g ther is nothin that can be l f out f th d f hi and ed mak th m gree in one common ppearance and so ha on general ame as *anonal ty* bein l f out f th complex d f man, makes gree w th brut in th more g eral id and name f nimal. And her for when to oid unpl asant enumera ons, men would mpr h d both whit and ed nd several ther such impl deas, under one general name they ha e bee fai to d t

Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum* I ph 59, 60.

by a ord hich d otes nly th way they get int th und Fo hen h te red and yellow are all compreh nded u de the genus r name colour t s gnif es no mor but such ideas as are p oduced the mind only by th ht, d ha e e tr nce only througl th e es And when th y would f m yet a more neral term to compreh nd both colours a d sounds and the lik simpl deas, they d t by a ord th t s g nif es all such as com t th mi d only by one sense And so the g eral te m *qual ty* in its ordi nary ceptati n, comp he ds colours, sounds, tastes mells, and tangibl qu l t s, th distun tion fr m exten. n, umber m pleasure a d pa n h ch make impress ns n the mind and introd ce th ir d as by mo e senses tha

17 *Name f simpl d as t arb t ary but per fect y taken f om the xistenc f thi* Sixthly The names of impl deas, substa ces, nd mixed modes ha e also this d ff ence th t those of *mix d mod* sta d f d as pe fectly arbitrary those of *substance* ar n t pe fectly so but refer t a p ttern though w th som latitude and those f *simpl* ... *as* are perfectly taken f m the exist nce f thi gs, a d ar n t arb trary at all Which, what d fference t makes n th n fi cati ns f their names, we shall see in the f ll w ing chap rs.

Simpl mod The names of *simpl mod s* diff r littl from those f impl d as.

Chap V Of the Names of Mi ed M d a d R lat ons

Mix d mod and for b t act id as as ther general nam s Th names f *mi d mod* be g g al, th y tand as has be n sh wed for sorts species f thi gs, e ch of h ch has its peculiar esse ce The esse ces of these species also as has bee shewed are n thi g but th abstra t d as in th m nd t wh h th n m is annexed Thus far th name and essences of mi ed modes ha n thi but what is common to them with th d as but if tak l ttle neare survey f them, e shall find that th y ha somethin peculiar which pe haps may deserv ou t tion

Fir t The b tract id as they tand for ar made by the under tand g Th first particular ty I shall observ in them, is, that th bstr ct id as, o if you please, th essences, f th sev ral pecies f mi ed modes, ar *made by th under tand* wherein they differ from those of impl deas in which sort th mind has no power to mak any one but only rece es such as ar presented

Ch. xxii. *Ibid*

already in his memory imprinted there by sensible objects not strangers to his palate so far may

true taste of that fruit itself In light and colours and all other simple ideas it is the same thing for the signification of sounds is not natural but only imposed and arbitrary And no *definition* of *light or redness is more fitted* or able to produce either of those ideas in us than the *sound* light or red by itself For to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound however formed is to expect that sounds should be visible or colours audible and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses Which is all one as to say that we might taste smell and see by the ears a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pança who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay[1] And therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper inlet the simple idea which any word stands for can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever put together *according to any rules of definition* The only way is by applying to his senses the proper object and so producing that idea in him for which he has learned the name already A studious blind man who had mightily beat his head about visible objects and made use of the explication of his books and friends to understand those names of light and colours which often came *in his way bragged one day That he now understood* what *scarlet* signified Upon which his friend demanding what scarlet was? The blind man answered It was like the sound of a trumpet Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have who hopes to get it only from a definition or other words made use of to explain it

12 *The cont y sh wn in complex ideas by instances of a statue and r nbow* The case is quite otherwise in *complex ideas* which consisting of several simple ones it is in the power of words standing for the several ideas that make that composition to imprint complex ideas in the mind which were never there before and so make their names be understood In such collections of ideas passing under one name definition or the teaching the signification of one word by several others has place and may make us understand the names of things which never came within the reach of our senses and frame ideas suitable to those in other men s minds when they use those names provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word *statue* may be explained to a blind man by other words when

prize to the painter against the statuary each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred because it reached further and even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it The painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man who being brought where there was a statue made by the one and a picture drawn by the other he was *first led to the statue in which he traced* with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman But being led to the picture and having his hands laid upon it was told that now he touched the head and then the forehead eyes nose &c as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth without finding any the least *distinction whereupon he cried out* that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship which could represent to them all those parts where he could neither feel nor perceive anything

13 *Colours indefinable to the born blind* He that should use the word *rainbow* to one who knew all those colours but yet had never seen that phenomenon *would by enumerating the figure* largeness position and order of the colours so well define that word that it might be perfectly understood But yet that definition how exact and perfect soever would never make a blind man understand it because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one being such as he never received by sensation and experience no words are able to excite them in his mind

14 *C mplex ide s d finable only t he the simple ideas of which th y consist have bee got f om exp ri ence* Simple ideas as has been shown[2] can only be got by experience from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions When by this means we have our minds stored with them and know the names for them then we are in a condition to define and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas that are made up of them But when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him When any term

1 Don Quixote Second Part Bk I ch ix.

2 Cf ch ix. § 8

he nfl cted on the

matt r f th e ponl f out I d ot say this is don w thout aso as hall ee m r by and b but this I say that t done by the free h ce f th mi d purs g ts own d d th t, therefore these pecies f mi ed modes are th w rkma h p f th u d rstand g A d th re is n thing mor id t than that, fo th most p rt, in th fr mi g of these d as, th mind searches t ts p tt rns in nature n r ref rs th d as t makes to th real xi t ce f things, but puts such tog th as may be t serve ts wn pur poses, w th t tying tself t a precise imitation f anythu that ally xists

B t st ll s b ervient t the end f l anguage and t m d at d m B t th gh these complex d as or esse ces f mi ed modes d pend n the mind and are mad by t th gre t l berty yet they are not mad t d m, and jumbled to g th thout any ason t all. Thou h these complex id as be n t alw s cop ed f om nature yet they are alway su ted t th nd for hi h bstr t d as are mad and though th y be com bina ons mad f d as that are loose ough, and ha as littl m in th msel es as several thers t which th mind nev gi es co exi n tha combi es th m t d y t they ar — m ce f communica

f

rd la guag h ch ha e n y at answ r th m n anothe Which pl inly hows that those f o u try by th cust ms and f d occas on t mak se

collecti ns mad and bstra ted by the mi u ord t naming and f r the con ni nce f com

nly bundan f part culars may be tained, but also gre t ar ty f ind pe d t d as collected into compl o I the mak in th fore f th pecies f mi ed modes, men ha e had gard nly t su h comb nat ns as th y had occas m u n t an the Those they ha e combined int dist ct complex d as, nd gi names to whils th rs, that in natur ha as ar ni ar l ft loos and nr garded F go furth tha human ct ons th msel es, if th y ould mak distı ct bstr d as f all th ar ties which might be — —

Jews, ha n w ds th langu ges t answ e th m th aso he eof is plai from what has

f these mixed modes as they find they h e oc cas t ha e names f in th ordinary occur nc f the ffairs. If they jo the dea f k li g th d f fath or moth d so mak d pec es f m kill g ma so ne ghbour is because f the d ff h inous ess of th crime and th d t pu ishm t is d th murd g man fathe and moth

wo ds whi h n translati ns and d u es are pposed t w n n the y t th is scarce f n amo g th names f compl d as, especially f mi ed modes, that tands for th sam precise d hi h th word does that in d u naries t is rendered by Th re ar d as mor mmon and l ss compounded than th m asures f time, ext ns n and w ght and th Lat names, *hor pe l b* ar w th t d f ficulty ndered by th English ames, *hour foot* and *pound* but yet ther thi g mor d t than that th d as a R man ann xed to these Latin names, were ery far diff re t from those which an Englishman expresses by those English es. And if th f these should mak use f th measures that those f th ther languag d

Cf. § 7 Cf. § 0.
Cf. ch. iii. § 2.

to it by the real existence of things operating upon it [1]

3 *Secondly made arbitrarily and without patterns* In the next place these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind but *made very arbitrarily made without patterns or reference to any real existence* Wherein they differ

able But in its complex ideas of mixed modes the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly It unites and retains certain collections as so many distinct specific ideas

cations Nor does the mind in these of mixed modes as in the complex idea of substances examine them by the real existence of things or verify them by patterns containing such pe

it true because any one has been witness to such an action? No but it suffices here that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea that makes the archetype and specific idea whether ever any such action were committed *in rerum naturâ* or no

4 *How this is done* To understand this right we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists and that is not in the

tain number
and makes them into one idea Thirdly It ties them together by a name If we examine how the mind proceeds in these and what liberty it takes in them we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind and consequently that the species themselves are of men's making

5 *Evidently arbitrary in that the idea is often before the existence* Nobody can doubt but that these *ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary* collection of ideas put together in the mind independent from any original patterns in nature who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may be made abstracted and have names given them and so a species be constituted before any one individual of that species ever existed Who can doubt but the ideas of *sacrilege* or *adultery* might be framed in the minds of men and have names given them and so these species of mixed modes be constituted before either of them was ever committed and might be as well discoursed *of and reasoned about and as certain truths discovered* of them whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding as well as now that they have but too frequently a real existence Whereby it is plain how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding where they have a being as subservient to all the *ends of real truth and knowledge as when they* really exist And we cannot doubt but law makers have often made laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of their own understandings beings that had no other existence *but in their own minds* And I think nobody can deny but that the *resurrection* was a species of mixed modes in the mind before it really existed

6 *Instances murder incest stabbing* To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind we need but take a view of almost any of them A little looking into them *will satisfy us that it is the mind* that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one and by the common name it gives them makes them the essence of a certain species without regulating itself by any connexion they have in nature For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep *with killing* that this is made a particular species of action signified by the word *murder* and the other not? Or what union is there *in nature* between the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that of a son or neighbour that those are combined into one complex idea and thereby made the essence of the distinct species *parricide* whilst the other makes no distinct species at all But though they have made killing a man's *father or mother a distinct species from* killing his son or daughter yet in some other cases son and daughter are taken in too as *well as father* and mother and they are all equally comprehended in the same species as in that of *incest* Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are left loose and never combined into *one idea because they have no need of one name* It is evident then that the mind by its free choice gives a connexion to a certain *number of ideas* which in nature have no more union with one another than others that it leaves out why else is the part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken notice of to make the distinct species called *stabbing* and the figure and

[1] Cf Bk II ch i § 2 x § 1
[2] Cf Bk II ch xxii §§ 5-8

works of nature conf rmabl I say to this, w find that their nam s lead our thou hts to th mi d, and n further When we speak of *just* ... *t* we fr me t oursel es o imagin ti n

wh we speak *f hor* ... deas we cons de n t as bar ly in th mind but as in things themsel es, hich affo d th or inal patt rns f those d as But in mixed modes, t l ast th most cons derabl parts f th m, hich ar moral beings, w ons d the riginal pat ... f r r ...

13 *I* ... *ut p tterns F r th ason hy they ar mpound d* Hence likewise w may lear why th complex d as f mi ed mod ar mm nly mo com pounded and decompou ded than those f nat ural substances Be us th y being th work

coh ce and so und t rm bundle to- ... compou nded and d

nl small mbe f impl es and n th pecies f animals, th se tw iz hape and commonly mak th whol minal esse ce

4 *Nam f mi d mod tand al y for th al ssenc hich ar the orkm nship f our m nds* Anoth thing we may bserve f m what has bee said is, Tha th ames f mi ed modes al gnify (wh th y ha e yd termined g nification) the al esse ces f th pecies. For these bstract d as be g th workmanship f h m nd nd f red t th real xistence f thi gs, th re is suppos ti f anything more signified by that nam bu bar ly tha compl x d th mind tself has formed which is all t ould ha e xpressed by t nd is that on which all th properties of th pecies d pend, and fr m

Cf Lock *Second Le ter* to Stillingfleet.

... the e l of hat led e of

15 *Why thei ... ther d as* This also may sho s th r aso why f r the most part th names f fi ed modes are got be f th deas they stand fo are perfectly known B cause th re bein n species of these rdinarily taken ou of but what ha names, and those pecies rather th ir essences, being abstra t ...

d as unless man ill fill his n ... p y of abstra t complex de hi h oth rs h g n n m s fo h has n th g to d w th

d as hich m n h e frequ nt occas n to u and communicat and in such, I ask h ther t be t th rdinary m thod that childr n l arn th names f mi ed mod bef re they ha e their id as What f thousa d ever frames the abstra t deas of *glory* and *amb t on* bef e he has heard the names f th m. I impl deas and substances I grant t is therwise wh ch, be ng such d as as ha al exist nce and un on in nature, th d as nd names are got o bef re th as t happens

16 *R as f my b g s l g thi subj t* What has be n said here f *mi d mod* s, w th ery littl differ ce pplicabl also t *l t ns* which, s ce ev ry ma himself may obs rv I ...

subj t equired. I allow t might be br ught n t rrowe compass b t I as willi g t tay my ead an argum nt that ppe rs to m ew and l ti out f th way (I m sure t is I th ght t f wh n I began to wr t) that, by searching t t th bott m, and turning t every d som part th might m t th ev ry ne th ughts, nd gi e occas n t th most erse or neglig t to effect n a ge ral miscarriag which, thou h f gr t cons qu nce, is littl taken n tice f Wh t is cons d ed what pudd is mad bo t *ssenc* and h much

See Bk. IV ch § 9 §§ 5 vi.

signed by their names he would be quite out in his account These are *too sensible proofs to* be doubted and we shall find this much more so in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses whose names when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into in other languages they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations

9 *This sh ws species to be made for commu ication* The reason why I take so particular notice of this is that we may not be mistaken about *genera* and *species* and their *essences* as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature and had a real existence in things when they appear upon a more wary survey to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding for the easier signifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occas on to communicate by one general term under which divers particulars as far forth as they agreed to that abstract idea might be comprehended And if the doubtful signification of the word *species* may make it sound harsh to some that I say the species of m xed modes are made by the understanding yet I think it can by nobody be denied that it is the mind makes *those abstract complex ideas to which specific* names are gi en And f it be true as it is that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things I leave it to be considered who makes the boundar es of the sort or species since with me *species* and *sort* have no other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom

10 *I mi ed modes it is the name that ties the combi nat on of s mple ideas to ther a d makes it a sp cies* The near relation that there is between *sp cies ess nces* and their *general name* at least in mixed modes ll further appear when we cons der that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences and give them their lasting duration For the connexion bet veen the loose parts of those complex ideas being made by the mind this un on which has no particular foundation in nature would cease aga n were there not

is the name wh ch is as it were the knot that ties them fast together What a vast variety of different ideas does the word *t umphus* hold together and deliver to us as one species! Had th s name been never made or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descr ptions of what passed in that solemnity but yet, I th nk *that which holds* those different parts together in the unity of one complex idea is that very word annexed to it without which the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing than any other show which having never been made but once had never been united into one complex idea under one denomination How much therefore in mixed modes the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those who look upon essences and species as real established things in nature

11 Suitable to this we find that men speaking of mixed modes seldom imagine or take any other *for species of them* but *such as are set out by* name because they being of man s making only in order to naming no such species are taken notice of or supposed to be unless a name be annexed

otherwise cease to have any as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea and ceased actually to think on it But when a name is once anne ed to it wherein the parts of that complex idea have a settled and permanent union then is the essence as it were established and the pecies *looked on as complete For to what purpose* should the memory charge itself with such compositions unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general unless it were that they might ha e general names for the convenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of action but if the point of the sword first enter the body it passes for a distinct species where it has a distinct name as in England in whose language t is called *stabbin* but in another country where it has not happened to be specif ed under a pecul ar name it passes not for a d stinct spec es But in the spec es of corporeal substances though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence yet s nce those ideas which are combined in it are supposed *to have* an union in nature whether the mind joins them or not therefore those a e looked on as d st nct species without any operation of the mind either abstracting or giving a name to th t complex idea

12 *F the orig nals f our m x d modes u e lo k no further th n the m nd which also sho them to be the* creatures of the understand ng rather than

the ordinary use f the ord relates t sorts, d that t is cons d red in part cular be gs further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from h re that, take but aw y th abstr t d as by d duals, and r nk th m und r

s

ha no n t u r hich plainly hov th ir rel tion. It is n cessary f m be as I am God d natur has mad me so but th is n thi I ha e ss nt al t m An ccid t r disease ma ery much alt my col ur shape fe r o fall ma tak ay m reaso m mory both nd an poplexy I neith sense n understand or lif Oth cr tu es f m hape ma be made th m re and bett or fe r d ors f cul ties than I ha d th rs may ha reason d sense shape d body ry different fr m f thes re esse tial t th r h

I

that as soo as h supposes I th ns d rat f som pec es, th compl x d gnified by som al nam comes t his mind and is f re ce to that that this alit is sa d t be esse tial. So that I

thin I w t ha us u par cular being be be co nted f th so t *man* and t h e th *m m g th aso* essen ial to t suppos aso t be part of th compl d th m man stands f as t co tai

f ca t be anked d h pec es, be called by tha nam tha bstra t d is

so peopl be bare ns pa th I d is no esse tal body if th rs mak

Cf h § 5
Cf Bk. IV h § 5

h they gi e th name *body* to be

d
d
ll
d

th the qualities tha al obed ence t th load t e nd ould ne th r be dra n by t nor rece e direction from it, ould a y o e question wh th r it a ted any thi g essential It ould be bsurd to ask Whethe a thin reall xist nted any thin esse tial t t. O could t be d manded Wh ther this mad an esse tial pecif c d f f re ce o no, ce ha th r m asur of esse tial o specific but our bstr ct d as And t talk f specifi diff nces *with*out ref nce t ge al d as n n mes, is to talk uni t ll gibly For I wo ld ask any n Wh t is suffici t to make a esse tial d ff e ce natu e betw een any two part cular be gs, th out ny regard had t som bstract d h h looked upon as th ss nce and sta dard of pec es All such p tt rns and sta dards be ng q t laid as d particular be gs, cons d ed barely n th ms l ll be fou d t ha all th ir q al t es eq ally ess ntial and e ery th n e h d dual w ll be sse tial t t o hich is mo e n thin t all F th gh t may be asonabl t ask, Wh th be g th magn t be sse tial t ir n yet I think t is ry mproper and ns gnifi nt t ask h th t be esse tial to th part cul r parcel f matt I cut my pen th th t cons de g t u de th n me r as be g f e ta pecies. And if as has be n sa d ur bstra t d as, hich m th bou d

po pm F be that real constituti n
Cf Spinoza *Ethic* Pt. II xl. Sch l. in analogy w h §§ 4 5.

all sorts of knowledge discourse and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless

dwelt long on an argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated because the faults *men are usually guilty of in this kind* are *not only* the greatest hindrances of true knowledge but *are so well thought of as to pass for it* Men would often see what a small pittance of reason and truth or possibly none at all is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds and observe what *ide s* are or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points and with which they so confidently *lay about them* *I shall imagine I have done some* service to truth peace and learning if by any enlargement on this subject I can make men reflect on their own use of language and give them reason to suspect that since it is frequent for others it may also be possible for them to have sometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings with very uncertain little or no signification And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves and not to be un ill ng to have them examined by others With this design therefore I shall go on with what I have further to say concerning this matter

Chap VI *Of the Names of Substances*

1 *The common names of substances stand for sorts* The common names of substances as well as other general terms stand for *so ts* which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas wherein se eral particular substances do or might agree by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception and s gnified by one name I say do or might agree for though there be but one sun existing in the world yet the idea of it being abstracted so that more substances (if there were se eral) might each agree in it t is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as there are stars They want not their reasons who think there are and that each f xed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for to one who was placed in a due distance which by the ay may show us how much the sorts or if you please

it is not impossible but that in propriety of speech that might be a sun to one which is a star to another

The essence of each sort of substance is our abstract idea to which the name is anne ed The measure and boundary of each sort or species whereby it is constituted that particular sort and distinguished from others is that we call its *essence* which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed so that everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort This though it be all the essence of natural substances that *we* know or by which we distinguish them into sorts yet I call it by a peculiar name the *nominal essence* to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances upon which depends this nominal essence and all the properties of that sort which therefore as has been said may be *called the real essence* v g the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for let it be for instance a body yellow of a certain weight, malleable fusible and fixed But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend How far these two are different though they are both called essence is obvious at first sight to discover [2]

3 *The nominal and real essence different* For though perhaps voluntary mot on with sen e and reason joined to a body of a certain shape be the complex idea to which I and others annex the name *m n* and so be the nominal essence of the species so called yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort The foundation of all those qualit es which are the ingredients of our complex idea is something quite different and had we such a kno ledge of that constitution of man from which his facult es of moving sensation and

than what now is contained in our definition that spec es be it what it will and our idea of any ind vidual man would be as far different from what it is now as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other contri ances ith in of the famous clock at Strasburg from that wh ch a gazing countryman has of it who barely sees the mot on of the hand and hears the clock strike and observes only some of the out ard appearances

4 *Nothing essential to individuals* That *essence* in

[2] Cf Bk II l vi i.

antumo y

makes le d and ir n malle ble, ntum y d ones not. And y t how fin t ly th me sh rt f th fin contr ances and in on e ble al esse ces f plants or a mals every knows. The workmanship f th all wise d powerful God in th gr t f br f th un erse and every part thereof further exceed th capac ty and comp h ns f th most inquis ti e and t llige t man, than th best contr an e f th most ingenious man d th th co ceptions f th most gn rant f au al c atures There fore we in ain pr t d to r g things to sorts, and dispose th m t c rtain classes un der names, by th ir al esse es, th t ar so far f m our discovery comp eh ns n. A bli d ma may as soo sort things by th colours, nd h that has lost his sm ll as w ll distu guish lily d os by their odours, as by those in ternal constituti ns which h knov t. He that thi ks h can distingu h h p and goats by th eal ss ces, that ar unkn n t him may be pleased t try his kill those pec es called as cary and querechinchi and by th ir ternal real esse ces d t rmi th bou dar es f those species, w th ut kno ing th compl dea f sens bl qualities that ach of those names tand for in th co tr es whe those nimals are t be fou d.

N t the sub tant l form which know l

Those therefor wh ha bee ta ght that th sev al pecies f substance had th ir d ti ct t rnal *sub tant al f rms* d that t was thos *form* which mad th distincti f substance t their tru species and g era led y t f ther out f th w y by ha g th mind se po fru tl ss quiries af bstantial forms wholly unint lligibl and wh eof w ha scarce so m ch as any bscur confused co ceptu g er l.

That the nom nal ne is that nly wher by d nush pec f sub tar further vident f m our d as f finite pirit d f God Tha our k g nd distu nushi g tu al substa ces into pec es cons ts th minal sse es th mind makes, nd t th al es ces to be fou d th things th msel es further ev d fr m our id as f pir ts For th mind g ti g nly by flec g ts own pe t ns, those mpl d as hi h t ttr but to p ts, hath can ha no ther no f p t but by ttr buti g all those opera ns t fi d in ts lf t sort f beings w th ut cons de at on of matter And n th most ad anced n tion we h e of GOD is but attr buting th same mple ideas which ha e got from eflection o what e find in ours l es d which w co c e to h e m pe f cti n them than ould be in th ab se ce attr buti g I say thos simpl deas t Him in an unl mited degr e Thus ha ng g t f m eflecti g o ours l es th d f exist ce knowledge po e and pleasur — ch of hich find t bett r t h than to w t and th mo e ha e of e ch the bette —j ing all these tog th r w th infin ty to ach of th m, we ha e th complex d a of an et nal d h n-

species than e of pir ts is mposs b ca h g no mo e s mpl d as (or be g bl t fr m m re) appl cabl t ch be gs, but only those few take *fr m oursel es*, and f m th tio f o n mi ds th k g and be g d lighted and m g se e al parts f our bod es can n th r e distinguish in ou co c pti ns th sev al species f sp ts, from an ther but by ttributi g thos per tions and pow rs w find oursel es to th m in higher or lo d gree and so ha e no ry disti t pec fic d as f sp ts ex pt o ly f Go t wh m w ttr but both du at nd all those the d as w th fin ty t th oth r spirits th limitati n as I humbly co ce d we betw n GOD d them in o deas, p t any diff e ce by any numbe f s mpl d as hich w ha f o and t f th th but nly th t f infinity All th par ticular d as f exist ce kn wledg will pov er and moti n &c. be g d as d ri ed f m th pe t ns of ou mi ds ttr but all of t m to all sorts f pir ts, w th the diff ce only f d gr es to the utmost w can imagi ev n infinity wh n w ould f m as w ll as w can d f the Fir t Be g h y t, t is tain, is infin t ly mor rem te, n th l excell cy f his natu fr m th highest d perfectest f all cr ted be gs, than th grea est man, nay pur t se ph, is f m th most co t mptibl part f matt and consequ ntly must infinit ly exceed hat our nar o u d tandings can co ce f Him.

Of finit p ts ther ar p b bly numberl

Cf. § 34.
Cf. Aristotle *M taphy* 1.

Cf. Bk II ch xxiii §§ 33–3 d Bk IV h
Cf. S Th mas Aq inas *Summa Theol gica*, Part I Q 108

on which the properties depend it necessarily supposes a sort of things properties belonging only to species and not to individuals v g supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of such a peculiar colour and weight with malleability and fusibility the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities and their union depend and is also the foundation of its solubility in *aqua regia* and other properties accompanying that complex idea Here are essences and properties but all upon supposition of a sort or general abstract idea which is considered as immutable but there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it is of this or that sort but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea and then there is nothing necessary to it nothing inseparable from it Indeed as to the real essences of substances we only suppose their being without precisely knowing what they are but that which annexes them still to the species is the nominal essence of which they are the supposed foundation and cause [1]

7 *The nominal essence bounds the species for us* The next thing to be considered is by which of those essences it is that substances are determined into sorts or species and that it is evident is by the nominal essence For it is that alone that the name which is the mark of the sort signifies It is impossible therefore that anything should determine the sorts of things which *we* rank under general names but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for which is that as has been shown which we call nominal essence Why do we say this is a horse and that a mule this is an animal that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort but because it has that nominal essence or which is all one agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts when he hears or speaks any of those or other names of substances to know what sort of essences they stand for

8 *The nature of species is formed by us* And that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names according to the complex ideas in *us* and not according to precise distinct real essences in *them* is plain from hence —That we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort called by one common name and so received as being of one species have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions as far different one from another as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically This as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies so chemists especially are often by sad experience convinced of it, when they sometimes in vain seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur antimony or vitriol which they have found in others For though they are bodies of the same species having the same nominal essence under the same name yet do they often upon severe ways of examination betray qualities so different one from another as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists But if things were distinguished into species according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species as it is to find different properties in two circles or two equilateral triangles That is properly the essence to *us* which determines every particular to this or that *classis* or which is the same thing to this or that general name and what can that be else but that abstract idea to which that name is annexed and so has in truth a reference not so much to the being of particular things as to their general denominations?

9 *Not the real essence or texture of parts which we know not* Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real essences because we know them not Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction of substances than a collection of *those sensible ideas which we observe in them* which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of yet is more remote from the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow than as I said a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasburg whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions There is not so contemptible a plant or animal that does not confound the most enlarged understanding Though the familiar use of things about us take off our wonder yet it cures not our ignorance When we come to examine the stones we tread on or the iron we daily handle we presently find we know not their make and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them It is evident the internal constitution whereon their properties depend is unknown to us for to go no further than the grossest and most obvious we

[1] Cf Bk IV ch xii §§ 9 10

in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.

Are monsters really distinct species? Thirdly, It ou t to be determined whether those we call monsters be really distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the word species; since it is certain that everything that exists has its particular constitution. And yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to result from, and accompany, the essence of that species from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong.

8. *Men can know no ideas of real essence.* Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e. we ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, the supposed real essences of things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species.

9. *Our nominal essences of substances not perfect collections of properties that flow from their real essence.* Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. But neither can this be done. For being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude that that essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that species. We can never know what is the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that determined that species. By the word *gold* here I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter, e.g. the last guinea that was coined. For if it should stand here in its ordinary signification, for that complex idea which I or any one else calls gold, i.e. for the nominal essence of gold, it would be jargon. So hard is it to show the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but words to do it by.

Hence names independent of real essence. By all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances into species by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according to internal essential differences.

But *need for such collections of simple ideas.* ... But since, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not the real essences of things; all we can do is, to collect such a number of simple ideas as, by examination, we find to be united together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea. Which, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences. For example: there be that say that the essence of body is extension: if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the essence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put extension for body, and when we would say that body moves, let us say that extension moves, and see how ill it will look. He that should say that one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by the bare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the several distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always a part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, body moves or impels. Likewise to say that a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one as to say a man; but no one will say that rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole essence to which we give the name man.

Our distinct ideas of ... the ... of ... There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is said (*sit fides penes authorem*, but there appears no contradiction that there should be such), that, with language and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species, it is

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxiii. §

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. §

Cf. Bk. II. ch. iv. and ch. xiii. §

species in a continuous series or gradation. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence: that in all the visible corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region: and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog; not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men: and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath; ...

13. *The nominal essence that of the species, as conceived by us: proved from water and ice.* But to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right. But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask whether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And I think it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new species, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be so, it is plain that *our distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas, with distinct names annexed to them.* It is true every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under several titles) is done by us according to the ideas that *we* have of them: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.

14. *Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real essences.* To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise essences or forms of things, whereby all the individuals existing are, by nature distinguished into species, these things are necessary:—

15. *A crude supposition.* First, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication, before it can fully be assented to.

16. *Monstrous births.* Secondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births that

in d ers sorts of animals ha been bserved ill al ays gi e us reason to doubt of on r bo h f these.

7 *Ar monster ally a dist nct pecie* Thirdly It ou ht t be determined wh th thos we call monsters be really a distinct peci s, ccording to th scholasti ti n f th word species ce is certain that ev rything that xists has — d th t

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8 *Men an har no deas f al enc* Fourthly d e

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thereby distinguish th m into pecies B t n her can this be don For being gn ant f th al esse tself is imposs bl t kn w all hose properties that flow f m t, and ar so annexed to t, that any f them be g ay ma certainly co clud that tha esse ce is no here, and so th thi g is t f tha species W can ev know what is th p ise umbe f properties depending th al essen f gold any f which failing th al ess ce f gold and consequently g ld would t be there nless we knew th real ess ce f g ld tself, and by that d rmined that pec es. By th ord g d here I must be u d rstood t d n particular p ece f ma g th las g ne hat as coined For if t should stand here ts ordinary gn f catı n, for that m pl id hich I or any lse calls g ld, for he nominal esse ce f g ld t would be jar gon So hard to show th ar us meaning nd impe fectı f words, whe w ha noth g se but words t d t by

Her name nd pendent f al er By hich is cl ar tha our distinguishing substances into species by names, is not t all founded on their real esse ces nor can w pretend t

Cf. Bk. II, ch. viii.

range and d termine th m xa tly nt species according to int rnal ess ntial diffe ences

21 *B t t d for such ll t f mpl sub tanc as u ha m de the nam tand f* But ince as has been emarked w ha need f g eral w rds, though w know not th eal es se ces f thi gs all we can d is to coll ct uch a numbe f impl d as by examinatio find to be united tog th r in things xisting and th reof to mak o complex d a. Which, th ugh it be n t the r al essence f any substance that xists, is yet the specific esse ce to which our name bel ngs, and is con rt ble w th it by which we may t least try th truth of these nominal e s ces. F exampl ther be that y that the esse ce f body is *tension* f t be so we can n er mistak in putting th s-sence f ythi g f r the thi g tself Let us th n son rs put t ns n f body and when

moves an th ext ns n would y exp ess n suffici tly how th bsurd ty f uch n tion. Th ess c of anythi g n spect f us, is th wh l compl x d comp h ded and marked by that n m nd n substances, bes des th sev al distin t simple deas that mak th m up th confused on f substance f an unknown s ppo t and cause of th ir un n, is alw ys part and ther fore th essence f body n t bar xt ns n, but an ex t nded solid thin and so to say an t nded solid thing mov s, or imp ls an the is all one and as int ll gibl as to say *body* m im pels Likew se to say that r ti nal animal cap ble f con ers tion is all as to say ma but n o will say that t al ty ca pabl f con rsati because t mak n t th wh l esse ce t hich w gi the nam man

but ar hairy and wa t language and eason. Ther ar naturals mongst us that ha pe f tly our shape but want ason, and som f th m languag too Th are creatur s as t is said (*sit fid pene auth em* but th ppears co tr di ti that th hould be su h) that, w th languag and eason and hape th things greeing w th ours, ha hairy tails th ers wh th males ha n beards and th rs wh th f males ha If t be asked wh th these be all *men* or n all f human pecies t is

Cf Bk II h xxu §

Cf. Bk. II h. d h. xui. §

plain the question refers only to the nominal essence for those of them to whom the definition of the word man or the complex idea signified by the name agrees are men and the other not But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different it is wholly impossible for us to answer no part of that going into our specific idea only we have reason to think that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs the internal constitution is not exactly the same But what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire whilst our measures of species be as they are only our abstract ideas which we know and not that internal constitution which makes no part of them Shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill when they agree in shape and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things

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of neither sort alone but to have jumbled them both together To which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature will find it hard even in the race of animals to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is and be at a loss about the real essence which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation and has alone a right to the specific name But further if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?

24 *Not by substantial forms* Upon the whole matter it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of *their* several sorts of substances and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in the sorting them Much less were any *substantial forms* ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools and yet those ignorant men who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities are often better acquainted with their differences can more nicely distinguish them from their uses and better know what they expect from each than those learned quick sighted men who look so deep into them and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential

25 *The specific essences that are commonly made by men* But supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions or anything else but their *obvious* appearances since languages in all countries have been established long before sciences So that they have not been philosophers or logicians or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men but those more or less ... h m t part in

qualities they found in them thereby to signify them when absent to others whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing

26 *Therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men* Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their *nominal* and not by their real essences the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences come to be made As to the latter it is evident

[1] Cf Shakespeare *Midsummer Night's Dream* iii. 1 21

they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they Nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several men as experience tells us they are. For, if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances in all men the same: no, not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be that the abstract idea to which the name man is given should be different in several men, if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be *animal rationale*, and to another, *animal implume bipes latis unguibus*. He that annexes the name man to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the species man; and he that, upon further examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the species he calls man: by which means the same individual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other. I think there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent, is very visible; since it has been more than once debated, whether several human foetuses should be preserved or received to baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another mould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in an ape or an elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human species. The learned divine and lawyer must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of *animal rationale*, and substitute some other essence of the human species. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion: "When the abbot of Saint Martin," says he, "was born, he had so little of the figure of a man, that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was baptized, and declared a man provisionally till time should show what he would prove. Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotru, i.e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen." (*Menagiana*, 278, 430.) This child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the species of man, barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was; and it is certain, a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a man. And yet there can be no reason given why, if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have been lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

27. *Nominal essences of particular substances are undetermined by nature, and therefore various as men vary.* Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no such thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst men. The real essence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident, we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we make ourselves, that, if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly-shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it is past doubt one should meet with different answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances, were not made by man with some liberty; but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby all substances were distinguished into certain species. Who would undertake to resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned by Licetus (lib. i. c. 3), with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c. If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part to the middle been of human shape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? As I have been told it happened in France some years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from certainly knowing what a man is; though perhaps it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think I may say, that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal es-

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Cf Shakespeare *Midsummer Night Dream* ii 1 21

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Cf. Bk. IV ch. §§ 3-7

plain the question refers only to the nominal essence for those of them to whom the definition of the word man or the complex idea signified by the name agrees are men and the other not But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different it is wholly impossible for us to answer no part of that going into our specific idea only we have reason to think that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs the internal constitution is not exactly the same But what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is *in vain to inquire* whilst our measures of species be as they are only our abstract ideas which we know and not that internal constitution which makes no part of them Shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill when they agree in shape and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the *real frame and secret constitutions of things*

23 *Species in animals not distinguished by generation* Nor let any one say that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female and in plants by seeds keeps the supposed *real* species distinct and entire For granting this to be true it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further than the tribes of animals and vegetables What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient for if history lie not women have conceived by drills and what real species by that measure such a production will be in nature will be a new question and we have reason to think this is not impossible since mules and ju[marts] ... a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone but to have jumbled them both together To which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature will find it hard even in the race of animals to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is and be at a loss about the real essence which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation and has alone a right to the specific name But further if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished *only by propagation must I go* to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?

24 *Not by substantial forms* Upon the whole matter it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of *their* several sorts of substances and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in the sorting them Much less were any *substantial forms* ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools and yet those ignorant men who pretend not any insight into the real essences nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities are often better acquainted with their differences can more nicely distinguish them from their uses and better know what they expect from each than those learned quick sighted men who look *so deep into them* and talk *so confidently* of something more hidden and essential

25 *The specific essences that are commonly made by men* But supposing that the *real* essences of substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions or anything else but their *obvious* appearances since languages in *all countries* have been established long before sciences So that they have not been philosophers or logicians or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men but those more or less ... qualities they found in them thereby to signify them when absent to others whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing

26 *Therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men* Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their nominal and not by their real essences the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences come to be made As to the latter it is evident

[1] Cf Shakespeare *Midsummer Night's Dream*

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that, though th minal esse ces of s bsta ces re all pposed t be cop ed from n ture yet they are all, most f them ery imperfect. S ce th composit f those complex d as re seve al m ery d ff rent d th ref re that these bo daries of spec es are as men d n t as N tu e makes th m, if t l ast there re n nature any such prefi ed bo ds It s tru that ma y particular bsta es are so mad by N ture, that they ha agre m t d lik ess o e th an ther d so fford a fou d u n f be ing anked int sorts. B t th sort g f th gs by s, th making f d t rmı t spec es, be g rd t mı g d mp h d g th m I t see h w t can be

as a ther N d theref re d ff re t m n f a g out o putting sev ral mpl d as wh ch oth ers d not, ac ord ng t their nous ex m t o sk ll r observ t n of that sul ject, ha e d fferent esse ces of gold wh ch must therefo e be f th r own and n t f n t re s mak g

32 *The mor gener l our d f subst nc s e th mor ne mp t nd part l they ar* If the mbe of m l ideas that mak the m al essence of

nature F w ha ıng n ed l g eral na es for prese t use stay f perfect discovery f all those q l t es wh ch w ld *b t* show us th most material differe ces d agreem ts

so in the m re comprehens class f the masters f log c, are called *g ner* These are compl x deas des gnedly mperfect a d tıs ıs ble at f rst ght, that several f those q al ties th t re to be f d in th th ngs themsel es are p rposely l ft o t f g rical deas. Fo as the mı d t mak g eral d as compreh d ng sev ral part cul rs, lea es out those of um a d pl ce and su h th that mak th m c mmu cable t m re tha d vıd l so t mak other y t mo g ral d as, that may comprehend d ff re t sorts t lea es out those qual t es th t dist guish th m a d p ts t ts new collecti n nly such deas as a commo to several sorts.

id a, and gi t g al m that record ing ou th ghts and ou disco rs w th th rs, w may in h rt w d des gn t all th d vid als th gre in th t compl d w th t m rati g th impl deas th t mak t p and so t wast ur tım d breath ted us descrip ns whi h w see they ar f in to d wh w uld disco rse f y new sort f things they ha t y t nam f

3 *Es enc f p cies nder the am nam ery d f ferent d ffer t m nds* B t h wev these pe es of bsta ces pass w ll enough in rdinary co versatı is plain that this complex idea wh re in they bserv several ind vid als to gree is by

m tal be g exed th is genus constituted th esse e wh reof be g that abstract d c n taın g nly mall bl ess d fus bil ty with ce tain degrees of w ght d fi ed ess, wh n som bodies f sev al ki ds gre lea es out th col u and ther qualities pecul to g ld d il d th th sorts compreh ded u d th nam *m tal* Wh by t pl th t m n f ll w not exactly th p tterns set th m by na

sence so far from being settled and perfectly known that very material doubts may still arise about it And I imagine none of the definitions of the word *man* which we yet have nor descrip tions of that sort of animal are so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive per son much less to obtain a general consent and to be that which men would everywhere stick by in the decision of cases and determining of *life and death baptism or no baptism in pro* ductions that might happen

8 *But not so arbitrary as mixed modes* But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes To the making of any nominal essence it is necessary First that the ideas whereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea how compounded soever *Secondly that the particular ideas so united be* exactly the same ne ther more nor less For if two abstract complex ideas differ either in num ber or sorts of their component parts they make two different and not one and the same essence In the first of these the mind in making its com plex ideas of substances only follows nature and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in nature Nobody joins the voice *of a sheep with the shape of a horse nor the col* our of lead with the we ght and fixedness of gold to be the complex ideas of any real substances unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras and his discourse with unintelligible words Men observing certain qualities always joined and ex isting together therein copied nature and of ideas so united made their complex ones of substances Fo though men may make what complex ideas they please and g ve what names to them they will yet if they will be understood *when th y spe k of thi s really xisting* they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of or else men s language will be like that of Babel and every man s words being intell gible only to himself would no longer serve to conver sat on and the ordinary affairs of life if the ideas they stand for be not some way ans ering the common appearances and agreement of sub stances as they really exist

nature yet the number it comb nes depends up-on the various care industry or fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with *some few sensible obvious qualities and often* if not always leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take Of sensible

quality and most characteristical part that de termines the species And therefore in vegetables and animals an extended solid substance of such *a certain figure usually serves the turn For how* ever some men seem to prize their definition of *animal rationale* yet should there a creature be found that had language and reason but par taked not of the usual shape of a man I believe it would hardly pass for a man how much so-ever it were *animal rationale* And if Balaam s ass had all his life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master I doubt yet whether any *one would have thought him worthy the name* man or allowed him to be of the same species with himself As in vegetables and animals it is the shape so in most other bodies not propa gated by seed it is the *colour* we must fix on and are most led by Thus where we find the colour of gold we are apt to imagine all the other quali ties comprehended in our complex idea to be there also and we commonly take these two ob-*vious qualities viz shape and colour for so pre* sumptive ideas of several species that in a good picture we readily say this is a lion and that a rose this is a gold and that a silver goblet only by the different f gures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil

30 *Yet imperfect as they thus are they serve for com mon co verse* But though this serves well enough for gross and confused concept ons and inaccu rate ays of talking and thinking yet *men are far e u h from h in g agreed o the p ecise number of sim ple ideas or qu l t es bel ging to any sort f th s sign fi d by its name* Nor is it a wonder since it requires much t me pains and skill strict in

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are always to be found together in the same sub-ject Most men wanting either time incl nation or industry enough for this even to some *toler* able degree content themsel es with some fe vob-*vious and outward appearances of things* there by readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affa rs of life and so without further

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t. complex idea th name gold is by any ne annexed to, ma be sa d of ts peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the like qualities for whatever is left out, or put in, t is still th com ex id t which that name is annexed that makes the species and as any particular parcel of matter answers that id so the name of the sort bel gs truly to t and t is of that species. And thus anything is true gold perfect metal. All which d termination of the species, t is plain, depends the understanding of man, making this or that complex idea.

36 *Nature makes the similitude of substances.* This, then, in short, is th case Nature makes many *particular things*, which d agree ne w th another in man sensib. qualities, and probabl too in their internal frame and constitution but t is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species t is men who, taking occasion from the qual. es they find united in them, and wherein they bserve o. en several indi iduals to agree range them into sorts, in rder to their naming, for th con eni ce of comprehensi e signs under which individuals, ccording to their conformity to this or that bstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns so tha this is of the blue, that th red regimen this is man, that drill and in this, I think, consists the whol business of genus and species.

37 *The manner of sorting particular beings the work of the men, though ... make th g a. ke* I d not den but nature in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not alway new and various, but ery much alik and of kin ne another but I think t ever theless true, tha the boundaries of the species, hereby men sort th m, are mad by me since the essences of the spec es, distinguished by different names, are as has been proved of man making and seld m adequa to the internal nature of the things they are tak n from. So that we ma truly say such manner of sort ing of things is the workmanship of men.

38. *Each ... act t... to t, makes nominal sense* One thing I doubt no but will seem very strange in this doctrine whi h is, that from what has been sa d t will f llow that ch bstract idea, with name to t, makes distinct species. But who can h lp t, if truth will ha e so For so must remain till somebody can show us the species of things limited and distinguished by something lse and l us see that general erms signify no our bstract id as, but something differe t from them. I would fain know wh shock and hound are n t as distinct species as spaniel and an elephant. W ha e no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a span l tha we ha e of the dif ferent essence of a shock and hound all the essential difference whereby we know and distinguish them one from another consisting o ly in the different collectio of simple id as, to which we ha e gi en those d fferent names.

39. *How gener and species are ... d to ...* How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names and how much general names are necessary if not to the bei g yet at least to th compl ting f a spec es, and mak ing t pass for such, will a pear bes des what has been said above concern ice and water in a ery familiar examp. A lent and s rik in watch are but e species to those who ha e but one name for them but h that has the name ... nd clock for he other and dis-

plain they are but one species to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contri nce to make a new species. There are some watches that are made w th four wheels, thers w th five is this a specifi difference t the workma Some ha e strings and ph s es, and thers no some ha e the balance loose and others regulated by a spiral spring and thers by hogs bris es. Are any or all of these enough to mak a specifi dif ference t th workman that knows ch of these and several the different contrivances in

difference o no, relates o ly to th complex idea to which th name w tch is given as l g as they all gree in th id a which that name tands for and that name does not as a generical name compreh nd different species under t they are not essentially nor specifically differe t. B t if an one will mak minu er d isions, from differences that h knows in th internal fram of watches, and to such precise complex id as gi e names that shall prevail they will then be new species, to them who ha e those ideas with names to them, and can by those d feren es distinguish wa ches int these several sorts and then *watch* wil be g nerical name. B t y t they would be no distinct species t men ignoran of clock work, and th inward co tri an es of wa ches, who had no the idea but th out ward shape and bulk, with the marking of the

ture when they make their general ideas of sub

men in making their general ideas seeking more the convenience of language and quick dispatch by short and comprehensive signs than the true and precise nature of things as they exist have in the framing their abstract ideas chiefly pur sued that end which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names So that in this whole business of genera and species the genus or more comprehensive

one will think that a man and a horse and an animal and a plant &c are distinguished by real essences made by nature he must think na ture to be very liberal of these real essences mak ing one for body another for an animal and an

new thing made but only more or less compre hensive signs whereby we may be enabled to ex press in a few syllables great numbers of partic ular things as they agree in more or less general conceptions which we have framed to that pur pose In all which we may observe that the more general term is always the name of a less com plex idea and that each genus is but a partial conception of the species comprehended un der it. So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete it can only be in respect of a certain establ shed relat on between them and certain names which are made use of to signify them and not in respect of anything ex isting as made by nature

33 *Th s all accom od ted to the e d of speech* This is adjusted to the true end of speech which is to be the easiest and shortest way of commun cat ing our notions For thus he that would discourse

spontaneous motion needed bu

anim l to signify all which partaked of those ideas and he that had made a complex idea of a body with l fe sense and mot on with the faculty of reasoning and a certa n shape joined to t need ed but use the short monosyllable *ma* to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea This is the proper business of genus and species and this men do without any considera tion of real essences or substantial forms which come not within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things nor within the s gnifica tion of our words when we discourse with others.

ing of something between feathers and hair of a *dark brown colour without win s but in the* place thereof two or three little branches com ing down like sprigs of Spanish broom long great legs with feet only of three claws and without a tail I *must make this description of it* and so

plex idea *mentioned in that description* though by that word which is now become a specific name I know no more of the real essence or con stitution of that sort of animals than I did before *and knew probably as much of the nature* of that species of birds before I learned the name as many Englishmen do of swans or herons which are specific names very ell known of sorts of *birds common in England*

35 *Men determine the so ts of substances which may be sorted va iously* From what has been said it is evident that *men* make sorts of things *For* it being different essences alone that make differ ent species it is plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal essences do thereby make *the species or sort Should* there be a body found having all the other qual ities of gold except malleableness it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold *or not i e whether t were of that spec es* This could be determined only by that abstract idea to wh ch every one annexed the name gold so that it would be true gold to him and *belong to*

ableness in his specif c idea And who

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thol than usual and imagines t to be from ispicion he has of his wif Adah, (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too m ch kindness f nother man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to E e and desires her to tak care that Adah commit not f lly and in these discourses w th E e h makes use f these two new ords k s and nou h. I time Ad m s mis-

alty to him and th the for th ct f commit ting d ovalty) lost not their distinct significa

plain consisted in precise combina ion of simpl ideas, different in e from t ther I ask, whether th comp ex id Adam mind, hich he called kine h were dequat not. And it is plain t was for t bein combination of simple ideas, which he, w thout any regard to an archetype w thout respect to anythin as pattern voluntarily put to th bstracted, and gav th name kinneah to to exp ess in short to thers, by that one sound all the impl ideas contained and united in that complex or t must necessarily f llow that t was an dequat idea. His own choice having made that combination, t had all in t h intended t should, and so could ot but be perfect, could n t but be dequat being referred to no ther archetype which t as supposed to represent.

45 These words, kine h and nou h, by d grees grew into commo use, and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam children had the same faculties, and thereby th sam power that he had, to make wha mplex id as of mixed modes they pleased in th ir own minds to abstract them, and mak what sounds t ey p eased the signs of them. but th use f names bein to make our ideas w thin us known to thers, that canno be done, but when th same sign tands for the same idea in two who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together Those, therefore, of Adam children, tha found these two words kinneah and niouph, in familiar use, could no tak them for insignificant sounds, but must needs conclud they stood for some

as names of species alre d established and agreed they ere b nd t conf rm th ideas th minds, s gn f ed by these names, t the ideas that they stood f r in other men s minds, as to th patterns d archetypes and then indeed their ideas of these comp ex modes were liabl to be inadequat as bei ery apt (especially those that consisted f comb nations of many simpl ideas) not to be exactl conf rmabl t the ideas in other men s minds, using th same names though for this there be usually a remedy at hand which is to ask th meanin of any word w understand not of him that uses t it being as imposs bl t know cer tainl what the words jealousy nd dultery (which I think answer and) stand for in an ther man s mind, w th whom I would discourse about them as it was imposs bl in the beginning of language t know what k eah and no h stood for i nother man s mind w thout explicati they being voluntary signs in every ne

46 Inster f ces f substance named Za hab Let us now also consider after the same manner th names of s bstances the first pplicati n. O of Adam hildren, ro g the mountains, li hts on a gl ttering substance which pleases his eye Home h carries t to Adam, who upon considerat of it, finds it t be hard to ha e bri ht yellow colou and n exceedin great weight. These perhaps, t first, are all the qualities h takes notice of in t d bstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance ha ing that peculiar bright yellowness, and w ght ery great in proporti n t ts bulk, h gi es the name zhab to denominat and mark all substances that ha e these sensib

u ne put ideas together nl by his own imagination, not taken from th existence of anything and to them h ga names t denominat all things that should happen t ree t those his bstract ideas, witho t considering whether any such thing did exist or t th tandard there was of his own making. B t in the forming his idea of this new substance, h takes the quite co trary course here h has standard mad by nature and therefore, being to represent that to himself, by th idea h has

hours by the hand For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea and signify no more nor no other thing but a watch Just thus I think it is in natural things Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say) within are different in a *rational man* and a *changeling* no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a *drill* and a *chan eln* But whether one or both these differences be essential or specifical is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for for by that alone can it be determined whether one or both or neither of those be a man

40 *Species of artificial thin s less confused than natural* From what has been before said we may see the reason why in the species of artificial things there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural Because an artificial thing being a production of man which the artificer designed and therefore well knows the idea of the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea nor to import any other essence than what is certainly to be known and easy enough to be apprehended For the idea or essence of the several sorts of artificial things consisting for the most part in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts and sometimes motion depending thereon which the artificer fashions in matter such as he f nds for his turn it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof and so settle the signification of the names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished with less doubt obscurity and equivocation than we can in things natural whose d fferences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries

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those of natural substances For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct species one from another as a horse and a dog they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas and to others by distinct appellations?

42 *Subst nces alone of all our sev ral sorts of ideas have p oper names* This is further to be observed concerning substances that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names whereby one only part cular thing is signified Because in simple ideas modes and relations it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this or that particular when it is absent Besides the greatest part of mixed modes being actions which perish in their birth are not capable of a lasting duration as substances which are the actors and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union

43 *Difficult to lead another by words into the thou hts of things stripped of those abstract ideas we give them* I must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this subject and perhaps with some obscurity But I desire it may be considered how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those specifical differences we give them which things if I name not I say nothing and if I do name them I thereby rank them into some sort or other and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species and so cross my purpose For to talk of a man and to lay by at the same time the ordinary signification of the name man which is our complex idea usually annexed to it and bid the reader consider man as he is in himself and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution or real essence that is by something he knows not what looks like trifling and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things as thought to be made by nature if it be but only to make it understood that there is no such thing signified by the general names hich substances are called by But because it is difficult by kno vn familiar names to do this give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the m nd has of specific names and ideas a little more clear and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intell gent beings or which is the same to the signification annexed by others to their received names and sometimes to no archetypes at all Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas of substances either to the substances themsel es or to the signification of their names as to the archetypes and also to make plain the nature of spec es or sort ng of things as apprehended and made use of by us and of the essences belong ng to those spec es which is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certa nty of our kno ledge than we at f rst imagine

44 *Insta ces of m xed m des named* kinneah *and* niouph Let us suppose Adam in the state of a grown man with a good understanding but in

significations of words are ery warily and sparingly t be altered Because men be g fur nished alre dy w th names f r their d as, and commo se ha ng appropriated kn wn names to certain d as, a affected misapplicatio of th m cannot but be ery rid culous. H that hath ew ti ns will perh ps e ture sometimes on the coining of ew terms t express them but men think t a boldness, and t is uncertain wh ther common use will ever make th m pass f current. B t in commun cati n w th thers, is necessary th t e conform the d as w mak th ulgar words f any la guage stard for to their known prope gnificati ns, (hich I ha explai ed at larg already) or else t mak kn wn that nev gn fication e pply th m t

Chap VII Of Part cl s

1 *Particl connect parts or hol sentenc t gether* Besides words which are names f d as in th mind there are great ma y thers that are mad use of t signify th *nexion* that th mind gi est d as, or t propos ti ns, w than ther Th mind in communicating its thoughts to thers, does t nly eed signs of the deas t has th before t, but thers also, to how or timate some particular acti f its own, at that time rel ti g t those ideas. Th is t does several way as *I* and *I t* are th g neral marks, of th mind, affirming d ying But besides affirmati negati n, w thout which there is w rds no truth or falsehood, th mind does, in decl ri g its sentime ts t thers, co ect t l) th parts f propos tions, but wh le se t ces ne t anoth vith th ir several re lati d d pend cies, t mak cohere t discourse

I ght us f particl onsi ts th art f w ll p h g Th words wh reby gn fies what co nexi gi es t th several affirmati ns

good tyl T th nk w ll t is not no gh that ma has id as cl ar nd d tinct in his thou hts, or tha he bserves th greement disagree me t f some f th m but h must th nk train, and bserve th d pendence f his tho ghts and reaso gs upo th A d t express ll such m thodical and rati nal thoughts, h must ha words to sh w wha connexi n tri n, disti t n, ppos ti n, mph s &c. h gives t ch respecti e *part* f his discourse T mistak in y f these is t puzzl

inst d of nforming his hearer and therefore it is, that those words which are not truly by themsel es the names of y ideas are f such constant d dispensable use i language a d d m ch co tribute to men s well expressing themsel es.

3 *They show wh t elation the mind gi s t its own thoughts* This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some thers over dil gently culti ated It is easy for men t writ one after an ther f cases and genders, moods nd tenses, gerunds a d sup es in these and the lik there has been gre t d ligence used and particles themsel es, in some languages, ha e been, w h great show f exactness, ranked to their several orders. B t though *pr po ti ns* and *co jur t ons* &c. are ames well known n grammar nd th particles co ta ed und th m carefully ra ked t their disti t subd is ons yet h who would show the right use of particles, and what gn f cancy and forc they ha e, must take l ttl more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and bserve n cely th several postures of his m nd discours ng

4. *They ar a l marks f som act on or nt mat f the mind* N ther is it en gh, for the expla ning of these words, t render them, as is usual in d ti aries, by words of an ther to gi e wh ch come arest t th s gnificati f r what is m t by th m is commonly as hard t be u d rstood one as an ther langu g They are all marks of some ti n or timati n f the mi d a d therefore to understand th m rightly the several iews, postures, stands, turns, limit ti ns, nd excepti ns, and several other thoughts of the mi d for which we h e either no o very d fici t names, are dil gently to be stud ed Of these there is a gre t ari ty m ch e ceeding the umber f particles that most la guages ha to express th m by d therefore t is not to be wondered that most of these par ticles ha d rs and som times almost ppo t s gnificati ns. In the H brew to gue th re *is particl* consisting of but singl l tter f which there are reckoned up as I rem mbe seve ty I am sure bove fifty sev ral gnifica tions.

5 *Instanc but* " But is a particle, no

m t intimat several lati ns th mi d gi es to th several propos tions parts f th m which t joins by this monosyllable.

First, B t to say more here t intimates

of it even when it is absent he puts in no simple idea into his complex one but what he has the perception of from the thing itself He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable

47 This piece of matter thus denominated *zahab* by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before nobody I think will deny to be a distinct species and to have its peculiar essence and that the name *zahab* is the mark of the species and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence But here it is plain the essence Adam made the name *zahab* stand for was nothing but a body hard shining yellow and very heavy But the inquisitive mind of man not content with the knowledge of these as I may say superficial qualities puts Adam upon further examination of this matter He therefore knocks and beats it with flints to see what was discoverable in the inside he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces he finds it will bend without breaking Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea and made part of the essence of the species that name *z hab* stands for? Further trials discover fusibility and fixedness Are not they also by the same reason that any of the others were to be put into the complex idea signified by the name *zahab*? If not, what reason will there be shown more for *the one than the other? If these must then all* the other properties which any further trials *shall discover in this matter* ought by *the same* reason to make a part of the ingredients of the *complex idea which the name zahab stands for* and so be the essence of the species marked by that name Wh ch properties because they are endless it is plain that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype will be always inadequate

48 *The abst ct ideas of substances always imperf ct and therefore various* But this is not all It would also follow that the names of substances would not only have as in truth they have but would also be supposed to have d fferent s gnifications as used by different men which would very much cumber the use of language For if every distinct qual ty that were d scovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a necessary part of *the complex dea signified by* the common name given to it it must follow that men must *suppose the same word to signify dif*

49 *Therefore to fix their nominal species a real essense is supposed* To avoid this therefore they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species from which these properties all flow and would have their name of the species stand for that But they not having any idea of that real essence in substances and their words s nifying nothing but the ideas they have that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence without knowing

either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition i e part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for and so this affirmation all gold is fixed contains nothing but the signification of the term gold Or else it means, that fixedness not be ng a part of the definition of the gold is a property of that substance itself in which case it is plain that the word gold *stands* in the place of a substance having the real essence of a species of things made by *nature*. *In* which way of substitution it has so confused and

will always fail us in its particular application *and so is of no real use or certainty* For let it be ever so true that all gold i e all that has the *real essence of gold* is fixed what serves this for whilst we know not in this sense *what is or is not gold?* For if we know not the real essence of gold it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence and so whether it be true gold or no

51 *Conclusio* To conclude what l berty Adam had at f rst to make any complex ideas of *mixed modes* by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have all men ever s nce had And the same necessity of conforming his ideas of *substances* to things without him as to archetypes made by nature that Adam was under if he would not wilfully impose upon *himself* the same are all men ever since under too The same *liberty also that Adam had of affixing any new* name to any idea the same has any one still (espec ally the beg nners of languages if we can imagine any such) but only with this d fference that in places where men in soc ety have already established a language amongst them the

[1] Cf ch x. § 17

a stop of the mind in the course it was going before it came quite to the end of it

Secondly I saw but two plants here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other

Thirdly You pray but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion

Fourthly But that he would confirm you in your own The first of these *buts* intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it

Fifthly All animals have sense but a dog is an animal here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former as the minor of a syllogism

6 *This matter of the use of particles but lightly touched here* To these I doubt not might be added a great many other significations of this particle if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude and consider it in all the places it is to be found which if one should do I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of it would deserve the title of *discretive* which grammarians give to it But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs The instances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles some whereof constantly and others in certain constructions have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

Chap VIII *Of Abstract and Concrete Terms*

1 *Abstract term ot p d ctable one of n ther d why* The ordinary words of language and our common use of them would have gi en us l ght into the nature of our ideas if they had been but considered with attention The mind as has been shown has a power to abstract its ideas and so they become essences general essences whereby the sorts of things are distinguished Now each abstract idea being distinct so that of any two the one can never be the other the mind will by its intuitive knowledge perceive their difference, and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another This we see in the common use of language which permits not any two abstract words or names of abstract ideas to be affirmed one of another For how near of kin soever they may seem to be and how certain soever it is that man is an animal or rational or white yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions *humanity is animality* or *rationality* or *whiteness* and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming not one abstract idea to be another but one abstract idea to be joined to another which abstract ideas in substances, may be of any sort in all the rest are little else but of relations and in substances the most frequent are of powers v g a man is white signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects or a man is rational signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also in it the essence of rationality i e. a power of reasoning

2 *They show the difference of our ideas* This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas for if we observe them we shall find that *our simple ideas have all abstract as well as concrete names* the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive the other an adjective as whiteness white sweetness sweet [2] The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations as justice just equality equal only with this difference that some of the con

substances we have very few or no abstract names

number of names of substances to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones and those few that the Schools forged and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use or obtain the license of public approbation Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas which no doubt they would have had had not their consciousness to

of those substances whereof they knew they had no ideas And indeed it was only the doctrine of

[1] Cf. Bk. IV ch. ii. § 1

[2] Cf. Bk. II ch. xxxi. § 12

substantial form and th confidence f mistaken

use amo st th R mans b t in a far d ffere t sense, and tood not f the bstr t essence of any substance b t was th bstra ted name of mode, and its co crete *huma us t hom*

Chap IX Of the Imperfect on of W ds

1 *W ords ar us d for ords g nd mm nicat g our tho ghts* From what has bee said in th f regoing chapt rs, t is easy t perce what imper fecti there is in language, and ho the ery nature of w rds makes t almost na d bl for many of them to be do btful and uncertai in their nificati ns. T exami e the perfecti imperf tio f rds, t is necessary first t co der th ir use and end f as they ar more or less fitted t ttain that, so they are more less perf t. W ha in th f rmer part of this discourse often, po occasion, menti ed do ble use of words.

F t O e f the co d g f ur own th ghts.

Secondly Th ther f the communicating of ur tho ghts t th rs.

2 *Any ords ll ev for ord g* As to th first of these, *for the ccordi g ur o tho hts for th help f ur o memorie* wh reby as t ere, w talk to oursel es, any w rds will serv th turn F since sounds are luntary and indifferent signs f any deas, a man may use what w rds h pleases t gnify his own deas to himself and there will be no imperfecti in them, if h constantly use the same n f th sam idea f th h t

ge al p posit ns certa n and u doubted truths, hich the mi d may rest upon and be satisf ed w th n its search after tru kn wledge. These two uses are ery distinct and a gre t deal less exa tness ll serv in the than in the ther as w hall see hat follows.

4. *The mperf t f ords s the d btfulness or amb guity f their signific t hich is s d by the sort f deas th y t d for* Th ch f end of l nguage in communication be g to be understood w rds serve t ll f th t end n ther n d philosophical disc rse h n y word does not excite in the h arer the same d a which t tands f in the mind f the speaker N si e so nds ha no natural co exion w th our d as, bu ha all their s gnification from th arb trary m positi of me th d btful ess and u tai ty f their s gnif ca n, which is th n perfect on e here are speaking f has its cause more in the deas th y tand f than in y capacity th ere is ne sound more tha an the t gn fy any idea for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then wh ch makes d btfulness nd u certainty in th signif catio of som more than the words, is the difference f deas they sta d f

5. *Natural caus f the mperf t f cially tho that tand for mix d mo s nd for ur d s f sub t nc* W rds ha ing naturally n s gnifica ti the d which e ch ta ds f r m st be learned and retained by those wl w ld change th ghts, and hold int lligible discourse w th thers, in y langua e. B t this is the hard est to be d e h re,

First, Th deas they tand f r are ry com plex, and mad up f a great umber of d as p t tog ther

Seco dly Where th deas they tand f r h no certain connexion in nature and so no settled tandard anywhere in nature existing t rectify and djust th m by

Thirdly When th s gnificati of the word is ref rr d to tandard wh ch sta dard is t easy t be kn n.

F urthly Where th signification of th rd and th real essence f th thing are ot exactly th same.

1 Ci il — use

na commerce, bout th rdinary affairs and co enien es f ci il life, in th soci tie f m amo gst nother

Seco dly By th *phil phical* use f words, I m an such use of th m as may serv t co ey th precise tions f things, and to express in

Cf. ch x. § 3

— eas which another has not rgans faculties t ttain as th names f col urs t blind man sounds to a deaf man, need t here be me ti ned.

In all these cases w shall find an imperfecti n

a stop of the mind in the course it was going before it came quite to the end of it

Secondly I saw but two plants here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other

your own The first of these *buts* intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it.

Fifthly All animals have sense but a dog is an animal here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former as the minor of a syllogism

6 *This matter of the use of particles but lightly touched here* To these I doubt not might be added a great many other significations of this particle if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude and consider it in all the places it is to be found which if one should do I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of it would deserve the title of *discretive* which grammarians give to it But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs The in stances I have given in this one may give occa sion to reflect on their use and force in language and lead us into the contemplation of several act ons of our minds in discoursing which it has found a way to intimate to others by these par ticles some v hereof constantly and others in certain constructions have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them

Chap VIII *Of Abstract and Concrete Terms*

1 *Abstract te ms ot p dict ble e of another a d why* The ordinary words of language and our common use of them, v ould have given us light into the nature of our ideas if they had been but cons de ed with attention The mind as has been shown has a power to abstract its ideas and so they become essences general essences v hereby the sorts of things are distinguished Now each ab stract idea being distinct, so that of any tv o the one can never be the other the mind will by its intuiti e knowledge perceive their difference, and therefore in propositions no tv o v hole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another Th s we see in the common use of language v hich permits

al or white yet every one at first hearing per ceives the falsehood of these propositions *huma ity is animality* or *rationality* or *whiteness* and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming not one abstract idea to be another but one abstract idea to be joined to another which abstract ideas in substances, may be of any sort in all the rest are little else but of relations and in substances the most frequent are of powers v g a man is white signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects or a man is rational s gnifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also in it the es sence of rationality i e a power of reasoning

2 *They show the d fference of our ideas* This dis tinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas for if we observe them, we shall find that *our simple ideas have all abstract as well as con crete names* the one whereof is (to speak the lan guage of grammarians) a substantive the other an adjective as whiteness white sweetness sv eet The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations as justice just equality equal only with this d fference that some of the con crete names of relat ons amongst men chiefly are substantives as *pate n tas pater* whereof it v ere easy to render a reason But as to our ideas of substances we have very few or no abstract names at all For though the Schools have introduced *animalitas humanitas corporietas* and some others yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances to v hich they nev er were ridiculous enough to attempt the coin ng of abstract ones and those few that the Schools forged and put into the mouths of their scholars, could ne er yet get admittance into common use or obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the con fession of all mankind that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas v hich no doubt they would have had had not their consciousness to

tain soever it is that man is an animal or ration

Cf. Bk. IV ch ii. § 1

orously ventured on such terms as *aurietas* and *sax tas m t llietas* and *l gnietas* or the l ke names, v h ch should pretend to signify the real essences of those substances whereof they kne v they had no deas And indeed it was only the doctrine of

[1]Cf. Bk. II ch. xxxi. § 12.

does not little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea and then repeat to them the name that stands for it as *white, sweet, milk, sugar cat dog* But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, *moral words* the sounds are usually learned first and then, to know what complex ideas they stand for they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) *are left to* their own observation and industry which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds or when they have any it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused signification. And even those themselves who have with more attention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience to have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, concerning honour faith, grace religion, church, &c., wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them. Which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words, nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make them stand for and so all the contests that follow thereupon are only about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see that, in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications and of limiting distinguishing varying the signification of these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still having the same power multiplied in infinitum. Many a man who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of Scripture, or clause in the code at first reading, has, by consulting commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this that I think commentaries needless but to show how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts.

10. *Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors* What obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men who have lived in remote ages, and different countries, it will be needless to take notice. Since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way are proofs more than enough, to show what attention, study sagacity and reasoning are required to find out the true meaning of ancient authors. But, there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of but those that contain either truths we are required to believe or laws we are to obey and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with due clearness and perspicuity we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them, resolve thus with ourselves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi

11 *Names of substances of doubtful signification because the ideas they stand for relate to the reality of things* If the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, because there be no real

the names ...

cation, for a contrary reason, viz. because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to as standards made by Nature. In our ideas of substances we have not the liberty as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank and denominate things by In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly

12. *Names of substances referred to real essences that cannot be known.* The names of substances

in words which I shall more at large explain in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas for if we examine them we shall find that the *names of Mixed Modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection for the two first of these reasons* and the *names of Substances chiefly for the two latter*

6 *The names of mixed modes doubtful First because the ideas they stand for are so complex* First The names of *mixed modes* are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification

I Because of that *great composition* these complex ideas are often made up of To make words serviceable to the end of communication it is necessary as has been said that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker Without this men fill one another s heads with noise and sounds but convey not thereby their thoughts and lay not before one another their ideas which is the end of discourse and language But when a word stands for a very complex idea that is compounded and decompounded it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise idea without any the least variation Hence it comes to pass that men s names of very compound ideas such as for the most part are moral words have seldom in two different men the same precise signification since one man s complex idea seldom agrees with another s and often differs from his own—from that which he had yesterday or will have to morrow

7 *Secondly because they have no standards in nature* Because the names of mixed modes for the most part *want standards in nature* whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations therefore they are very various and doubtful They are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind pursuing its own ends of discourse and suited to its own notions whereby it designs not to copy anything really existing but to denominate and rank things as they come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word *sham* or *wheedle* or *banter* in use put together as he thought fit those ideas he made it stand for and as it is with any new names of modes that are now brought into any language so it was with the old ones when they were first made use of Names therefore that stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubtful signification when such collections are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them. What the word *murder* or *sacrilege* &c signifies can never be known from things themselves there be many of the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action itself the intention of the mind or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connexion with the outward and visible action of him that commits either and the pulling the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed and is all the action that perhaps is visible has no natural connexion with those other ideas that make up the complex one named murder They have their union and combination only from the understanding which unites them under one name but, uniting them without any rule or pattern it cannot be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary collections should be often various in the minds of different men who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by in such arbitrary ideas.

8 *Common use or propriety not a sufficient remedy* It is true common use that is the rule of propriety may be supposed here to afford some aid to settle the signification of language and it cannot be denied but that in some measure it does Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation but

not sufficient to adjust [illegible]

Discourses there being scarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others) which in common use has not a great latitude and which keeping within the bounds of propriety may not be made the sign of far different ideas Besides the rule and measure of propriety itself being nowhere established it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a word be propriety of speech or no From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection to be of doubtful and uncertain signification and even in men that have a mind to understand one another do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer Though the names *glory* and *gratitude* be the same in every

9 *The way of learning these names contributes also to their doubtfulness* The way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned

and figure in things of kn wn seminal propagation, and in ther substances, f r th most part h some oth r sensible qual

usua
meant by th word g ld or pp e,
th ne from th ther But in phil phical inquiries and debates, where general truths are t be es en re ces drawn from posi-

1

th m, tha wi u
gold, taken in such a significati n but yet such as another man ca ne er be f rced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, wh makes n t mal leableness, or the sam degree f fixedness, part of that complex dea that th name gold, in his use of t, tands f

16 *Ins ar l quor* This is n tu al and almost u d bl ump f ti n Im st ll th names of substances, in all languages whatsoever which me will easily find wh n, nce passing from confused loose ti th y m t more strict and close inquiries. For the they will be co nced h w d btful and bsc re those words are in th ir significa n, which in rdin ary use ppeared ry clear d d termin d. I was nce in meeting of ry learned and ing ous physicians, where by chance there arose q estion, wh ther any liquor passed through th filame ts of the erves. Th debat ha ing bee managed good whil by ari ty f argume ts both sides, I (wh had been used to suspect, tha th g est par f dispu es m re bou the significati f w rds than real dif ference in th concepti f things) desired, that, bef re the w any further n in this dispute they ould firs xamin and establish amo gst th m, wh th w rd l qu gnified Th y t firs were li tl urprised a th proposal and had they bee persons less ingenious, they might perhaps ha taken t f ery frivol us ex tra gan ne since there was ther that though no himself to understand ery perfectly wha th word liquo tood f which I think, too none f the mos perplexed names of substances. However they wer pleased to comply w th my motio and upo xami ti found tha th significati of tha w rd was n so set tled certain as they had all imagined bu tha each of th m made t a sign of a different complex d a Th s made them pe cei e that the main of their dispute was bout the signficati n hey d ff red ery little in

ne
er t was to be called l quor o no
when consid red, th y th ught t not worth the co tending bo t.

17 *Inst g gold* H w much this is the case in th g t t part f disp t s th t men are e g ged so h tly in I shall perhaps ha e an occa sio an ther place to take n tice. Let us nly he o d a l ttl m e actly the f r m nt shall see significa f r bo which being th ia nex d th t nam the shining y ll w pa t of peacock s tail is properly to th m g ld. Oth rs find g fus b l ty j ned w th that y llow colour in certain parcels of matte make f that m t complex dea t hich th y gi e the

admit to be of that pecies, o to be compre under that name g ld, nly such substa ces as, ha ing that shinin y llow col ur will by fire be reduced to fusi n, and n t to ashes. An ther by the same reason, dds th w ight, which be ing quality as traightly j ined w th that col ur as ts fus bil ty, h thinks has the same reaso t be j ined in ts idea, and to be signified by ts nam d th ref th ther mad up of body f such a col and fusibility to be mperfect and so n of all the est wherein n ne can show reaso why some of th inseparabl qualities, that are alw y uni ed in na ure, should be put into th n minal essence, and thers lef out r why th w rd g ld, nifying that sort f body th ring his finger is mad of sh uld d t min that sort ther by ts col ur we ght, and fusibility than by ts col ur w ght, and sol bility in *qua rgi* since the dissol ing t by that liqu is as inseparabl from t as th fusi n by fire and they are both of th m nothing but th elati n which that substance has to two th bodies, which ha power to per te diff rent ly pon t. F by what right is that fusibility comes to be part of th essence signified by the word g ld, and sol bility but property of t. Or why is ts col ur part f th esse ce, and ts mal leableness but a property That which I *mean is*

have as has been shown [1] a double reference in their ordinary use

First Sometimes they are made to stand for and so their ignification is supposed to agree to *the real constitution of things* from which all their properties flow and in which they all centre But this real constitution or (as it is apt to be called) essence being utterly unknown to us [2] any sound that is put to stand for it must be very uncertain in its application and it will be impossible to know what things are or ought to be called a *horse* or *antimony* when those words are put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all And therefore in this supposition the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards

13 *To co existin qualit es which are known but imperfectly* Secondly The simple ideas that are *found to co exist in substances* being that which their names immediately signify these as united in the several sorts of things are the proper standards to which their names are referred and by wh ch their significations may be best rectified But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose as to leave these names without very various and unce tain significations Because these simple ideas that co exist and are united in the same subject being very numerous and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea which the spec fic name is to stand for men though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider yet frame very different ideas about it and so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have n several men very different significations The s mple qualities wh ch make up the complex ideas be ng most of them powers in relation to changes which they are apt to make in or rece ve from other bod es are almost infin te He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive from the different applicat on only of fi e and ho mucl a g eater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chymist by the application of other bod es will not th nk it st ange that I count the prope ties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected and completely kno n by the ways of inquiry wh ch our faculties are capable of They being therefore at least so many that no man can know the precise and def n te number they are differently discovered by different men according to their various skill attention and ways of handling who therefore cannot choose but have different ideas of the same substance and therefore make the s gnification of its common name very various and uncertain For the complex ideas of substances being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co exist in nature every one has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together For with that colour in his idea of gold as any one does its fusibility solubility in *aqua regia* being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other others put into it ductility or fixedness &c as they have been taught by tradition or experience Who of all these has established the right s gnification of the word gold? Or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature which he appeals to and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea sig ified by the word gold those qual ties, which upon trial he has found united as another who has not so well examined has to leave them out or a third who has made other trials has to put in others For the union in nature of these qual ties being the true ground of their union in one complex idea who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or left out than another? From hence it will unavoidably follow that the complex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them will be very var ous and so the significations of those names very uncertain

14 *Thirdly to co existi qu lities wh ch a e known but mperfectly* Besides there is scarce any part cular th ng existing which in some of its simple ideas does not communicate with a greater and in others a less number of particular beings ho shall determine in this case wh ch are those that are to make up the prec se collection that is to be sign fied by the spec fic name? or can w th any just authority presc be which ob ious or common qual t es are to be left out or which mo e secret or more part cular are to be put in the names of substances wh ch causes such uncertainty disputes or mistakes when we come to a philosophical use of them.

15 *With th s impe f ction th y m y se e f r civil but ot well f ph l phic l use* It is true as to ci il

[1] Ch v
[2] Cf Bk II ch viii.

and figure in things of known seminal propaga
t hst es, f th most part

meant by th word gold or pple, to distinguish the one from the ther B t in the inquir ies and d ba es, where g ral truths are t be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down, there the precise signif cau of the names of substances will be found t nly not to be well established, but also ry hard t be so For exampl he that shall mak malle

each of th m mad t a sign of a differe t com pl x id a This made them perce e that the main of their dispute was bo t the significat n of that term and th t th y d ffered ery l ttle in their pinions co cern g m flu d d subtle matt r p s g thr gh th co d is f the nerves though t was ot so easy t agree wh th er t was to be called *l quor* r no, a thin wh ch when considered th y th ught t n t w th the co tending bout,

17 *I t-ne gold* H m ch this is the case in th gre t t p t of disp t s th t m n ar e g ged so hotly I shall perhaps ha e an occa si th r place to take otice. Let us only h de a l ttl mo e ctly th f e

gold, take in such sign ficatu n but y t such as another man can er be forced t admit, no be con inced of their truth, who makes not mal leableness, or the sam degree f fixedness, part of tha complex idea that th name g ld, in his use of t, stands for

6 *Istan l quor* This is a natural and almost o d bl imp f t n lm t all th names of substances, in all languages wh tsoev er which men will easily find hen ce passing fr m confused loose u ns th m more strict and close inquiries. For th they will be co inced h w d btful and obscur those ords are in their significatu which in rdin ary use ppeared ry clear and d t rmin d. I was once in meetin of ery learned and in en ious physicians, where by chance there arose q estion, whether any liquor passed through th filaments of the erves. Th d bate ha ing been managed good hile, by ari ty of arguments both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that th gr t p f disput m re bou the significatio f w rds than real dif ference in the concepu of things) desired, that, before they wen any furth n in this disp te, they ould first examin and establish amo gst th m, wha th w rd *l q* gnifi d. Th y t firs were li tl surprised th proposal and had they bee persons less ingen ous, they might perhaps ha take for ry fri l us ex tra agan ne since there was on there that tho ght no himself to understand ery perfectly hat the word liquo stood f which I think, too, none of th mos *perplexed names of substances.* However they were pleased comply w th my mou and po *examinatio found* tha th gnificatio of that word was so set tled or certain as they had all imagined bu that

f a body l ye

hich being the d to which children ha e an exed that m th shin g y llow part of a peacock s tail is properly t them gold. Oth rs finding fusibility joined w th that yell w col ur in certain parcels of matter make of that com binati n compl x dea t wh ch they gi the name gold t den t sort of substances and so excl d from being gold all uch yellow shi ing bod es as by fire will be red ced to ashes and admit to be of that pecies, or to be comprehended under that name gold, nly such ubstances as, ha g th t shin g yell w col ur will by fire be red ced to fusi n, d n t t ashes. An ther by th same eason, dds th weight, wh ch, be ing quality as straightly joined w th that col as its fusibility he thinks has the same reason to be j ined in ts dea, and to be sign fied by its name and th ref re th th mad p of body f such colour and fusibility to be imperf t and so of all th rest wherein n one can show reaso why som f th inseparabl qualities, tha are al y united in nature should be p t into th n minal essence, and thers left out r why th word g ld signifying that sort of body th rin his finger is mad of should d t min that sort ther by its col ur we ght, and fusibility than by its colour weight, and sol bility in *qua reg* sin th dissol ing t by that liqu is as inseparabl from t as th fusi by fire and they are both of them nothi g b t the relati n h ch that substan e has to two oth r bodies, hich ha po er to perate diff rent ly upo t. F by what right is t that fusibil ty comes to be part of th essence signified by th word gold, and solubility b t property of t. O why is ts col ur part f th esse ce, and its mal leableness but property That which I mean is

this That these being all but properties depend ing on its real constitution and nothing but pow ers either active or passive in reference to other bodies no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another whereby the signification of that name must un avoidably be very uncertain Since as has been said several people observe several properties in the same substance and I think I may say no body all And therefore we have but very imper fect descriptions of things and words have very uncertain significations

18 *The names of simple ideas the least doubtful* From what has been said it is easy to observe what has been before remarked viz that the *names of simple ideas* are of all others the least li able to mistakes and that for these reasons First Because the ideas they stand for being each but one single perception are much easier got and more clearly retained than the more complex ones and therefore are not liable to the uncer tainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes in which the precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed so readily kept in mind And Secondly Because they are never re ferred to any other essence but barely that per ception they immediately sign fy which refer ence is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed and gives occasion to so many disputes Men that do not perversely use the r words or on purpose set themselves to cavil seldom mistake n any lan guage which they are acquainted w th the use and signification of the name of s mple ideas *White* and *sweet* *y llow* and *bitter* carry a very ob v ous meaning with them which every one pre cisely comprehends or easily perceives he is ig norant of and seeks to be informed But what precise collection of s mple ideas *mod sty* or *fru gality* stand for in another s use is not so certain ly known And however we are apt to think e well enough know what is meant by *g ld* or *n* yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain and I believe t is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collect on Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes when they are made use of in discourses where n men have to do with universal proposit ons and would settle in their minds un versal truths and consider the consequences that follow from them.[1]

19 *And next to them simple modes* By the same rule the names of *simple modes* are next to those of simple ideas least liable to doubt and uncer tainty especially those of figure and number of which men have so clear and distinct ideas Who ever that had a mind to understand them mis took the ordinary meaning of *seven* or a *triangle*? And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names.

20 *The most doubtful are the names of very com pounded mixed modes and subst ces* Mixed modes, therefore that are made up but of a few and ob vious simple ideas have usually names of no very uncertain signification But the names of mi ed modes which comprehend a great number of simple ideas are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning as has been shown. The names of substances being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact rep resentations of the patterns they are referred to are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncer tainty especially when we come to a philosophi cal use of them

21 *Why this imperf ction charged upon words* The great disorder that happens in our names of sub stances proceeding for the most part, from our want of knowledge and inability to penetrate in to their real constitutions it may probably be

tice that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have follo ed this method I must confess, then that, when I first began this D scourse of the Understanding and a good while after I had not the least thought that any cons deration of words was at all necessary to it But when hav ing passed over the original and composition of our ideas I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge I found it had so near a connexion with words that unless their force and manner of signif cation were first well observed there could be very little said clearly and pert nently concerning kno vledge which be ng conversant about truth had constantly to do with propos tions And though it terminated in things yet t was for the most part so much by the intervent on of words that they seemed scarce separable f om our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much be tween our understand ngs and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that l ke the med um through wh ch visible objects pass the obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and mpo e upon our un

[1] Cf. Bk. II ch. vi. § 2 also Bk. II ch viii.

In Bk. II *In Bk. IV

derstandings. If e co sider n the fall c es n p t po th msel es, as ell a th rs, d the must k me s d p tes a d t o h great part is ov g to words, nd the r u cer tain r ustak nsig f cati ns, w shall ha e rea son t think this small bst cle n the y to knowledge which I co l de e are tl more carefully t be arned of because t has been so far fro being taken ce of as inco en ce, th t th arts f imp g t l e been mad th business of men s tudy and obtai ed the rep tat on f l a g nd s bt lty as we shall see in the f ll g chapte B t I a i apt t imagi e that, were th imperfect ons of l gu g as the instrum t f k wledg m e thoroughly w ghed a great many of th co tro ers that m k h e the o ld w uld of themsel s cease d th w y t kn wl dge d pe h p pe ce too l e a gre t d al peacer than t does.

Thi hould t ach us moder t impon g sr ou nse f old author Sure I am that th signifi catio of words in ll langu ges, d pend g ery much on the tho ghts, t ns, a d d as of him

th gh th sam words. B t hen t th natu al difficulty ev ry cou try there shall be dded differe t countries and remot ges, wh re the speakers and rit rs had ery differe t t ons, t mp t m m ts d fig of speech, &c. every e of which infl ced th sig ificati f their w rds th tho gh t us w th y ar lost d unkn w t wo ld beco

t p bl w th t consta t d fi g th terms, of co y g th sense d int t n f the speaker th t any ma f d bt d un certai ty t th hearer And disc urses of re ligion, law and mo ali y as they are m tt rs f th h gh t co m t so th ll be h

may be nay cannot choose but be ry fall ble in the u d rstanding of it. \ is t to be o dered th t the w ll f God l n cl th d in ords, sh ld be liable t that doubt and u cer t nty wh ch u d bly attends th t t of con eyance wh ev his Son whilst clothed n flesh, was s bject t all th f ailt es and nc n ve ences of h man ture sin excepted. And e ght t mag ify his good ess, that he hath spread before all th wo ld such leg bl char ters of his works and pro dence nd gi en all ma ki d so suff t a l ght of reason, that tl ey to whom tl s writt n word ne r cam co ld ot (wh nc e they set the nsel es t search) ei th r d bt of the be g of God or of the obed ce d t him. S nce th n the p ecepts of Na t al R l g are pl d ery t ll g ble to ll manki d d seldom come to be co tro t d d oth e e l d truths, wh ch are c eyed t us by books d la gu ges, are liable to th co uno d t al bsc rities and dif f ulties cid tt words methinks it w ld be come us t be more careful and dil gent n ob serving th f rmer d less magist rial, posit and mperi us, mpos g own sense nd t rpretations of th latter

Chap X Of the Ab se of Wo ds

1 *Woeful bus f ords* Besides th imperfec ti that is tu ally n l guage d the b scurity nd confusi n that is so hard t be o d ed in the use of w rds, th re re sev ral *lful* f lts and n glects wh ch e are gu lty of n this w y f mm cat whe by th y rend these signs less clea d dist t in their gn f cati th t ally they eed to be.

2 *It ds are ft mpl y d th t y or u th ut l ar d as Fir t* In this k d th first nd most palpabl buse is, th using f words w th t cle dd u ct id as wh ch s worse s gns th t y thi g gnif ed Of these th re are t sorts —

I *Som words ntrodu d thout cl ar deas nr d t them thei f t ori al O*

eu th th rs or promot rs, th affecti g som th g si gular d t of tl e way of comm n ppreh ns ns, r t pport som trang p s, or co so weakness f their hypo hesis, seld f il to coin n w words,

Cf. *Verum O anum* Bk I p 60, on th *Idol fora.*

this That these being all but properties depending on its real constitution and nothing but powers either active or passive in reference to other bodies no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain Since as has been said several people observe several properties in the same substance and I think I may say nobody all And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things and words have very uncertain significations

18 *The names of simple ideas the least doubtful* From what has been said it is easy to observe what has been before remarked viz that the *names of simple ideas* are of all others the least liable to mistakes and that for these reasons First Because the ideas they stand for being each but one single perception are much easier got and more clearly retained than the more complex ones and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes in which the precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed so readily kept in mind And Secondly Because they are never referred to any other essence but barely that perception they immediately signify which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed and gives occasion to so many disputes Men that do not perversely use their words or on purpose set themselves to cavil seldom mistake in any language which they are acquainted with the use and signification of the name of simple ideas *White* and *sweet yellow* and *bitter* carry a very obvious meaning with them which every one precisely comprehends or easily perceives he is ignorant of and seeks to be informed But what precise collection of simple ideas *modesty* or *frugality* stand for in another s use is not so certainly known And however we are apt to think we well enough know what is meant by *gold* or *iron* yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes when they are made use of in discourses wherein men have to do with universal propositions and would settle in their minds universal truths and consider the consequences that follow from them.

19 *And next to them simple modes* By the same rule the names of *simple modes* are next to those of simple ideas least liable to doubt and uncertainty especially those of figure and number of which men have so clear and distinct ideas Who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of *seven* or a *triangle*? And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names

20 *The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances* Mixed modes, therefore that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas have usually names of no very uncertain signification But the names of mixed modes which comprehend a great number of simple ideas are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning as has been shown. The names of substances being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty especially when we come to a philosophical use of them

21 *Why this imperfection charged upon words* The great disorder that happens in our names of substances proceeding for the most part, from our want of knowledge and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions it may probably be wondered why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than understandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method I must confess

words was at all necessary to it But when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge² I found it had so

being conversant about truth had constantly to do with propositions And though it terminated in things yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge At least they interpose themselves so much be

must before our eyes and impose upon our un

¹ Cf. Bk II ch. vi. § 2 also Bk II ch viii.

In Bk. II ² In Bk. IV

sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his ad antage, would presently ha clapped pon him, o of the two names men are commonly disgusted w th. And yet in arguings and learned contests, th same sort of proceedings passes commonly for w t and learning but to me t ppears greater dishonesty than th misplacin of counters in the castin up d bt and the cheat the greater by how much truth is of greater concernment and al than money

6. III *Affected obscurity as the Peripatetick and other sects of philosophy Thirdly* Another buse of language is an *affected obscurity* by either applying old words new and unusual significations or introducing new and ambiguous terms, w tho t de... either or else puttin them so together as m y conf d th ir d n ry me n g Though the P ripatetic k philosophy has bee most eminent in this w y t ther sects ha not been whol clear of t. There are scarce any of them tha are not cumbered w th some difficulties (such is the imperfectio f human knowled e.) which they ha e been fain to cover w th obscurity of terms, and t confound the significatio f w ds, whi h, l k a mist bef people eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That *body* and *extension* in common use stand for two distinct ideas, is plain to an one that will bu reflec little. For were their significatio precisely th same, would be as proper and as intelligibl to sa the body of an extension, as the extensio of body and yet there are those who find necessary to confound their ..gnification. T this buse, and the mischief f nf ding h gnificatu n of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they ha been handled in th schools, ha gi en eputation and the admired Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection f languages, whilst has been mad use of and fitted to perplex the significatio of words, more than to discover the knowled and truth of things and he tha will look into tha sort of learned writings, will find the words there much more bscure uncertain, and undetermined in their meanin than they are in ordinary co ersation.

Logic and dispute has much con buted t this This is una oidably to be so, where men parts and learning ar estimated by their skill in disputing And if reputation and reward shall t tend these conquests, which depend mostly the fineness and niceties of words, is no wonder if the w of man so mployed, should perplex, in ol and subtilize th significatio of sounds, so as never to want something to say in opposing or defending any question the ictory bein ad judged not to him who had truth his side, but the last word in the dispute.

8. *Calling it subtilty* Thus, though a ery useless skill, and that which I think the direct opposite to the w ys of knowled e, hath y t passed hitherto under th laudable and esteemed names of *subtilty* and *acuteness* and has had the pplause of th schools, and encour ement of ne part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder since the philosophers of old, (the disp ting and wran lin philosophers I mean, such as Lucian w tily and w th reason taxes) and the Schoolmen since, aiming t gl ry and esteem, for their great and uni ersal knowled e, asier great deal to be pretended to than really acquired, found this good expedient to cover their norance, w th a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themsel es the admir tion of thers, by unintell ib terms, th pter to produce wonder because they could not be under ood whilst t ppears in all history that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but small ad antag to human lif the soci ties wherein they li ed unless th coining of new words, where they produced no new things to pply them to, or th perplexing or obscurin the significatio of old nes, and so bringing all things into question and dispute, w re a thing profitable to the li of man, worthy commendation and eward.

9. *This learning very little benefits society* For not w thstanding these learned disp tants, these all knowin doctors, t was to the unscholastic statesman tha th governme ts f the w ld wed their peace, def nce, and liberties and from the illiterate and contemned mechan (a name of disgrace) that they recei ed the impro ements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mi htily in these last ges, by th in erest and artifice of those who found no easier w y to that p tch of uthority and dominion they ha tained, than by amusin the men of business, and norant, w th hard words, or emplo ing th ingenious and idl in intricat dispu es bou unintell g b erms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such w y to gain admi tance, gi defence to trange and absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about w th legions of bscure, doubtful, and undefined w rds. Which et make these treats more like the dens of robbers, or h les of f xes, than the fortresses of fair warriors which, if t be hard to ge them out f, is no for the strength

Cf. Bk. II ch. xiii §§ —24.
Cf. Bk. IV ch. vii §

and such as when they come to be examined may justly be called *insignificant terms* For having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented or at least such as if well examined will be found inconsistent it is no wonder if afterwards in the vulgar use of the same party they remain empty sounds with little or no signification amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the distinguishing characters of their Church or School without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for I shall not need here to heap up instances every man s reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him Or if he wants to be better stored the great mintmasters of this kind of terms I mean the Schoolmen and Metaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him

3 II *Other words to which ideas were annexed at first used afterwards without distinct meanings* Others there be who extend this abuse yet further who take so little care to lay by words which in their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly use words which the propriety of language *has* affixed to very important ideas without any distinct meaning at all *Wisdom glory grace* &c are words frequent enough in every man s mouth but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them they would be at a stand and not know what to answer a plain proof that though they have learned those sounds and have them ready at their tongues ends yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds which are to be expressed to others by them [2]

4 *Thus occasioned by men learning names before they have the ideas they belong to* Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained before they knew or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for they usually continue to do so all their lives and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have contenting themselves with the same words other people use as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning This though men make a shift with in the ordinary occurrences of life where they find it necessary to be understood and therefore they make signs till they are so yet this insignificancy in their words when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon especially in moral matters where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas not regularly and permanently united in nature their bare sounds are often only thought on or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbors and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for use them confidently without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning whereby besides the ease of it they obtain this advantage That, as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode This I guess to be so and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so or not

5 *Unsteady application of them Secondly* Another great abuse of words is *inconstancy* in the use of them It is hard to find a discourse written on any subject especially of controversy wherein one shall not observe if he read with attention the same words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas and sometimes for another which is a perfect abuse of language Words being intended for signs of my ideas to make them known to others not by any natural signification but by a voluntary imposition it is plain cheat and abuse when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly or greater dishonesty And a man in his accounts with another may with as much fairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of units v g this character 3 stand sometimes for three sometimes for four and sometimes for eight as in his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas If men should do so in their reckonings I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in the affairs and business of the world and call 8

[1] See Epistle to the Reader pp 91 92
[2] Cf Bk II ch xxii § 8 xxix § 9 xxxi § 8 Bk III ch iv § 6

are som thing eal Th w ds men h e learned from their ery entrance pon kn wl edge, and ha e f und their masters and sy tems lay great stress upo th m and theref re they cannot quit th pin n, that they are conf rm b to n ture and ar th prese tati ns f something that really exists. Th Pl tonists ha e *world* d th Ep cureans their

icant and should *certai* anu

ce, by th pre alency of that doctrine, to be g erally cei d y h re n d ubt those terms ould mak impressions men minds, so as to establish them in th persuasi f the reality of such things, as m ch as Peripatetick *forms* and *i nt nal f cie* ha heret f re d ne.

5. *Instan* *matter* H w m ch n mes taken for things are pt t mislead th understanding, th tte ti adin f philosoph c l riters would bundantl discov and that perhaps in w rds littl suspe ted of any such misuse. I shall t ce in ne nly and that ery f miliar e.

dent th word matter tands for an dea distin t from th dea f body F if th ideas these two te ms tood f w e p cisely th sam they migh indifferently in all places be p t f e anoth B t w see th t th gh t be proper to say There is ne matter of all bodies, ne cannot say There is body f all matters w famili arly say ne body is b ger than ther but t sounds harsh (and I think is ev used) to say mat er is b gger than another Whence comes this, the Fi from h ce that, th u h matter and body be ally distin t, b t h rever there is th ne there is the ther y t matter and body tand for tw diff rent co ceptions, where of the ne is incomplete and b t part f the ther F body tands for solid exte ded fig ured substance, whereof matter is b t partial and more confused co cepti t seemin to me to be used f th substan and sol d y f body tho taking in ts extensio and figure and theref re t is that, speakin f matter w peak

of t al ays as e, because in truth t expressly contains nothing but th dea of a solid substance, which is everywhere th same, everywhere un form. This bei g our d a f matter we no more co ce r peak f different *matter* in the world than we d of different sol d ties though w both conce nd peak of d fferent bod es, because extensi n d f gur are capabl of ari tion. B t, since solid ty cannot exist w thout extension and f gure, th taking matter to be the name of som thi g r ally existing und r th t precision, has n doubt prod ced those obscure and unin t ll g bl disc *urses* d disputes wh ch ha e filled the heads and books of philosophers co ce n g *m t* *f m* wh ch mpe f ct on or buse, how far t may concern gre t many other gene al t rms I lea e to be considered. This, I t k I m t l ast say that w sl ould ha a

ideas u

wh w argue bout *matter* o any the like term, we truly argue nly bout the idea w express by that sound, whether that precise idea gree t anything really existing in nature or no. And if m n w uld t ll what deas th y make their words stand fo there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling n th search or support of truth that there is.

16 *This mak s errors lasting* B t whatever in co enience f llows from this mi tak f words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, th y charm men into nou ns far remote from the truth of things. It would be hard matter to per suad any one that the words which his f the or schoolmaste th parso of th parish, such a re ere d docto used g fied thi g that really existed in nature hich perhaps is none of th least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, ev n in pinions purely philosophical, nd where th y ha no other terest but truth. F the words they ha l g time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, t is no wo der that the wro g nou ns an exed t th m should not be remo ed.

7 V *By tt g them the place f what they can not signify F fthly* An ther buse f w rds is *the sett g them in the plac f th g wh ch they d or by no means signify* W may bserv that n the general names of ubstances whereof th *mi nal* esse ces are nly known to us when we p t them into propositi ns, and affirm deny thing bout them, w d most commonly tacitly

Cf. Lucretius, *O the Natur f Thing* ii. 2 6, 5 -93.

Cf ch ii, §§ 3

Cf. Arist tl *Physics* i. 9 *M taphysics* ii 3 and *O the Soul* iii. 4.

that is in them but the briars and thorns and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity

10 *But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication* Thus learned ignorance and this art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge hath been propagated in the world and hath much perplexed whilst it pretended to inform the understanding For we see that other well meaning and wise men whose education and parts had not acquired that *acuteness* could intelligibly express themselves to one another and in its plain use make a benefit of language But though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black &c and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words yet there were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black i e to prove that white was black Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse conversation instruction and society whilst with great art and subtlety they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it a gift wh ch the illiterate had not attained to

11 *As useful as to confound the sounds that the letters of the alphabet st d for* These learned men did equally instruct men s understandings and profit their lives as he who should alter the signification of known characters and by a subtle device of learning far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate dull and vulgar should in his writing show that he could put A for B and D for E &c to the no small adm at on and benefit of his reader It being as senseless to put *black* which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea to put it, I say for another or the contrary idea i e to call *w bl k* as to put this mark A which is a character agreed on to stand for one modificat on of sound made by a certain mot on of the organs of speech for B wh ch is agreed on to stand for another mod fication of sound made by another certain mode of the organs of speech

12 *This art has perplexed relig ion d justice* Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical n ceties or curious empty speculations it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and soc ety obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity brought confusion disorder a d uncertainty into the affairs of mankind and if not destroyed yet in a great measure rendered useless these two great rules religion and justice What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for but to make the meanin more doubtful and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acute niceties but obscurity and uncertainty leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands are easily understood speaking to their people in their laws, are not so? And as I remarked before doth it not often happen that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text or a law that he reads till he consults an expositor or goes to counsel who by that time he hath done explaining them makes the words signify either nothing at all or what he pleases

13 *And ou ht not to pass for learnr* Whether any by interests of these professions have occasioned this I will not here examine but I leave it to be considered whether it would not be well for mankind whose concernment it is to know things as they are and to do what they ought and not to spend their lives in talking about them or tossing words to and fro —whether it would not be well I say that the use of words were made pla n and di ect and that language wh ch was given us for the improveme it of knowledge and bond of soc ety should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people s rigl ts to raise mists and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at least if this will happen *it should not be thought learning* or kno ledge to do so?

14 IV *By t kin a ds for things Fourthly* Another great abuse of words is the *tak g them for th s* Th s though it in some degree concerns all names in general yet more particularly affects those of substances To this abuse those men are most subject who most confine tl eir thoughts to any one system and g e themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they pe fectly correspond w th the r

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1 Cf Bk IV ch xvii §§ 4 8 On Syllogism.

Pred caments, to be exactly confor nable to the natu e of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that *sub t tial f rms g t tire s uls bh rr ce f a c cuum int t nal spe es* &c.

Cf Arist tl O *the Soul* Bk II

for something real. These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them: and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their *soul of the world*, and the Epicureans their *endeavour towards motion* in their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant. And should *aerial* and *aetherial vehicles* come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetick *forms* and *intentional species* have heretofore done.

15. *Instance in matter.* How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about *matter*, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from *body*; as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say, There is one matter of all bodies, one cannot say, There is one body of all matters: we familiarly say one body is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? Viz. from hence: that, though matter and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended figured substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception; it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is that, speaking of matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is everywhere the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive or speak of different *matters* in the world than we do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning *materia prima*; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only, and not for things themselves. For when we argue about *matter*, or any the like term,

-scurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.

16. *This makes errors lasting.* But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any one that the words which his father or schoolmaster, the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.

17. V. *By setting them for what they cannot signify.* Fifthly, Another abuse of words is *the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify.* We may observe that, in the general names of substances, whereof the *nominal* essences are only known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly

Cf. Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* ii. 6, 51–93.

Cf. ch. ii. §§ 3.

Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* i. 9, *Metaphysics* ii. 3 and *On the Soul* iii. 4.

that is in them but the briars and thorns and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity

10 *But destroys the instruments of knowledge and commu ication* Thus learned ignorance and this art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge hath been propagated in the world and hath much perplexed whilst it pretended to inform the understanding For we see that other well meaning and wise men whose education and parts had not acquired that *acuteness* could intelligibly express themselves to one another and in its plain use make a benefit of language But though unlearned men well enough under stood the words white and black &c and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words yet there were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black i e to prove that white was black Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse conversa tion instruction and society whilst with great art and subtlety they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it a gift which the illite rate had not attained to

11 *Is useful as to co found the sounds that the let ters f the aplhabet st d for* These learned men did equally instruct men s understandings and pro fit their lives as he who should alter the signifi cation of known characters and by a subtle de vice of learning far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate dull and vulgar should in his writing show that he could put A for B and D for E &c. to the no small admiration and bene fit of his reader It being as senseless to put *black* which is a word agreed on to stand for one sen sible idea to put it I say for another or the con trary idea i e to call *s ow bl ck* as to put this mark A which is a character agreed on to stand for one modificat on of sound made by a certain motion of the organs of speech for B which is agreed on to stand for another modificat on of sound made by another certain mode of the or gans of speech

12 *I t is rt has perpl xed religio nd justice* Nor hath this m schief stopped in logical niceties or curious empty speculations it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and society obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and di inity bro ght confusion disorde and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind and if not destroyed yet in a great measure rendered useless these two great rules religion and jus tice What have the greatest part of the com ments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for but to make the meanin more doubtful and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acute niceties but obscurity and uncertain ty leaving the words more unintelligible and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands are easily under stood speaking to their people in their la s, are not so? And as I remarked before doth it not often happen that a man of an ordinary capa city very well understands a text or a law that he reads till he consults an expositor or goes to counsel who by that time he hath done explain ing them makes the words signify either noth ing at all or what he pleases

13 *And ou ht not to pass for le rning* Whether any by interests of these professions have occa sioned this I will not here examine but I leave it to be considered whether it would not be well for mankind whose concernment it is to know things as they are and to do what they ought and not to spend their lives in talking about them or tossing words to and fro —whether it would not be well I say that the use of words were made plain and direct and that language wh ch was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of society should not be employed to dar ken truth and unsettle people s rights to raise mists and render unintelligible both morality and rel gion? Or that at least if this will happen it should not be thought learning or kno ledge to do so?

14 IV *By taki g w rds for thi gs F urthly* An other great abuse of words is the *t king them f r thi gs* This though it in some degree concerns all names in general yet more particularly affects those of substances To this abuse those men are most subject who most conf ne their thoughts to any one system and g ve themselves up nto a firm belief of the perfect on of any received hypothe sis whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things that they perfectly correspond w th their real ex stence Who is there that has been bred up in the Per patetick philosophy who does not th nk the Ten Names, under wh ch are anked the Ten Pred caments, to be exactly confo mable to the natu e of th ngs? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that *ubst ntial f rms t getat ve s uls bh rrenc f a vacuum i tenti nal speci s* &c

Cf Bk IV ch x ii. §§ 4 8 On Syllogism.

Cf Aristotl *O the Soul* Bk II

are something real. These w rd m n h e learned from their very entrance pon knowl ed-e, and ha found their masters and systems la great stress pon them and therefore they cannot quit the pinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are th represe tations of something that really exists. The Platonists ha e their *soul of the world* and the Epicureans their *endeavour towards motion* in th ir toms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not d stinct set of terms that others understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in th weak ness of human understanding, serves so ell to palliate men s norance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use among those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant: and should *aerial* and *a herial vehicles* come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywh re, n d ubt those terms would make impressions on men minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetick *forms* and *intentional* ... ha e heretofore done.

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16. *This makes errors lasting.* But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be hard matter to persuad any one that the words which his f ther or schoolmaster the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothi g that really existed in nature. which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn t quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they ha e no ther interest but truth. For the words they ha e long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, t is no wonder that the wron notions annexed to them should not be removed.

V *By setting them in the place of what they cannot signify.* ... Another abuse of words is *the se ... them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify.* W may bserve that in th general names of substances whereof the *nominal* essences are nly known t us when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny y thing about them, we d most commonly tacitly

Cf. Lucretius, O ... *Nature of Things* ii. 6, 5 -93.

Cf. ch. ii. §§ 3.

Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* i. 9, *Metaphysics* ii. 3 and *O the Soul* iii. 4.

suppose or intend they should stand for the *real* essence of a certain sort of substances For when a man says gold is malleable he means and would insinuate something more than this That what I call gold is malleable (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood viz That gold i.e what has the real essence of gold is malleable which amounts to thus much that malleableness depends on and is inseparable from the real essence of gold But a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not but only with the sound gold he puts for it Thus when we say that *anim l rationale* is and *animal implume bipes*

signify that a rational animal better described that real essence than a two legged animal with broad nails and without feathers For else why might not Plato as properly make the word *αν θρωπος* or *man* stand for his complex idea made up of the idea of a body distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appear ances as Aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave the name *ανθρωπος* or *m n* of body and the faculty of reasoning jo ned together un

the idea a man professes he would express by it?

18 V g *Puttin them for the eal essences of sub sta ces* It is true the names of substances would be much more useful and propositions made in them much more certain were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds which those wo ds sign fied And it s for want of those real essences that our wo ds con ey so l ttle knowl edge or certainty in our discourses about them and therefore the mind to remo e that imper fect on as much as it can makes them by a se cret supposition to stand for a thing having that

yet there is scarce anybody n the use of these wo ds but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence on which these properties depend Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words that by a plain abuse it adds to it when we would make them stand for something which not be ing in our complex idea the name we use can no ways be the sign of

19 *Hence we think cha ge of our complex ideas f substances not to chan e their species* This shows us the reason why in *mixed modes* any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one being left out or changed it is allowed to be another thing i e to be of another species, as is plain in *chance medley manslau hter murder parri cide* &c The reason whereof is because the com plex idea signified by that name is the real as well as nominal essence and there is no secret refer ence of that name to any other essence but that. But in *substances* it is not so For though in that called *gold* one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out and vice versâ yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is

in *aq regia* which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species but only

consisted But this reference of the name to a thing whereof we have not the idea is so far from helping at all that it only serves the more to involve us in difficult es For by this tacit ref erence to the real essence of that species of bodies,

ing put for somewhat whereof we have no idea

in name and about a parcel in the body itself v g a piece of leaf gold la d before us though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the th ng

20 *The c us f th s abuse supp sit n of nature s working lu ys ularly i sett g b nda es to spe c es* That wh ch I think very much di poses men to substitute their names for the real essences of spec es is the suppos tion before mentioned that nature works regularly in the production of things and sets the boundaries to each of those species by g ing exactly the same real internal consti tution to each indi dual hich w rank under one general name Whereas any one who observes the r d fferent q alities can hardly doubt that many of the ind viduals called by the same name

Cf ch v § 14.

are, in
from a

less bserv d buse of w rds and that is,
h l g a d f mil ar use annex d

th y ha e th mind h n they use t b t understa d w t u
So that, if I may so y g ify g o thing d s
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h t ch kind f se cause a

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d termined and d u guished
Thus bus t nst f l pp t ns B t
h p post rous d bsurd t be t make
mes t d f deas w h en t, (which

ha e th reby as tw set bef re th rs the ery
thing th y talked f And so l kew se t k g the
w ds f oth rs as n t lly ta d g *fo just*
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pe es. Th t every thing has l nsti t
h reby t is what t s, d which is sens bl
qualities d pend is past d bt b t I think t has
be proved that th mak s n t th distu
f p es as ank th m, th boundar es
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Seco dly this ta tly also nsinu tes, as if w
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purpose lse is t, t inq h th this that
th g ha th eal esse f th pec es ma if
did t ppose that th re h pe
f k esse ce known. Wh ch y t is tte ly false
A d th f h ppl f n m as
w uld mak th m ta d f deas wh ch w h
t m t d g t d d dis-
rse d aso g b t th m nd b
gr co ni ce in ur commu cati by
w ds.
Cf Bk IV chh iii §§ 9– 7 xi xv

ill t be a l ar nstan f this. *Lif* is a t rm,
m f miliar Any e almost w uld take
t f n ffro t t be asked hat h mea t by
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that l es ready f med in th seed h e lif wh
th th embry in gg bef e bati n,
ma in a swoo w th t sense m u be
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ti t, settled dea does not alw ys ccomp y the
use f so k wn w rd as th t f lif is. S m
gross and confused co ceptions m indeed d
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d nary disco ses affairs. B t this is t suffi
cie t f philosophical q iries. Kn wl dg d
reasoning require precise d terminat d as. A d
th gh men will t be so mpo tun tely dull as
not to dersta d hat th rs say w th ut d
ma ding expl cati f th t ms so
tro blesomely critical as to correct others n the

use of the words they receive from them, yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words whose sense seems dubious, or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with, yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same, though perhaps what they would have be different.

23. *The ends of language: First, to convey our ideas.* To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language. The ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three: First, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another. Secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as possible; and Thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things, language is either abused or deficient when it fails of any of these three.

First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they are the signs; or 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas to which the common use of that language does not apply them; or 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one and by and by for another idea.

4. *To do it with quickness.* Secondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be when they have complex ideas without having any distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show another.

25. *Therewith to convey the knowledge of things.* Thirdly, There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the nature of things as attention, study, and application might make them, yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence.

26. *How men's words fail in all these. First, when used without any ideas.* First, He that hath words of any language without distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby

according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else.

27. *When c… plex ideas are … thout names a… ed to them.* Secondly, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better case than a bookseller who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles, which he could therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them, and so is fain often to use twenty words to express

sign for the same idea, but uses the same words sometimes in one and sometimes in another signification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man as he does in the market and exchange who sells several things under the same name.

29. *When words are d… t d… f… m their common use.* Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the

to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them, yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are annexed

to, and are wo t to e cite n th m d f the hearers, they cann t make known the tho ghts of him wh thus uses them.

3 *Whe they ar nam ff tastical m gina ns* F thly He that imagin d to himself substances such as ever ha e been and filled his head w th deas which ha e n t any correspondence w th th real nature of things, t h ch yet h gi es settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps an ther man s head w th th fan tastical imagin ns f his n brain, but ill be ery far from d ancing thereby n j t n

rom continu ...

existence ...

tru knowledg in his understanding and hath instead th reof chimeras

32. *How men u ds fail whe they tand for substances* I ur notions co cerning S bstances, we are liable to all th f rmer inco eniences v g h that uses the w rd *tarantul* w th ut ha ing any imaginatio dea of what t tands for pro unces good w rd b t so l g means thing a all by t. H that, n ewly-disco ered country shall see sev ral so ts f mal and eg tables, unknow t him bef re may ha as true deas f th m, as of horse o tag b t can peak f them nly by descripti n, till he shall ther take th names th natu es call th m by gi them names himself 3 H that uses th w rd *body* som times f pure extensi and som times f ext ns d sol d y t g ther will talk ery fall ciously 4. H that gi es th nam *k* to that idea which comm n usag calls *mul* talks imp perly and will n t be understood. 5 H that thinks th nam *nt ur* stands f some cal be g impo es n himself and mistakes w ds f things.

33 *How whe they t nd for mode nd lat ns* I Modes and Relati ns generally w are liabl nly to th f ur first of these inco eniences iz I may ha in my memory th names f modes, as *gratitud* *charity* and y t n t h any pre cise deas an e ed in my tho ghts to thos names. I may ha deas, and n t kn w th ames th bel g to them g I may ha e th dea f

a man s drinking till his colour and humour be alter ll h t ru trips, and his eyes look red and l to be of amis that dea wh ch ou er ... sound *t unless* 4. I may use any of those ames w th inconstancy 5. But, in modes and relations, I t h deas disagreeing to the existence

t gether and so also an dea f my own maki g these deas can scarce be f und t disagree w th anythi g existing since they are not in the mind as the cop es f things regularly made by ature, no as properties inseparably fl wing from the internal constituti r esse ce of any substance but, as t w re, p tterns lodged in my memory

... f them, when I gi e wrong ames to them. Only if I p t in my id as f mixed modes r relations any in *nsistent* deas together I fill my head al so w th chimeras since such ideas if well exam ined, cann t so m ch as exist in the mi d m ch less any real being e er be denomin ted from them.

34. *Seventhly lan uag is ften bused by figur t e speech* Since w t and fancy find easier entertain m t in th w ld than dry truth and real kno l ed figurati e peeches and allusio in language will hardly be dmitted as an imperf ctio ab se f t. I confess, discourses wher we seek rather pl asur and delight than informati n and impro ment, ch rn ments as are borrowed from th m can scarce pass f f ults. But y t if we w uld peak of things as they are, w must all that all the art of h t ric, besides rder and clearness all th artificial and figurati p- pl cation of w rds eloque ce hath in e ted are f othing ls but t in in t w g deas, m th passions, and ther by mislead the j dg m t and so indeed are perfect cheat and theref re, howeve la d bl allowabl t ry may render them in harangues and popular d dresses, they ar ce tainly in all discourses th t p et d t f m stru t wh lly to be ded and wh truth nd knowl dg ar co cerned, cann t but be tho ght gr t f ult, e ther of the languag perso that makes use

of them What and how various they are will be superfluous here to take notice the books of rhetoric which abound in the world will instruct those who want to be informed only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived since rhetoric that powerful instrument of error and deceit has its established professors is publicly taught and has always been had in great reputation and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness if not brutality in me to have said thus much against it Eloquence like the fair sex *has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself* ever to be spoken against And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived

Chap XI *Of the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses of Words*

1 *Remedies are worth seeking* The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above at large and speech being the great bond that holds society together and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man and one generation to another it would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider what remedies are to be found for the inconveniences above mentioned

2 *Are not easy to find* I am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world no not so much as of his own country without rendering himself ridiculous To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense and for none but determined and uniform ideas would be to think that all men should have the same notions *and should talk of nothing but what* they have clear and distinct ideas of which is not to be expected by any one who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent And he must be very little skilled in the world who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding or that men s talking much or little should hold proportion only to their knowledge

3 *But yet necessary to those who search after truth* But though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking and gossipings not be robbed of their ancient privilege though the schools and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have anything offered to abate the length or lessen the number of their disputes yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity doubtfulness or equivocation to which men s words are naturally liable if care be not taken

4 *Misuse of words the great cause of errors* For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity *the mistakes and confusion that are spread in* the world by an ill use of words will find some reason to doubt whether language as it has been employed has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind How many are there that when they would think on things fix *their thoughts only on words* especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder if the result of such contemplations and reasonings, about little more than sounds whilst the ideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady or perhaps none at all who can wonder I say that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake without any clear judgment or knowledge?

5 *Has made men more conceited and obstinate* This inconvenience in an ill use of words men suffer

others For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their discoveries, reason

break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning what does he but lead himself and *others into errors?* And he that designedly does it ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge And yet who can wonder that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms and insignificant and doubtful expressions capable to make the most attentive or quick sighted very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox since subtlety in those who make profession to teach or defend truth hath passed so much for a virtue a virtue indeed which consisting for the most part *in nothing but* the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance and more obstinate in their errors.

[1] Cf Bk II ch xi § 2

6. *Instanced to* ... *—gli— ... sounds* Let us look ... of controversy of an ... kind, there

1

about things, but names. As often as such a whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree but barely the sound, the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite different.

7 *Instance bat and bird.* Whether a bat be a bird or no, is not a question. Whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of. But the question is, (1) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which these names are supposed to stand. And then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete by examining whether all the simple ideas to which, combined together, they both give the name bird, be all to be found in a bat. but this is a question only of inquirers (not disputers) who neither affirm nor deny but examine Or (2) It is a question between disputants whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat is a bird. And then the question is barely about the signification of one or both these *words* in that they not having both the same complex ideas to which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute about them. For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted between them) whether all the simple ideas of the more general name bird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no and so there could be no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no. And here I desire it may be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification of words and whether if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must be where they signify anything) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or should stand for those disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds i.e. those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity (which every man may do in the words he uses himself) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory ambition, or a party

8. *Remedies* To remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

First remedy T use no word without an idea annexed to it First, A man shall take care to use no word without a signification, no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words as *instinct sympathy* and *antipathy* &c., in the discourse of others, so made use

like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used but there being no natural connexion between any words and any ideas, these, and any other may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

9. *Second remedy T have distinct determinate ideas annexed to words especially in mixed modes* Secondly It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas. those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct if complex, must be determinate, i.e. the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words which, having no settled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. *Justice* is a word in every man's mouth, but most

See Epistle to the Reader " p. 9

commonly with a very undertermined loose signification which will always be so unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of and if it be decompounded must be able to resolve it still on till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up and unless this be done a man makes an ill use of the word let it be justice for example or any other I do not say a man needs stand to recollect and make this analysis at large every time the word justice comes in his way but this at least is necessary that he have so examined the signification of that name and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind that he can do it when he pleases If any one who makes his complex idea of justice to be such a

plex idea of justice it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will perhaps be judged very troublesome and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds But yet I must say till this be done it must not be wondered that they have a great deal of obscurity and confus on in their own minds and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others

10 *And disti ict and conform ble ideas in words that stand for subst nces* In the names of substances for a right use of them something more is required than barely *determined ideas* In these the names must also be *conform ble to thin s as they xist* but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge and in controvers es about truth And though it would be well too if it extended itself to common conversation and the ordinary affairs of life yet I think that is scarce to be expected Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses and both though confused enough yet serve pretty well the market and the wake Me chants and lovers cooks and tailors have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs and so I think, might philosophers and disputants too if they had a mind to understand and to be clearly understood

11 *Thi d remedy To pply wo ds to such ide s as common use has an xed them to* Thirdly it is not enough that men have ideas dete m ned ideas, for which they make these signs stand but they must also take care to apply their words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has annexed them to For words especially of languages already framed being no man s private possession but the common measure of commerce and communication it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp they are current in nor alter the ideas they are affixed to or at least, when there is a necessity to do so he is bound to give notice of it. Men s intentions in speaking are, or at least should be to be understood which cannot be without frequent explanations demands and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men s minds with the greatest ease and advantage and therefore deserves some part of our care and study especially in the names of moral words The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those who in their writings and discourses appear to have had the clearest notions and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man s words according to the propriety of the language though it ha e not always the good fortune to be understood yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks as not to understand it when made use of as it ought to be

12 *F urth remedy To declare the mea in in which we use them* Fourthly But because common use has not so vis bly annexed any s gnification to words as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for and because men in the improvement of their knowledge come to have ideas d fferent from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new words, (which men seldom venture to do for fear of be ng though guilty of affectation or novelty) or else must use old ones in a new signification therefore after the observation of the foregoing rules it is sometimes necessary for the ascertaining the sign f cation of words to *declare their mea* where either common use has left it uncerta n and loose (as it has in most names of very complex ideas) or where the term being very material n the discourse and that upon wh ch it chiefly tur is is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake

13 *And th t n three w ys* As the ideas men s words stand fo are of d fferent sorts so the way of making known the ideas they stand for when there is occasion is also d fferent. For thoug *de fi g* be thought the proper way to make known the proper signif cation of words yet there are

[1] Th f mous discuss on in the first and cond Book of Plato *Rep bl* f th mix d mode named just ce is r l ant in this conn xi n
[2] Cf § 24 also Bk IV chh §§ 11–17 v 11–17

some words that will not be defined, as there are others whose precise meanin cannot be made known but by definition. and perhaps a third, ich partake somewhat of both the ther as we shal see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and substances.

§ 4. I. *In simple ideas, either by synonymous terms or by showing an example* First, when man makes use of the name of any simple dea, which he per ceives is ot understood o is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged, by the law of ingenuity and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes t tand for This, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition. and theref re, when syn ymous word fails t do t, there is but one of these ways left. First, Sometimes th *naming* th subject wherein that simpl idea is to be found, will make ts name to be understood by those who are ac quainted w th that sub ect, and know t by that name. So to make countryman understand what *feuillemorte* colour signifies, t may suffice to tell him, t is the colour of w thered lea es falling rin. Secondly but the nly sure way of

§ 5. II. *I mixed modes by definition.* Secondly Mixed modes, especially th se bel gin to morality being most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of ts own choice, and whereof there are no alw ys standing pat terns to be f und existing the signification of their names canno be mad known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing but, in recompense thereof may be perfectl and exactly defined. For

composition, and so both use these words in ertain and und ub ed gnification, and per fectl declare, when ther is occasion, what they stand for This, if well considered, would lay great blame those who make not their discourses abou *moral* things ery cl ar and distinct. For sinc th precise signification of th names of mixed modes, or which is all one, th real essence of each species is to be known, they bein not of nature s, but man making is great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things w th uncertain y and obscurity which is m pard nabl tre ting f n tural ubstances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be

a oided, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by

6 *Morality capable of demonstration.* Upon this ground t is that I am bold to think that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as math matics since th precise real essence of the th s moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so th congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one ob ect, that the names of substances are often to be mad use of in morality as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their di ers natures are not so much inquired into as supposed g when we say that man is subject to law we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational creature what the real essence or ther qualities of that creature are in this case is no way considered. And, therefore, whether child or changeling be a man, in physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputabl as t will, t concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, corporeal rational bein For were there monkey or any other creature, to be found that had the use of reason t such a degree, as to be abl t understand general signs, and to deduce consequences bout general deas, he would no doubt be subject to law and in that sense be a *man*, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical discourses where, if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any ther body he has his clear settled d a which ar es not, though t may by mistake be pplied to a par ticular body to which t belongs not.

Definitions can make moral discourse cl ar This I ha here mentioned, by the by to show of what consequence t is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is oc casion since thereby moral knowledge may be brou ht to so great clearness and certainty And t must be great want of ingenuousness (to say no worse of)t refuse t do t. since a definition is th nly w y whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known and yet way where by their meaning may be known certainly and w thout lea ing any room for any contest about t. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses

Cf. ch. iii. §§ 4 4.

Cf. Bk. IV chh. iii. §§ 8–20 §§ 7–8 xii. § 8.

in morality be not much more clear than those in natural philosophy since they are about ideas in the mind which are none of them false or disproportionate they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to and must correspond with It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea which shall be the standard to which they will give the name justice with which pattern so made all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination than having seen Aristides to frame an idea that shall in all things be exactly like him who is as he is let men make what idea they please of him For the one they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together in the r own minds for the other they must inquire into the whole nature and abstruse hidden constitut on and various qualities of a thing existing without them

18 *And is the only way in which the meaning of mixed modes can be made known* Another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary especially of moral words is what I mentioned a little before viz that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty For the ideas they stand for being for the most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together but scattered and mingled with others it is the mind alone that collects them and gives them the union of one idea and it is only by words enumerat ng the several simple ideas which the mind has united that we can *make known to others what their names stand* for the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us by the proposal of sensible objects to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for as it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas and also to some degree in those of substances

19 III *In substances both by sh wing and by defining* Thirdly for the explaining the s gnification of the names of substances as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct species both the forement oned ways vi of showing and def ning are requ site in many cases to be made use of For there being ord narily in each sort some leading qualities to which we suppose the other ideas which make up our complex idea of that species annexed we forwardly give the specific name to that th ng wherein that characterist cal mark is found wh ch we take to be the most distinguish ng idea of that spec es These leading or characteristical (as I may call them) ideas *in the sorts of an mals and vegetables* are (as has been before remarked ch vi § 9 a d ch ix § 15) mostly figure and n inanimate bodies colour and in some both together Now

of our specific ideas and consequently the most observable and invariable part in the definitions of our specific names as attributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge For thou h

to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind perhaps the outward shape is as nec essary to be taken into our complex idea s gni

the name man standing for that sort of creatures

they can be excused from murder who kill mon

discerned in a well formed than ill shaped infant as soon as born And who is it has informed us that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement unless it has just such a sort of frontisp ece or can *join itself to and inform no sort of body* but one

a thousand times better And *the idea of the par*ticular colour of gold is not to be got by any descr ption of it but only by the frequent exerc se of the eyes about t as is ev dent in *those* who are used to this metal who w ll frequently d stinguish true from counterfeit pure from adul t r by the s ght where others (who ha e as

it, no more than the particular yello that be*longs to that metal*

2 *The Ideas f the power f sub tan are b t kno by definition.* But because many f th sim ple ideas that mak p our specifi deas of sub- tances are powers which lie ot obv ous to our senses in th things as they rdinarily appear therefore, in the signification of ur names of sub- stances, som part f th significati n will be be rm d known by enumerating those simpl

the ideas of great u

and sol bility in qua gia will ha a perfecte idea of gold than h can ha e by seeing a p ece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind nly ts bvious qualities. B t if the f rmal constitu on of this shining hea y ductile thing (from

our kn wl dg f corpo eal things lies in our senses. For how p rits, separ t from bodies, (hose knowledg and deas f these things are certainly much more perf t than urs) know them, w ha e no not n, no dea t all. The whole extent of our knowled e imaginatio reaches not beyo d ur own deas limited to ur w y f perception. Though yet t be not to be do bted tha pints of higher rank than those mmersed in flesh may ha as clear deas of th radical con titutu of substances as w ha e of man le, and so per h w all th ir prope ties and perations flow from thence but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds ur co ceptions

24. IV *Ideas f sub tances must als be onform ble to thing* F urthly But, tho gh definitions will serv to explain the names of substances as they tand for our ideas, y t they lea them not w tho t great imperfection as they stand f things. F ur names of substances being not p t barely fo ur ideas, but being mad use of ultimately to represent things, and so are p t in their place, their signiacatio must agree w th the truth f things as well as w th men ideas. And there f re, in substances, w are not alw ys to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly recei ed as th signification of that word, but must go h ti further and inquire into th nature and properties of th things th msel es, and th reby perfect, as m ch as w can, ur ideas of their dis- tinct pecies else learn th m from such as are

used t that sort of things, and are experienced in them. F r s c it is nt nded their names sh uld tand f r such collecti ns of simple d as as d really exist in things th msel es, as well as fo th complex dea in ther men' minds, which n the ordinary c eptat n th y stand f r th ref re to d fin their names right, natural history is t be quired into, and their proper ties are, w th care and examination to be f u d out. F t is not enough, f r the iding incon ni nces in discourse and arguings abo t na tu al bod s d sub t tial th ngs *to ha e* learned, from the propri ty of the language, th common, b t confused r ery imperfect, id a to which each word is ppl ed, and to keep them to that idea in our use of th m b t we must, by acquainting oursel es with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settl our complex id a be l ging t each pecific name and discourse th thers, (if we find them mistak us) we ought to tell what th complex d a is th t w make such name stand f This is the more necessary to be do by all those wh search af ter knowledge and philosophical ent y in that children, being taught words, whilst they ha

ersatio) they are pt to contin e when th y are men and so begin t the wro g nd, learning words first and perfectly but make the notions to which they pply those w rds af erwards ery ov rtly By this means it comes to pass, that men peaking the languag of th ir country e.

truths, and th knowledg of things, as they are to be f und in themsel es, and not in ur imagi nations and t matters not m ch for th improv ment of ur knowled how they are called.

5. *V t asy to b made so* It were theref re to be wished, That men ersed in physical inquiries, and acquainted w th th several sorts of natural bodies, would set d n those impl deas where in they observe the indi iduals of each sort con stantly to gree. This would remedy great deal of that confusion which comes from several per sons pplying the same name to collection f a smaller or greater n mber f sensible qualities, proportionably as they h been more o less equainted w th, ccurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things which com under

one denomination But a dictionary of this sort, containing as it were a natural history requires too many hands as well as too much time cost pains and sagacity ever to be hoped for and till that be done we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances as explain the sense men use them in And it would be well where there is occasion if they would afford us so much This yet is not usually done but men talk to one another and dispute in words whose meaning is not agreed between them out of a mistake that the significations of common words are certainly established and the precise ideas they stand for perfectly known and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them Both which suppositions are false no names of complex ideas having so settled determined significations that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of anything but by the necessary ways of attaining it and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in another man s mind without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound there being no other way without such a declaration certainly to know it Indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words within some tolerable latitude that may serve for ordinary conversation and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common use in a language familiar to him But common use being but a very uncertain rule which reduces itself at last to the ideas of particular men proves often but a very variable standard But though such a Dictionary as I have above mentioned will require too much time cost, and pains to be hoped for in this age yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose that words standing for things which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease and in less time teach the true signification of many terms especially in languages of remote countries or ages and settle truer ideas in men s minds of several things whereof we read the names in ancient authors than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics Naturalists that treat of plants and animals have found the benefit of this way and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason to confess that he has a clearer idea of *apium* or *ibex* from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of *strigil* and *sistrum* if instead of *currycomb* and *cymbal* (which are the English names dictionaries render them by) he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments as they were in use amongst the ancients *Toga tunica pallium* are words easily translated by *gown, coat* and *cloak* but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them Such things as these which the eye distinguishes by their shapes would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them and more determine the signification of such words than any other words set for them or made use of to define them. But this is only by the bye

26 V *Fifth remedy To use the same word constantly in the same sense* Fifthly If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words and definitions of their terms are not to be had yet this is the least that can be expected that, in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another he should use the same word constantly in the same sense If this were done (which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity) many of the books extant might be spared many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end several of those great volumes swollen with ambiguous words now used in one sense and by and by in another would shrink into a very narrow compass and many of the philosophers (to mention no other) as well as poets works might be contained in a nutshell.

27 *When not so used the variation is to be explained* But after all the provision of words is so scanty in respect to that infinite variety of thoughts that

different senses And though in the continuation of a discourse or the pursuit of an argument, there can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition as often as a man varies the signification of any term yet the import of the discourse will for the most part if there be no designed fallacy sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning and show in what sense he there uses that term.

BOOK IV Of Knowledge and Probability

Chap I Of Kn ul dge n General

1 *Our knowl dge nversa t b ut our ideas nly* Since the mind, in all its tho ghts and reasonings, hath no other immediat bject b t its wn ideas, which t al ne does can cont mpl te, t evident that our knowledg is only con ersant about them.

K l d, *is the per pti n f the gr ement or disagr ement f t deas K oul d* then seems to me to be nothing but *the per ptio f the nnexi f and gr ement, or disagr ement nd p g-ancy f any f our ideas* I this al t consists. Where this perception is, there is kn wledg and where t is not, there, tho gh may fan y guess, r believe, yet w alway come short f knowledge. For when w know that white is n t black, what do we else b t perce e, that these tw d as d not gree. When possess ursel es w th the utmos secur ty of th d monstr ti that th three angles of trian l are eq al to tw ght nes, what d we more b t percei that equal ty to two right nes does ecessarily gree to and is inseparable from, the three angles of tri angl

3. *This agr ement or dis gr ement may b y f four sorts* B t to understand littl more distinctly herein this greeme t or disagreeme t consists, I think w may reduce t all to these f ur sorts

I. *Identity diversity*
II *Relation.*
III *Co-existence nece sary connexi n.*
IV *R al xistence*

4. *Of identity or di ersity ideas Fir t* As to the first sort of greement or disagreement, viz. *identity or diversity* It is the firs ct f the mind, when t has any se timents or ideas t all to percei e its ideas and so far as t percei es th m to know each what t is, and thereby also to percei e their difference, and tha ne is not another This is so absol tely ecessary tha w thout t there could be no knowledge, n reasoning no imagination, no distin th ghts t all. By this th mind clearly and infallibly perce es each idea to agree w th tself and to be wha is and all distinct ideas to disagree, e. the not to be the ther and this does w thout pains, labour or deductio but first view by its tural power of perception and distin t n. And tho gh men of art ha reduced this into those gene al rules, *What is is* and *It impossibl for the same thing to be nd ot to be* so ready appl cati n all cases, wherein there may be occasion t reflect n t yet it is ce tain that the first exercise f this f culty is bo t particular deas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has th m in his mind that the deas he calls *wh te* and *und* are the ery deas they ar and that *th y are ot other ideas which he calls d or quar* r can y maxim o proposition in th w ld make him know t clearer or ure than he d d bef re and tho t any ch ge eral r l Th s th s th first greem t or disagree

happen any u ...

to be bout th names, and not th id as th m sel es, whose dentity and d ersity will alw ys be perce d as soo and cl arly as the deas themsel es are n can t possibly be therwise.

5. *Of b t act la ions b t en d as S nly* the

...

la io between any two ideas, of what kind soever wh ther substances, modes, any ther For since ll distinct deas must ternally be known *t to be the same* and so be uni ersally and constantly denied e of an ther there could be no room f r any positi e kn wledg t all if w could n t percei any rel ti betw en ur ideas, and find o t the greement disagreeme t they ha e n w th an ther in several ways the mind takes of comparing th m.

6 *Of th y st nc substances Thirdly* The third sort f agreement or disagree ment to be f und in our ideas, which th perception of th mind is mployed bout, is *co-existence* or *no -co-existenc* in th *ame subj t* and this be lo gs particularly to substances. Thus when w pro u ce concerning gold, that t is fixed, our knowledg of this truth amou ts to no more but this, that fixedness, or power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an id a that always accompanies and is j ined w th that particular sort of

Cf Lock F Letter t S illingfleet, p. 83 also *Third Letter* pp 45 47
Cf. ch. xi §§ 3 4.
Cf. Bk. II h. xxi, § 5.

... enc greeing to any dea.
W thin these four sorts of agreement or dis-
Cf. chh. ii, viii.

agreement is I suppose contained all the knowledge we have or are capable of For all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them is That it is or is not the same with some other that it does or does not always co exist with some other idea in the same subject that it has this or that relation with some other idea or that it has a real existence without the mind Thus blue is not yellow is of identity Two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal is of relation Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions is of co-existence God is is of real existence [1] Though identity and co existence are truly nothing but relations yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads and not under relation in general since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation as will easily appear to any one who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this *Essay*

I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge but that it is necessary first to consider the different acceptations of the word *k wled e*

8 *Knowled e is either ctual or habitual* There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of

agreement of any of its ideas or of the relation they have one to another

II A man is said to know any propos tion which having been once laid before h s thoughts he evidently percei ed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists and so lodged it in his memory that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on he without doubt or hesitation embraces the right s de assents to and is certain of the truth of it. This I think one may call *habitual knowledge* And thus a man may be sa d to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory by a foregoing clear and full per eption whereof the mind is assured past doubt

if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on they would all be very ignorant and he that knew most would know but one truth that being all he was able to think on at one time [2]

9 *Habitual knowled e is of two degrees* Of habitual knowledge there are also vulgarly speaking two degrees

First The one is of such truths laid up in the

an intuitive knowledge here the ideas themselves by an immediate view discover their agreement or disagreement one with another

Secondly The other is of such truths whereof the mind having been convinced it *retains the memory of the conviction without the proofs* [4] Thus, a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to t o right ones is certain that he knows it because he cannot doubt the truth of it In his adherence to a truth here the demonstration by which it was at first kno n is forgot though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to kno and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief for that relies on the testimony of another —yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty and is in effect true knowledge That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived as it was at first by an ac

position hose certainty we remember For example in this proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two r ght ones, one ho has seen and clearly percei ed the demonstration of this truth kno s it to be true when that demonstration is gone out of his m nd so that at present it is not actually in ew and possibly cannot be recollected but he kno s it in a different way from hat he d d before The agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first p oduced that perception He remembers i e he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of this proposit on that the three angles of a triangle are equal to t o right ones Tl e immutability of the same relations bet een the same

[1] Cf ch v
[2] Cf Bk. II chh x. §§ 8 9 xxvii. § 10.
[3] Cf Bk II ch
[4] Cf cl xvi. § 2

mm tabl thingsisn w th dea th tsh him, that if th three angles of triangle w nce eq al to two right nes, th y will alway be equal t n right es. And hence h comes to be cer tain, that what was c tru in th case, is al w ys tru what ideas ce greed will al ys gree and consequently what h nce knew to be true, h will al ys know t be true as l g as h can remember that h ce knew t. Upo this ground t is, that particular demonstrati ns

knowledg of general p position m t f o m them t al d m tr tion w uld be any ther tha particular and hen man had demonstr ed any proposition concer in triangle r circl his knowledge w uld not ach bey d that particular di gram. If h would extend t further h must r new his d m nstrati in an th instance, bef re h could know t to be true in an ther lik trian le, and so by which means could never come to th knowledg f any general proposit ns. Nobody I think, can deny that Mr Newt n cer tainl know an propositi that h w t any time reads in his book t be tru though h has t in a tual e that dmirabl chain of inter media id as wh reby h t first disco ered t to be true. S ch memory as th t, bl to retai such trai f particulars, may be ell th ght bey nd th reach f human f culties, wh th ry discov ry percepti n, and laying together th w derf l connexi f d as, is f u d t urpass m t readers compreh nsi n. B t y t t is evid th th himself know th proposi ti to be tru remembering h ce saw th con exi f th se d as as certainly as h know ch ma wo ded an ther emembern that h saw him run him throu h. B because the memory t alw y so clear as tual percep t n, and does all men more less decay in length of time this, amo gst ther differe ces, is ne which sh th t *demo at* knowledge is m ch more imperfect than *intuit* as w shall see in th f ll wing chapter

Chap II *Of the D gr f our k owledge*

Of the degr d fferent l arne f our knowl dg I *I tu* All our knowledg consist ing as I ha said, in th ew th mind has of ts own deas, wh ch is th tmost light and great es certainty we, w th our f culties, and in our

think w may call *intuit knowl* r in this the mind is at pains of proving r examining but percei es the truth as the eye d th light, nly by being directed tov ards t Thus th mind per cei es that *white* is n t *black* that c d is ot a *triangle* that t are more than *tw* and equal t *nd t* Such kinds of truths the mind per cei es t th first sight of the d as together by bare intu ti w thout the interve ti n f any th r de a d this k d f kno ledg is the cl arest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledg is irresistible and, lik bright sunshine f rces tself immedi

finds to be so gre t, th t he cann t imagi and theref re t require greater f man can ot conce himself capabl of a greater certainty than t kn w that any id a in his mind is such as he percei es t to be and that tw id as, where in h percei es diff rence, are different and t precisely th same. H th t demands gre ter certainty than this, demand h kn ws n t what, and sh ws nly that he has mind t be sceptic, tho t being bl t be so Certainty d pends so wholly on this intu t th t, th next d gree of kn wledg hich I call d monstrati e, this intuitio is necessary in all th co exi s of th intermediat deas, w th ut hich w can n t ttain kn wledge and certainty

II *Dem nstr t* Th t degree of kn wl edge is, where the mi d percei es th greement disagreement of any id as, but not immed t ly Th h wherever th mind percei es the greement disagreement of y of ts deas, there be certa kn ledg y t t does not al w y happe that th mind sees that greement disagreement, which there is betv een them, even where t is disco rabl and in that case remains n gnorance, and at most gets no fur

Newt n, *Principia*. Cf. Epistl to th Reader
Cf. Bk. II h x § 9.

Cf. I trod. § 5 Bk. IV ch. iii. § o.
Cf. Bk. II. ch i. §

ther than a probable conjecture The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is be cause those ideas concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it In this case then when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison and as it were juxta position or application one to another to perceive their agreement or disagree ment it is fain *by the intervention of other ideas* (one or more as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches and this is that which we call *reaso in* Thus the mind be ing willing to know the agreement or disagree-ment in bigness betv een the three angles of a tri angle and two right ones cannot by an immedi ate view and comparing them do it because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two angles and so of this the mind has no im mediate no intuitive knowledge In this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality and finding those equal to two right ones comes to know their equality to two right ones

3 *Demonstratio d pends on cl rly perceived proofs* Those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement of any two others are called *p o fs* and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived it is called *demonstration* it being *shown* to the un derstand ng and the m nd made to see that it is so A quickness in the mind to find out these in

s g city

4 *As certai but not so easy nd re dy as intuitive knowledge* This knowledge by intervening proofs though it be certain yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready as in intuit ve knowledge For though in demonstration the mind does at last perceive the ag eement or disag eement of the ideas it con siders yet it is not without pains and attention there must be more than one transient vie v to find it. A steady application and pursuit are re quired to this discovery and there must be a progression by steps and degrees before the m nd can in this way arrive at certainty and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs and the use of eason to show it.

5 *The demonstrated conclusi n not without doubt precedent to the demonstration* Another difference be tween intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed when by the intervention of the intermed ate ideas the agreement or disagreement is per ceived yet before the demonstration there was a doubt which in intuitive knowledge cannot hap-pen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can dis tinctly see white and black) Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour If there be si ht in the eyes it will at first glimpse without hesita tion perceive the v ords printed on this paper d fferent from the colour of the paper and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive kno ledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seein or the mind of perceiving we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one or clearness of percep-tion in the other

6 *N t so clear as intuitive k owledge* It is tru the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that al ways accompany that which I call intuitive like a face reflected by several mirrors one to another where as long as it retains the similitude a d agreement with the object it produces a kno l edge but it is still in every successive reflection with a lessening of that perfect clearness and dis-tinctness which is in the first till at last after many removes it has a great mixture of dimness, and is not at first sight so knowable especially to weak eyes Thus it is v ith knowledge made out by a long tra n of proof

7 *E ch step in demonstrat d knowledge must have i tu ti e id nce* Now in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge there is an intui tive knowledge of that agreement or disagree ment it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof for if it e e not so that yet v ould need a proof since v ithout the per

ceived by itself there is need of some interven ing idea as a common measure to show their agreement or disagreement. By v hich t is plain that every step in reasoning that produces kno l edge has intuit e certainty v h ch hen the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make th agreement or disagree ment of the ideas concerning v h ch v e inquire visible and certain So that to make anything a

demonstration, tis necessary to percei the immediat gre ment of th intervening d as, whereby the agreement disagreement of the two id as under examination (whereof the ne is al ays the first, and th other the last in the account) is found. This intuiti e perception of the greement or disagreement of th intermedi te deas, in each t p and progressio of th demonstration, must also be carried exa tly in the mind, and man must be sure that no part is left out, which, because in long ded tions, and th use of many proofs, th memory does not al w y so readily and exactly retain therefore t comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuiti knowledge, and men emb often falsehood for d monstrati ns.

8. *Hence the mi take* ex p æcognitus, et præcocessis. The necessity of this intuiti e knowledge, in each step of scientifical or demonstrati rea soning ga occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken axiom, That all reasoning was *pr gnitis t præconcessis* which, h w far t is mistake, I shall ha e occasion t show more t large, wh n I come to consider propositions, and particularly those propositions which are called maxims, and to show that t is by mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledg and reasonin s.

9. *Demonstration not limited to ideas f mathemati al qua t ty* It has be n generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone ar capabl of demonstr ti ertainty b t to ha such an greement or disagreement as may intuiti ely be perceived, being, as I ima ine, not the pri ilege of the d as of umbe extens n, and figure al ne, may possibly be th want of d e method and pplication in us, and n t of sufficient ev dence in things, that d monstrat n has been thought to ha e so little to d in ther parts of knowledge, and been scarce so m ch as aimed t by any but mathematicians. Fo whatever ideas we ha e wherein the mind can percei the immediate greement or disa reeme t h he

— ex ension, figure, number and their modes.

0. *Why it has b en thought t be so limit d.* The reason why t has been generally sought for and supposed to be only in those, I imagin has been, not nly the general usefulness of those sciences. Cf. ch. vii.

but because, in comparing their equality or excess, th modes of umbers ha e every the least diff re ry clea nd pe c able nd though in extensio every th least excess is not so percept ble, yet the mind has fou d o t w ys to examine, and discover demonstrati ely the just equality of two angles, or extensi ns, or fi ures and both these, i.e. umbers and figures, can be set d wn by isible and lasting marks, wherein the deas under consideration are perfectly d t rmined wh ch for the most part they are not, where they are marked nly by names and words.

Mode f qual ty not demonstrable like modes f quantity B t in other simpl ideas, whose modes and differe ces are made and counted by degrees, and t quant ty we ha not so nice and c curat distinctio of their differences as t pe cei e, or find w ys t measure, their just equal ty the least differences. For those other simpl ideas, being ppearances of sensations prod ced in us, by th size, figure, number and motio of min te corpuscles sin ly insensibl their different degrees also d pend pon the ariation of some of all those causes which, sin e t cann t be bserved by us, particles of matter whereof each is too subtil to be percei ed, t is impossibl for us t ha e any exact measures of the different de rees of these imple ideas. Fo supposing the sensation or idea we name hiteness be prod ced in us by a certain number of globules, which, ha ing a erticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the ye, w th certain degree of rotation, as well as progressiv swiftness t will hence asily follow that th more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered as t reflect the greater number of gl bules of li ht, and to gi e them the proper rota tion, which is fit to prod ce this sensat of whit in us, th more whit will that body ppear that from an equal pace sends t the retina the greater number f such corpuscles, w th that peculiar sort of motion. I d n t say that the nature of light consists in ery small round globules nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts as gi es a certain rotatio to these globules when t reflects them f I am n t now treating physi ally of light or colours. But this I think I may say that I cannot (and I would be glad any n w uld make int lligibl that h did) co cei e how bodies w thout us can any w ys affect our senses, but by th immediat co tact of th sensibl bodies themsel es, as in tasting and feeling or th impulse f some sensibl particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling by th different impulse of which parts, caused by their

ther than a probable conjecture The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is be cause those ideas concerning whose agreement

together as by their immediate comparison and

or more as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches and this is that which we call *reasonin* Thus the mind be ing willing to know the agreement or disagree

three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two angles and so of this the mind has no im mediate no intuitive knowledge In this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality and finding those equal to two right ones comes to know their equality to tv o right ones

3 *Demonstration dep nds on clearly perceived proofs* Those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement of any two others are called *proofs* and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived it is called *demonstration* it being *shown* to the un derstanding and the mind made to see that it is so A quickness in the mind to find out these in termediate ideas (that shall discover the agree ment or disagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is I suppose that which is called *sa city*

4 *As certain but not so asy and re dy as intuitive knowled_e* This knowledge by intervening proofs though it be certain yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so

siders yet it is not w thout pains and attention there must be more than one transient v ew to find it. A steady appl cation and pursuit are re quired to this d scovery and there must be a progression by steps and degrees before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy bet veen two ideas that need proofs and the use of reason to show it.

5 *The demonstrated conclusion not without d ubt precedent to the dem nstration* Another d fference be tween intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement or disagreement is per ceived *yet before the demonstration there was a* doubt which in intuitive knowledge cannot hap pen to the mind that has its faculty of percept on *left to a degree capable of distinct ideas no more* than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can dis tinctly see white and black) Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour If there be i ht in the eyes it will at first glimpse v ithout hesita tion perceive the v ords printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive kno ledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing or the mind of perce ving we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one or clearness of percep tion in the other

6 *Not s cle r as intuitive knowledge* It is tru the percept on produced by demonstration is also

a fac reflected by se eral mirrors one to another

with a lessening of that perfect clearness and dis

n hich is in the first till at last after

by a long train of proof

7 *Each st p in d monstrated knowledge must ha e intuitive evidence* Now in every step reason makes in demonstrati e knov ledge there is an intu tive knov ledge of that ag eement or disagree ment it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof for if it ere not so t at yet v ould need a proof since v ithout the per ception of such ag eement or disagreement there is no kno vledge produced if it be percei ed by itself it is ntuit e kno ledge if t cannot be per ceived by tself there is need of some interv en ing idea, as a common measure, to sho v the r agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain that e ery step in reasoning that produces kno l edge has intuitive certa nty h ch hen the mind percei es, there is no more required but to remember it, to make th agreement or disagree ment of the ideas concern ng which v e inquire visible and certain So that to make anything a

reement, and so have but very obscure knowledge of it. But ideas which, by reason of their obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct knowledge: because, as far as any ideas are confused, so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood, he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make propositions of them of whose truth he can be certain.

Chap III Of the Extent of Human Knowledge

1 *Extent of our knowledge* Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence That,

It extends no further than we have ideas. First, we can have knowledge no further than we have ideas.

2 *It extends no further than we can perceive their agreement or disagreement* Secondly That we can have no knowledge further than we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas; or 2. By reason, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of some others; or 3. By sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things: hence it also follows:

3. *Intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the relations of all our ideas* Thirdly That we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend itself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by juxtaposition, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus, having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or rational knowledge.

4. *Nor demonstrative knowledge* Fourthly, It follows, also, from what is above observed, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas: because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.

5. *Sensitive knowledge narrower than either* Fifthly, Sensitive knowledge reaching no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former

Cf. Locke's *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet, pp. 7 2, 5 8.

own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received from some few and not very acute ways of perception, such as are our senses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a square, a circle and equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some

Cf. ch. xi. § 9.

Cf. ch. ... § 8.

different size figure and motion the variety of sensations is produced in us

12 *Particles of light and simple ideas of colour* Whether then they be globules or no or whether they have a verticity about their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us this is cer

motion is —the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are reflected as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sun beams in the shade and in a dark hole in each of which it will produce in us the idea of whiteness in far different degrees

13 *The secondary qualities of things not discovered by demonstration* Not knowing therefore what number of particles nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness we cannot *demonstrate* the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness because we have no certain standard to measure them by nor means to distinguish every the least real difference the only help we have being from our senses which in this point fail us But where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas whose differences can be pe fectly retained there these ideas or colours as v e see in different kinds as blue and red are as capable of demonstration as ideas of number and extension What I have here said of whiteness and colours I think holds true in all secondary qualities and their modes

14 *Sensitive knowledge of the pa ticular existence of finite beings without us* These two viz intuit on and demonstration are the degrees of our *k owl edge* whatever comes short of one of these with what assurance soeve embraced is but *faith* or *opinion* but not knowledge at least in all general ... There is indeed another perception of

e ther of the foregoing degrees of ce ta nty pas es under the name of *k owledge* There can be nothing more ce ta n than that the idea e e ceive from an external object is n our minds this is intuitive knov ledge But whether there be anything more than barely that dea in our minds v hether v e can thence certainly infer the exist ... th ng without us which corresponds

exists no such object affects their senses ...

[1] Cf ch xi.

here I think we are provided v ith an evidence that puts us past doubting For I ask any one Whether he be not invincibly conscious to him self of a different perception v hen he looks on the sun by day and thinks on it by n ght v hen [1] ... lly tastes worm ood or smells a rose

as we do between any two distinct ideas If any one say a dream may do the same thing and all these ideas may be produced in us v ithout any external objects he may please to dream that I make him this answer —1 That it is no great matter whether I remove his scruple or no where all is but dream reasoning and arguments are ... ruth and knowledge nothing 2 That

I answer That we certainly finding tha ... ure or pain follo s upon the appl cat on of certain objects to us whose existence v e percei e or dream that we perce ve by our senses this certainty is as great as our happ ness or misery beyond ... have no concernment to know or to I
forme
ence ...
ception and consciousness we have of the act ... entrance of ideas from them and allo v these three d grees of knov ledge viz *intuitive demonstrative* and *sensiti e* in each of which there are different degrees and ways of e idence and certainty

15 *Knowledge ot always clea whe e the ideas that enter into it a e cle r* But s nce our kno ledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only v ill it not follow from thence that it is conf rmable to ou ideas and that here our deas are clear and d st nct or obscure and confused our kno vledge will be so too? To which I ans er No for our kno ledge cons sting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any t o ideas its clearness or obscur ty consists n the clearness or obscur ty of that percept on and not in the clearness or obscurity of the deas them selves v g a man that has as clear deas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to t o right ones as any mathemat cian in the world may yet have but a very obscure perception of their

ty on one side of the question but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what safety what advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountable rubs, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehension. It is past controversy that we have in us *something* that thinks our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what *kind* of being it is. and it is in vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of anything because we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not something in it which manifestly baffles our understandings. Other spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which, if we add larger comprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the connexion and agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies them the intermediate proofs, which

another we may guess at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge.

But to return to the argument in hand our knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too but how far it reaches, let us now inquire.

How far our knowledge reaches The affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts, viz. identity co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these

8. *Our knowledge of identity and diversity in ideas extends as far as our ideas themselves* First, as to identity and diversity In this way of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves. and there can be no idea in the mind, which it does not presently by an intuitive knowledge, perceive it to be what it is, and to be different from any other

9. *Of that co-existence extends only very little way* Secondly as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in *co-existence* in this our knowledge is very short though in this consists the greatest and *most material part* of our knowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species of substances being, as I have showed nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject, and so co-existing together e.g. our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow malleable, and fusible. for these, or some such complex ideas as these, in men's minds, do these two names of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for When we would know anything further concerning these, or any other sort of substances, what do we inquire, but what *other* qualities or powers these substances have or have not. Which is nothing else but to know what *other* simple ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea.

10. *Because the connexion between most simple ideas in substances is for the most part unknown.* This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science, is yet very narrow and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are, *for the most part*, such as carry with them, in their own nature, no *visible necessary* connexion or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.

Especially of the secondary qualities of bodies The ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about which our knowledge

we should know which have a *necessary* union or inconsistency one with another For not knowing the root they spring from, not knowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those qualities which make our complex idea of gold, it is impossible we should know what *other* qualities result from, or are incompatible with, the same

Cf. Bk. II ch. x. § 9.
Cf. ch. ii. §§ 2–3.

On the ideas of identity and diversity cf. Bk. II. ch. xxvii. § also Bk. IV. ch. i. § 4.
Cf. Bk. II ch. xxiii. Bk. III. ch. vi.
Cf. Bk. II ch. viii. etc.

systems of matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance it being in respect of our notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to matter *a faculty of thinking* than that he should superadd to it *another substance with a faculty of thinking* since we know not wherein thinking consists nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which cannot be in any created being but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator

Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know For[1] I see no contradiction in it that the first Eternal thinking Being or Omnipotent Spirit should if he pleased give to certain systems of created senseless matter put together as he thinks fit some degrees of sense

dently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first thinking Being What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions such as v g pleasure and pain should not be in some bodies themselves after a certain manner modified and moved as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body Body as far as we can conceive being able only to strike and affect body and motion according to the utmost reach of our ideas being able to produce nothing but motion so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain or the idea of a colour or sound we are fain to quit our reason go beyond our ideas and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker For since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I say not this that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul s immateriality I am not here speaking of probability but knowledge and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially where we want that evidence that can produce

knowledge but also that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach for the state we are at present in not being that of vision we must in many things content ourselves with faith and probability and in the present question about the Immateriality of the Soul if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty we need not think it strange All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proofs of the soul s immateriality since it is evident that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here sensible intelligent beings and for several years continued us in such a state can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men according to their doings in this life And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other as some over zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul have been forward to make the world believe Who either on the one side indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter can allow no existence to what is not material or who on the other side finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind have the confidence to conclude —That Omnipotency itself cannot give percep-

to extended matter or existence to anything that has no extension at all will confess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge and he who will give himself leave to consider freely and look into the

on which side soever he views it either as an *unextended substance* or as a *thinking extended matter* the difficulty to conceive either will whilst either alone is in his thoughts still drive him to the contrary side An unfair way which some men take with themselves who because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding This serves not only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments which drawn from our own views may satisfy us that we can find no certain

Cf Locke s *First Letter* to Stillingfleet p 67
Cf Bk. II ch xxiii. § 5
Cf ch x.
Cf Locke s *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet pp 398–403

Cf Bk II ch xxiii. §§ 15–32

urs at the same time? To which I answer, that these bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different colours: but I take the liberty also to say, to eyes differently placed it is different parts of the object that reflect the particles of light; and therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time.

6 *Our knowledge of the co-existence of powers in bodies extends but very little way.* But as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt as to these, whether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be certain that they are in any subject, by the connexion with any of those ideas which to us make its essence. Because the active and passive powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover; it is but in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to, any of those ideas which make our complex one of that sort of things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication of those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and co-existence of the powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that, whichever hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,) our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and powers of bodies have a *necessary* connexion or repugnancy one with another; which in the present state of philosophy I think we know but to a very small degree: and I doubt whether with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not particular experience) in this part much further. Experience is that which in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished that it were more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others, especially the philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their observations, and sincere in their reports as those who call themselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater.

7 *Of the powers that co-exist in spirits yet narrower.* If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transient hint in another place[3] I have offered to my reader's consideration.

8. *Of knowledge of other relations between abstract ideas, it is not easy to say how far our knowledge extends. Thirdly.* As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation: this, as it is the largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend: because the advances that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that may show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is not considered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of for the finding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what further improvements and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the *ideas of quantity* are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful, parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours.

Cf. Bk. II. ch. viii. §§ 3–6.
Cf. Bk. III. ch. xvi.
Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. §§ 2–5.

Cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. III. 34.
[3]Cf. Bk. II. chh. x. § 9, xxiii. § 3.

constitution of the insensible parts of gold and so consequently must always co exist with that complex idea we have of it or else are inconsistent with i

12 *Because necessary connexion between any secondary and the primary qualities is undiscoverable by us* Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies on which depend all their secondary qualities there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co existence or *inco existence* (if I may so say) of different ideas in the same subject and that is that there is no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those primary qualities which it depends on [1]

13 *We have no perfect knowledge of their primary qualities* That the size figure and motion of one body should cause a change in the size figure and motion of another body is not beyond our conception the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another and the change from rest to motion upon impulse these and the like seem to have *some connext n* one with another And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies we might have reason to hope we m ght be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another but our minds not being able to discover any connex on betwixt these primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced in us by them we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the *c nsequence* or *co-existence* of any secondary qualities though we could d scover the size figure or motion of those invisible parts which immediately *produce them We are so far from knowing what* figure size or mot on of parts produce a yellow colour a sweet taste or a sharp sound that we can by no means conce ve how *any* size figure or motion of any part cles can poss bly produce in us the idea of any colour taste or sound whatsoever there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other

14 *And seek in inf c rtain and un iers l knowl ed e f u p c ited qualities in substances* In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (the only true way of certa n and universal knowledge)[2] what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of *our* complex idea of any substance s nce we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend nor did we know them could we discover any necessary connexion between them and any of the secondary qualities which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their necessary co existence So that, let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will we can hardly from the simple ideas contained in it certainly determine the necessary co existence of any other quality whatsoever Our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further than our experience. Indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible connexion one with another as figure necessarily supposes extension receiving or communicating motion by impulse supposes solidity But though these and perhaps some others of our ideas have yet there are so few of them that have a visible connexion one with another that we can by intuition or demonstration discover the co existence of very few of the qualities that are to be found united in substances and we are left only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us what qualities they contain For of all the qualities that are co existent in any subject without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one with another we cannot know certainly any t o to co exist any further than experience by our senses informs us Thus though we see the yellow colour and upon trial find the we ght mal

connexion with the other we cannot certainly know that where any four of these are the fifth

by the observation of our senses or in general by the necessary connex on of the ideas themsel es

15 *Of ep n ncy to co-exist o k oul dge is larger* As to the incompat b lity or repugnancy to co-existence we may know that any subject may have of each so t of primary qualit es but one part cular at once v g each particular extension figure number of parts motion excludes all other of each k nd The like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense for what ever of each kind is p esent in any subject excludes all other of that sort v g no one subj ct can have two smells or two colours at the same time To this pe haps ill be sa d Has not an opal or the infus on of *lig um nephr t cum* two col

[1] Cf. Bacon *N um O g um* II 13– 6

Cf Hume s *Enq y C nc g Hum Understand g* Sect iv also Sect vii

Cf Hume *Enqu y C ncern H man Underst nd g* S t v

or disagreement, and the resol ti n of the questio be nothing but th result of the whole made p of such particulars, whereof th mind has a (h t sett g d wn th

t

t would be almost imposs bl t carry so many different ideas in the mind thout conf und in l ting slip som parts of th reck ning and thereby making all ur reaso ings bout it useless. I which case th cyphers or marks help not the mind t all to perce e th greem t f any tw more umbers, their equalit es or proportions that th mind has nly by intu ti n f its own ideas of the umbers themsel es. But the umerical characters are help t the m m ry t record and retain th several deas bout which the demonstr tio is made, wh reby man may kn w how far his intuit e kn wledg in survey ing several f th particulars has proceeded that so he may w thout confus g to what is y t unknown and t last ha e in e before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.

20 *Remedie f ur d fficultie deal demonst t ely th moral ideas* O part of these disad an tages in moral ideas which has mad th m be thought t capabl of demonstration may in a good measure be remed ed by d finiti ns, set ting down th t collect f simpl ideas, hich ev ry term shall tand f and then using th rms t dily and constantly f th t precise collecti n. And what methods l bra, something f that kind may hereaf er suggest, t re mo th ther difficult es, t is not easy t for tell. Confide t I am, that, if men w uld in the same method, and with th sam indifferency search af er mo al as they d mathematical truths, they w uld find them ha tro g connexi n ne w th another and more ecessary consequence from ur clear and distinct ideas, and to come earer perfec d monstrati than is commonly imagined But m ch f this is t t be expec ed, whils th desire f esteem, riches, or pow makes me espouse th well-e d wed pinions in fash n, and th seek argum nts ther mak good their bea ty arnish over and co their def rmity N thin being so bea iful to th ey as truth is to th mind thing so deformed and irreco cilabl t the understand g as lie For tho gh many man can w th sa isfa ough w no ery handsom wif his bosom y who is bold gh penly to ow tha b has espoused falsehood, and re-

Cf. Bk. III ch xi. §§ 5 8.

th breath power of man wi olly t exti guis

21 *Of the thr al xi tences f uk ch u ha er tain knowledg* F urthly As to the f urth so t of our kn wledge iz of th *al actual xisten f things* we ha n intu t e kn wledge of *ir ex ex tence* and a d m nstrati e knowledg f th existence of a *God* of the existence f *anyth g lse* we h no other but sensiti e knowledge which extend not beyo d the bjects p esent t our senses.

Our no nce gr t Our kn wledg being so narrow as I ha e sh wn, t will perhaps gi e us some l ght int th present stat f ur minds if we look littl into the dark side and take ew of *our gnoran* wh ch, being infin tely larger than ur knowledge may serve much t th qu ti g f disputes and mpro ement f useful knowledg if discovering how far we h e clear and distinct deas, w confine ur th ughts w th in th co t mpl ti f those things th t are w thin the rea h f our u derstandings and launch n t tint that byss of darkness, (where

of the f lly of uch co ceit, w eed t g far H that kn w anythi g kn ws this, in th first place, that h need n t seek l g f instances f

thinking m find themsel es puzzl d and t loss in every partic of matter W shall th less wo der t find t so when we consider th *use*

Cf. I trod, § 5 Bk. IV ch. ii. § 1
Cf. Bk. III ch. xi. §§ 6 7 Bk. IV ch xii.

Cf. I trod. §§ 5–7

Morality capable of demonstration The idea of a supreme Being infinite in power goodness and wisdom whose workmanship we are and on whom we depend and the idea of ourselves as understanding rational creatures being such as are clear in us would I suppose if duly considered and pursued afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place *morality* amongst the *sciences capable of demonstration* [1] wherein I doubt not but from self evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestible as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences The *relation* of other *modes* may certainly be perceived as well as those of number and extension and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstration if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement Where there is no property there is no injustice is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid for the idea of property being a right to any thing and the idea to which the name injustice is given being the invasion or violation of that right it is evident that these ideas being thus established and these names annexed to them I can as certainly know this proposition to be true

which require conformity to them and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do what ever he pleases I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics.

19 *Two things have made moral ideas to be thought incapable of demonstration their unfitness for sensible representation and their complexedness* That which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration is

First That they can be set down and represented by sensible marks which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds whatsoever Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification An angle circle or square drawn in lines lies open to the view and cannot be mistaken it remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered and examined and the demonstration be revised and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once without any danger of the least change in the ideas. This can not be thus done in moral ideas we have no sensible marks that resemble them whereby we can set them down we have nothing but words to express them by which though when written they remain the same yet the ideas they stand for may change in the same man and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons [2]

Secondly Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is That moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematics From whence these two inconveniences follow —First, that their names are of more uncertain signification the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in communication always and in thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same idea [2] Upon which the same disorder confusion and error follow as would if a man going to demonstrate something of an heptagon should in the diagram he took to do it leave out one of the angles or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than the name ordinarily imported or he intended it

name being retained one angle i e. one simple idea is left out or put in the complex one (still called by the same name) more at one time than another Secondly From the complexedness of these moral ideas there follows another inconvenience viz that the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the habitudes and correspondences agreements or disagreements of several of them one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions and the intervention of several other complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones.

The great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts is very apparent and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by step to examine their several correspondences. And though in casting up a long sum either in addition multiplication or division every part be only a progression of the mind taking a view of its own ideas and considering their agreement

[1] Cf Bk III ch xi § 16

[2] Cf Bk III chh v ix §§ 6 7 x §§ 15 18.

or disagreement, and the resol tion of th ques tion be nothing but the result of th whole, made p of such particulars, whereof the mind has clear percepti) t, w thout setting down the several parts by marks, whose precise sign fica tions are known, and by marks that last, and re main in iew when th memory had l t them go, t would be almost imposs bl to carry so many different ideas in the mind thout conf und in, or letting slip some parts of the recko ing and thereby making all ur reasonings bout t useless. I which case th cyphers or marks help not the mind t all t percei the reement of any two o more umbers, th ir equalit es o proportions that the mind has nly by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themsel es. B t th numerical characters are helps t the memory t record and retain th several ideas bout which the demonstratio is made, whereby man may know how far his intuit e kn wledge in survey ing several of th particulars has proceeded that so he may w thout confusio go n t what is y t unknown and t last ha in o w before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.

o. *Rem die f our d fficult deal n, demonstr tively th moral ideas* O part of these disad antages in moral ideas which has mad them be hm h t capabl of d monstratio may in

collection. And what methods alg bra, or some hin of tha kind may hereafter suggest, t re mov th ther difficulties, t is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that, if men w uld in th same method, and w th th sam indifferency search after moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them ha tro g connexio on w th another and more necessary conse que ce from ur clear and distinct ideas, and to me earer perfec demonstratio than is com monly imagined. Bu much of this is t be expected, whilst the desire of es eem, riches, power makes men espouse th ell-e d wed

deformed and irreco cilabl to the understand ing as li For though many man can w th satisfac io nough own no ery handsom wif in his bosom ye who is bold en gh penly t ow tha he has espoused falsehood, and re-

Cf. Bk. III ch. xi. §§ 5 8.

ce ed int his breast so ugly a thing as a li ? Whilst th parties of men cr m th ir t nets do n all men s throats whom they can get into their power w thout permitting them to exami e th ir truth o falsehood and will n t let truth ha e fair play n the wo ld, no men th liberty to search after t what impro ements can be expe ted f this kind What greater light can be hoped f r in th moral sciences. The subject part of man kind in most places might, instead thereof th Egyptian bo d ge, expect Egyptian darkn ss, were t the candl of the Lord set up by him self in men s minds, which t is imposs bl f r th breath or power of man wh lly t exti guish.

21 *Of the th al xi tence f which we ha e tain knowl dg Fourthly* As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, iz. f th *al actual xi tence* f our knowledge of *our o thing* w ha intuiti kn wledge of *our o existence* and a d monstrat e knowledge of th existence of a *God* of the existence of *anythir else* we ha ther but sensiti e knowledge which ext ds t beyo d th objects prese t to our senses.

2 *Our norance gr at* Our kn wledge being so narrow as I ha shown, t will perhaps g e us some l ght int th present tate of our minds if w look little into the dark side, and take ew of *ur gnorance* which, being infinitely larger than ur kn wledg may serv m ch to the qu ting f disputes, and impro em t of us f l kn wledg if, disco ering how far we ha e clear and distinct ideas, we confin our th ughts w th in th co templ ti f thos thing that are w thin the reach of ur understandings, and launch t ut int that byss of darkness, (where w ha e n t yes t see n faculties to perce e anything) out of a presumpti n that n thi g is beyo d ur comprehension. But to be satisfied of th f lly f such a conceit, w ceed n t g far H that knows anything, kn ws this, in th first place, that h need n t seek l g f r instances of his gn an e. The meanest and most bvious things that com in our w y ha e dark sides, that th qu ckest sight cannot pe trat int The cl arest and m t enlarged u derstanding f thinkin men find th msel es puzzled and t a loss in every particle of matter W shall th less wo der to find t so, when w consider th *cause*

Cf. Introd. § 5 Bk. IV ch. ii. §
Cf. Bk. III ch. xi. §§ 6 7 Bk. IV ch. xii.

Cf. Introd. §§ 5-7

of our ignorance which from what has been said I suppose will be found to be these three —

Its causes First Want of ideas

Secondly Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have

Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our ideas

23 *One cause of our ignorance want of ideas First* There are some things and those not a few that we are ignorant of for want of ideas

I *Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the universe may have* First all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine But to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as sight and colours because he had no manner of idea of any such thing nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing The ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle He that will consider the infinite power wisdom and goodness of the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable mean and impotent a creature as he will find man to be who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings What faculties, therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours we know not This we know and certainly find that we want several other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of substance itself which is the foundation of all

I may confidently say of it That the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest.

24 *Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having but have not because of their remoteness* Secondly Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we have of which we know nothing so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in igno-

these primary qualities of bodies in general yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure and motion of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe we are ignorant of the several powers efficacies and ways of operation whereby the effects which we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too remote and in others by being too minute When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings how far they are extended what is their motion and how continued or communicated and what influence they have one upon another are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations and confine our thoughts to this little canton—I mean this system of our sun and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it What several sorts of vegetables animals and intellectual corporeal beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which even of their outward figures and parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this earth there being no natural means either by sensation or reflection to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess much less have clear and distinct ideas of them.

Cf Bk II ch xxi Bk III ch

25. *Because of their minuteness* If a great, nay far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These insensible corpuscles, being the active parts of matter and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch, whereby it performs its operations, and of a file, which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels we should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man sleep as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed or that, some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver in *aqua fortis*, and gold in *aqua regia*, and not *vice versa*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a smith to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another But whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials we make are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.

26. *Hence no science of bodies within our reach.* And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scientifical will still be out of our reach because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have but adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet whilst we want the latter we are not capable of scientifical knowledge nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. *Certainty* and *demonstration* are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour figure, taste, and smell, and other sensi b s wh r s clear and distinct ideas

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we so much as guess, much less know their manner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions.

Much less science of unembodied spirits This at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings to which if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity almost the whole intellectual world a greater certainly and more beautiful world than the material. For bating some very few and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the eternal independent Author of them, and us, and all things, we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself,

Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, the opening aphorisms of Bk. II.

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¹ Cf Bk II ch xx Bk III ch vi

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manner and certainty of their productio f r th two forego g reasons, must be cont t to be very gnorant f In these we can g o fur ther than part cular experi ce inf rms us of mat ter of fact, and by analogy to guess wh t effe ts t 7 bod es m non other trials, lik t pro-

3 *Ath d cause ant f i aci g our deas 1 hard ly* Where w ha adequat deas, and where there is certain and discoverabl connexi n be

er And thus ma y are gn ant f mathematical truths, not out f any imperfecti f thei f cul t es, uncertainty in th things th msel es, but for want of ppl catio in cquiring, examining, and by d w ys compari g those deas. That which has most co trib ted t hind the d tracin f ur deas, and finding t their rela ti ns, nd greem ts or disagre ments, th

ment of ideas th msel es, whilst their th ghts fl tter bo t, st ck nly in so ds f doubtful and un rtain gnificat ns. M th mat ians bstracting their th ghts fr m names, and a cus ming th msel es t set bef re their minds the ideas th msel es that they would consider and no sounds instead of th m, ha ided

uncertain gnification, they are unabl to distinguish tru from false, certain from probable, consis t from inconsis t, their n pinns This ha ing been the f misf rt f great part of men fl tters, the increase bro ght th ock of real knowledg has been ery littl in p portio th schools, disp tes, and writings, the world has been filled w th whilst ud ts, being lost in the great wood f words, knew not wh reabouts they were, how far th ir discoveries were ad anced, or what was want ing in th ir own, or th general ock of knowl edg Had men, in the discoveries of the mat ri al d ne as they ha in those of the intellectual world, in ol ed all in the obscurity of u certain and d btful ways of talking *olumes* writ of na gatio and voyages, theories and st ries f zo es and tides multipl ed and disputed nay h m b lt, and fleets sent out, would never ha e

every particular thi g in whom that essence e that abstract idea, is t be f und and hat is once kn wn f such id as, w ll be perpetually and f ever tru So that as t all *general knowl dg* must earch and find t nly in our minds and *t is nly the xamining f our own deas that* furnis. th us w th that. Truths bel gi g to s- se es f things (that is to bstra t deas) are t rnal and are t be f d t by th co t m plati nly *f those essences* as th exist ce of

kn wledg in g ral.

Chap IV *Of the R ality f k owl d e*

Obj t n. Knowl dg plac d our id as m y b all unr al or himeri al I d ubt n th tim eader by this time may be pt to think that I ha been all this whil nly building a castl in th air and be eady to say to me

T what purpose all this ur? Knowled say you, is nly th percepti n f th greement disagreem t f ur own deas b t who kno what those deas may be. Is th anything so extr agant as th imaginations f men b ains Where is th head that has chimeras in t? Or if there be sober and wise man, what differ will th be by y rules betw n his knowledge and th t f th most extr agant fan cy in th w ld They both ha e their ideas, and

See Bk III. chh. ix, x.

Cf. Berkeley *Principles* Introd. §§ 3–25.

I Bk III

Bk. IV chh -viii.

Cf. Bk. II chh. xii, xxx.

every man has a reason from their words and actions *to be satisfied* and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man that considers to be ignorant that there is a God But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God who is there that by his own search and ability can come to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures conditions states powers and several constitutions wherein they agree or differ from one another and from us And therefore in what concerns their different species and properties we are in absolute ignorance

28 *Another cause want of a discoverable connexion between ideas we have Secondly* What a small part of the substantial beings that are in the universe the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge we have seen In the next place another cause of ignorance of no less moment is a want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have For wherever we want that we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge and are in the former case left only to observation and experiment which how narrow and confined it is how far from general knowledge we need not be told I shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance and so leave it It is evident that the bulk figure and motion *of several bodies about us produce in us several* sensations as of colours sounds tastes smells pleasure and pain &c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour or smell which we find in our minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent which perfectly surpass our comp ehensions As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our *minds can by us be no way deduced from bodily* causes nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which (experience shows us) produce them in us so on the others de the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable Ho v any thought should produce a mot on in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas as ho v any

never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like though they have a constant and

Cf. ch ii. § 1

regular connexion in the ordinary course of things yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that All wise Agent who has made them to be and to operate as they do in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive

29 *Instances* In some of our ideas there are certain relations habitudes and connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves that we cannot concei e them separable from them by any power whatsoever And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge Thus the idea of a r ght lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones Nor can we conceive this relation this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly mutable or to depend on any arbitrary power which of choice made it thus or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c. by impulse and motion nay the original rules and com

tect I need not I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead the future state of this globe of earth and such other things which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent The things that, as far as our observation reaches we constantly find to proceed regularly we may conclude do act by a law set them but yet by a law that we know

ble in our ideas we can have but an experimental knowledge of them From all which it is easy *to perceive what a darkness we are involved in,* how little it is of Being and the things that are, that we are capable to know And therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge when we modestly think with oursel es that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe and all the things contained in it that e are not capable of a philosophical kno ledge of the bod es that are about us and make a part of us concerning their secondary qualities po ers, and operations e can have no universal certainty Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge but the causes

6. *Hence the certainty of mathematical knowledge.* I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge and not the bare empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain and yet, if we will consider we shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically i.e. precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing because real things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones. It is true also of a triangle, wherever it really exists Whatever other figure exists, that it is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge because, intending things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those figures, when they have *barely an ideal existence* in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have *a real existence* in matter his consideration being barely of those figures, which are the same wherever or however they exist.

7. *And of moral* And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas, all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

8. *Existence not required to make it abstract knowledge* For the attaining of knowledge and certainty it is requisite that we have determined ideas. and, to make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with so little care and regard (as it may seem) to the real existence of things since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to inquire after truth and certainty will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be general propositions, and notions in which existence is not at all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a circle conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no In the same manner the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat. nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he writ but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i.e. in idea, that murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder As for other actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other species of things, which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men.

9. *Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral ideas are of our own making and naming* But it will

[illegible]

themselves, nor the reasonings about them no more than (in mathematics) there would be disturbance in the demonstration, or change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles. that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another For let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, *equilaterum* or *trapezium* or any thing else the properties of, and demonstrations about that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at first disturb him who knows not what idea it stands

Cf. § 9.
Cf. Locke *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet, pp. 69, also ch. ii. § 5.

perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another If there be any difference between them the advantage will be on the warm headed man s side as having the more ideas and the more lively And so by your rules he will be the more knowing If it be true that all knowledge *lies only in the perception of* the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain It is no matter how things are so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations and talk conformably it is all truth all certainty Such castles in the air[1] will *be as strongholds of truth as the demonstrations* of Euclid That an harpy is not a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge and as much a truth as that a square is not a circle

But of what use is all this fine knowledge of *men s own imaginations* to a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not what *men s fancies are it is the* knowledge of things that is only to be prized it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings and preference to one man s knowledge over another s that it is of things as they really are and not of dreams and fancies

2 *Answer Not so where ideas agree with things* To which I answer That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them and reach no further where *there is something further intended our* most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream and with great assurance utters them But I hope before I have done to make it evident that this way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas goes a little further than bare imagination[2] and *I believe it will appear that all* the certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else

3 *But wh t shall be the criterion of this greement?* It s evident the mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a c f mity betw een our ideas and the reality of th ngs But what shall be here the c ite on? How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its ow n ideas kno that they agree with things themsel es? This though it seems not to want difficulty[5] yet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things

4 *As all simple ideas re really conformed to things First* The first are simple ideas which since the *mind as has been shown can by no means* make to itself must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way and producing therein those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to From whence it follows that simple ideas are not fictions of our fanc es but *the natural and regular productions of things* without us really operating upon us and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended or which our state requires for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances to discern the states they are in and so to take them for our necessities and apply them to our uses *Thus the idea of whiteness or bitter* ness as it is in the mind exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there has all the real conformity it can or ought to have with things without us And this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things[6] is sufficient for real knowledge

5 *All complex ideas exc pt ideas f substances are their own arch types Secondly* All our complex ideas *except those of substances* being archetypes of the mind s own making not intended to be the copies of anything nor referred to the existence of anything as to their originals cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge For that wh ch is not designed to represent anything but itself can never be capable of a wrong representation nor mislead us from the true apprehen s on of anything by its dislikeness to it and such, excepting those of substances are all our complex ideas Which as I have shown in another place[7] are combinations of ideas which the mind by its free choice puts together without considering any connex on they have in nature And hence it is that in all these so ts the ideas thems lves are considered as the archet pes and

tain concerning these ideas is real and reaches things themsel es Because in all our thoughts reasonings, and discourses of this kind we intend *things no further* than as they are conformable to our ideas So that in these we cannot miss of a *certain and undoubted reality*

[1] Cf Bk I ch iii. § 25
[2] Cf Locke s *Third Lette* to Still ngfl et p 245.
[3] *Cf ch* § 31
[4] Cf Hum *Enq* s t ii
[5] Cf h § 2 also Locke s *Th d Lett* to Still ingfleet p 246
Cf ch b lso Bk. II ch xxiii. § 2
[7] *Cf Bk. III. ch v*

e. p ecisely tru in his life. B t y t in at h h f v truths properties belonging

tria g tna is

right ones. *It is tru also f trian le, herever t ally ex is* Whatever other figure exists, that t is not exactly answerable to that dea f a tri angl in his mind is t at all co cerned in that proposit n. And theref re h is certain all his knowledg co cerni such deas is real knov l edg because, intending things further than they gree w th those his deas, h is sure what he know co cern ng those figures, when they ha *bar ly an ideal xi tenc* in his mind will hold true of th m also when they ha *al tence* in mat ter his consider ti n bein barely of those fig ures, which are the sam wherev r or however they xist.

7 *And f moral* And he ce t f llows that moral

u usp

business to quire after truth and certaint will I pres me, upon e am nati n, be f u d t be general propositions, and n ti ns in which exist ence is not at all co cerned. All the discourses of th m th mat c ans bo t the squa i g of a circle conic secti ns, or any ther part f mathe matics, co cern not the existence of any f those figures but th ir d monstr ti ns, hich depend n *their* deas, are the same, wh ther there be any square r circle existing in th o ld r no I *th same manner* the truth and certainty of mo al discourses bstr cts from the li es f me and th existence of those irtues in th w ld whereof they treat. nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody n the world that exactly pra tises his rules, and li es p *to that* pattern of a irtuous man which h has gi en us, and which existed o here when h writ but idea. If t be true in peculati n, e. in dea that murder deserves death, t will also be true in re ality of any action that exists conf rmable t that d a f murder As f ther acti ns, th truth f that propositi n concerns th m n t. And thus t is f all ther pecies of thin s, which ha no ther esse ces b t those id as which are in the minds of men.

9. *Nor u ll it b less true or ertain, b caus mor l d as ar f ur an maki g and naming* B t t ll

cep f ch greem t, by th interv tion f ther d as or med ums ur mo al deas, as w ll as math ma cal bei g arch types them sel es, and so adeq te and compl te deas all th greeme disagre me t hich we shall find th m will produce real kno ledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

8. *Exist nce not qu d to mak b t act kno l d el* For th ttaini g of knowledg and certain ty t is requis te tha we ha e determined ideas and to make ur knowled real, t is requisite that the ideas answer their arch types. N l t t be wondered, that I place th certainty of our knowledg in the consideratio of our ideas, w th

themsel es, th reasonings abo t them no mo than (n math mat cs) th would be disturbance in th d monstration, change in th properties f figures, and their relations to an th if man sh uld make triangl w th four corners, trapez um w th f ur ght an gles that is, in plain E glish, cha g the names of the figures, and call that by e name, which mathematicians call *rdinarily* by another F l t a man mak to himself the idea of a figure w th three angles, whereof *ne is* right e, and call t, if he please, *quilaterum* o *tr pezium* o any thing else the properties of, and demonstrations abo t that dea will be th sam as if h called t a rectangular triangle. I confess the change f th name, by the impropri ty of speech, will at first disturb him who knows not what dea t stands

Cf. § 9.
Cf. Lock *Third Letter* S illingfleet, pp 69,
7 also ch. ii. § 5.

for but as soon as the figure is drawn the consequences and demonstrations are plain and clear Just the same is it in moral knowledge let a man have the idea of taking from others without their consent, what their honest industry has possessed them of and call this *justice* if he please

name or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind and the same things will agree to it as if you called it *justice* Indeed wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics where the figure once drawn and seen makes the name useless and of no force For what need of a sign when the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names that cannot be so easily and shortly done because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes But yet for all this, the miscalling of any of those ideas contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language hinders not but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements if we will carefully as in mathematics keep to the same precise ideas and trace *them* in their several relations one to another without being led away by their names If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty whatever sounds we make use of

10 *Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge* One thing more we are to take notice of That where God or any other law maker hath defined any moral names there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing of those even nick named ideas

11 *Our complex ideas of substances have their archetypes without us and here knowledge comes short* *Thirdly* There is another sort of complex ideas which being referred to archetypes without us may differ from them and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real Such are our ideas of substances which consisting of a collection of simple ideas supposed taken from the works of nature may yet vary from them by having more or different ideas united in them than are to be found united in the things themselves From whence it comes to pass that they may and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves [1]

12 *So far as our complex ideas agree with those archetypes without us so far our knowledge concerning substances is real* I say then that to have ideas of *substances* which by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge it is not enough as in *modes* to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence though they did never before so exist v g the ideas of sacrilege or perjury &c. were as real and true ideas before as after the existence of any such fact. But our ideas of sub-

consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts without any real pattern they were taken from though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination The reason whereof is because we knowing not what real constitution it is of substances whereon our simple ideas depend and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another and the exclusion of others there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature any further than experience and sensible observation reach [2] Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances—That all our complex ideas of them must be such and such only as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in nature And our ideas being thus true though not perhaps very exact copies are yet the subjects of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them Which (as has been already shown) will not be found to reach very far but so far as it does, it will still be real

general knowledge But to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things Whatever simple ideas have been found to co exist in any substance these we may with confidence join together again and so make abstract ideas of substances For whatever have once had an union in nature may be united again

13 *In our inquiries about substances we must consider ideas and not confine our thoughts to names or species supposed set out by names* This, if we rightly con

[1] Cf Bk. II ch xxxi. § 1
Cf. Bk II ch i. § 2
[2] Cf Bk II ch xxiii. § 1

sider and confine t ur th hts and abstra t deas to names, as if there ere, could be o ther *ort* of things than what kn wn names had already d termined, and, as t were, set ut, e sh uld think f things w th greater freedom and less confusi n than perhaps we do. It would possibly be th ght bold paradox, if n t a ery dangerous falsehood if I sh uld say that some *harg l g* who ha li ed f rty y ars tog ther w th t y pp aran f as ar some thing between a man and a beast which preju dice is f unded upon n thing else b t a false supposit n, that these tw names, man and beast, tand f distu t pecies so set ut by al s sences, th t there can come ther species betw en th m wher as if w will bstr ct f om those mes d the supposit of s ch pecific

and life f man w thout reason, is as m ch a distinct d a, and makes as m ch distin t sort of things from man and beast, as the dea of th hape f an ass with reaso w uld be different from either that of man r beast, and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both.

14. *Obj ti gainst chang ling being om thi g bet en man and b ast ns er d.* Here every body will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed som thing between man and beast, pray what are they I answer *cha li g* which is as good a w rd to signify something different from th significati f *man b ast* as the names man and beast ar to ha gn ficati ns differ t ne from th ther This, well cons d ed vould resol this matter and sh w my meaning w th t any more ado. B t I am t so unacq ainted w th th al f some men, which enables them to pin conseq ences, and to se religi threat ened whe eve any en ures t qu t their forms of peaki g, as not to f esee what names s ch *propositio* as this is like to be charged w th and w th t d bt t w ll be ask d If ha g l gs ar som thi g betw n man and beast, wh t will becom f th m in the other world? T which I answer *It co cerns me t* to know or inquire. T their own master they stand or fall. It will make their tat neither bet

th ghts or pinions, n r distinguishes them according to names and species of our co tri ance. And w that kn w so l ttle f this present world we are in, may I think, co tent oursel es th out being peremptory in defining the diff re t states which creatures shall come into when they T h t re It may suffice us, that H hath

stat B t, Secondly I ans er The f ce of these

such questi ns ill be groundless and rid culous. I desire th n those wh think there is more but an ccid tal difference bet een themsel es and changelings, the essence in both being exactly th same, to consider h ther they can im ag ne mm t l ty an e d to ny outw rd shape of th body the ery proposing t is, I pose no gh to make th m diso n t. No o e y t, th t ever I heard f how much soever immersed matter allowed that excellency to any figure f the gross sensible o t ard parts, as to affirm ternal lif due t t, a necessary c seq ce of t that any mass of matter sh uld after ts dissol ti n here, be gain esto ed here after to an everlasting tate f sense, perception, and kn wledge, nly because t was moulded in t this that figure, and had s ch a particular frame f ts isible parts. Such an opini n as this, pl cing immortality in ertain superficial figure, turns ut f doors all cons d ti of soul o p rit upo whose ccount al some corporeal bei s ha hithert been c clud d m mortal, and thers not. This is to tribute more to th is de than insid of things and t place

and lif erlasting which h has bo other material beings, to annex t, I say t th cut f his beard, or th fashion of his coat. F this that tward mark of ur bodies no more carries w th t th hope of an ternal dur tion, than th fash n f man u t g es h m ason bl grounds to imagin t will ever wear ut that

Cf. Bk. III, ch. 1, § 6.

it will make him immortal It will perhaps be said that nobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal but it is the shape is the sign of a rational soul within which is immortal I *wonder who made it the sign of any such thing* for barely saying it will not make it so It would require some proofs to persuade one of it No figure that I know speaks any such language. For it may as rationally be concluded that the dead body of a man wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of life than there is in a statue has yet nevertheless a living soul in it, *because of its shape as that there is a rational* soul in a changeling because he has the outside of a rational creature when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in many a beast.

16 *Monsters* But it is the issue of rational parents and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul I know not by what logic you must so conclude I am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of For if they did they *would not make bold as everywhere they do to* destroy ill formed and mis shaped productions Ay but these are *monsters* Let them be so what will your drivelling unintelligent intractable changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster a defect in the mind (the far more noble and in the common phrase the far more essential part) not? Shall the want of a nose or a neck make a monster and put such issue out of the rank of men the want of reason and understanding not? This is to bring all back again *to what was exploded just now this is to place*

people do lay the whole stress on the figure and resolve the whole essence of the species of man (as they make it) into the outward shape how unreasonable soever it be and how much soever they disown it we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little further and then it will plainly appear The well shaped changeling is a *man* has a rational soul though it appear not this is past doubt say you make the ears a little longer and more pointed and the nose a little *flatter than ordinary and then you begin to bog*gle make the face yet narrower flatter and longer and then you are at a stand add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it *and* let the head be perfectly that of some other animal then presently it is a monster and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul

and must be destroyed Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure which the *utmost bounds of* that shape that carries with it a rational soul? For since there have been human fœtuses produced *half* beast and *half* man and others three parts one and one part the other and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man or a brute —I would gladly know what are those precise lineaments which according to this hypothesis are or are not capable of a ra*tional soul to be joined to them. What sort of out*side is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within? For till that be done we talk at random of *man* and shall always I fear do so as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature we know not what. But after all I desire it may be considered that those who think they have answered the difficulty by telling us that a mis shaped fœtus is a *monster* run into th same fault they are arguing against by

but something neither man nor beast but par

examine them by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist and not by groundless fancies that have been taken up about them

17 *Words and species* I have mentioned this here because I think we cannot be too cautious that words and species in the ordinary notions *which we have been used to of them impose not* on us For I am apt to think therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge especially in reference to substances and from thence has risen a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty Would we accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words we might in a great measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts but yet it would still disturb us in our discourse with others as long as we retained *the opinion that species and their essences were* anything else but our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them to be the signs *of them*

18 *Recapitulation* Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge *and wherever we are*

[1] Cf ch iii. § 6 also Bk II ch xx § 2

Cf Locke's *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet p 289

sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things, having here given the marks, I think, I have shown wherein it is that certainty, real certainty consists Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.

Chap V Of Truth in General

What truth is What is truth, was an inquiry many ages since and it being that which all mankind either do, or pretend to search after it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood.

Right joining or separating of signs, i.e. ideas or words Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but *the joining or separating of Signs as the Things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another* The joining or separating of signs here meant, is what by another name we call *proposition*. So that truth properly belongs only to propositions whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, viz. ideas and words.

3. *Which make mental or verbal propositions* To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth of thought, and truth of words, distinctly one from another but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words, and then the instances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be barely mental, and become verbal. For *a mental proposition* being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds, stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put into words.

4. *Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of* And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may if attentively made use of serve for a mark to show us what are those things we have clear and perfect established ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our mind takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about *white* or *black*, *sweet* or *bitter*, a *triangle* or a *circle* we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the names. But when we would consider or make propositions about the more complex ideas, as of *man*, *vitriol*, *fortitude*, *glory* we usually put the name for the idea because the ideas these names stand for being for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the names themselves, because they are more clear certain, and distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas and so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental propositions. In substances, as has been already noticed, this is occasioned by the imperfections of our ideas, we making the name stand for the real essence, of which we have no idea at all. In

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which requires time and attention to be recollected and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it and is utterly impossible to be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for Some confused or obscure notions have served their turns and many who talk very much of *religion* and *conscience* of *church* and *faith* of *power* and *right* of *obstructions* and *humours*, *melancholy* and *choler* would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves and lay by those words with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

5. *Mental and verbal propositions contrasted.* But to return to the consideration of truth we must, I say observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making—

First, *mental*, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together or separated, by the mind perceiving or judging, of their agreement or disagreement.

Secondly *Verbal propositions*, which are

Cf. chh. ii § 4 iii § ix, xi.
Cf. Locke letter Collins, Oct. 9, 03 also ch. xxi §
Cf. ch. xxi §4.
Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxxi §

words the signs of our ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences By which way of affirming or denying these signs made by sounds are as it were put together or separated one from another So that proposition consists in joining or separating signs and truth

him that the mind either by perceiving or supposing the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative which I have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together and separating But this action of the mind which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny than to be explained by words When a man has in his head the idea of two lines viz the side and diagonal of a square whereof the diagonal is an inch long he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts v g into five ten a hundred a thousand or any other number and may have the idea of that inch line being divisible or not divisible into such equal parts as a certain number of them will be equal to the sideline Now whenever he perceives believes or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line he, as it were joins or separates those two ideas viz the idea of that line and the idea of that kind of divisibility and so makes a mental proposition which is true or false according as such a kind of divisibility a divisibility into such *aliquot* parts does really agree to that line or no When ideas are so put together or separated in the mind as they or the things they stand for do agree or not that is as I may call it, *mental truth* But *truth of words* is something more and that is the affirm

knowledge which we have spoken of already

7 *Objection against verbal truth that thus it may all be chimerical* But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth that did about knowledge and it will be objected that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words in propositions *as the ideas they stand for* agree or disagree in men s minds, the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be nor worth the pains and time men employ in the search of it since by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men s brains. Who knows not what odd notions many men s heads are filled with and what strange ideas all men s brains are capable of? But if we rest here we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in our own imaginations nor have other truth but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs as men and horses For

true propositions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say *all centaurs are animals* as that *all men are animals* and the certainty of one as great as the other For in both the propositions the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man and so these two propositions are equally true equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?

8 *Answered Real truth is about ideas agreeing to things* Though what has been said in the fore going chapter to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical or (if you please) barely nominal they depending both on the same foundation yet it may not be amiss here again to consider that though our words signify nothing but our ideas yet being designed by them to signify things the truth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of things And therefore truth as well as knowledge may well come under the distinction of verbal and real that being only verbal truth wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an existence in nature But then it is they contain *real truth* when these signs are joined as our ideas agree and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature which in substances we cannot know but by knowing that such have existed

9 *Truth and falsehood in general* Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the mark

g down in words th greement or disagree me t of ideas therwise than t is. And so far as these d as, thus marked by sou ds agre t their arch types, so far ulj is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what deas the words sta d f r and th percepu f th agreem t disagreement f those deas, cording as t is marked by those words.

10. *G ral p t t b t a d f mor at larg* B t because w rd are looked on as the great co duits of truth and knowledge and that in co ty n and recei ing of truth, and com m nl in asoning bo t t, mak use of words and propositions, I shall more t large in quire wherein th certainty of real truths contained in propositions consists, and where t is to be h d d endea our to sho in what sort f those which most mpl y ur thoughts, and exercise ur co templ t n. Ge eral truths are mos looked after by the mind as those that most nlarg ur kn wledg and by th ir comp hensi ess satisfying us t ce of many particulars, nlarge our ew and shorten our way to knowledge.

Moral and met physical truth. Besides truth taken in th strict sense bef re mentioned, there ar th so ts f truths As, Mo al truth, hich is peaking of things according to th per suasio of ur own minds, tho gh th proposi tio w peak ree not to the real ty f things Metaphysical truth, hich is nothing b t th real existence of things, conf rmabl t th ideas to which w ha annex d th ir names. This, had bef re se tled w th the name to t. But these consider tions of truth, eith ha ing been before taken ce of, t being m ch t ur present purpose, t may suffice here nly to ha e men ed them.

Chap VI *Of Universal Pr po t ns their Truth and Certa nty*

T i g f u d ne y t k l dg Thou h the examining and j dging of deas by themsel es, th ir names being quite laid aside, be th best and surest w y to clear and distin t knowledg y t, through the prevailin custom of using sounds for ideas, I think t is ery seld m practised. E ery ne may bserve how common it is for names to be made use of nste d f the deas themsel es, even when men think and rea son w thin th ir own b easts especially if the ideas be ery complex, and mad up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consid ratı n f words and pr posit ns so n cessary a part of th Treatise of Knowledge, that t is ery hard to speak intelligibly of the one, w th ut explaining the other

2 *General truths hardly to be understood, but verbal pr posit ns* All the knowledge w ha e, being nly of particular o general truths, t is evi dent that hatever may be done in th f rmer of these the latter which is that which w th reason is mo t so ght aft r can ne er be w ll made kno n, and is ery seld m pprehended b t as n d and exp essed in wo ds It is not, But that we may not be misled in this case by that hich is th danger e erywhere, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, t is fit to bser that certainty is t of ld *ertainty f truth* and *certainty f knowl dg* Certainty of truth is, when words are so p t together in propositions as exa tly t express th agreeme t r disagreement of th deas they stand f as really t is. Certainty of knowl edg is t percei e th greement r disagreement of deas, as expressed in any proposition. This w usually call know g, r being certain of th truth of any propositi n.

4. *N pr p siti can be certainly known to be true wher the al essence f ach speci ment ed is not known.* Now because we cann t be certain of the truth of any general propositi n, unless w know th precise bounds and extent of the species ts terms tand f t is necessary we should know the essence of each species, which is that which constitutes and bounds t.

This, in all simpl ideas and modes, is t hard to d For in these the eal and nominal essence being the same, or which is all the abstract idea which th general term stands f bei g the sole essence and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can be o doubt how far th pecies extends, what things are com prehended under each term which, t is evi dent, are all that ha e an xact conformity w th the idea t tands f and n ther

B t in substances, wherein eal essence, distinct from th ominal, is supposed t constitute d termine, and bound th pecies, th exte t f

Chh. vi, vii, viii.

Cf. Lock *Third Lette* to Stillingfleet, pp 353–54.

the general word is very uncertain because not knowing this real essence we cannot know what is or what is not of that species and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it And thus speaking of a *man* or *gold* or any other species of natural substances as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it For man or gold taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these species with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold is yellow But where the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species nor can be in doubt on this account whether any propos tion be true or not I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way and have made use of the terms of *ess nces* and *species* on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract ideas with names to them To suppo e that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names according as they agree to several abstract deas of which we make those names the signs is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propos t ons that can be made about them Though therefore these things might to people not possessed with scholastic learning be treated of in a better and clearer way yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people s minds who have received any tincture from the learning wh ch has prevailed in this part of the orld are to be discovered and remo ed to make ay for that use of words which should convey certa nty with it

5 *This m re part cula ly co ce ns s bst ces* The names of substances then whenever made to stand for species vhich are supposed to be constituted by real essences wh ch e know not are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding Of the truth of general propos tions made up of such terms we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know where it is or is not and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold being incurably ignorant whether it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold i e that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all This being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is

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which e know not is v g in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is yet could we not be sure that this or that quality could ith truth be affirmed of gold since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea

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constitute

6 *The truth of few universal propositions conce n ng substanc s is to be k own* On the other side the names of substances when made use of as they sho ild be for the ideas men have in their minds

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truth e can be certain Not because in this use of h m e are uncertain what things are signi

ion or repugnancy but a ;

ideas

7 *Because necessary co existence of simple ideas in substa ces c n in few cases be known* The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for are collections of such qualities as have been observed to co exist in an unkno n substratum wh ch e call substance but what other qualit es necessarily co exist ith such combinations e cannot certainly kno unless e can d scover the r natural dependence hich n the r primary qualities we can go but a very little way in and in all their secondary qualities e can discover no connexion at all for the reasons ment oned chap iii [2] Viz 1 Because e know not the real constitut ons of substances on which each secondary quality partic

[1] Cf Bk III ch ii § 13 also Locke s *Th d Letter* p 358

Cf Bk II h §§ 7–26

larly depends. 2 D d w know that, t w uld serv us nly f r experimental (t un ersal) kn ledg and reach w th certainty n further t h t b tan e b cau e u und r

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compl d th word gold sta ds

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th specific essence the nam of g ld tands f r t is plain, *all gold is mall bl* is not certain propo- siti Because, l t th complex id a of gold be mad up f whichsoeve f its other qualities you please, malleableness ill not ppear to depe d o that complex dea, nor f llow from any simple e co tained in t th co nexion that malle ableness has (if t has any) th those ther quali ties be g only by the int rv u f the r al co tutu f its insensibl parts which since we kn w t, t is mpossibl w h ld percei e that connexi n unless we could disco er that which ties them together

A far as y such o-ext tence ca be known, far uni ersal pr po t ns may b erta n. B t this w ll g but l ttle w y The more, ind ed f these co- existing qualities w un te into o e complex dea, under e name, the more precise and d termi n te we make th s gnification f that w rd b t e yet make t thereby m re capable f uni rsal certainty *pect f ther qual t s not c tai d ur mpl d* sin e we p rce e n t their connexion d pend e on ne an ther being gn rant both of that real constituti n in which they are all f unded d also how th y fl from t. Fo th chief part f ur kn l dg co c rning substan es is n t, as in other things, barely of the relati of tw ideas that may exist separately b t is of th ecessary co exi and co-existen f several distin t deas in th same bj ct, f their rep gn cy so t -exist Could w begin t th ther end and disco er what t was wher that col ur consist d hat mad body l ght hea er what textur f parts mad t malleable, fusible, and fixed and fit to be dissol d in this sort f l qu r and n t in an ther —if I say w h d such an d as this of bodies, and could percei whe in all sensible qualities g ally nsist, and how th y a prod ced w *might fram such bstr t deas f* th m as would furnish us w th matte f mo ge al kn wledg and enable us to mak un rs l p p u ns that sh ld carry ge e al truth and certainty w th th m. B t whilst ur complex ideas of th sorts of sub tances are so mo f m th t t nal al constitut n o which th ir sensible q alities d pend and ar mad up f n thing b t an imperfect coll tion of those ppare t qualities ur senses can disco

Cf. I trod. § 7

8 essence in gold —

siti whose truth we can t be certain of h v uni ersally soever t be belie d. For if accord ing to the useless imaginati n f the Schools, any ne supposes th term g ld t tand f r species f things set out by nature, by real essence be lo ging to t, t is evident h kn s n t wh t par ticular substances are of that pecies d so can t w th certainty affirm anything uni ersally of g ld. B t if h makes g ld tand f pec es de termin d by ts minal essence, l t th nominal essence, f example, be the complex idea of a body of certain yell w col ur malleable, f sibl and hea er than any ther kn w —in th rope use of th w d g ld, there is n dif

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tio together t is impossibl that w should cer tainly know th truth f this propositi that all g ld is fixed.

9 *N disc er bl nec ary nnext b t nom inal sence f gold and ther imp ideas* As there is no disco bl co xi bet een fixed ess and th colour we ght, d ther simpl deas of tha nominal essence f gold so if make ou compl dea f g ld, body y llow fusible, d le, weighty and fixed w hall be t th same uncertainty concerning sol bility in *qua* and f th same reason. Sin we can ev from consid u f th id as th msel es, w th certainty affirm deny f body whose complex dea is mad p f yellow ery we ghty ductil fusible, and fix d that t is sol ble in *aqua gia* and so f the rest of its q alities. I would gl dly meet w th general affirmatio concerning any q ali y of gold, that any e can ce tainly know is true. I will, n doubt, be pres- ently objected, Is t this an uni ersal proposi tion, *All gold is malleabl* To which I answer It is ery certain proposition, if malleableness be

the general word is very uncertain because not knowing this real essence we cannot know what is or what is not of that species and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it And thus speaking of a *man* or *gold* or any other species of natural substances as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it For man or gold taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these species with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold is yellow But where the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species nor can be in doubt on this account whether any proposition be true or not I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way and have made use of the terms of *ess c s* and *species* on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract ideas *with names to them To suppose that the spec es* of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names the signs is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propos t ons that can be made about them Though therefore these things might to people not possessed with scholastic learning be treated of in a better and clearer way yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people s minds who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world are to be discovered and remo ed to make vay *for that use of words hich should convey cer*tainty with it

5 *This more p ticul rly c ncerns subst nc s* The names of substances then whenever made to stand for spec es which are supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding Of the truth of general propos t ons made up of such terms we cannot be sure The reason whereof is plain for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know where it is or is not and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold being incurably ignorant whether *it* has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold i e that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all This being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence which we know not is v g in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is yet could we

has a necessary connexion with a real essence of which we have no idea at all whatever pecies that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute

6 *The truth of f w uni ersal propositions co cerni substanc s is to be known* On the other side the names of substances when made use of as they should be for the ideas men have n their minds though they carry a clear and determinate s g

of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them but because the complex ideas they stand for are such combinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy but with a very few other ideas

7 *Because necessa y co existence of simple ideas in subst nces can in few cases be known* The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for are collections of such quali

cause we know not the rea con stances on which each secondary quality partic

Cf Bk III ch iii § 13 also Lock s *Thi d Letter* p 358

Cf. Bk II ch i. §§ 7–26

ularly depends. D d e know that, t w ld serv us only f exper me tal (n t ersal) kn wledg and reach th ce tai ty o further than th t b in t ce b s o u der standings ca discover co cei ble connexi n betw en any secondary quality and any mod f cati wh tsoe er f any f th p mary es And theref there ar ery f g ral proposit ns to be mad co cernings s bsta ces, which can carry th them d bted ce tainty

8. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed is proposit whose truth we cann t be certa f ho ni ersally soe e t be believed. For if acco d ing to th useless imaginatio f the Schools, any pposes th t rm g ld t tand f a pec es f things set t by ture, by real esse ce be l ging to t, tis ev dent h kn w ot h t particular bstances are f th t pec es d so can t w th ce tainty affirm anything uni ersally of g ld. B t if h makes g ld tand f a pecies de t rmin d by ts n minal essence l t th minal esse ce f example be th complex dea f body of certain yell col malleable, fu sible, and he er than any ther kn w — n this p pe use f th w d g ld, th e is n dif fi lty t kn w wh t is is t gold. B t yet no ther q al ty ca w th certainty be uni ersally affirmed or deni d f g ld, but what hath *dis er bl* connexi inconsist cy w th th t minal esse e. Fixed ess f example ha ing ecessary connexi th t e can discover th th col ur weight, any ther simpl d of ur mplex e, w th the h l combin ti tog ther t is impossibl that w should ce tainly kn w th truth of this propo ti that all g ld is fix d

9 *N d er bl ne ary nne b tu nom inal es nc f gold nd ther simp deas* As th re is disco bl n betw fix d ss and th col ur weight, and ther mpl d as f th t minal essence f g ld if mak ou compl dea f g ld body y ll w fusibl d tile, ghty and fix d w hall be t th sam uncertainty cerning sol bility in *qua* and f th sam eason. S w

ui usibl and fix d th t t is sol bl in *qua g* and so f th rest f

eu y bjected, Is t this an uni rsal p po ti n, *All gold is mall bl* T which I answer It is ery certain propositio if malleableness be a part f the complex dea the w rd g ld stands f B t th h re is othing aff rmed f gold b t that tl t so d tands for an idea in hich mal l bleness is co tai ed and s ch so t of truth and certainty as this t is, t say centa is f ur footed. B t if malleableness make t a part of th spec f c essence th ame f g ld stands f r t is plain *ll g ld mall bl* is t a certain proposit Because, l t the complex d f g ld be made p f whichsoe er of is ther qualities yo please, malleabl ess will n t ppear to d pe d that complex dea, or f llo from a y simple e co tain d in t the connexio that malle bleness has (if t has any) with those ther qual ties be g only by the intervent n f th e l constitut of ts inse sibl parts which ince e kn not, t is mpossible w h ld perce e that co xion unl ss w could disco r th t which ties them tog ther

t *As far as y such o-ext t c ca b known, s far uni ersal p po t ns m y b certain. But th u ll g b t l tll u y* The mo e, i d ed f these coexisting q alities w te into e complex dea, under o ame, the m re precise and det rmi n te w mak th gn f cati n of that word b t never y t make t thereby m re cap ble of uni ersal certainty *p t f ther qual t s not c tained ur mpl d* sin e w pe cei t their connexio r d pe de ce on o an th being g orant both f that real c nstitut n n which th y are all f nd d and also how th y fl w fr m t. F th ch ef part f r kno ledge co cerning bstances is ot, as ther things, barely f th elati n of two deas that may exist separ t ly b t is f the cessary co xi and co-exist c f several distin t deas in the same bj t f th ep g a y so t -exist Could w begin t the othe d and disco r what t was he in th t col ur c nsisted wh t mad a body light r hea h t te t f parts mad t mall able, fusibl and fix d and fit to be dissol d this sort f l q and n t in an ther —if I say had such dea as th s f bodies, and could percei whe ein all se ble q al t s g ally o t d how th y a prod ced might f m ch bstr ct deas f th m as w uld furnish us w th matter f m e g al kn wledge, and e bl m l n al

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nal l constit ti n n which their sens bl qu liti d pe d and ar mad p f n thing but an mperf t coll cti of those pparent q alities ur senses can discov

Cf. I trod. § 7

the general word is very uncertain because not knowing this real essence we cannot know what is or what is not of that species and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it And thus speaking of a *man* or *gold* or any other species of natural substances as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it For man or gold taken *in this sense* and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these *species* with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold is yellow But where the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species nor can be in doubt on this account whether any proposition be true or not I have chosen to explain this uncerta nty of propositions in this scholastic way and have made use of the terms of *essences* and *sp ecies* on purpose to sho v the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract deas with names to them To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names the s gns is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them Though therefore the e things might to people not possessed with

who have received any t ncture from the learning which has preva led in this part of the world are to be discovered and removed to make way for that use of words which should convey cert nty with it

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standing Of the truth of general proposit ons

made up of such terms we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of *speaking nothing is gold* but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know where it is or is not and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold being incurably ignorant whether *it* has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold i e that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all This being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence which

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not be sure that this or

truth be affirmed of gold since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence of which we have no idea at all whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute

6 *The truth of few u sers l propositions c ncerning substances is t be known* On the other side the names of substances when made use of as they should be for the ideas men have in their minds

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truth we can be certain Not because in this use of th m are uncertain what things are signi

ion or repugnancy but with a very few o ideas

7 *Because necessary co existence of simple ideas in s bstances c n n few cases be kn wn* The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for are collections of such qualities as have been observed to co-exist in an unknown substratum which we call substance but h o her q alities necessarily co exist with

a very little way in and in all their secu qualities we can disco er no connexion at all for the reasons mentioned chap iii Viz 1 Because we kno v not the real constitut ons of substances on which each secondary quality partic

Cf. Bk III ch iii. § 13 lso Lock s *Th d Let* *te* p 358

Cf. Bk II ch i. §§ 7-26

made often on se eral sorts of animals by in si bl causes, th ce tain de th (as are t ld) of some of them, b barely passing the l e or as t is certain of ther by being remo ed nto a ghbc n d tly sh w that the ur w th wl thing to do, is absol tely ecess be what they ppear to us, and to preserve those qual u by wh h w kn w a d d su guish th m. W ar then qui t of th way when w think that things contain u th thems l s the qualities th t ppear to u n them and we in ain search f that constitutu w thin th body of a fly an el phant, upo hich d pend those q al and powers we bserv th m F r hich, perhaps, to u derstand them aright we ght look t nly beyo d this o earth and tmosphere b t even beyo d th su r remot est tar our eyes ha e y t disco ered. F how m ch the being and perati n of part cular sub-stan es in this urgl be depends n causes utter ly bey d our ew is impossibl f us to d t mine. W see and perce e som of th mou ns and grosse perati ns of things her about us but when th streams come th t k p all these urious machines in mou and pair h con yed and modifi d is bey d our o c a d pp ehensio and th gre t parts and wh els, as I may so say of this t pendous stru ture of the uni erse may f gh w know ha e such co xi and d pe d in th ir fl es and perations po an ther that perhaps things in this ur mansi w ld p t quit an ther f e, and cease t be what they ar if som of th tars gre t bod es incompre hensibly emot from us sh uld ase t be r mo as t does. This is ce tain things, however bsol te d enture th y seem in th msel es are b t tain rs to th parts f tu e, f th t which th y are most taken nou of by us. Their b rv bl q al u and pow rs are wing something w th u th m and there is so mpl and perf par th t w kn of nature which does t th being t has, and the ex llences f t, t its eighbours and e mus t co fin ur th ghts w thin th ur fac f any body bu look great d al further comprehend perfectly those qual ties that are t.

Our nominal ss f sub tances furnish few u er al p p si ns b t them th t ert If th be so is not to be w nd red that w ha ry mperfec ideas of bstances, nd that th cal essences, whi h d pend their properties d pe tions, are unknown to us. W cannot discover so much as that size f gure d texture of th ir min te a d t e parts, which is really in t m m ch less the d fferent m tions and im-pulses mad in and upo th m by bod es fr m w tho t, upo wh h d pe ds, and by wh ch s f rmed the greatest and most emarkabl part of those qu hs rve in th m, and of wl ch ur con consid all ur l essences se ces mak use of inste d of them ut be use to furnish us b t ry sparingly w th any g eral kno ledg r u ersal propos tions cap ble of real certa nty

13 *Judg ut f j b b l ty c ncer g sub tane s m y ch further but that s t knowl dg* We are t the ef e to w d r if c rtainty be t be f u d y l w g n ral p posit s m de co cern g subst ces u knowl dge of the r qual u a d propert es goes ry seldom further than ur senses re ch and inf rm us. Poss bly in-quisiti nd bserving men may by stre gth of j dgment, pe trat furth er a d on probabil ties taken from wary observ u and hi ts ll laid togeth er oft n guess right t hat experi ence has not y t discov red to them. But this is but g ess g st ll t mounts only t opi on and has not that certainty hich is equisite to kn wledge. For all gene al kn wledg l es only n ur n th ughts, and consists barely n the co templati of ur own bstra t deas. Wher eve w pe ce any greement r disagre m nt am g t th m th we ha g n al k l edg and by p tu g the names of those d as to-geth er rdingly in propositi ns, can w th er t ty pro unc g n al truths. But because the bstra t deas of substances, for which their pecifi nam tand wh er they h a y di inct and det min t gn ficati h a d sc rabl exi n nco ist cy w th

p cipal inqu ry co ern g th m nd there

bel gi t t, and consta tly co-exi ting in ist t w th th t d whe er t is to be f d.

4 *Wh t q t f ur knowl dg f b tance* Bef re can ha e any t l rab kn l dg f th k nd must F t kn w what

Cf. ch. § ch. xi

er there can be few general propositions con cerning substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured since there are but few simple ideas of whose connexion and necessary co existence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge I imagine amongst all the *secondary* qualities of substances and the powers relating to them there cannot any two be named whose necessary co existence or repugnance to co exist can certainly be known unless in those of the same sense which necessarily exclude one another as I have elsewhere shown No one I

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to make or receive on or from other bodies The same may be said of the sound or taste &c Our specific names of substances standing for any col lections of such ideas it is not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty But yet so far as any complex idea of any sort of sub- stances contains in it any simple idea whose *nec essary* co-existence with any other *may* be discov ered so far universal propositions may with cer tainty be made concerning it v g could any one discover a necessary connexion between malle ableness and the colour or weight of gold or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name he might make a certain universal propo sition concerning gold in this respect and the real truth of this proposition that *all gold is malle able* would be as certain as of this *the three angles of all right lined triangles are all equal to two right ones*

11 *The qualities which make our complex ideas of substances d pend mostly on exte nal remote and un percei ed causes* Had we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities e find in them and how those qualities flo ed *from thence* e could by the specific ideas of their real essences in our o vn minds more certainly find out their properties and d scover what qualities they had or had not h n e can now by our senses and to know the

experiments upo

kno ing the properties of a triangle that a tri angle should exist *in any matter* the idea in our minds ould serve for the one as well as the other But e are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so much as e er approach the first entrance to vards them. For we are wont to consider the substances we meet

Cf. ch ii. §§ 11 13

with each of them, as an *entire thing by itself* having all its qualities in itself and independent of other things overlooking for the most part, the operations of those invisible fluids they are encompassed with and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction whereby we know and denominate them. Put a

water in

ity left to itself would cease to be fluid *But if* inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them that they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies that environ them removed it is yet more so in vegetables which are nourished gro and *produce leaves flo ers and seeds* in a constant succession And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals we shall find that their depend ence as to life motion and the most consider able qualities to be observed in them, is so holly *on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bod es* that make no part of them that they cannot sub sist a moment ithout them though yet those bodies on which they depend are little taken no- tice of and make no part of the *complex ideas* we frame of those animals. Take the air but for a m nute from the greatest part of li ing crea

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wl ich are not vulgarly observed or so muci thougl t on and how many are there which the *severest inquiry can ne er discover?* The inhab- itants of this spot of the universe though re moved so many mill ons of miles from the sun yet depend so much on the duly tempered mo- tion of particles coming *from or agitated* by it that ere this ea th removed but a small part of out of its present situat on and

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ish since e find them so often destroyed by excess or defect of the sun s armth h ch an acc dental pos tion in some parts of this our l ttle *globe exposes them to* The qualities observed in a lo dsto ie must needs l e the r source far be yond the confines of that body and the ravage

Chap VII *Of Maxims*

1 *Maxims or axioms are self-evident propositions* There are sort of propositions, which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms* have passed for principles of science and because they are *self evident*, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency It may however be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge.

2. *Wherein that self-evidence consists* Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to

reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition.

3. *Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms* This being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those *propositions which commonly pass under the* name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation, co-existence, and real existence which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such.

4. I. *As to identity and diversity all propositions are equally self-evident* For First The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of *identity* being founded in the mind having distinct ideas, this affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas and it is the first act of the mind (without which it can

never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself that he knows the ideas he has that he knows also when any one is in his understanding and what it is and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another which always being so (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood that is, as soon as we have in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the proposition stand for And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be

terms standing for more general ideas, or such as are less so g whether the general idea of Being be affirmed of itself as in this proposit

being in general be denied of not Being which is the only (if I may so call it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as a man is not a horse red is not blue. The difference of the ideas, as soon as the terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently visible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as well as the more general propositions and all for the same reason, viz. because the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea to be the same with itself and two different ideas to be different, and not the same and this it is equally certain of whether these ideas be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. It is not, therefore alone to these two general propositions— whatsoever is, is and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be —that this sort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by the terms *whatsoever* and

Cf. Locke *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet, pp 340–44.

ibid p. 322.

changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another and how Secondly We must know *what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us*[1] *This is in truth no* less than to know *all* the effects of matter under its divers modifications of bulk figure cohesion of parts motion and rest. Which I think every body will allow is utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation Nor if it were revealed to us what sort of figure bulk and motion of corpuscles would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour and what sort of figure bulk and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty concerning the several sorts of them unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk figure texture and motion of bodies in those minute parts by which they operate on our senses so that we might by those frame our abstract ideas of them I have mentioned here only *corporeal substances whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings* For as to the operations of spir ts both the r thinking and moving of bodies we at first sight find ourselves at a loss though perhaps when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies and their operations and exam ned how far our notions even in these reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact we *shall be bound to confess that even in these too* our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity

15 *Whilst our complex ideas f substances contain not ideas of their re l constitutions we c n make but few general ce tain propositions conce n g them* This is evident the abstract complex ideas of substances for which the r general names stand not *comprehending their real constitutions* can afford us very little universal certainty Because our ideas of them are not made up of that on wh ch those qualit es we observe in them and would inform ourselves about do depend or with which they have any certa n connexion v g let the ideas to which we give the name *m n* be as it commonly is a body of the ordinary shape ith sense voluntary motion and reason j d o it This being the abstract idea and

which sensation power of motion and reasoning with that peculiar shape depend and hereby they are united together in the same

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tainty affirm That all men sleep by intervals That no man can be nourished by wood or stones That all men will be poisoned by hemlock because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man ith this abstract idea that name stands

certainty whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united and from whence they flow Wh lst our idea the word *man* stands for is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him there is no discernible connexion or repugnance *between our specific idea and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones upon his* constitution There are animals that safely eat ml l d others that are nourished by ood

d pend we must not hope to reach certainty in

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can afford us such propositions But these a few and of so little moment[3] that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substanc lm st non at all

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soever ... the terms used in them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement as there expressed is capable to be discovered by us And n of tl eir truth or falsehood

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ticulars It is the contemplat on of our o n ab*stract ideas that alone is able to afford us general* knowledge

[1] Cf Bk II ch v ι

[2] Cf. Bk. II ch xxi. § 2

[3] Cf. ch ii. § 5.

ing as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in words it understands and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same must necessarily follow that such self-evident truths must be first known which consist of ideas that are first in the mind. And the ideas first in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things, from whence, by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus *particular ideas* are first received and distinguished and so knowledge got about them and next to them, the less general or specific, which are next to particular For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is

and con ... culty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together It is true the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge to both which it is naturally very much inclined But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection at least, this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about

10. *Because on perc... of ... the other parts of our knowledge do not depend.* Secondly from what has been said it plainly follows, that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge. For if there be a great many other truths, which have as much self-evidence as they and a great many that ... know before them, it is impossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all other truths. Is it impossible to know that one and ... hree but by virtue of this, or ... whole is equal ... im and all from the same reason of self-evidence the equality of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any other axiom as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor after the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he know that one and two are equal to three better or more certainly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and parts are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the mind than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may ask these men, who will needs have all knowledge, besides those general principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident principles. What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are two, that two and two are four that three times two are six. Which being known without any proof evidence, That either all knowledge does not depend on certain *praecognita* or general maxims, called principles or else that these are principles and if these are to be counted principles, a great part of numeration will be so. To which, if we add all the self-evident propositions which may be made about all our distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite at least innumerable which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages and a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence are wholly independent receive no light nor are capable of any proof one from another much less the more particular from the more general or the more simple from the more compounded the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar and the easier and earlier apprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this, That a man sees the same idea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas. For when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow and the idea of blue, he cannot but certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one,

Cf. Berkeley *Principles* Introd. § 13.
Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.
Cf. ch. §§ 8.

thin than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims amounting to no more, in short, but this that *the same is the same* and *the same is not different* are truths known in more particular instances as well as in those general maxims and known also in particular instances before

[illegible]

nothing more visible than that the mind without the help of any proof or reflection on either of these general propositions perceives so clearly and knows so certainly that the idea of white is the idea of white and not the idea of blue and that the idea of white when it is in the mind is there and is not absent that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence

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be itself and not to be another and to be in his mind and not away when it is there with a certainty that cannot be greater and therefore the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty nor add anything to this So that, in respect of identity our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-e ident propos tions as we have names for distinct ideas And I appeal to every one s own mind whether this proposition a circle is a circle be not as self-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms, whatsoever is is and again whether this proposition blue is not red be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And so of all the like

5 II *In co-existence we have few self-evident propositions Secondly* as to *co-existence* or such a necessary connexion between two *ideas* that, in the subject where one of them s supposed there the other must necessarily be also of such agreement or disagreement as this the mind has an immed ate perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort we have but ery l ttle intu ti e knowledge nor are there to be found very many propos tions that are self-evident, though some there are v g the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superf cies be ing annexed to our idea of body I think it is a self-evident proposition that two bod es cannot be in the same place.

6 III *In other r lations we may have m y Third ly* As to the *relations of modes* mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality As, equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equal which with the rest of that kind however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these —that one and one are equal to two that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two and from the five fingers of the other hand two the remaining numbers will be equal These and a thousand other such propositions may be found *in numbers*, which at the very first hearing force the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness, than those mathematical axioms.

7 IV *Concerning real existence we have none Fourthly* as to *real existence* since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas but that of ourselves, and of a First Being we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings not so much as demonstrative much less a self-evident knowledge and therefore concerning those there are no maxims.[1]

8 *These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge* In the next place let us consider what influence these rece ved maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools that all reasonings are *Ex praecognitis et praeconcessis* seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to suppose them to be *praeco nita*. Whereby I think are meant these two things first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind and secondly that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend

9 *Because maxims or axioms are not the truths we first knew First* That they are not the truths first kno n to the mind is evident to experience as we have shown in another place (Bk. I chap i) Who percei es not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother that its sucking bottle is not the rod long before he [illegible] that it s mposs ble for the san e thing to

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these general maxims, to which mathematicians, in their argu ngs do sometimes refer them? Whe eof the reason is ery plain for that hich makes the mind assent to such propositions, be ing nothing else but the percept on it has of the agreement or disagreement of ts ideas, accord

[1] Cf. ch ii. § 14 also ch i § 18.

ing as t finds them affirmed or denied o of an ther in words t u derstands and every dea being kn wn to be what t is, and every two distin t deas being kn wn t t be the same t must ecessarily f llow that such self-evident truths must be first known which consist of deas th t are first in th mind. And th deas first in

g eral names to them. Thus *particular id as* are first recei ed and distinguished and so knowl edg g t abo t them and next to them, the less general pecific, which are ext to particular F abstra t deas are not so b us r easy to children th y t unexercised mind as par

them, w shall find that *g neral d as* are fictions and co tri an es f the mind, that rry d ffi

oi th most bstract, comp ehens e, and diffi cult,) f t must be ther bliq r rectan gle, either equilateral, equicrural nor scal b t all and no of these t ce. I effect, it is something imperfect, that nn t exist an idea wher in some parts of se eral different and inconsistent ideas are p t tog ther It is true, the mind, in this imperf ct tate, has need of such ideas, and makes all th hast to them t can, f th co enien y of comm t d

us is eno gh to sh that th most bstra t and general deas are t those that the mind is first and most easily quainted w th, no such as its earliest kn wledg is co ersant bo t.

B ause percept f them the ther parts f our knowledg d not d p nd Seco dly from what has been said t plainly f ll ws, that these mag nified maxims ar n t th principles and f un d ti ns of all ur th kn wled e. For if there be gre t many ther truths, which ha as m ch self-evid ce as they and gre t many that w know before them, t is impossibl they h uld be the principles from which ded ce all th

er truths. Is t impossible to kn w that one and two are equal to three, but by irtue of this, r some such axiom, iz. the wh le is eq al to all its parts taken together? Many o e knows that o e and two are equal to three, w tho t ha ing heard tho ght on that or any other axiom by hich it might be pro ed and kn s t as certainly as any ther man knows, that the whol is equal to all its parts, or any ther max im and all from th sam reason of self evidence th equal ty of those deas being as is bl and cert in to him thout that o any other axi m as th t, t needing o proof to make it per cei ed. N after the knowledge, that th h le is equal t all its parts, does he know that one and two are equal t three better or more cer t inly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those deas, th wh l a d parts are more obscure, or t least more difficult t be settled in the mind than those of o e, two, and three. And ndeed I think, I may ask these men who will ceeds ha all kno ledge besides those gen al principles themsel es, to d pend o general nate, and self-ev dent principles. What principle is requis te to pro that one and o e are two that two and two are fou that three t mes o

called principles else that these are principles and if thes are to be counted principles, great part f numer t n will be so To which if we add all th self-ev d t propos tions which may be mad bout all ur distu t d as, princ ples will be alm t infinit at l ast um bl which men arri e t the knowledge of t differ ent es and a great ma y f these innate prin ciples they e er come to kno all their li es. But wh ther th y come in ew f the mind ear l er r later this is true f them, that they are all known by their nat ev d are wh lly in d pendent ec n l ht, or are capabl of any proof from an ther m ch less th more particular from the m e gen al the more simpl from th m compo d d the more simpl and less bstra t being the most familiar and the eas and earli ppreh ded. B t whichever be the clearest d h e and That a, and be dif der dea f e, can t b t cer tainly know that th dea of n is th d a of ne,

Cf. Berk ley *Principle* I trod. § 3.
Cf. Bk. II ch. x. § 9.

Cf. ch. §§ 7 8.

them than it does to any other ideas These two general maxims amounting to no more in short but this that *the same is the same* and *the same is not different* are truths known in more particular instances as well as in those general maxims and known also in *particular instances before* these general maxims are ever thought on and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular ideas There is nothing more visible than that the mind without the help of any proof or reflection on either that the idea of white when it is in the mind is there and is not absent that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in his mind he knows each to be itself and not to be another and to be in his mind and not away when it is there with a certainty that cannot be greater and therefore the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty nor add anything to this So that in respect of identity our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one s own mind whether this proposition a circle is a circle be not as self evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms whatsoever is is and again whether this proposition blue is not red be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of as soon as it understands the words than it does of that axiom it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And so of all the like

5 II *In co-existence we have few self evident propositions Secondly* as to *co existence* or such a necessary connexion between two ideas that, in the subject where one of them is supposed there the other must necessarily be also of such agreement or disagreement as this the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self evident, though some there are v g the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our idea of body I think it is a self-evident proposition that two bodies cannot be in the same place.

6 III *In other relations we may have many Thirdly* As to the *relations of modes* mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality As equals taken from equals the remainder will be equal which with the rest of that kind however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these —that one and one are equal to two that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two and from the five fingers of the other hand two the remaining numbers will be equal These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers which at the very first hearing force the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness than those mathematical axioms

7 IV *Concerning real existence we have none Fourthly* as to *real existence* since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a First Being we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings not so much as demonstrative much less a self-evident knowledge and therefore concerning those there are no maxims.

8 *These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge* In the next place let us consider what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools that all reasonings are *Ex præcognitis et præconcessis* seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to suppose them to be *præcognita* Whereby I think are meant these two things first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind and secondly that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend

9 *Because maxims or axioms are not the truths we first knew First* That they are not the truths first known to the mind is evident to experience as we have shown in another place (Bk. I chap i) Who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother that its sucking bottle is not the rod long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And how many truths are there about numbers which it is obvious to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with and fully convinced of before it ever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians in their arguings do sometimes refer them? Whereof the reason is very plain for that which

¹ Cf ch ii. § 14 also ch i § 18

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t must n cessarily f llow that such self-ev dent truths must be first known which consist of deas th t are first in th mind. And th deas first in th mind t is evid nt, are those f particular things, from hence, by slo d grees, th understanding proceeds to some few ge eral es which being taken from the rdinary and famul iar bjects of sense, are settled in th mind, w th general names to them. Thus *particular id as* are first recei ed and distinguished and so knowl edg g t abo t them and next to them, th less general pecific, which are next to particular For bstract deas ar not so bvious easy to children, th yet unexercised mind as par ticular es. If th y seem so to grown men, t is only because by constant and f miliar use they are mad so F when nicely eflect upo them, w shall find that *g neral d as* are fi tions and co tri ances of th mind that carry diffi culty w th th m, and do n t so easily ffer th m sel es as w are pt to imagine. For example, does require som pains and skill to form the general idea of a trian le, (which is yet n e of th most bstra t, compreh n i e, and diffi cult,) f t mus be ther bliqu r rectan gle, neither equilateral, eq crural or scale b all and no of these t once. In effect, t is something imperfect, that cann t exist an idea wher in some parts of sev al differ t and inconsistent ideas are p t tog ther It is tru *the mind, in this imperfect tate, has eed of* such ideas, and makes all th has to th m t can f th co eniency of communication and enlar me t f knowledge to both which t is naturally ery much inclined But yet has reaso to suspect such deas are *marks f ur* imperf u t least, this is eno h to sh w tha th mos abstr t and g neral deas are t those that th mind is first and m t easily c quainted w th, no ch as ts earliest kn wledge is co rsan bout.

Because percepti f them th ther part f our knowledg do ot d pend Seco dly from what has bee said t plainly f ll ws, th t these mag nified maxims are not th principles and f un d ti ns of all ur ther kn led e. F if there be great many ther truths, which ha as m ch self-evid ce as they and great many that w know before them, t is impossibl th y hould be th principles *from* which w deduce all th er truths. Is t impossible to know that one and two are equal to three, b t by irtue of this, or some uch axi m, iz. the whole is equal to all ts parts taken together? Many one knows that e a d two are equal to three, w th t ha ing heard or thought on, that or any ther axi m by hich it might be proved and knows it as certainly as any ther man kn ws, that the h l is equal t all ts parts, or y ther max m h m reason of self ev dence

— cei ed. N r af er the knowledge, that the w is qual t all ts parts, does he *know* that one and two are equal to three, better or more cer tainly than he did bef e. Fo if there be any odds in those d as, th whol and parts are more ob- scure, or t least more difficult t be settled in th mind than those of one, two, and three. And indeed I think, I may ask these men who will needs h e all kn wledge besides those general principles themsel es, to d pend n general, in nate, d self-evid t principles. What principle is requisite t pro e that and o e are two that two and two are fo r that three times two are six. Which being known w thout any proof do evince That either all knowledge does not d pend certain *prae gnita* or general maxims, called principles or else that these are principles and if these are to be counted principles, a gre t part f numeratio will be so To which, if we add all th self-evid t pr pos t ns which may be mad about all ur distin t deas, p in ples will be almo t infinit t l ast in um bl which men arri e t the knowledge f at d ffer ent ges and great many of these nnate prin ciples they n er come t know all their l es. But wh ther they com in ew f th mind ar l er or later this is tru of them, that they are all kn wn by their nat e evid ce are wholly in d pendent no li ht, n are capabl of any proof from an ther m ch less the m particular from the more gen al o th more impl from th m compou d d th m e simpl and less bst t being the most famil ar and the eas er and arlier pprehend d. B t whichever be th cl arest deas, the evidence and certainty of all such proposit ns is in this, That man sees th sam d to be the sam idea, and infall bly pe es two different deas t be dif ferent deas F wh n a man has in his u d tanding th deas f and of two, th dea of yel w and th dea f bl e, he cann t but cer tainly know that th dea of is th idea of one,

Cf. Berkeley *Principle* Introd. § 3.
Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.
Cf. ch. §§ 7 8.

and not the idea of two and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow and not the idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind which he has distinct that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time which is a contradiction and to have none distinct is to have no use of our faculties to have no knowledge at all And therefore what idea soever is affirmed of itself or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true as soon as it understands the terms, without hesitation or need of proof or regarding those made in more general terms and called maxims

11 *What use these general maxims or axioms have* What shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By no means though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken to be [1] But since doubting in the least of what hath been by some men ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against as overturning the foundations of all the sciences it may be worth while to consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge and examine more particularly to what purposes they serve and to what not

(1) It is evident from what I as been already said that they are of no use to prove or confirm less general self-evident propositions

(2) It is as plain that they are not nor have been the foundations whereon any science hath been built There is I know a great deal of talk propagated from scholastic men of sciences and the maxims on which they are built but it has been my ill luck never to meet with any such sciences much less any one built upon these two maxims *what is is a d it is impossible for the same thin to be and not to be* And I would be glad to be shown where any such science erected upon these or any other general axioms is to be found and should be obliged to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on these or any such like maxims that could not be shown to stand as firm w thout any consideration of them I ask Whether these general

silence wranglers and put an end to dispute But I think that nobody will therefore say that the Christian rel gion is built upon these maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it s derived from these principals It is from revelation we have received it and without revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it When we find out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before When God declares any truth to us this is a revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit and we are advanced in our knowledge. But in neither of these do we receive our light or

immediately to us and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring veracity

(3) They are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences or new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr Newton in his never enough to be admired book [2] has demonstrated several propositions which are so many new truths, before unknown to the world and are further advances in mathematical knowl

These were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas as expressed

and advancing the sciences wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims Would those who have this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom no stone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge and of communicating it between the method of raising any science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is ad anced—they would see that those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first discoverers raised their admirable structures not the keys that unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge Though afterwards, hen schools were erected and sciences had their professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of maxims, i e laid down certain propositions which ere

[1] Cf Locke s *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet p 340 also p 263

[2] Cf ch ii § 4

[2] The *Principia*

self-evident, or to be recei ed for true which be ing settled in the minds of their scholars as un questionabl enties, they on occasion made use of, to co ince them of truths in particular in tances, that were n t so familiar t their minds as those general axi ms which had before been inculcated to th m, and carefully settled in their minds. Though these particular instances, when well reflected n, are no less self-ev dent to th understanding than th general maxims brought to confirm them and t was in those particular instances that the first discoverer f und the truth, w thout th help f th general maxims and so may any one else do, who w th attention co siders them.

Maxims f use in the posit f hat has b en disc er d, and silencing b t nat u angler To come, therefore, th use that is mad of maxims.

( ) They are of use, as has been bserved in the rdinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are d anced but of littl none in ad ancing th m further

(2) They are of use in disp tes, f r th silenc ing of bstinat wranglers, and bringing those co ests t some conclusi n. Wh ther need of them that end cam n t in th manner f ll w ing I cra lea t inquire. Th Schools ha g mad disp tatio th to chst f men s bilities, and th crit of kn wledge, ad judged tory t him that k pt the field and h tha had th las word was co cluded to ha the better of the argument, if not of th cause. But because by this means there was lik t be no de cis be wee skilful comb tants whilst on never failed of *medius terminus* t prove any pro positi and th ther could as constantly w th ou or w th distin ti n, deny th maj mi no t prev t, as m ch as could be running ou of disp tes into an endless train of syllogisms, certain ge eral propositi ns—most f them, in d ed self-ev d t—w introd ced into the Schools which being ch as all m allowed and agreed to, were looked as ge eral measures of truth, and served instead of principles (where the d putants had not lain down any ther between th m) be d which there was g ing and which mus not be receded from by either de. And thus these maxims, getting th name of prin ciples, bey nd which me in disp t could not retreat, were by mistake take be the riginals and sources from whence all knowledg began and the foundati ns whereo th sciences were built. Because when in their disputes they came to any of these, they topped there, and went no further the ma ter was d ermined. B t how much this is a mistake, hath been already shown.

How maxims came t be much i vogue This me thod of the Schools, which ha been tho ght th f u tains of knowledge, introd ced as I sup pose, the like use of these maxims into a great part of co ersation ut of th Schools, to st p the mouths of ca illers, whom any n is excused from argui g y l ger w th, when they deny these general self-ev dent p inciples recei ed by all reasonabl m n wh ha e o ce thought of them but yet their use herein is b t to put an end t wra gli g They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach n thing that is already d e by th intermediat ideas mad use of in the de bate, whose connexi n may be seen w tho t the help of those maxims, and so the truth kn wn be f re th maxim is prod ced, and th argument t

test f t ry And thus maxims ha e their use

men t oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, e. till they are red ced t contra dict themsel es, som established principles t is no wo der that they should n t in ci il con ersation be ashamed f that which in the Schools is counted irtu nd glory iz. obstinately t maintain that side f th question they ha chosen, hether tru false to the last extrem- ty even after co tion. A tran w y to at tain truth and knowledge and that which I think th rational part of mankind, n t corrupted by education, could scarce belie should ever be admitted amo gst th l ers f truth, and stu dents f rel gi o nature, introd ced int the semi aries f those h are t prop g t th truths of religi n philosophy amo gst the g ran and unco inced. How much such a w y of learning is lik t turn young men s minds from the incere search and l of truth nay and t make them doubt wh ther there is any such thin t least, w rth th adhering to I shall n t n w inquire. This I think, that, b ting those places, which bro ght th Perip t tick Philosophy in to their schools, where t co tinued many ges, w thout teaching th wo ld anythin b t the art of wrangling these maxims were n wh re thought th found ti ns n which th sciences wer b ilt, no th great helps to th ad an m t f kn wledge.

Of gr at us to top u angler disputes but f lit

tle use to the discovery of truths As to these general maxims, therefore they are as I have said of great use in disputes to stop the mouths of wranglers but *not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths* or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge For who ever began to build his knowledge on the general proposition *what is is* or *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* and from either of these as from a principle of science deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often involving contradictions one of these maxims as a touchstone may serve well to show whither they lead But yet *however fit to lay open the absurdity or mistake* of a man s reasoning or opinion they are of very little use for enlightening the understanding and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge which would be neither less nor less certain were these two general propositions *never thought on It is true as I have said they* sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler s mouth by showing the absurdity of *what he saith and by exposing him to the shame* of contradicting what all the world knows and he himself cannot but own to be true But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error and another to put him in possess on of truth and I would fain know what truths these two propos tions are able to teach and by their influence make us know which we did not know before or could not know without them Let us reason from them as well as we can they are only *about identical predications and influence if* any at all none but such Each part cular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as *clearly and certainly kno vn in itself if attended* to as either of these general ones only these general ones as serving in all cases are therefore more inculcated and insisted on *As to other less* general maxims many of them are no more than bare verbal propos tions and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another 'The whole is equal to all its parts what real truth I beseech you does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim than what the signification of the ord *totum* or the *whole* does of itself import? And he that kno s that the *wo d* whole stands for what is made up of all its parts knows very little less than that the whole is equal to all its parts And upon the same ground I think that this proposition A hill is higher than a valley and several the like may also pass for maxims. But yet masters of mathemat cs when they would as teachers of what they know initiate others in that science, do not without reason

place *this and some other such* maxims at the entrance of their systems that their scholars having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions made in such general terms may be used to make such reflections and have these more general propositions as formed rules and sayings ready to apply to all particular cases *Not that if they be equally* weighed they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to con*firm but that* being more *familiar to the mind* the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding But this I say is more from our custom of using them and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them than from the different evidence of the things But before custom has settled methods of

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better *in that particular instance than by this* general proposition 'The whole is equal to all its parts and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other *the general* h more need to be let into his mind by the par

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the mind takes the quite contrary course and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can makes those familiar to its thoughts and accustoms itself to have recourse to them as to the standards of truth and false*hood By which familiar use of them* as rules to measure the truth of other propositions, it comes in time to be thought that more particular prop*os tions have their truth and evidence from their* conform ty to these more general ones, which in discourse and argumentation are so frequently urged *and constantly admitted And this* I think to be the reason why amongst so many self evident propositions the *most general o ly* have h d l t tl *of maxims*

I

general maxims That they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true kno l edge that *if our notions be wrong loose* or unsteady and eres gn up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than fix them on settled deter*mined ideas of th ngs I say these general max*ims w ll serve to confirm us in mistakes and in such a way of use of words, which is most com*mon will serve to pro e contrad ctions* v g he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind an

idea of what he calls body to be n thing but ex tension, may easily demonstrate that there is n acuum, i.e. no space oid of body by this max im, *What is is* For the idea t which he annexes the name body being bare extension, his knowl edge that space cannot be w thout body is cer tain. For h knows his own idea of ext nsion clearly and distinctly and knows that t is what t is, and not an ther dea, th gh t be called by these three names,—extension, body space. Which three words, standing f one and the same idea, may no doubt, w th the same evidence and certainty be affirmed ne of another as each of tself and t is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same idea, this predica tion is as true and identical in ts signification, that space is body as this predication is true and identical, that body is body" both in si nificatio and sound.

3 *Instanc in acuum.* B t if another should come a d make t himself another idea, differ ent from Descartes s, of the thing, which yet w th Descartes he calls by the same name body and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body t be of thing that hath both extension and solidity together h will as easily demo strate, that there may be acuum or space w th out body as Descartes demonstrated the con trary Because the idea t which h gi es the name space being barely the simpl one of extension, and the idea to which he gi es the name body being the complex idea of extensio and resist ibility or solidity tog ther in the same sub ject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the understandin as distinct as the ideas of ne and two white and black, or as of *orpor ty* and *humanity* if I may use those barbarous terms and theref re th predication of them in our minds, or in word st d r

p position. —*7*

4. *But they prov not the existence f thing without us* But yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, iz. that there may be acuum, and that there cannot be acuum, by these two certain principles, viz. *hat is is*, and *the same thing cannot b and not be* yet neither of these principles will serve t prov to us, that any what bodies do exist for that we are left t our senses to discover to us as far as they can. Those uni ersal and self-evident prin ciples being only our constant, clear and distinct knowledge of our own d as, more general or co n prehensi e, can assure us of nothing that passes w thout the mind their certainty is founded nly upo th knowledge we ha e of each dea by it self and of ts distinction from others, about wh ch we cann t be mistaken whilst they are in our minds though we may be and often are mistaken when we retain the names w thout the deas or use them confusedly sometimes for one and some times for another idea. In which cases the force of these axioms, reaching only to the sound, and n t the signification of the words, serves nly to lead us int confusion, mistake, and error It is t show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of truth, will not secure them from error in careless loose use of their words, that I ha e made this remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use f r the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous use in und termined d as, I ha e been far enough from saying o int ding they sh uld be laid asid as some ha been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths and so cannot be laid aside. As far as their infl ence will reach, t is in ain to endea our no will I ttempt, t abridge t. But yet, w thout any injury t truth o knowledge, I may ha e reason to think their use is n t ansi erabl to th great stress which seems to be laid on them and I may warn men not t mak an ill use of them, for the confirming th msel es in errors.

5. *They cannot add to our knowledg f substances and their pplication to omple ideas is dangerous* B t l t them be of what use they will in erbal prop ositions, they cannot discover or prove t us the least knowledge of the nature of substances, as they are found and exist w thout us, any further than grounded n experience. And though the consequence of these two propositions, called principles, be ery clear and their use not dan gerous or hurtful, in the probation of such things wherein there is n need t all of them f proof but such as are clear by themsel es w thout them, viz. where our deas are [determined] and kn wn by th names that tand for them. y t when these principles, iz. *what is is* and *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* are mad use of in the probation f propositions wherein are words standing f complex ideas, g man, horse, gold, irtue there they are of infinit danger and most commonly make men receive and retain false hood for manifest truth, and uncertainty for dem nstratio po which f llow error bstinacy and all th mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these principles are less true or of less force in pro ing

propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas than where the propositions are about simple ideas But because men mistake generally —thinking that where the same terms are preserved the propositions are about the same things though the ideas they stand for are in truth different therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum So that whilst men take words for things as usually they do these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions as shall yet be further made manifest

16 *Instance in demonstrations about man which can only be verbal* For instance let *man* be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything and we shall see that so far as demonstration is by these principles it is only verbal and gives us no certain universal true proposit on or knowledge of any being existing without us First a child having framed the idea of a man it is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the painter makes of

he calls man whereof white or flesh colour in England being one the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle *It is impossible for the me thi g to be and not to be* that a negro is *not* a man the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition which perhaps he ne er heard nor thought of but the clear distinct perception he hath of his o n simple deas of black and white which he cannot be persuaded to take nor can ever mistake one for another whether he knows that maxim or no And to this child or any one who hath such an idea which he calls man can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul because his dea of man includes no such not on or idea in t And therefore to him, the princ ple of *What is is* pro es not this matter but t depends upon collect on and observation by which he is to make his complex idea called man

17 *Another instance* Secondly Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls ma and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men by this maxim *it is imp ssible fo the same th g t be and not to be* and I ha e discoursed ith very rational men who have actually denied that they are men

18 *A third instance* Thirdly Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls *man*

that a man may have no hands but be *quad upes* neither of those being included in his idea of man and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined that was a man because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that *What is is*

19 *Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas* So that if rightly considered I think we may say That where our ideas are determined in our minds and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations there is little need or no use at all of these maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions without the help of these and the like maxims will not be helped by these max

requires nor admits any proof one part of it more

that two are equal to two will also have need of a proof to make him admit that what is, is. He that needs a probat on to convince him that two are not three that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle &c or any other two [determined] dist nct ideas are not one and the same will need also a demonstration to convince him that *It is imp ssible fo the same thi to be and not to be*

20 *The r use da gerous wher ur deas re not d termined* And as these maxims are of l ttle use where we ha e determined ideas so they are as I have sho n of dangerous use where our ideas are not determ ned and where we use ords that are not annexed to det m ned ideas but such as are of a loose and wande ing s gn fication sometimes standing for one and sometimes for othe idea from hich follo v mistake and er

confirm and rivet.

Chap. VIII Of Trifling Propositions

Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge

Wh ther the maxims tre ted of in the foregoin chap er be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed, I lea t be considered. This, I think, ma confidently be affirmed That there are universal propositions, which, tho h they be certainly true, yet they add no li ht to ur u derstanding b ing n increase t ur knowledge. S ch are—

Identical propositions. As First. All purely identical propositions These ob usly a d t first blush ppear to co tain no instruction in them for when w affirm th said term of tself wheth er be barel verbal, or whether t co tains any clear and real idea, t show us nothin but what e must certainl know before whether such proposition be either mad by or proposed to us. Indeed, tha most general one *what is,* may serve sometimes t show a man the bsurdity h is guilty o, when, by circumlocution or equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of tself because nobody will so penl bid defiance to common sense, as to affirm visib and direct co trad ct ns in plain words or if he does, ma is excused if he breaks ff an furth disc urse w th him. B t y t I think I ma sa that either that rece ed maxim, nor any ther dentical proposition, teaches us an thin and thou h in such kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boas ed to be th foundation of d monstration, ma be and of n is mad use of to confirm them, yet all proves amounts no more than this, Tha the same word ma w th great certainty be affirmed of tself w tho t an doubt of the truth of any such proposition and le me add, also, w thout an real knowledge.

3. *Example* For t this rate, any ery gnorant person, wh but mak propositi and know wha he me ns when h sa s y or no, may make million of propositions of whose truth he ma be infallibl certain, and ye not know ne thing in the world thereby g what is soul, is soul or soul is soul spiri is a spiri f tiche is f tiche &c. These all bein equivalent to this propositi n, viz. *what is,* e. what hath existence hath exis ence or who hath soul, hath soul. What is this more than triflin w th words. I is but like monkey shifting his oyster from *one hand to the* other and had h but words, migh no doubt ha e said, 'Oy er in right hand is subject, and oys er in lef hand is

stan ng

kno ledge and bulk together

H w d t lf p n as are trif g I know there are some who, because dentical propositions are self-evident, show a great concern for them, and think they do gre t service to philosophy by crying them up as if in th m was co tai ed all kn ledge, and the und rstand g were led into all truth by th m only I grant as f rwardly as an one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant further that the foundat o of all our knowledge lies in the f culty we ha e of perce ing the same dea to be the same, nd

tions, f th imp ment of knowledge from the imputati n of trifling, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the will is the will, or lay what tress n t h th nks fit of what use is this, and an infinit th like propositi ns, for the enlarging our knowledge Let man bou d as m ch as th pl nty f words which he has ill permit, in such propositi ns as these law is law and obligation

or thers in the knowled e of morality Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know what is ri ht and what is wrong, nor th measures of them, can w th as much assurance make and in fall bly kn w th truth of thes d all uch propositi ns, as h that best instructed in morality can do. B t wha ad ance do such propositi ns g e in th kno led of anythin necessary useful for th ir co duct.

maxims as these substan is bstance and body is body a acuum is acuum, and ortex is ortex ce taur is centaur and chimera is chimera, &c. For these and all such ar qu lly tru qually e ta n d equally self-evident. B t yet they cannot but be counted trifling when mad use of as principles of instructi n, and tress laid n them as helps to

Cf. ch. § 4 iii. § 8 also Aristotle *Prior Analytics* I. 3 *Metaphysics* Bk. IV chh. iii, vii.

See also ch. ii. §

propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas than where the propositions are about simple ideas But because men mistake generally —thinking that where the same terms are preserved the propositions are about the same things though the ideas they stand for are in truth different therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum So that whilst men take words for things as usually they do these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions as shall yet be further made manifest

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he calls man whereof white or flesh colour in England being one the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle *It is impossible f r the same th ng to be and not to be* that a negro is n t a man the foundation of his certainty being *not that universal proposition which perhaps he* ne er heard nor thought of but the clear distinct perception he hath of his o n simple deas of black and white which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can e er mistake one for another whether he knows that max m or no And to this child or any one ho hath such an idea h ch he calls man can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul because his dea of man includes no such not on or idea n it And therefore to him, the principle of *What i is* proves not this matter but t depends upon collection and observation by which he is to make his complex idea called man

17 *A other inst ce* Secondly Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls *man* and to the out ard shape adds laughter and rational discourse may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men by this maxim *it is impo sible f r the sam thi g to be and not to be* and I have discoursed w th very

rational men who have actually denied that they are men

18 *A third instance* Thirdly Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls *man*, only out of the ideas of body in general and the powers of language and reason and leaves out the shape wholly this man is able to demonstrate that a man may have no hands but be *quadruf s neither of those being included in his idea of man* and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined that was a man because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that *What is is*

19 *Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas* So that if rightly considered *I think* we may say *That* where our ideas are determined in our minds and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations there is little need or no use at all of these maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions without the help of these and the like maxims will not be helped by these max

requires nor admits any proof one part of it more

that two are equal to t o ill also have need of a proof to make him admit that hat is, is. He that needs a probation to con ince him that t o are not three that hite is not black that a triangle is not a circle &c or any other two [determ ned] dist nct ideas are not one and the same will need also a demonstrat on to convince him that *It is imp ssibl f r the same th n t be and t to be*

20 *Thei use da ger us where our ideas are not d termined* And as these maxims are of l ttle use

are not annexed to determined ideas but such as are of a loose and ander ng s gnif cat on somet mes stand ng for one and sometimes for another idea from hich follo mistake and error wh ch these maxims (brought as proofs to establish propo tions herein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by their author ty confirm and rivet.

ambling horse, or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this—That body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man and where they are not to be found together the name man belongs not to that thing and so of the other—That body sense, and a certain way of going with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfrey, and when they are not to be found together the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man — e.g. suppose a Roman signified by the word *homo* all these distinct ideas united in one subject, *corporietas, sensibilitas, potentia se movendi, rationalitas, risibilitas*, he might, no doubt, with great certainty universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word *homo* but did no more than say that the word *homo* in his country comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by the word *palfrey* signified these ideas —body of a certain figure, four legged with sense motion, ambling neighing white, used to have a woman on his back—might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfrey but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfrey in his or romance language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was wanting But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word *man* stands for and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal.

7. *For this teaches but the signification of words* Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words who makes such a proposition, which when it is made contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before e.g. a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow And this is no further tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him and then it teaches only the signification of that word, and the use of that sign.

8. *But no real knowledge* We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty The one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty but not instructive. And, secondly we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it. as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles. Which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge.

9. *General propositions concerning substances are often trifling* We having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make any universal certain propositions concerning them, any further than our nominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those which depend on their real *constitutions*, the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined and propositions consisting of such terms, may with the same clearness, be deduced one from another as those that convey the most real truths and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. By

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxii.

knowledge since they teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse knows without being told viz that the same term is the same term and the same idea the same idea And upon this account it was that I formerly did and do still think, the offering and inculcating such propositions in order to give the understanding

and he that would enlarge his own or another s mind to truths he does not yet know must find out intermediate ideas and then lay them in such order one by another that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question Propositions that do this are instructive but they are far from such as affirm the same term of itself which is no way to advance one s self or others in any sort of knowledge It no more helps to that than it would help any one in his learning to read to have such propositions as these inculcated to him— An A is an A and a B is a B which a man may know as well as any schoolmaster and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives Nor do these or any such identical propositions help *him one jot forwards in the skill of reading let* him make what use of them he can

If those who blame my calling them trifling propositions had but read and been at the pains to understand what I have above writ in very plain English they could not but have seen that by identical propositions I mean only such wherein the same term importing the same idea is affirmed of itself which I take to be the proper signification of identical propositions and concerning all such I think I may continue safely to say that to propose them as instructive is no better than trifling For no one who has the use of reason can miss them where it is necessary they should be taken notice of nor doubt of their truth when he does take notice of them.

But if men will call propositions *identical* wherein the same term is not affirmed of itself whether they speak more properly than I others must judge this is certain all that they say of propositions that are not identical in my sense concerns not me nor what I have said all that I have said relating to those propositions wherein the same term is affirmed of itself And I would fain see an instance wherein any such can be made use of to the advantage and improvement of any one s knowledge Instances of other kinds whatever use may be made of them concern not me as not being such as I call identical

4 II *Secondly propositions in which a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole* Another sort of trifling propositions is *when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole* a part of the definition of the word defined Such are all propositions wherein the *genus is predicated of* the species or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms For what information what knowledge carries this proposition in it viz

Lead is a metal to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified by the name lead Indeed to a man that knows the signification of the word metal and not of the word lead it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead by saying it is a metal which at once expresses several of its simple ideas than to enumerate them one by one telling him it is a body very heavy fusible and malleable.

5 *As part of the definition of the term defined* Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name

with sounds to affirm that of the name gold which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely as a truth of *moment* that gold is yellow and I see not how it is any

What instruction can it carry with it to tell one that wh ch he hath been told already or *he is* ... For I am supposed to

body yet o ...
not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition and gravely say all gold is fusible Such propositions can only serve to

with them but of the signification of words however certain they be

6 *Inst*
an mal
tion as can ...
knowledge of things than to say a palfrey is an

Chap. IX. Of our Threefold Knowledge of Existence

essences or ... ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understanding,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence; and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would

another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, and how we come by it. I say, then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of other things by sensation.

3. *Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive.* As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience[3] then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious

to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.

Chap. X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God

characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being;[4] yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But, though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable of *knowing*, i.e. *being certain* that there is a God, and *how we may come by* this certainty, I think we need go no further than *ourselves*, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.

2. *For man knows that he himself exists.* I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is *something that actually exists*.

3. *He knows also that nothing cannot produce a being; therefore something must have existed from eternity.* In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare *nothing can no more produce any*

Especially in ch. ..., also Bk. III. ch. ...

1 Cf. ch. ... § 7 ... § 4, iii, § ... iv §§ 4 ...

2 Cf. Bk. II. chh. xxiii and xxviii § 2.

3 Cf. Descartes, *Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting the Reason*, iv.

4 Cf. ch. ii § 4, ch. xi.

Cf. Bk. I. ch. iii §§ 8–6.

Cf. ch. ix § 3.

this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things v g he that having learnt these following words with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them v g *substance man animal form soul vegetative sensitive rational* may make several undoubted propositions about the soul without knowing at all what the soul really is and of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions reasonings and conclusions in books of metaphysics school divinity and some sort of natural philosophy and after all know as little of God spirits or bodies as he did before he set out

10 *And why* He that hath liberty to define i e to determine the signification of his names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect who makes them stand for his own ideas) and makes their significations at a venture taking them from his own or other men s fancies and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves may with little trouble demonstrate them one of another according to those several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another wherein how ever things agree or disagree in their own nature he needs mind nothing but his own notions with the names he hath bestowed upon them but thereby no more increases in his own knowledge than he does his riches who taking a bag of counters calls one in a certain place a pound another in another place a shilling and a third in a third place a penny and so proceeding may undoubtedly reckon right and cast up a great sum according to his counters so placed and standing for more or less as he pleases without being one jot the richer or without even knowing how much a pound shilling or penny is but only that one is contained in the other twenty times and contains the other twelve which a man may also do in the signification of words by making them in respect of one another more or less or equally comprehensive

11 *Thirdly using words variously is trifling with them* Though yet concerning most words used in discourses equally argumentative and controversial there is this more to be complained of which is the worst sort of trifling and which sets us yet further from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them or find in them viz that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things that they use their words loosely and uncertainly and do not by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations make plain and clear deductions of words one from another and make their discourses coherent and clear (how little soever they were instructive) which were not difficult to do did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms to which perhaps inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute

12 *Marks of verbal propositions* To conclude Barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks

Predication in abstract First All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of sounds For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term it can signify no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two names signify the same idea Thus should any one say that parsimony is frugality that gratitude is justice that this or that action is or is not temperate however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem yet when we come to press them and examine nicely what they contain we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms

13 *A part of the definition predicated of any term* Secondly All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term are only verbal v g to say that gold is a metal or heavy And thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive words, called genera are affirmed of subordinate or less comprehensive called species or individuals are barely verbal

When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ... signification of words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs

This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule That wherever the distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood This perhaps if well heeded might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute and very much shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge

the things that are made, even his eternal po ver and Godhead. Though ur w being furnishes us, as I ha e shown, w th an ev dent and incon testible proof of Deity and I believ nobody can o d the cogency of t, who will but as carefully ttend to t, as to any ther demonstration rt th s being so fundamental

n th h more ev dent than that someth g must

ectly othing This being of all bsurdities the gre test, t imagi that pure nothing th per fect negation and absence of all beings, sh uld ever prod ce any real existence.

It being then una o d ble f r all ratio al creatures to co clud that somethin has existed from ernity l t us ext see what kind f thing that must be.

9. *T sorts f bei g gitative and inc tative* There are b t two sorts of beings in the world

Secondly sensible, thinking percei ing beings, such as we find ursel es t be. Which if yo please. w will hereafter call gitatir and incogitatir beings which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial.

I cogitati. bei annot produc gitat b ing If, th n, there must be something ternal l t us see wha so t of bein t must be And t that t is ery bv ous reason, that t must necessaril be cogitati bein For t is as impossibl to co that e bare cogitati e m tt should produce thinking intelligent being as that nothing should of tself prod ce matt Let us suppose an parcel of ma er ternal, gre t small w shall find t, in tself bl t prod ce thing For exampl l us suppose th matt of th ex pebbl w meet w th ternal, closely m ed and the parts firmly t rest together if there were no ther being in th w ld must t ernally remain so, d ad ina ti e lump I possible conceive t can dd mo t t self bein purely ma ter or prod ce anything Ma ter then, by ts own trength, cann t produce in tself so much as motion the motio t has must also be from eternity or else be pro d ced and added to m tter by some oth r being more powerful than matter matter as is ev dent, ha ing ot power to produce motion in tself But l t us suppose motio ternal too y t mat te c g t t matte and m tion what r ch ges t m ght produce of figure and bulk could ne e prod ce th ught kn wledg will still be as far beyond the power of mot n and matter to prod ce, as matter is beyond th pow er of n thin or nonentity to produce. And I appeal t e ery ne own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conc matter produced by *nothing* as thought t be produced by pure matter when bef r there was no such th g as thought or an intelligent being existing D ide matter into as many parts as you will (which w are pt t imagin a sort f spirituali ing o making a thinkin thing of t,) ary the figure and mo of t as much as you please—a globe cube, co e, prism, cylinder &c. whose diam eters are but oo oooth part of *gry* will per ate no th rwise upon ther bodies of propo tionabl bulk, than those of an inch foot diam eter and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, th ght, and kn wledge, by p tting together in a certain figure and mot gross particles of matter as by those that are the ery minutest that d y h re exist. They knock, impel, and resist e other just as th greater d and that is all they can do. So that, if we will

is evident fr m h nce, that then sense, percep t n and kn wledge *must be* property t nally nseparabl from matt and every part cle of t. N t t add that th gh our general spe *cif* co ception f matter makes us peak of t as

A *gry* is enth of lin line ne enth f an inch, an inch ne-tenth of philosophical foo philosophical foot ne-third f pendulum, whose diadroms, in th latitud f forty fi e d be th common measure in the Commonwealth f Let ers.

See Locke correspo d nce w th M lyneux in Dec. 692 and Jan 693

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. §

real being than it can be equal to two right angles [1] If a man knows not that nonentity or the absence of all being cannot be equal to two right angles it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid If therefore we know there is some real being and that nonentity cannot produce any real being it is an evident demonstration that *from eternity there has been something* since what was not from eternity had a beginning and what had a beginning must be produced by something else

4 *And that eternal Being must be most powerful* Next it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source This eternal source then of all being must also be the source and original of all power and so *this eternal Being must be also the most powerful*

5 *And most knowing* Again a man finds in *himself* perception and knowledge We have then got one step further and we are certain now that there is not only some being but some knowing intelligent being in the world There was a time then when there was no knowing being and when knowledge began to be or else there has been also *a knowing being from eternity* If it be said there was a time when no being had any knowledge when that eternal being was void of all understanding I reply that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge and operating blindly and without any perception should produce a knowing being as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter that it should put into itself sense perception and knowledge as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones [2]

6 *And therefore God* Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth — *That there is an eternal most powerful and most knowing Being* which whether any one will please to call God it matters not The thing is evident [3] and from this idea duly considered will easily be deduced all those other attributes which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being If nevertheless any one should be found so senselessly arrogant as to suppose man alone knowing and wise but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (l ii De Leg) to be considered at his leisure What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend should be moved and managed without any reason at all? *Quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat nulla ratione moveri putet?*

From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is anything else without us When I say we *know* I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries

7 *Our idea of a most perfect Being not the sole proof of a God* How far the *idea* of a most perfect being which a man may frame in his mind does or does not prove the *existence* of a God I will not here examine For in the different make of men s tempers and application of their thoughts some arguments prevail more on one and some on another for the confirmation of the same truth But yet, I think this I may say that it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing atheists to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation and take some men s having that idea of God in their minds, (for it is evident some men have none and some worse than none and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity and out of an over fondness of that darling invention cashier or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world being understood by

[1] Cf Bk II ch xxi § 1 ch xxvii § 1 also Locke s *First Letter* to Stillingfleet pp 135–6
[2] Cf ch iii § 6
[3] Cf Bk II ch xxi § 33–36

to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and I challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one above another.

§ III. *The eternal system of incogitative matter cannot be thinking.* If then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking being; nor all matter, as matter, i.e. every particle of matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is some certain *system* of matter, duly put together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, I imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would have him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: for to suppose the eternal thinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts; than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.

And that whether this corporeal system is in motion or at rest. But further: this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges above one atom.

If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be regulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the cause of motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: so that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the same thing: not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before mentioned; since, let this thinking system be all or a part of the matter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle should either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particle; and so regulate its own thoughts or motions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion.

18. *Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.* Secondly, Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, though it take not away the being of a God, yet, since it denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty years since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that *you* is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made began not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too;) therefore when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things that are not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible for a material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well considered, creation of a spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how *matter* might at first be made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being: but to give beginning and being to

one thing yet really all matter is not one individual thing neither is there any such thing existing as *one* material being or *one* single body that we know or can conceive And therefore if matter were the eternal first cogitative being there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative being but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative beings independent one of another of limited force and distinct thoughts which could never produce that order harmony and beauty which are to be found in nature Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it and actually have at least all the perfections that can ever

follows that the first eternal being cannot be matter

11 *Therefore there has been an eternal co itative Be in* If therefore it be evident that something

Though this discovery of the *ecess ry existence of an eternal Mind* does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God since it will hence follow that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he gives them and therefore if he made those he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe —all inanimate beings whereby his omniscience power and providence will be established and all his other attributes necessarily follow yet to clear up this a little further we will see what doubts can be raised against it

13 *Wheth r the ete nal Mind may be also material or no Fi st* Perhaps it will be said that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it that there must be an eternal Being and that Being must also be knowing yet it does not follow but that thinking Being may also be *material* Let it be so it equally still follows that there is a God For if there be an eternal omniscient omnipotent Being it is certain that there is a God whether you imag ne that Be ng to be material or no *But herein I suppose lies the danger and* deceit of that supposit on —there being no way to avoid the demonstration that there is an eternal knowing Being men devoted to matter would willingly have it granted that this knowing Being is material and then letting slide out of their minds or the discourse the demonstration whereby an eternal *knowing* Being was proved necessarily to exist would argue all to be matter and so deny a God that is an eternal cogitative Being whereby they are so far from establishing that they destroy their own hypothesis For if there can be in their opinion eternal matter without any eternal cogitative Being they manifestly separate matter and thinking and suppose no necessary connexion of the one *with the other and so establish the necessity of* an eternal Spirit but not of matter since it has been proved already that an eternal co itati e Being is unavoidably to be granted Now if thinking and matter may be separated the eter*nal existence of matter will not follo from the* eternal existence of a cogitative Being and they

satisfy themselves or others that this eternal thinking Being is material

I I would ask them whether they imagine that all matter *every particle of matter* thinks? This I suppose they will scarce say since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of matter and so an infinity of gods And yet, if they will not allow matter as matter that is every particle of matter to be as well cogitative as extended they will have as hard a task to make out to their o n reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts if I may so speak

15 II *Secondly because one particle al ne of matter c nnot be cogitative* If all matter does not think I next ask Whether it be *only ne at m* that does so? This has as many absurdities as the other for h n his atom of matter must be alone eternal

thinking atom to have p oduced all the rest o *matter they cannot ascribe that pre eminency* to it upon any other account than that of its th nking the only supposed d fference But allow it to be by some other way which is abo e our conception it must st ll be creat on and these men must give up their great maxim, *Ex nih lo nil fit* If it be said that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom, it w ll be to say anything at pleasure though ever so absurd. For

is certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of anything, but a man's self alone, and of God.

3. *This notice by our senses, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us.* The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of *knowledge*. If we persuade our selves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own thoughts,) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contrary to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me: since, by their different application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is.

But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons:—

4. I. *Confirmed by concurrent reasons:—First, because we cannot have ideas of sensation but by the inlet of the sense.* It is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses: because those that want the *organs* of any sense, never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them: for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smell roses in the winter: but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.

5. II. *Secondly, Because we find that an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very distinct perceptions.* Because sometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay by *that* idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure,) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not *both* memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without.

6. III. *Thirdly, because pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensation, accompanies not the returning of those ideas without the external objects.* Add to this, that many of those ideas are *produced in us with pain*, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome; and is again, when actually repeated: which is occasioned by the disorder the

which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of *pleasure* accompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a certainty approach-

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxx. § 2.

a *spirit* would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them or to inquire so far as grammar itself would authorize if the common settled opinion opposes it especially in this place where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose and leaves this past doubt that the creation or beginning of any one SUBSTANCE out of nothing being once admitted the creation of all other but the CREATOR himself may with the same ease be supposed

19 *Objection Creation out of nothin* But you will say Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing *since we cannot possibly conceive it?* I answer No Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being because we cannot comprehend its operations We do not deny other effects upon this ground because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves in all our voluntary mot ons which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds and are not nor can be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it For example my right hand writes whilst my left hand is still What causes rest in one and mot on in the other? Nothing but my will —a thought of my mind my thought only changing the right hand rests and the left hand moves This is matter of fact, which cannot be den ed explain this and make it intelligible and then the next step will be to understand creation For the giving a new determination to the motion of the an mal spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot To alter the determination of motion being in this case no easier nor less than to give motion itself since the new determination gi en to the animal spirits must be either immediately by thought or by some other body put in their way by thought wh ch was not in their way before and so must o e its motion to thought either of which lea es

ities, and to conclude all things impossible to be done whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension This is to make our comprehension infinite or God finite when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of it If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind that thinking thing within you do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind who made and governs all things and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain

Chap XI *Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things*

1 *Knowledge f the existence of other finite beings is to be had only by actual sensation* The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition The existence of a God reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown

The knowledge of the existence of *a y other thing* we can have only by *sensation* for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any *idea* a man hath in his memory nor of any other existence but that of God with the existence of any particular man no particular man can know the existence of any other being but only when by actual operating upon him it

m n evide ces his being in the world or the

us notice of the existence of other things and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us which causes[2] that idea in us though perhaps we neither know nor cons der how it does it For it takes not from the certainty of our senses and the ideas we receive by them, that e know not the manner wherein they are produced v g whilst I write this I have by the paper affecting my eyes that idea produced in my mind which whateve object causes, I call *wh te* by which I know that that quality or accident (i e whose appearance before my eyes always causes that dea) *doth really exist* and hath a being without me And of this, the greatest assurance I can poss bly have and to which my facult es can attain is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this t h test mony I have reason to rely on

[1] Cf ch ii. § 14 also Bk II ch viii.
[2] Cf. Bk II ch xxi. § 2

since there is no *necessary connexion* of his existence a minute since w th his existence n w by a thou sand w ys he may cease t be, since I had th testimony of my senses fo his existence. And if I cannot be certain that the man I saw last to-d y now in being I can less be certain that h is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I ha e not seen since yesterd y or since the last year and much less can I be certain of the exist nce of men that I never saw And, therefore though t be hi hly probable that milli ns of men d now exist, yet, whilst I am al ne, writ ing this, I ha e not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge tho gh the great likeli hood of t p ts me past doubt, and t be reason able for me t do several things upon the co fidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, w th whom I ha to d) n in the world but this is but probability n t kn l ed e.

10. *Folly t exp t dem nst t t erythin.* Whereby y t we may bserve h w foolish and ain thing t is for man of a narrow knowl edge who ha ing reaso gi en him t judge of the different ev dence and probability of things, and t be swayed accordin ly h w ain, I say t is to expe t d monstr ti n and certainty in things t capabl of t and refuse assent t ery rational proposi ns, and ct co trary t ery plain and cl ar truths, because they cann t be ev d t, as t surmount every the

I

ure t and I would fain know wha is he could d pon such gro nds as are capabl of no do b no bjecti n.

Past existenc f other th ng is know by mem ory As hen ur sens ar *actually empl y d bout any obj t w d kn w th t t does exist so by ur memory* w may be assured tha heretof re things h affected ur senses ha exis ed. And thus e ha e knowledge of th pas existence of sev al things, whereof ur senses ha ing inf rmed us, our memories ill retain the ideas and of this w are past all doubt, so lo g as w remember well B t this knowledg also reaches no further than ur senses ha e forme ly assured us. Thus, seeing w er t this instant, t is an unquestion bl truth t me that w ter d th exist and remembering hat I saw t yesterd y t will also be alw ys true and as lo g as my memory retains it al ays an undoubted proposition to me, that water d d exist the 10th of July 1688 as it will also be equally true that a certain number of d t wh ch at the same time

the wat r doth now exist, than tha or col urs therein do so t being no more necessary that w ter should exist to-day because t xisted yesterday than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day because they existed yesterday th ugh t be exceedingly much more probable because water hath been observed to continue l g in existence but bubbles, and the colours n them, quickly cease to be.

12 *The existence f other finite pirits not know ble and is o faith.* What id as we ha e of pir ts, and how e come by them, I ha e already sh h h we ha e those deas in ur n

t

1

are finite spirits really exis ing ha e of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any on has of fairies o entaurs, h can come t know that things answering those d as do really exist.

And therefore co cerning th existence of fin t spirits, as well as several ther things, e must co tent urseI es w th the ev dence of faith but uni ersal, certain propositions concerning this matter are beyo d ur reach. F ho ever true t may be, g that all the intelligent pirits that God ever created d still exist, yet t can never mak part of ur certain kn wledge. These and th like propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are ot, I fear in this state capa bl of knowing W are not then, t put thers upon d monstrating n r oursel es upo search of uni ersal ce tainty in all those matters where in w are not capabl of any other knowledge, but what our senses gi e us in this or that par ticular

3. *Only particular pr positi ns concernin concr t*

Cf. I troduction, §§ 5-7

Cf. Bk. II ch. xi § 9.
See Bk II. ch. xxiii. §§ 5. 5. 9-2 8 Bk. IV ch. iii. § 7
Cf. ch. xv § 3 ch. iii. § 2 ch. ix. § 3.

ing to that of demonstration itself For it would be very strange that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth that two angles of a figure which he measures by lines and angles of a dia gram should be bigger one than the other and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and an gles which by looking on he makes use of to meas ure that by

7 IV *Fourthly because our senses assist one anoth er s testimony of the existence of outward thin s and en ble us to predict* Our *senses* in many cases *bear witness to the truth of each other s report* concerning the existence of sensible things without us He

certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom unless that the pain be a fancy too which yet he cannot when the burn is well by raising the idea of it bring upon himself again

Thus I see, whilst I write this I can change the appearance of the paper and by designing the letters tell *beforehand* what new idea it shall *exhibit the very next moment* by barely drawing my pen over it which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands stand still or though I move my pen if my eyes be shut nor when those characters are once made on the paper can I choose afterwards but see them as they are that is have the ideas of such letters as I have made Whence it is manifest that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination when I find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts do not obey them nor yet cease to be whenever I shall fancy it but continue to affect my senses constantly and regularly according to the figures I made them. To which if we will add that the s ght of those shall from another man draw such sounds as I beforehand design they shall stand for there will be little reason left to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me when they cause a long series *of regular sounds to affect my ears* which could not be the effect of my imagination nor could

cal as to distrust his senses and to affirm that all we see and hear *feel and taste think and do* during our whole being is but the ser es and de luding appearances of a long dream whereof there is no reality and *therefore will question the* existence of all things or our knowledge of any thing I must desire him to consider that, if all

be a dream then he doth but dream that he makes the question and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him But yet if he pleases he may dream that I make him this an swer That the certainty of things existing in *rerum natura* when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to but as *our condition needs For our* faculties being suited not to the full extent of be ing nor to a perfect clear comprehensive knowl edge of things free from all doubt and scruple but to the preservation of us in whom they are and accommodated to the use of life they serve to our purpose well enough if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are con venient or inconvenient to us For he that sees a

ing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man s fancy by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into

as certain to us as our pleasure or pain i e. *hap*

sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil wh ch is caused by them which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them

9 *But reaches no further than actual sensation.* In fine then when our senses do actually con ey into our understandings any idea we cannot but be satisfied that there doth someth ng *at that time* really exist without us which doth affect our senses and by them give notice of itself to our

our senses to be un ted together do really exist together But this knowledge extends as far as the *present testimony of our senses,* employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further For if I saw such a collect on of s m *ple ideas as is* wont to be called *man* existing to gether one minute since and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now

CHAP XII

body is
tu of t
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maxim
ha ing
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es l

l ttl finger but by ur

th ir hands are eq al. Cann t
say unless she fetch th ertainty f t from this maxim, that *f yo take quals f m quals the mainder ill be quals* maxim which possibly he nev h ard o tho ght of? I desire any e t cons der from wh t has been lsewhere said hich is kn wn first nd clearest by most peopl th part cular instance, r th g neral rul nd which t is that gi es lif and birth t th other These g eral rules are b t the comparing ur more gen al and abst act deas which ar the kmanship f the mind mad and ames gi t them f r the as er disp tch in ts rea sonings, and drawing int mprehens terms and sh t rules ts arious d mult plied b- serv tions. But kn wledg began in th mind and was founded part culars though after wards, perhaps, o t ce was taken th f t being natural f th mind (f rward till to n larg ts kn wledg) most t entu ely t l y p those g eral t ons d make th proper use of them, which is t disburden th memory of th cumbersome l d f part culars. F I de ire t may be considered what more certainty th re is t child any th t his body littl finger and all is b gger than his littl finger f m h m t his body th n m

tainly know th t any parcel of matter w th an other parcel of matter j ined to it is b gger than either f them al e, will ne er be bl to knov t by th help of thes two relat terms, h l and part, make of them what maxim you pl ase

4. *Dan er us to build po pr arious principl s*
B t be t n the math mat cs as t will, wh ther t be cl arer that, taking an ch from a black line of tw inches, and an inch from a red line f t o inches, the remaining parts of the two lines ill be equal r that *f y u take quals f om quals the rem inder will be quals* wh ch, I say of th se tw is the clearer and first kn wn I le e to any on to d termi t n t being material to my present occas n. That which I h h re to d is t inquire h ther if it be the read est w y to kn wledg t begin w th ge eral maxims, and build upon them, t be yet a saf way to take the *principl s* wh ch are laid d wn in any other sci n e as unq est abl truths and so recei e th m w th ut examin tion and adhere to th m, w thout ff ri them t be d bted f be- cause n so fair able If this ... what may n t be ntro- f r truth in m rality what may n t be ntro- d ced and pro ed in n tural philosophy

Let that principle of som of the ld philoso- phers, That all is Matte and th t there is n th ing else, be recei d f r ertain and ind b table, and t ill be asy t be seen by the writings f some that h rev ed t again n ur days, what consequences t will l d us into Let any h P l mo tak th w ld or w th th

t ms gi him, which it coul
them Could h kn w that his body was b gg than his lit l finger if his langu g were y t so imperfec th t h had ch rel t erms as wh l and part I ask, furth when h has g t these ames, h w is h m re certain tha his body is wh l d his l ttl fing r part, than he was might be cert in bef h l arn hose erms, that his body was b gg than his littl finger? Any ne may as reason- bly d bt d y th t his lit l fing is part of his body as that is less than his body And l tha can doubt whether t be less, will as cer ainly doub wh ther be part So that the maxim, the whol is b gger than part, can ve er be mad use of t prov th littl finger less than the body b t when t is useless, by be g brought t co vince of truth which h know already For h that does not cer

ki d f lif Aristippus, wh pl ced happiness in bodily pl asure and in Antisthenes wh mad irtu uffic t t f l city And he wh w th Plat shall place be t tud in the kn wledg of God will ha his th ught aised t ther n t mpl ti ns than th se wh look ot bey d this pot f earth and those perishing things which are t be had n t H th t w th Arche l us, shall l y t d wn as principle that right and wro g h est and dish est, are d fin d nly by laws, and n t by n tu will h th measures f mo al rectitud and p vity than those wh take t f granted th t w are under

existences are knowable By which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions —(1) There is one sort of propositions concerning the *existence* of anything answerable to such an idea as having the idea of an elephant phoenix motion or an angel in my mind the first and natural inquiry is Whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars No existence of anything without us but only of God can certainly be known further than our senses inform us (2) There is another sort of propositions wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of *our abstract ideas* and their dependence on one another Such propositions may be universal and certain So having the idea of God and myself of fear and obedience I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general if I have made an abstract idea of such a species whereof I am one particular But yet this proposition how certain soever that men ought to fear and obey God proves not to me the *existence* of *men* in the world but will be true of all such creatures whenever they do exist which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ideas

14 *And all general propositions that are known to be true concern abstract ideas* In the former case our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things producing ideas in our minds by our senses in the latter knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds producing there general certain propositions Many of these are called *aeternae veritates* and all of them indeed are so not from being written all or any of them in the minds of all men or that they were any of them propositions in any one s mind till he having got the abstract ideas joined or separated them by affirmation or negation But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is endowed with such faculties and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have we must conclude he must needs when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas Such propositions are therefore called *eternal truths* not because they are eternal propositions actually formed and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere out of the mind and existed before but because being once made about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past or to come by a mind having those ideas always actually be true For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same *habitudes one to another* propositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must needs be *eternal verities*

Chap XII *Of the Improvement of our Knowledge*

1 *Knowledge is not got from maxims* It having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters that *maxims* were the foundation of all knowledge and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain *praecognita* from whence the understanding was to take its rise and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more *general propositions* as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines thus laid down for foundations of any science were called *principles* as the beginnings from which we must set out and look no further backwards in our inquiries, as we have already observed[1]

2 (*The occasion of that opinion.*) One thing which might probably give an occasion to this

tain a great certainty of knowledge these sciences came by pre-eminence to be called Μαθήματα and Μάθησις learning or things learned thoroughly learned as having of all others the greatest certainty clearness and evidence in them.

3 *But from comparing clear and distinct ideas* But if any one will consider he will (I guess) find that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in these sciences was not owing to the influence of these principles nor derived from any peculiar ad

were employed about and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them that they had an intuitive knowledge and by *that* a way to discover it in others and this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young lad to know that his whole

[1] Ch. vii.

body I call g ld, be malle ble, r n wh ch ex perience (hich ay ever t pro e n that par ucular body I xamin) mak me n t certa that t is so in all any ther yellow heavy f bod es h t th t which I ha e tried Be

au un ..

here f the n minal esse f g ld, supposed t cons t of body f ch det rminat col weight, and fus bility will h ld tru if malle ableness, fixed ess, and sol bil ty in *qua* be added to t. Our reaso ings from these d as ill carry us b t a l ttl ay in th certa dis covery of the th propert s those masses of matter wh rein all these are t be f und Be cause the *ther* prope t es f ch bod es, d pe d ing t these, b t n that u kn n real es sence o which these also d pe d we can ot by th m discove th re t w can go no further than the impl deas f ur n minal ssence ill carry us, which is ery littl bey nd them sel es and so aff rd b t ry spar gly y rtain, un rsal and useful truths F r po trial, ha ing f und th t part cular p ce (and all thers of th t col ur w ght d fus bil ty that I ever tr ed) mall bl th t also makes pe haps, part f my mplex d part of my minal esse ce f g ld wh reby th gh I mak my compl d t wh h I affix th nam g ld t consist f more impl deas than bef re y till t t co taining th real es se ce f any pec es f bodies, t helps m n t certainly kn w (I say t kn pe h p t may be t co j ture) th ther rema ning prope es of that body further than they ha isibl co nexio w th some all f th s mpl deas th mak p my ominal esse ce. F exampl I can be er in from this complex d wh ther g ld be fixed because as bef re there is *ne ary* co xi inconsist ce t be disco red be wixt *mple d f body llow he y fus bl mall bl* betwixt these I say and *fix dne* so that I may certainly know tha wh tsoev body these are f d th re f ed ess is sure t be H g n, f assurance I must pply myself to expen ce as far as tha ches, I may ha certain kn l edg but fur he

Experienc may procur us c enient not scien. I d y b t man, ccust med t ra io al and regular experime ts, shall be bl to see further into th nature of bod es and guess

Cf Bk. III. ch. 1.

righter at th ir yet unkn wn propert es than o h r s st a ger to them but yet as I ha e s l

are in in this wo ld can ttai t makes me suspect that *tural phil phy is ot c pable f bei made sci nc* W are able, I imagin to reach ery little ge eral kn wledge co c rn g the spec es of bod es and their several propert es. Experim ts a d historical observ t ns e may ha from h ch w may draw ad nt ges of ease and health and th reby increase our stock f con en e c f this lif but beyond th s I f ar our talents re ch n t nor are our f culties, as I guess, bl t d a ce

1 *W ar fitted f m al nc b t ly for p b bl terp t t ns f ternal natur* From whe ce t is ob us t co clud that, since ur f cul ties are n t fitted t pe trate t th int rn l f bei and real essences of bod es but y t plainly disco e to us th be g f a God and th kno l edg of rs l es, e o gh t l d u into a full and cl ar disc ery of ur d ty and great con cernm nt t will become us, as r tional crea tures, to empl y those facult e we ha e abo t wh t they are most ad pted t and foll the dire t n f ture, where t se ms to po t us ut th ay F t is rat al to co clud th t ur prope employm nt l es in those q ir es, nd in th t so t f kn wledg h ch is most suited t ur n tural cap cities, and carries t ur great t int re t, e. th cond t o f ur ternal est t H ce I think I may co cl d that *moral ty is the proper scienc and bus ne s f mank nd general* (wh are both cerned and fitted t search t their *summum b um*) as se al arts, co rsant about se eral parts of na ture, ar th l t and pri t tal t f part cular me f th mm n use f h man lif and their n part cular bsist nce in this ld Of what consequence th discov ry of n tu ral body d its prope t es may be t human life th h l gre t co tinent f Amer ca is a co incing nstance wh se gn ance in useful arts, and ant f th gre test part of the c n en f lif n a co try that bo ded w th all so t f natural plenty I think may be ttributed t their g ance f what was to be f d in a ery rdinary desp cabl st I mean th mi eral f n. And what er w think f ur parts r impro eme ts n thi part f th w ld where kn wledg and pl nty m t ie th each th yet t any that ill

obligations antecedent to all human constitutions

5 *To do so is no certain way to truth* If therefore those that pass for *principles* are *not certain* (which we must have some way to know that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful) but are only made so to us by our blind assent we are liable to be misled by them and instead of being guided into truth we shall by principles be only confirmed in mistake and error

6 *But to compare clear complete ideas under steady names* But since the knowledge of the certainty of principles as well as of all other truths depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas the way to improve our knowledge is not I am sure blindly and with an implicit faith to receive and swallow principles but is I think to get and fix in our minds clear distinct and complete ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them proper and constant names And thus perhaps without any other principles but *barely considering those perfect ideas* and by *comparing them one with another* finding their agreement and disagreement and their several relations and habitudes we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule than by taking up principles and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others

7 *The true method of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas* We must therefore if we will proceed as reason advises adapt our methods of inquiry to *the nature of the ideas we examine* and the truth we search after General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of *abstract ideas* A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these relations is the only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty concerning them into general propositions By what steps we are to proceed in these is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians who from very plain and easy beginnings by gentle degrees and a continued chain and the admirable methods they have invented for the singling out and *laying in order those* intermediate ideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities is that which has carried them so far and produced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries but whether something like this, in respect of other ideas as well as those of magnitude may not in time be found out I will not determine This I think, I may say that if other ideas that are the real as well as nominal essences of their species were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians they would carry our thoughts further and with greater evidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine

8 *By which morality also may be made clearer* This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture which I suggest (chap iii.) viz that *morality* is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics[3] For the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all real essences and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain real and general truths and I doubt not but if a right method were taken a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness that could leave to a considering man no more reason to doubt than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics which have been demonstrated to him

9 *Our knowledge of substances is to be improved not by contemplation of abstract ideas but only by experience* In our search after the knowledge of *substances* our want of ideas that are suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite different method We advance not here as in the other (where our abstract ideas are real as well as nominal essences) by contemplating our ideas and considering their relations and correspondences that helps us very little for the reasons that in another place we have at large set down[4] By which I think it is evident that substances afford matter of very little *general* knowledge and the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and certainty What, then are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course the want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts to the things themselves as they exist *Experience here must teach me what reason cannot* and it is by *trying alone* that I can *certainly know* what other qualities co-exist[5] with those of my complex idea v g whether that yellow heavy fusible

Cf Bk I ch iii § 24.
[2] Cf § 9.

Cf Bk III ch xi §§ 16–18 IV ch iii §§ 18–19
Bk II ch xxiii III ch vi
Cf ch xi § 9

that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

Secondl The ther is the art of findin out those intermedia e ideas, which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

5 *Mathematics an instance of this* That these two (and not the relying maxims, and draw consequences from some general propositions) are the ri ht methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where first we shall find that he that has not perfect and clear idea of those angles or figures of which he desires to know anything, is ut erly thereby incapa of any knowledge about them. S ppose but man no t have a perfect exact id of a right a e, scalenum, or trapezium, and there is nothing more certain than that h will in vain seek any demonstratio about them. Further t is evident that t was n t th influence of those maxims hich are taken for principles in mathematics tha hath led th masters of that science int those wonderful discoveries th y have made. Let man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly and contemplat their extent and consequences as much as h pl ases, h will, by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know tha the square of the hypothenuse in a righ an led triangl is equal t the squares of the two ther sides. The knowledge that the whole is equal to all ts parts, nd if you take equals from equals, th remainder will be equal," &c. helped him not, I presume, this demonstration and man may I think, pore long enough n those axioms w thou ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by the th hts therwise pplied the mind had ther bjects, ther ews before t, far differen from those maxims, when it firs go the knowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enou h acquainted w th those received axioms, bu gnorant of th ir method who first mad these demonstrations, can never sufficientl admire. And who knows hat methods t enlarge our knowledge in ther parts of science may hereaf er be in ented, answering tha of algebra in mathematics, which so readily finds ou the id as of quantities to measure them by whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly or perhaps, never come to know?

Chap XIII *Some Further Considerations Concerning our Knowl ge*

1 *Our knowle partly nec ssary partly voluntary* Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity w th our sight, that t is neither wholly necessary nor wholly voluntary If our knowledge were altogether necessary all men s knowledg would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable and if t were wholly voluntary some men so little regard or value t that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but recei e some ideas by them and if they have memory they cannot but retain some of them, and if they have any distinguishing fac ulty cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one w th another as he that has eyes, if he will open them by day cannot but see some objects and perceive a dif ference in them. But thou h a man w th his eyes open in th li ht, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects hich he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capa ble t del ht or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to pen, never take the pains to look into.

The pplication f our faculties voluntary but, they bein employed, u know as things ar not as we pl ase There is also another thing in a man s power and that is, thou h he turns his eyes sometimes t wards an obj t, y t he may choose wh ther he will curiously survey t, and w th an in ent pplication endea our to observe ccurately all tha is visibl in t. But yet, what he does

ppear painted w th flowers, nor the fields covered w th verdure, whenever he has mind t t: in the cold winter he cannot help seeing t white and hoary if he will look broad. Just thus is t w th our understandin all that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or w thh ldin any of our *faculties* from this or that sort of objects, and more or less ccurate survey of them but, *they being employed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledg of the mind one way or another* that is done only by the objects themsel es, as far as they are cl arly disco ered. And therefore, as far as men senses are con ersant bout external objects, the mind cannot but recei those ideas which are presen ed by them, and be informed of the existence of things w thout and so

duced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations So that he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral may be truly styled the father of arts and author of plenty

12 *In the study of nature we must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles* I would not therefore be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of *nature* [1] I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire revere and glorify their Author and if rightly directed may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary charity that have at so great charge been raised by the founders of hospitals and almshouses He that first invented printing discovered the use of the compass or made public the virture and right use of *kin kina* did more for the propagation of knowledge for the supply and increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave than those who built colleges workhouses and hospitals All that I would say is that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge where it is not to be had or by ways that will not attain to it that we should not take doubtful systems for complete sciences nor unintelligible notions for scientifical demonstrations In the knowledge of bodies we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments since we cannot from a discovery of their real essences grasp at a ime whole sheaves and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together Where our nqu ry is concerning co existence or r pugnancy to co-exist which by contemplation of ou ideas we cannot discover there experience observat on and natural history must give us by our senses and by retail an ins ght into corporeal substances The knowledge of *bodies* we must get by our senses warily employed in taking not ce of their qualities and operations on one another and what we hope to know of *separate spirits*[3] in this world we must I think expect only from revelation He that shall consider how little general maxims precarious pr nciples and hypotheses laid down at pleasure have promoted true knowledge or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational men after real improvements how little I say the setting out at that end has for many ages together advanced men s progress, towards the knowledge of natural philosophy will think we have reason to thank those who in this latter age have taken another course and have trod out to us though not an easier way to learned ignorance yet a surer way to profitable knowledge

13 *The true use of hypotheses* Not that we may not to explain any phenomena of nature make use of any probable hypotheses whatsoever hypotheses if they are well made are at least great helps to the memory and often direct us to new discoveries [6] But my meaning is that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the mind that would always penetrate into the causes of things and have principles to rest on is very apt do do) till we have very well examined particulars and made several experiments in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis and see whether it will agree to them all whether our principles will carry us quite through and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature as they seem to accommodate and explain another And at least that we take care that the name of *principles* deceive us not, nor impose on us by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture such as are most (I had almost sa d all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy [7]

14 *Clear and distinct ideas with settled names and the finding of those intermediate ideas which show their agreement or disagreement e the w ys to enlarge ur knowled e* But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no the ways to enlarge our knowledge as far as e are capable seem to me in short, to be these two —

First The first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names at least, so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in or reason about And if they be specific deas of substances we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can whereby I mean that we should put together as many simple deas as being constantly observed to co-exist may pe fectly determine the species and each of those simple deas which are the ingred ents of our complex ones should be clear and distinct in our minds For it being evident

[1] Cf Bk II ch xxi.
ki k na—qu nine.
[3] Cf ch xi. § 12
Cf Bk I ch iii. §§ 22–24 and Bk IV ch vii.

[6] Cf Int oduct n § 7
Cf Ba A um O g num I 19
Cf. Bk I ch iii. §§ 23 24 ch. vii.

rd ent which being th most usual w y wh re th mind has occas to employ this f culty I hall der these terms, tr at f t, as l ast h abl in ur la guag t q ocat

4 Judgment is the pr m g th g t be s u th

f Thus the mind has tv faculti es

um d t be so wh en is, as take t be so bef t ce t nly appe rs And if t so unites o separates th m as real ty things are, t is right j dgm t.

Chap XV Of Pr b b lity

P bab l ty is the ppearanc f g ement p f l bl pr f As dem nst t is th sh wing th d sagr me t f tw deas by th

next is t cons t d mm t bl t t ast is not perce ed t be so b t is, appears f th mo t p t t be so d is gh t d the mi d t j dg th propos t be tru f lse her th th t ary F ex mpl n th d monstr t f t ma pe ce es th tain mm t bl xi th is f q l ty

p og ss, th wh l se is co t ued w th an d wh h l arly h th gre m t disagreeme t f hose thr angles q lity t t righ ne d thus h ha t kn wl edg hat is so B t th ma wh ook th p t bserv th d m t t n hear g ma h mat ian, ma f cred t affirm l three gles f ri gl t be qual to tw right s, asse t ece es t f tru which case the f dat f his assen is th probabil of the thi g th proof be g h as f t most part carri truth w th t th man whose est mo y h rece es t not being w t ffirm y h g trary t be des his knowledg espec lly matters f this ki d so ha ha wh ch causes his assent t this propo-

f tri ngle are s e t t i

c rse— ay t po are such as h e u d bt d kn l dge of th ir truth y t some f them bord r so n ar upon ce t ty th t w l d ht at ll abo t them but asse t t

a d l d grees f asse t from full as ur ce a u

f u u — ta ty) th t pl ce to cons d th er l d g d g und f p b b l ty and as t f th.

3 B th t l h m ke us p um tl g t be t ue b f know them t bes Probab l ty is lik l ess t be tru tl ery or t f th w d g nif y g ch propos t n f hi h the be ar gum ts o proof t mak t pass, r be rece ed f tru Tl t t m nt th mind g es this so t f propos t call d b l f as t f wh h is th dmitt g g any p p- os t f tru upo argum ts proof that ar f u d t pe su d us t e t as tru

xi u t d a, h t p has ts is bl and cert co n bel f t so Th t wh h mak s m bel ev is someth g ext us to th thing I bel ev someth g t ev d tly j d n both dest and so t ma ifestly sh w g th gre m t disagre m nt f those d as th t ar u der cons d tio

4. The g nd f p b b l ty ar t form ty u th ur ou perr nc or th t t m y f ther per enc P b b lity the be g t s pply th de f t f ur kn wledg d t gu d us wh e th t f l s alway n t bout p po t o wh eof w ha certainty b t nly some in

See ch t—xi.
Cf. I trod § 3.

far as men s thoughts converse with their own determined ideas they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that *is to be found amongst some of them* which is so far knowledge and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths For what a man sees, he cannot but see and what he perceives he cannot but know that he perceives

3 *Instance in numbers* Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers and hath taken the pains to compare one two and three to six cannot choose but know that they are equal he that hath got the idea of a triangle and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones and can as little doubt of that as of this truth that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be

4 *Instance in natural religion* He also that hath the idea of an intelligent but frail and weak being made by and depending on another who is eternal omnipotent perfectly wise and good will as certainly know that man is to honour fear and obey God as that the sun shines when he sees it For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind and will turn his thoughts that way and consider them he will as certainly find that the inferior finite and dependent is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite as he is certain to find that three four and seven are less than fifteen if he will consider and compute those numbers *nor can he be surer in a clear* morning that the sun is risen if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way But yet these truths being ever so certain ever so clear he may be ignorant of either or all of them who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should to inform himself about them

Chap XIV *Of Judgment*

1 *Our knowledge being short we want something else* The understanding faculties being given to man not barely for speculation but also for the conduct of his life man would be at a great loss

tions of his life perfectly at a stand had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed will have little else to do but to sit still and perish.

2 *What use to be made of this twilight state* There

are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state so in the greatest part of our concernments he has afforded us only the twilight as I may so say of probability suitable I presume to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption we might by every day s experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liableness to error the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection It being highly rational to think, even were revelation silent in the case that as men employ those talents God has given them here they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day when their sun shall set and night shall put an end to their labours

3 *Judgment or assent to probability supplies our want of knowledge* The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had is *judgment* whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree or which is the same any proposition to be true or false without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had and sometimes out of laziness unskilfulness or haste even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which they are desirous or concerned to know but either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations or impatient of delay lightly cast their eyes on or wholly pass by the proofs and so without making out the demonstration determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance and take it to be the one or the other as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey This faculty of the mind when it is exercised immediately about things, is called *judgment* when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called *assent*

or *dissent* which being the most usual w y where in th mind has occasion t mploy this f culty I shall, under these terms, treat of t, as least li ble in ur language t equi ocation.

4 *Ju ment is the pr sum things t b s th out perceiving, t* Thus th mind has two f culties con ersant bo t truth and falsehood —

First, KNOWLEDGE h r by t ertainly *per n* and is undoubtedly satisfied f th agree me t or disagreement of any ideas.

Secondly JUDGMENT which is the putting d as togeth r separating th m from an ther in the mind, when their certain gree me t r disagreement is ot percei ed but *pr ur d* to be so which is, as th w rd imports, taken to be so bef re t certainly appears. And if t so unites or separates them as reality things are, t is right j dgment.

Chap XV Of Prob b l ty

1 *Pr bability is the ppearanc f agr ement po fallable proof* As *demonst at* is th sh wing the agreement disagreeme t of tw deas by the interventi of more proofs, which ha e constant, imm tabl and isibl connexi n ne w th another so *pr b b l ty* is n thi g b t th ppearance of su h an greement disagree me t by th int r tion f proofs, whose co nexio is t constant and mm t bl o t least is not perce ed t be so b t is, ppears f the most part to be so d is en gh t ind ce the mind t j dge th propos t t be true false rather tha th co t ary F exampl in th d monstr tio f t man percei es the ce tain, immutabl connexi there is of equal ty betwee th three les f triangl and those in rmediat nes wh ch are mad use f t sh d ir quality t tw right es and so by an int e knowledg of th greem t disagree me t of th intermediat d as in each t p of the progress, h wh l series is co tinued w th an evidence which cl arl sh w th greeme t disagreeme t of those three angles quality t w righ ones and thus h has tain kn wl ed that t is so Bu an ther man who never took th p ins bserv th d m nstr n, heari g ma h mat ian, man of cred t, affirm the three angles of tria gl t be equal t two righ nes, assents t t, rec es f tru in which case the foundatio f his asse t is th probabili f the thing th proof being such as f he mos part carries ruth w th t th ma whose es imo y he rece es t, not being w t ffirm an thi g co trary bes des his knowledg especially in matt rs of this kind so tha that which causes his assent to this propo sition that the three angles of a triangle are equal t tw right ones, that which makes him tak these d as to gree w th ut kn wing them t do so is the w ted er city of the peaker in ther cases, r his s pposed eracity in this.

2 *It is to supply ur want f knowl g* Our knowl edge as has been shown being ery narrow and we n t happy n gh to find ce tain truth in everything hich we ha e occas on t cons der most of the proposit ns w think, reason dis course—nay et upo are such as w can ot ha u d bted kn ledge of th ir truth yet some of them bord so ar po certainty that we make o doubt t all bo t th m but assent to th m as firmly and a t cc rding t that as se t, as resol t ly as if th y were infall bly dem nstrated and that our knowledg of th m was perfect and certain. But there be g degrees h e in, from th ry ghbourhood of certainty and dem nstrat on, quite d n t improbability and unlike ess, even th confines f impossib lity and also degrees of assent from full assura ce and confid ce quit d wn t co jecture d ubt, and distrust I shall com n w (ha in as I think, fo nd t *the b unds f human knowledge and ce tai ty*) in th next place to cons der *the s eral d gr and gr unds f pr bab l ty and as ent faith.*

3 *Bei that which make us p ume th g t b true befor kn w them t be* Probabil ty is lik li ness to be tru th ery notatio of the rd g nifyin ch a propositi n, f h ch th re be ar gume ts proofs t mak t pass, r be recei ed f true. Th ntertainme t th mind gi es this sort of proposit ns is called *b l f as ent pin n*, which is the dmitting recei ing any prop os t f tru upo argume ts o proofs that are f und t persuad us to ec t as tru w tho t certa knowledg th t t is so And herein lies th difference betw n *pr b b l ty* and *certainty f h*, and *kn wl dg* th t in all th part f kn led th re is intuiti ea h imm d t dea, ch t p has its isibl and certain con exi in bel f not so That which makes m believe, is something extraneous t th thing I bel e som thin n t ev d ntly j ined o both ides to, and so not manifestly shown in th gree me t disagreeme t of those deas th t are u der cons derat on.

4 *The gr und f pr bab lity ar t form ty u th our ow perienc or the te timo y f ther perienc* Prob bility the being t supply th d fect of our kn wledg and t guid us where that f ils, is alw ys con ersa t bout p po ti ns whereof we ha e certainty but nly some in

See ch. i–xi.

Cf. Introd. § 3.

far as men s thoughts converse with their own determined ideas they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them which is so far knowledge and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered they must

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3 *Inst nce in numbers* Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers and hath taken the pains to compare one two and three to six cannot choose but know that they are equal he that hath got the idea of a triangle and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones and can as little doubt of that as of this truth that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be

4 *Instance in atural relı ion* He also that hath the idea of an intelligent but frail and weak being made by and depending on another who is eternal omnipotent perfectly wise and good will as certainly know that man is to honour fear and obey God as that the sun shines when he sees it For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind and will turn his thoughts that way and consider them he will as certainly find that the inferior finite and dependent is under an obl gat on to obey the supreme and infinite as he is certain to find that three four and seven are less than fifteen if he will consider and compute those numbers nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way But yet these truths being ever so certa n ever so clear he may be ignorant of either or all of them who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should to inform himself about them.

Chap XIV *Of Judgment*

1 *O r kn wledge bein short we w nt s methi g else* The understanding faculties being given to man not barely for speculat on but also for the conduct of his life man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct h m but what has the certainty of true *knowledge* For that being very short and scanty as we have seen he would be often utterly in the dark and in most of the actions of his life perfectly at a stand had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed will have little else to do but to sit still and perish

2 *What use to be made f this twilight state* Therefore as God has set some things in broad daylight as he has given us some certain knowledge though limited to a few things in comparison probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state so in the greatest part of our concernments he has afforded us only the twilight as I may so say of probability suitable I presume to that state of med ocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption we might by every day s experience be made sensible of our short s ghtedness and liableness to error the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection. It being highly rational to think even were revelation silent in the case that, as men employ those talents God has given them here they shall accordingly receive the r rewards at the close of the day when their sun shall set and night shall put an end to their labours

3 *Jud m nt or assent to prob bil ty s pplies our w nt f knowl d e* The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had is *jud ment* whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree or which is the same any proposition to be true or false without perceiving a demonstrati e e dence in the proofs The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had and sometimes out of laziness unskilfulness or haste even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had Men often stay not arily to exam ne the agreement or disagreement of two deas which they are desirous or concerned to know but either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long tra n of gradat ons or impat ent of delay l ghtly cast their eyes on or wholly pass by the proofs and so without making out the demonstration determ ne of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance and take it to be the one or the other as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey This faculty of the mind when it is exerc sed immediately about things, s called *judgme t* when about truths de l vered in words is most commonly called *ass nt*

sion in their memories as truth they ha e discovered and for the future they remain satisfied th the testimo y of their memories that this is the opinio that, by the proofs th y ha o ce seen of t, deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford t.

2. *These cannot always be actually in view and then must assent ourselves th t a remembrance that a we saw ground for such degr f assent* This is all that the greatest part of men are capabl of doing, in regulating their pinions and judgments unless a man will exa t of them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probabl truth, and that too, in the same order and regular ded t n of c nse quences in which they ha e formerly placed or seen them, which sometimes is enough t fill large volume on one single questio or else they must require man, for every op nion that he embraces, every day t examine the proofs both hich are impossible. It is una oidable, therefore, of men must be either ery scepti or change every moment, and yield th msel es p t whoever ha ing lately studied th question, ffers hem argume ts, which f want of m mory they are not able presently answer

3. *The ill cons quence f this f our former judgments if not ghtly made* I cann t but own, that men s st cking their past judgme t, and ad hering firmly t conclusions formerly made, is of en the cause of great bs inacy in error and mistake Bu the fault is not that they rely n their memories for wha they ha before well judged bu because they j dged before they had ell examined May w no find gre t number (not to say the grea est part) of men that think they ha e formed righ j dgm nts of several ma ters and tha for no ther reaso bu because they ne tho ght therwise. that imagin th mselves ha j dged right, nly because they never q es ed ne er examined their wn pinions Which is indeed t think they judged righ because they never j dged all. And y t hese of all men, hold h ir pinions w th the gre est ff ness those being generally th most fierce and firm in their tenets, wh ha l ast examined them. What w once know we are certain is so and we may be secure, that th re are no la en proofs undiscovered which may overturn our knowled e, or bring t in doubt. But ma ers of probability t is not in ev ry case we can be sure that we ha e all the particulars before us, that any ay concern the questio a d that there is no ev dence behind and yet unseen which may cast the probability on the other s de, and outw gh all that t present seems to prepo derat w th us. Who almost is there that hath th l isure, pat e ce and means to collect together all th proofs co cerning most of the pini ns h has, so as safely to conclud that he hath a clear and full ew and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information. And yet e are forced to d termin urselves n th ne sid r other The co duct of ur li es, and the management of our great con cerns, ill not bear delay for those depend for th most part, on the d terminati n of our judg ment in points wherein we are n t capable of certain and d monstrati e knowledge, and herein t is necessary f r us to embrace the one sid or th ther

4. *The right use f it mutual charity and forbearance in ec ssary diversity f opinions* Since, therefore, t is una o dable t th greatest part of men, if not all, t ha e several pinions w thout certain and indub tabl proof of their truth and t carries too great an imputation of gnoran e, lightness, or folly f r men t quit and ren unce their former ten ts presently upon th offer of an argument which they cann t immediately an sw d sh w th insufficiency of it w uld methinks, become all men t maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendship in the di ersity of pini ns since cann t reasonably expect that any one sh uld readily and obsequiously quit his own pinion, and mbrace ours, th blind res gnati n to an auth rity which th understanding of man cknowled es not. For ho ever t may often mistake, t can own no ther guid b t reason, nor blindly submit to th will and di tates of another If h you would bring over t y ur sentiments be one that examines before h assents, y u must gi e him lea t his leisure t go over th ccount gain, and recalling what is ut of his mind examine all th particulars, t see n which sid th d anta lies and if he will n t think our arguments of w ght enough t engage him anew in so much pains, t is but what w often do ursel es in the like case and we sh uld tak amiss if thers sh uld prescribe t us what points w h uld udy And if h be ne who takes his pini ns pon trust, how can e imagin that he should en u those ten ts hich tim and cus m ha so settled in his mind, th t h thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty or which he takes t be impressions h has recei ed

ducements to receive them for true The grounds of it are in short these two following —

First The conformity of anything with our own knowledge observation and experience

Secondly The testimony of others vouching their observation and experience In the testimony of others is to be considered 1 The number 2 The integrity 3 The skill of the witnesses. 4 The design of the author where it is a testimony out of a book cited 5 The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation 6 Contrary testimonies

5 *In this all the arguments pro and con ought to be examined before we come to a judgment* Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding and produces certain knowledge the mind if it *will proceed rationally* ought to examine all the grounds of probability and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition before it assents to or dissents from it and upon a due balancing the whole reject or receive it with a more or less firm assent proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other For example —

If I myself see a man walk on the ice it is past probability it is knowledge But if another tells me he saw a man in England in the midst of a sharp winter walk upon water hardened with cold this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics who never saw nor heard of any such thing before there the whole probabil ty relies on testimony and as the relators are more in number and of more credit and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth so that matter of fact is like to find more or less bel ef Though to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary and who has never heard of anything like it the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find be l ef

The ki g of Siam As it happened to a Dutch ambassador who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland which he was inquisiti e after amongst other things told him hat th ater in his country ould somet mes

upon you as a sober jai ı ui ... ... —

Cf ch xvi § 13

6 *Probable arguments capable of great variety* Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition and as the conformity of our knowledge as the certainty of observations as the frequency and constancy of experience and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it so is any proposition in itself more or less probable There is another I confess which though by itself it be no true ground of probability yet is often made use of for one by which men most commonly regulate their assent and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else and that is *the opinion of others* though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on nor more likely to mislead one since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge And if the opinions and persuasions of others whom we know and think well of be a ground of assent men have reason to be Heathens in Japan Mahometans in Turkey Papists in Spain Protestants in England and Lutherans in Sweden But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place [2]

Chap XVI *Of the Degrees of Assent*

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are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are or ought to be regulated only we are to take notice that whatever grounds of probability there may be they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth and endeavours to judge r ght than they appear at least in the first judgment or search that the mind makes I confess, in the opinions men have and firmly stick to in the world their assent is not always from an actual vie v of the reasons that at first prevailed with them t be ng in many cases almost imposs ble and in most very hard even for those who have ery admirable memories to retain all the proofs which upon a due examination made them embrace that side of the ques t on It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could and that they ha e searched into all the particulars that they could imag ne to give any light to the question and with the best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole ev dence and thus having once found on hich side the probability appeared to *them* after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make they lay up the conclu

See chh xvii § 19 xx. §§ 17 18

history giving us such an account of men in all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public: if all historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call *confidence*.

§ III. *Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident belief.* In things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c., when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a city in Italy as Rome: that about one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man, called Julius Caesar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another, called Pompey. This, though in the nature of the thing, there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.

9. *Experience and testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability.* Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a demonstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing; which rises and falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, *viz. common observation in like cases*, and *particular testimonies in that particular instance*, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c., of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, That as the arguments and proofs *pro* and *con*, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear upon the whole matter in a greater or less degree to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainments, as we call *belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief*, &c.

10. *Traditional testimonies the farther removed the less their proof becomes.* This is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of England; which is, That though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy ever so well attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be

it, viz. *that any testimony, the farther off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has.* The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof: but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or deserved little credit *from the mouths of their first authors*, are thought to grow venerable by age, are urged as undeniable.

11. *Yet history is of great use.* I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of *history*: it is all the light we have in many cases, and we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But

Cf. Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, Bk. I.

from God h mself or from men sent by him? How can we expect I say that opinions thus set tled should be given up to the arguments or au thority of a stranger or adversary especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design as there never fails to be where men find themselves ill treated? We should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information and not instantly treat others ill as obstinate and perverse because they will not renounce their ov n and receive our opin ons or at least those v e would force upon them when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not em bracing some of theirs For where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds *or of the falsehood of all he condemns* or can say that he has examined to the bottom all his own or other men s opinions? The neces sity of belie ing without knowledge nay often upon very slight grounds in this fleet ng state of action and blind ess we are in should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others At least those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men s belief which they them selves have not searched into nor weighed the arguments of probability on which they should receive or reject it Those who have fairly and truly examined and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern them selves by would ha e a juster pretence to require others to follow them but these are so fe v in number and find so l ttle reason to be magisteri al in their op nions that nothing nsolent and mper ous is to be expected from them and there is reason to think that if men were better in structed themselves they would be less imposing on others

5 *Probabil ty is either of s nsible matter of f ct ca pable of hum n te t m y or f u h t is beyo d the e d nce f ou sens s* But to return to the grounds of assent and the several degrees of it v e are to take not ce that the propositions v e receive upon inducements of *p ob bil ty* are of *two sorts* e *ther concerning* some part cular existence or as t is usually termed matter of fact wh ch falling under observation is capable of human testimony or else concerning th ngs hich be ing beyond the disco ery of our senses are not capable of any such testimony

6 *The concur ent e peri nc f* all *other men with ours produces ssur nce appro chi g to knowledge*

Concerning the *first* of these viz *particular matter of fact*

I Where any particular thing consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it we receive it as easily and build as firmly upon it as if it were certain knowledge and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demon stration Thus if all Englishmen who have oc casion to mention it should affirm that it froze in England the last winter or that there were swallov s seen there in the summer I think a man could almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven The first therefore and *highest degree of probability* is when the general consent *of all men in all ages as far as it can be knov n* concurs with a man s constant and never fa ling exper ence in like cases to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair v it nesses such are all the stated constitutions and propert es of bod es and the regular proceedin s of causes and effects in the ordinary course of na

after the same manner that we v ith reason con clude to be the effect of steady and regular causes though they come not w thin the reach of our knowledge Thus That fire warmed a man made lead fluid and changes the colour or consistency in v ood or charcoal that ron sunk in v ater and swam in quicksilver these and the like proposi tions about part cular facts being agreeable to our constant experience as often as e have to do with these matters and being generally spoke of (v hen ment oned by others) as things found constantly to be so and therefore not so much

pen again in the same manner is very true These *prob b l tie* ise so near to *c tainty* that they go ern our thoughts as absolutely and influence all our actions as fully as the most ev dent demon stration and in v hat concerns us we make little or no difference betv een them and certain knowledge Our belief thus grounded rises to *ass ance*

7 II *U quest on ble t stimo y and o r own ex*

by y o expe

others that mention it a th ng to be for the most part so a d that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses v g

[1] Cf. Bk I ch iii §§ 22–24 Bk. IV ch 1.

history gi ing us such an ccount of men in all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an pportunity to observe, confirming t, that most men prefer their privat ad antage to the public. if all historians that writ of Tiberius, say that Tiberius did so, t is extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has sufficient foundation to raise tself to a degree which we may call *confidence*.

8. III. *Fair testimony and the nature f the thing, is. ... unquestioned assent* In things that happen indifferently as that bird should fly this or that way that t should thunder on man s right or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected w tnesses, there our assent is also *unavoidable*. Thus that there is such city in Italy as Rome that about one thousand seven hundred years ago, there li ed in t a man, called Julius Cæsar that he was general, and that h n battl gainst another called Pompey

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n er man cannot oid believing t, and can as little doubt of t as he does of th being and actions of his own cquaintance, whereof h himself is w tness.

9. *Experience and testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability* Thus far th mat er goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence w th t, that t na urally determines the judgment, and lea es us as littl liberty t believe or disbelieve as demonstra-

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and tnesses clash w th the rdinary course of na ure, or w th one another there t is, here diligence entu n, and exactness are required, to form right judgment, and t proportion th assen to the differen evidence and probability of the thing which rises and falls, ccordin as those two foundations of credibility viz. common observation in like case and particular testimonies that particular instance f ur tradict t. These are liable to so gre t ari ty of co trary observ ions, circumstances, po ts, different qualifica io s, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. of the reporters, tha t is impossib t reduce to precise rules the various degrees wh rein men gi their assent. This only ma be said in general, Tha as the arguments and proofs *pr* and *con*, pc d xaminati n, ni ly w ghin every particular circumstance, shall t an one ppear pon the whole ma ter in greater or less degree to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted t produce in the mind such different entertainments, as w call *belief conjecture guess, doubt wavering distrust disbelief* &c.

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11. *Yet history is f gr at use* I would not be thought here o lessen th credit and use of *history* t is all th light we ha e in many cases, and we ha in many cases, and we rece e from t great part of th useful truths we ha e th co inci g evid nce. I think nothing more val uable than th records of antiquity I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But

Cf. Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* Bk. I.

this truth itself forces me to say That no probability can rise higher than its first original What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must stand or fall by his only testimony whether good bad or indifferent and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others one after another is so far from receiving any strength thereby that it is only the weaker Passion interest inadvertency mistake of his meaning and a thousand odd reasons or capric os men s minds are acted by (im poss ble to be discovered) may make one man quote another man s words or meaning wrong He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve where the originals are wanting and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on This is certain that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated But the further still it is from the original the less valid it is and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he received it

12 *In thin s which sense cannot discover analogy is the great rule of probability* [*Secondly*] The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such as concern matter of fact and such things as are capable of observation and testimony There remains that other sort concern ng which men entertain op nions with variety of assent though *the things be such that falling not under the reach of our senses they are not c pable f testim y* Such are 1 The existence nature and operations of finite immaterial beings without us as spirits angels devils &c. Or the existence of material beings which either for their smallness in themselves or remoteness from us our senses cannot take notice of—as whether there be any plants animals and intelligent inhabitants in the planets and other mansions of the vast un verse 2 Concerning the manner of operat on in most parts of the wo ks of nature where n though we see the sen s ble effects yet their causes are unknown and we perce e not the ways and manner how they are produced We see animals are generated nourished and move the loadstone draws iron and the parts of a candle successively melting turn into flame and give us both l ght and heat. These and the like effects we see and know but the causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture For these and the like coming not w th in the scrutiny of human senses cannot be examined by them or be attested by anybody and therefore can appear more or less probable, only as they more or less agree to truths that are established in our minds and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation *Analogy* in these matters is the only help we have and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another produces heat and very often fire it self we have reason to think that what we call *heat* and *fire* consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter Observing likewise that the different refractions of pellucid bod es produce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours and also that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies as of velvet, watered silk &c. does the like we think it probable that the *colo r* and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts Thus finding in all parts of the creation that fall under human observation that there is *a gradual connexion of one with another without any great or discernible g ps between in all that great variety of things we see in the world* which are so closely linked together that, in the several ranks of beings it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them we have reason to be persuaded that *by such gentle steps* things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection It is a hard matter to say where sens ble and rational begin and where insensible and irrational end and who is there quick sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest species of living things and which the first of those which have no life? Things as far as we can observe lessen and augment as the quantity does in a regular cone where though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance yet the difference between the upper and under where they touch one another is hardly discernible The d fference is exceeding great between some men and some animals but if we ll

compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little dif ference, that t will be hard t say that that f the man is either clearer r larger Observing I say such gradual and gentle descents d wn ards — f h cre t n that are beneath

of perf ct n, ascend g pwards t wards th in finite perfecti of th Creat by ge tl steps and differences, that ar ery t great d tan from th ext t t. This so t f proba bility which is th best co d ct f r ti al ex periments, and th rise f hypothesis, has also its use and infl ence and ary asoning from analogy leads us ft into th disco ery of truths and useful prod ctions, which w uld therwis

them gi refuse cred t to anything proposed to their belief y t there is o case herein

course of nature, th re, under such ci cumstances that may be the fitter t procure bel ef by how m ch th more th y are beyo d o co trary to ordinary observ ti This is th proper cas f mi acl which, well ttested d n t nly find credit themsel es, b t gi t also to th truths, which ed such co firmati

4. *Th bar t t mo y f d tine lat the high est erlai ty* Bes des those w ha hithert men tio ed there is sort f p pos ti ns that chal leng th highest d gree f ur assent, upo bare estimo y wh ther th thing proposed gr r disagree wi h commo expe ence and th rdi ary course of things, Th reaso whereof is, because th testimo y is of ch an as can not decei no be dece ed and that is of God himself This carries w th t an assuranc beyo d doubt, evidence beyo d exception. This is called by peculiar name, *re lati n*, and ur assent t t, *f ith* wh ch bsol t ly d term es ur minds, nd as perf tly excl des all w ering as our kno ledg tself and w may as well doubt of our n being as w can wh ther any revela io from God be true. So that faith is settled and sure principl of assent and assurance, and

Cf. ch. xviii. § 2

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pose oursel es to all the extra agancy of enthu siasm, and all the erro of wro g princ ples if e ha e faith and assurance in what is not *di e rev* el tion. And theref r in those cases, ur asse t can be rat nally n higher than the dence of its being a revel tio a d that this is th m an ing of th express ns t is del ered in. If the e i denc f its be g revelation o th t this is its tru sense be ly on probabl proofs, ur as sent can reach n h gher than a assurance or diffidence arising from the m e or less appar ent probability of the proof B t *f aith* and th pre edency t ght t h bef re ther argu ments f pers as I shall speak more hereaft here I tr at f t as t is rdinarily placed n c tradistin ti to reaso th gh in truth t be thing else but *as ent f und d the hi hest* n.

Chap XVII *Of Reas n*

1 *Various significat ns f the u d as* The word as in th E glish la gu ge has different significati ns somet mes t is taken for true a d clear principles som times f r clear and fair de ducti from those principles and sometimes fo th caus and part cularly the fin l cause. B t th consider t n I shall h e of t here is in a sign fication different from ll these and that is, as t tand f f culty in ma th t f culty whereby man is supposed t be distinguished from beasts and wherein t is ev dent he m ch ur passes th m.

Wherei as ni g nsists If ge ral kn l edg as has been sh wn consists in percep ti n f th greement disagreeme t f ur n deas, and th kn wledge of the existence f all *things* w *th t us* (except nly of God hose ist ce ry man may rtainly know nd demonstr t t himself from his o n existence) be had nly by ur senses, wh t room is there f r th exercise of any ther f culty but *ut ard sense* and *nward percept* What n ed t there of

Very m ch both f th enlarg ment of our kn wledg and regulating our assent. F th th to d both in kn wledg and pin o and is ec essary and assisting t all our oth t llectu l f cult es, and indeed co tain two of them *gacity* and *ll* By th e t finds ut and by the ther t so orders th interm di t deas

Ch. iii.
Cf Bk II ch § o.
Ch. § ch 2.
Cf. ch. ix. § 3 Bk. II ch. i. § 4.

as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain whereby the extremes are held

but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas in each step of the deduction whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration in which it arrives at *knowledge* or their probable connexion on which it gives or withholds its assent as in *opinion* Sense and intuition reach but a very little way The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas and in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent instead of knowledge and take propositions for true without being certain they are so we have need to find out examine and compare the grounds of their probability In both these cases the faculty which finds out the means and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one and probability in the other is that which we call *reason* For as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another in every step of a discourse to which it will think assent due This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason For where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion where it does not discern whether there be any such connexion or no there men s opinions are not the product of judgment

3 *Reason in its four degrees* So that we may in *reason* consider these *four degrees* the first and highest is the discovering and finding out of truths the second the regular and methodical disposition of them and laying them in a clear and fit order to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived the third is the perceiving their connexion and the fourth a making a right conclusion These several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstration it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part as the demonstration is made by another another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts a third to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one s self and something different from all these to have first found out these intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made.

4 *Whether syllogism is the great instrument of reason first cause to doubt this* There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning reason and that is, whether *syllogism* as is generally thought be the proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising this faculty The causes I have to doubt are these —

First Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the forementioned parts of it and that is to show the *connexion of the proofs* in any one instance and no more but in this it is of no great use since the mind can perceive such connexion where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without it

Men can reason well who cannot make a syllogism. If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest when we only observe the connexion of the proof without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism And therefore we may take notice that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly who know not how to make a syllogism He that will look into many parts of Asia and America will find men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself who yet never heard of a syllogism nor can reduce any one argument to

ly wrapt up in a smooth period and stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language show it in its naked deformity But the weakness or fallacy of such a loose discourse it shows by the artificial form it is put into only to those who have thoroughly studied *mode* and *figure* and have so examined the many ways that three propositions may be put together as to know which of them does certainly conclude right and which not and upon what grounds it is that they do so All who have so far considered *syllogism*, as to see the reason why in three propositions laid together in one form the conclusion will be certainly right but in another not certainly so I grant are certain of the conclusion they draw from the premises in the allowed *modes* and *figures* But they who have not so far looked into those forms, are not sure by virtue of syllogism that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises they only take it to be so by an implicit faith in their teachers and a confidence in those forms of argumentation but this is still but believing not being certain Now if of all mankind those who can make syllogisms are extremely few in comparison of those who cannot and if of those few who have been taught logic there is but a very

small number wh do a y more than beli e that syllogisms, in th allowed *mode* and *figur* sd con clude right, w th ut kn wing certainly that th y do so if syllogisms must be taken f th nly proper instrument of reaso and m ans of kn wl edge, t will f llow that, before Arist tl there was n t o man that did r could know any thing by reaso and that, ince the in enti of syllogisms, there is not o f ten th usand that d

t those f w f them that h could g t so to ex amin th gro ds f yllogisms, as to see that, in bove three score y that thre p opos t ns may be laid tog ther th re are but bout f ur teen wh rein may be sur that the co clu io is right and upon what gro ds t is, that, in these f w th co lusi n is ertain, and in th ther t God has bee m re bountiful t man kind than so H has g en them a mind that can easo w th t being instru ted in m thods of yllogizing th und rstanding is n t taught to reason by these rules t has a u f culty to perce e th coh rence incoherence f ts ideas, and can ang th m right w th ut any such perplexing repeti ions. I say not this any w y to lesse Arist tle, whom I look as o e of the greatest men am gst th anci ts whos larg ne s, cuteness, and pe trat of

t him, I may truly say that th y are not th nly or th best w y f reasoning f th lead ing of those into truth wh are willing t find t, and desire t mak th best use they may of their reaso f th ttainment f kn wledg And h himself t is plain, f und o t some f rms t be conclus e, d thers t not by the forms th m sel es, but by th riginal w y f kn wledge, e. by the isibl greeme t f ideas. Tell a country gentlew man that th wind is south west, and the weather lowering d lik t rain and sh will easily understand t is not saf f her t g abroad thin clad in ch d y after fever she clearly sees the probabl connexion f all these, viz. south wes wind, and clouds, rain, w tting taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, w th

t tying th m together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind which proceeds from e part to an th r qu cker and clearer w th ut them and th p obabil ty which sh easily per cei es in things thus in their n t e tat would be qu t lost if this argument were man ged learnedly and proposed in *mode* and *figur* F r t ry often conf unds the co nexio and I think, every one will perce in m themat cal d m nstrat ns, that th knowledge gained ther by comes sh rtest and clearest w th t syl l

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T infer is n thing but by irtu of propos tio laid d wn as true, t *draw* an ther as tru e. t see o suppose such a connexi n of th two d as of th inf rred propo ti n. V g Let this be the propos tio laid d wn Men shall be pun

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w th u infere ce th t will h ld, o an inference f right reaso as shown a willingness to ha t be r be taken f uch. But in n ther case is t syllo gism that disco ered those deas, o showed th nn xi n of th m f they must be both f und ut, and th connexion everywhere perce ed bef re they can rationally be made use of in syl logism unless t can be said that any idea, w th out cons dering what connexi n t hath w th th tw ther whose agreement should be sh wn by it will d well gh in a yll gism, and may be taken t enture f th *medius termi us* t prov any co clus But this nobody will say because t is by irtu f the percei ed greem t f th intermediat idea w th th extremes, th t the tremes are co cl ded t gree and ther f re each intermediate idea must be ch as in the whol chain hath visibl connexi w th those tw t has be n placed betwe o lse ther by th co lusi n cann t be inf rr d o

Cf. Bk. III ch. x. §§ 3.

drawn in for wherever any link of the chain is loose and without connexion there the whole strength of it is lost and it hath no force to infer or draw in anything In the instance above mentioned what is it shows the force of the inference and consequently the reasonableness of it but a view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclusion or proposition inferred? V g Men shall be punished God the punisher Just punishment The punished guilty Could have done otherwise Freedom Self determination by which chain of

right and conclusive modes and figures or no and so are not at all helped by the forms they are put into though by them the natural order wherein the mind could judge of their respective connexion being disturbed renders the illation much more uncertain than without them.] And as for the logicians themselves they see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those it stands between (on which the force of the inference depends) as well before as after the syllogism is made or else they do not see it at all For a syllogism neither shows nor strengthens the connexion of any two ideas immediately put together but only by the connexion seen in them

the ideas of *men* and *self determination* appear to be connected i e this proposition men can determine themselves is drawn in or inferred from this that they shall be punished in the other world For here the mind seeing the connexion there is between the *idea of men s punishment in the other world* and the *idea of God punishing* between *God punishing* and *the justice of the punishment* between *justice of punishment* and *guilt* between *guilt* and a *power to do otherwise* between a *power to do otherwise* and *freedom* and between *freedom* and *self determination* sees the connexion between *men* and *self determination*

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sides immediately applied to then those two remote ones or as they are called *extremes* do certainly agree and therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to that which it is applied to on each side on which the force of the reasoning depends is as well seen before as after the syllogism is made or else he that makes the syllogism could never see it at all This as has been already observed is seen only by the eye or the perceptive faculty of the mind taking a view of them laid together in a juxta position which view of any two it has equally whenever they are laid together in any proposition whether that proposition be placed as a *major* or a *minor* in a syllogism or no

Use of syllogism Of what use then are syllogisms? I answer their chief and main use is in the Schools where men are allowed without shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree or out of the Schools to those who from thence have learned without shame to deny the connexion of ideas which even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenuous searcher after truth who has no other aim but to find *it* there is no need of any such form to force the allowing of the inference the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and plain order and hence it is that men in their own inquiries after truth never use syllogisms to convince themselves or in teaching others to instruct willing learners Because before they can put them into a syllogism they must see the connexion that is between the intermediate idea and the

[1] This sentence is bracketed by Locke in the original.

two other id as t is set between a d appl ed to, t show their agreement and wh n th y ee that, they see whether the inference be good or no and so syll g m comes too late to settle t. For to mak use ag in of th f rmer nstan e I ask hether the mind considering the d a of justice, placed as an intermediat dea between the p nishme t of me and the guilt of the punished (and till t does so consid t, the mind cann t make use of t as med us term us) does n t as plainly see th force and stre gth of th infer ence as hen t is f rmed int a syllogism. To show t in ery plain and asy example let *ar mal* be the intermediat idea med us *terminus* that the mind makes use of t sh w the co ex ion of *homo* and *vivens* I ask whether the mind does ot more re dily and pl inly ee that con nexion in the simple and proper position of the connecting dea in th middle thus

Homo—Animal—Vivens

than in this perplexed ne,

Animal—Vivens—Homo—Animal

hich is the position these ideas ha e in syllogism, t show th co exi between *homo* and *vivens* by th interv tion of *anim l*.

Not the only w y to detect fallaci I deed syllogism is tho ght t be of *necessary* use, even t the lovers of truth, t show th m the fall cies that are often co cealed in florid w tty or in ol ed discourses. B t that this is a mistak will ppear if consider that the reason why sometimes men wh sincerely aim t truth are imposed po by such loose, and as th y are called het rical discourses, is, that their fancies being truck th some h ly met ph al represent tions, they negl t bserve, or d t easily perce e, hat are the *t ue* id as po which the inference de pends. Now t show such men th w akness of such an argumentatio there eeds more b t to strip if of th s perfl us d as, which blend ed and conf ded th those hich th in ferenced pends, seem t show co exio where th re is no or t least t hind th disco ery of the want of t d th t lay the ak d d as on wh ch th f rc of th argumentatio d pe ds in their d order in which positio th mind taking iew of th m, sees what onnexi they h and so is bl t j dg of th inferenc thout any eed of syllogism t all.

I gran tha mod nd figure is commonly made use of in uch cases, as if the d tecti of th in coherence of such loose discourses were wholly owing to the syllogis cal form and so I myself formerly thought till, pon tricter examina tion I n find that l ying the intermediate deas aked in their d e order sho s the neo- h h orm mental better than syllo- g to place,

but also because syllogism sho s the incoherence only t those (h o are not o e of ten th usand) ho perfectly understand mode a d figure, and th reaso upon h ch those fo ms are st blished h reas due a d orde ly pl ci g of the deas upon wh ch the infere ce is made makes every e, h ther log cian or n t l g cian who understa ds the terms, and hath th faculty to perc e l greement or disagreem nt of uch

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of connexion in the argumentation, and the absurdity of the inference.

And thus I ha e known a man unskilful n syllogism, ho t first h aring could perc e the weakness and inco clusi e ess of a l g art ficial and plausible discourse wherew th others better skilled in yllogism ha e been misled and I bel eve there are few of my re ders wh do not kn w such. And indeed if it ere n t so, th debates of most prin es councils, and th business of assembl es, would be in da ger to be mismanaged since thos who re relied pon nd ha e usually great troke in them, are n t al ys su h h ha e th good luck to be perfectly kno n in th forms of syllogism, or expert in *mode*

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and, en pri ces in matters that concern their crowns nd d gn t es, are so much in lo e with falsehood d mistak th t th y would every where ha e glected t bring syll gism into th d bates of moment or thought t ridicul us so m ch as t offer them in aff irs of conseq ence a plain id nce t me that men of parts a d penetratio h *were n t dly to dispute* ase b t were t t cording t the result of their d bates, and often pay for their mistakes w th their heads or fortunes, f und those scholastic forms were of little use t disco er truth or fallacy hil t both th ne and the ther might be sh n, and better sh wn w th ut them, t those h would not refuse t see what was visibly sh them.

Another cause t d ubt h ther syll gism be the nly

Cf. Lock s, *Second V d t f the Reasonableness f Christianity* 697 also Lock *Thoughts concern g Education*, 693, §§ 188 89.

drawn in for wherever any link of the chain is loose and without connexion there the whole strength of it is lost and it hath no force to infer or draw in anything In the instance above mentioned what is it shows the force of the inference and consequently the reasonableness of it but a view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclusion or proposition inferred? V g Men shall be punished God the *punisher* *Just punishment* The punished guilty Could have done otherwise Freedom Self-determination by which chain of

the ideas of *men* and *self determination* appear to be connected i e this proposition men can determine themselves is drawn in or inferred from this that they shall be punished in the other world For here the mind seeing the connexion *there is* between the *idea of men s punishment in the other world* and the *idea of God punishing* between *God punishing* and *the justice of the punishment* between *justice of punishment* and *guilt* between *guilt* and a *power to do otherwise* between a *power to do otherwise* and *freedom* and between *freedom* and *self-determination* sees the connexion between *men* and *self determination*

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that no syllogism does or can show That the mind only doth or can perceive as they stand there in that juxta position only by its own view to which

sides immediately applied to then those two remote ones or as they are called *extremes* do certainly agree and therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to that which it is applied to on each side on which the force of the reasoning depends is as well seen before as after the syllogism is made or else he that makes the *syllogism* could never see it at all This as has been already observed is seen only by the eye or the percep-

together in any proposition whether that proposition be placed as a *major* or a *minor* in a *syllogism* or no

Use of syllogism Of what use then are syllogisms? I answer their chief and main use is in the Schools, where men are allowed without shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree or out of the Schools to those who from thence have learned without shame to deny the connexion of ideas which even to themselves is visible But to an ingenuous searcher after truth who has no other aim but to find *it* there is no need of *any such form to force the allowing of the inference* the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and plain order and hence it is that men in their own inquiries after truth never use syllogisms to convince themselves or in teaching others to instruct willing learners Because before they can put them into a syllogism they must see the connexion that is between the intermediate idea and the

of Spain empowered the hands of his people and his [illegible] too so, he had brou ht t li ht but [illegible] of that treasure tha la so lo hid in the dark [illegible] of America. And I am [illegible] think, that [illegible] shall empow all the force of his rea son [illegible] in brandishing of syl [illegible], will dis cover [illegible] of that mass of know edge which lies yet concealed in th secre recesses of nature and [illegible], I am p t [illegible] nati e rustic rea son (as former has done) is likelier t pen a [illegible], and add t the common stock of man kind, rather than a scholas ic proceedi by the strict rules of [illegible] and *f* [illegible]

O [illegible] *to* [illegible] *syll gism* [illegible] ma . I doubt not nevertheless, but there are [illegible] be found t assist our reason in this most useful part and this the judicious Hoo er en courages me t [illegible] who in his Eccl. Pol. l. [illegible] 6, speaks thus. If there mi ht be added the ri ht helps of true art and l arning (which h lps, I must plainly confess, this [illegible] of the world, carry ing the name of learned age, doth neither much know nor g nerally regard,) there would un doubtedly be almost as much difference in ma turity of judgment betwee men therew th in ured, and that which men now are as between men that are now and innocents. I do not pre tend to ha found or discovered here an of those [illegible] be profart. this grea ma of deep thought mentions. bu that is plain, that syllogism and the logic now in use which were as well known in his da s, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me if by Discourse perhaps some thing ou of the wa I am sure as [illegible] wholly new and unborrowed, I shall ha e gi en occa sion others t cast bout for ew discoveries. and seek in their own thou hts for those right helps of art which will scarce be found, I fear by those who servilel confine themsel es th rules and dictates of [illegible]. For bea [illegible] lead this sort of ca tle, (as an observing Roman calls them,) whose thou hts reach onl to imitation, [illegible] But I can be bold to sa tha this age is adorned w th some men of that strength of judgment and largeness of com prehension, [illegible] hat, if they would emp y their thoughts on this subject, could pen new and un discovered w [illegible] the ad anceme t of knowl edge.

8. [illegible] *about particulars* [illegible] Having here had occasion to peak of syl logism in general, and the use of t in reasoning, and the improvemen of our knowled e, is fit, before I le this [illegible], to take notice of on manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism. [illegible] that no syllogistical reason can be right and conclus e, b t what has at least on *general* propo sition in it. As if [illegible] could not reason, and ha e knowledge bout particulars hereas, in truth, th mat er ri htl considered, the immediate ob ject of all our reasoning and knowledge, is noth ing b t particulars. E ery man s reasoning and knowledge is [illegible] bout th d as existing in his own mind [illegible] every one of them, particula [illegible] son bou [illegible] w th those [illegible] tion of th agreement or disagreement of our par ticular ideas is th ho and utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accid ntal to t, and consists onl in this, that the particular d as about which [illegible] is are such as more than on par ticular thin can correspond w th and be repre sen ed by. But th perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two deas, and conse quently our know ed is equally clear and ce tain wh ther either or both, or ne ther of those ideas, be capab of representing more real be ings than one, or no. O thing more I cra e lea e to offer about syllogism, before I lea e t, viz. May one not upon just ground inquire wh ther the form syllogism now has, is that which in reason [illegible] have. For the *medius terminus* being t join the extremes, i.e. the intermediate ideas, b its in ervention, to show the agreement or dis agreement of the two in question, would not th position of the *medius terminus* be more natural, and show th agreement or disagreement of th extremes clearer and bet er if [illegible] were placed in the middl between them. Which might be easi ly done by transposing th propositions, and mak in the *medius terminus* the predica of the first, and the sub ect of the second. As thus.

Omnis homo est animal.
Omne animal [illegible]
Erg [illegible]

Omne corpus est [illegible]
[illegible]
Ergo corpus non [illegible]

I need no tro bl [illegible] reader w th instances in syllogisms hose conclusions are particular. The same reason hold for th sam form in them, as well as in th general.

[illegible] *Our* [illegible] *fallacious Reason*, thou h t pen [illegible]

[illegible] mighty fabric, yet t comes far short of the real exten of even corporeal being And there are many instances wherein t fails us as,

proper instrument of reason in the discovery of truth Secondly Another reason that makes me doubt whether syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason in the discovery of truth is that of whatever use *mode* and *figure* is pretended to be in the laying open of fallacy (which has been above considered) *those scholastic forms of discourse are not less liable to fallacies than the plainer ways of argumentation* and for this I appeal to common observation which has always found these artificial methods of reasoning more adapted to catch and entangle the mind than to instruct and inform the understanding And hence it is that men even when they are baffled and silenced in this scholastic way are seldom or never convinced and so brought over to the conquering side they perhaps acknowledge their adversary to be the more skilful disputant but rest nevertheless persuaded of the truth on their side and go away worsted as they are with the same opinion they brought with them which they could not do if this way of argumentation carried light and conviction with it and made men see where the truth lay and therefore syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining victory in dispute than for the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair inquiries And if it be certain that fallacies can be couched in syllogism as it cannot be denied it must be something else and not syllogism that must discover them

I have had experience how ready some men are when all the use which they have been wont to ascribe to anything is not allowed to cry out that I am for laying it wholly aside But to prevent such unjust and groundless imputations I tell them that I am not for taking away any helps to the understanding in the attainment of knowledge And if men skilled in and used to syllogisms find them assisting to their reason in the discovery of truth I think they ought to make use of them All that I aim at is that they should not ascribe more to these forms than belongs to them and think that men have no use or not so full an use of their reasoning faculties without them. Some eyes want spectacles to see things clearly and distinctly but let not those that use them therefore say nobody can see clearly without them those who do so will be thought in favour of art (which perhaps they are beholden to) a little too much to depress and discredit nature Reason by its own penetration where it is strong and exercised usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism If use of those spectacles has so dimmed its sight, that it cannot without them see consequences or inconsequences in argumentation I am not so unreasonable as to be against the using them Every one knows what best fits his own sight but let him not thence conclude all in the dark who use not just the same helps that he finds a need of

5 *Syllogism helps little in demonstration less in probability* But however it be in knowledge I think I may truly say it is *of far less or no use at all probabilities* For the assent there being to be determined by the preponderancy after due weighing of all the proofs with all circumstances on both sides nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism which running away with one assumed probability or one topical argument pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration and forcing it upon some remote difficulty holds it fast there entangled perhaps and as it were manacled in the chain of syllogisms without allowing it the liberty much less affording it the helps requisite to show on which side all things considered is the greater probability

6 *Serves not to increase our knowledge but to fence with the knowledge we suppose we have* But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes (and yet I would fain see the man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism) yet still it fails our reason in that part which if not its highest perfection is yet certainly its hardest task and that which we most need its help in and that is *the finding out of proofs and making new discoveries* The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the connexion of remote ones This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already The forty seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is very true but the discovery of it I think not owing to any rules of common logic. A man knows first and then he is able to prove syllogistically So that syllogism comes after knowledge and then a man has little or no need of it But it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased and that

Cf Bacon on Syllogism *Novum Organum* I 11–14.

son all this way he will not do much otherwise than he who having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth should have it beaten up all into swords and put it into his servants hands to fence with and bang one another Had the King

agreement of the intermediate idea, on both sides, with those which we would compare, is *plainly discerned*, there it amounts to *demonstration*, whereby knowledge is produced, which, though it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear as *intuitive* knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt: the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it is; and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long, and perplexed, and too hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c., there the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge, which may be called *rational knowledge*, as the other is intuitive.

6. *To supply the narrowness of demonstrative and intuitive knowledge, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning.* Secondly, There are other ideas, whose agreement or disagreement can no otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or *likely* one: and in these it is that the *judgment* is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it, yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the probability is so clear and strong, that *assent* as necessarily follows it, as *knowledge* does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the judgment is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the overbalance.

Cf. ch. ii. §§ 2–5; iii. §§ 8–20; x. xi. § 10.
Cf. ch. xiv. xv. xvi.
Cf. ch. ii. § 4; iii. § 5; xi. §§ 8, 9.

17. *Intuitive knowledge* is the perception of the *certain* agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.

Rational knowledge is the perception of the *certain* agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be *frequent and usual*.

18. *Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas.* Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in *words*, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is *the finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third*. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are, but we observe it only by our ideas.

19. *Four sorts of arguments.* Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on *four sorts of arguments*, that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition.

I. *Argumentum ad verecundiam.* The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out

Cf. Berkeley, *Principles*, Introd. § 2.

I *In cases when we have no ideas* It perfectly fails us where our ideas fail [1] It neither does nor can extend itself further than they do And therefore wherever we have no ideas our reasoning stops and we are at an end of our reckoning and if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas it is only about those sounds and nothing else

10 II *Because our ideas re often obscure or im perfect* Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss because of the obscurity confusion or imperfec tion of the ideas it is employed about and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions Thus not having any perfect idea of the *least ex tension of matter* nor of *infinity* we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter but having per fect clear and distinct ideas of *number* our rea son meets with none of those inextricable diffi culties in numbers nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them Thus we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion or thought how the mind produces either of them in us and much imperfecter yet of the operation of God run into

to show conclusions Our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those ideas which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas and in this some men s faculties far outgo others Till

tions of ancient mathematicians and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human

12 IV *Bec use we often proce d upon wron p in ciples*

c ples

culties broug

without kno ing ho v to free itself and in that case it is n vain to implore the help of reason unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong principles [4] Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties wh ch the building upon false foundat ons brings a man into that if he will pursue it it entangles him the more and engages him deeper in perplexi ties

13 V *Because we often employ doubtful terms* As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our rea son so upon the same ground do dubious words and uncertain signs, often in discourses and ar guings when not warily attended to puzzle men s reason and bring them to a nonplus.[5] But these two latter are our fault and not the fault of rea son But yet the consequences of them are never theless obvious and the perplexities or errors they fill men s minds with are everywhere ob servable

14. *Our highest degree of knowled e is intuiti e with out reasoning* Some of the ideas that are in the mind are so there that they can be by them selves immediately compared one with another and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle as clearly as it does the idea of a circle and this therefore as has been said I call *int itive knowled e* [6] which is cer tain beyond all doubt and needs no probation nor can have any this being the highest of all human certainty In this consists the evidence of all those *maxims* which nobody has any doubt about but every man (does not as is sa d only assent to but) *knows* to be true as oon as ever they are proposed to his understanding In the discovery of and assent to these truths there is no use of the discursive faculty *no need of reasoning*

and the spirits of just men made perfect shall ha e in a future state of thousands of things which now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or hich our short sighted reason having got some faint g

15

h

immediate compar ng them And in all these have *eed f r as ni g* and must by discourse and nference make our d scoveries. Now of these there are t o sorts which I shall take the l berty to m ntion here aga n —

them. In this case when the agreement or dis-

[1] Cf ch iii. § 1
Cf Bk II ch xx §§ 30 31 also Hume *E q C ncern g H m U der ta d g* ect p 506
Cf Bk II h xxi §§ 8–55 also Locke s *F t Letter* to St llingfleet p 50
Cf. Bk I chh. i. ii IV ch. vii

[5] Cf Bk III
Cf ch ii. § 1 iii. § 3

greement of the intermediate ideas on both sides, with those which we would compare, is plainly discerned, there it amounts to demonstration, whereby knowledge is produced, which, though it be certain, yet is not so easy nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt: the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it is; and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and too hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c., there the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge, which may be called rational knowledge, as the other is intuitive.

6. To supply the narrowness of demonstrative and intuitive knowledge, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning. Secondly, There are other ideas, whose agreement or disagreement can no otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or likely one: and in these it is that the judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the mind that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable mediums. This though it never amounts to knowledge, ... which is the lowest ...
d
t

Th great e cell y no use ... —

Cf. Ih. §§ 3 ... §§ 8–2 ... xi. § ...
Cf. ibid. xi
Cf. ibid. § ... § 5 xi. §§ 8, 9.

to observe right, and do take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the overbalance.

17. Intuition, demonstration, judgment. Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.

Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.

18. Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas. Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is the finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas: and things agree or disagree as really they are; but we observe it only by our ideas.

19. Four sorts of arguments. Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of arguments that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on others or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition.

I. Argumentum ad verecundiam. The first is, to allege the opinions of men whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out

Cf. Berkeley, Principl. Introd. §

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11 III *Because we perceive not intermedi te id as to show c nclusi ns* Our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those deas which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas and in this some men s faculties far outgo others Till algebra that great instrument and instance of human sagacity was discovered men with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human

12 IV *B c use we ften proceed upon wro p in*

case it is in vain to mplore the help of eason unless t be to d scover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong princ ples Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties wh ch the building upon false foundations brings a man into that if he will pursue it t entangles him the more and engages him deeper in perplexities

[1] Cf ch § 1
[2] Cf Bk II h xxiii §§ 30 31 also Hume *E qu y C nc g H m U der t d g* sect xi p 506
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14. *Our hi hest deg ee of knowled e is int ti e with out reasoni* Some of the ideas that are in the mind are so there that they can be by themselves immediately compared one with another and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle as clearly as it does the idea of a circle and this therefore as has been said I call *int itive k wledge* [6] which is certain

all those *maxims* which nobody has any doubt about but every man (does not as is said only assent to but) *knows* to be true as oon as ever they are proposed to his understanding In the discovery of and assent to these truths there is no use of the discursive faculty *o need of reasoni g* but they are known by a superior and h gher degree of evidence And such if I may guess at things unknown I am apt to think that angels have now and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have in a future state of thousands of things which now either wholly escape our apprehensions or which our short sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of we in the dark grope after

15 *The ne t is got by e soning* But though we have here and there a little of this clear l ght, some sparks of bright knowledge yet the greatest part of our ideas are such that we cannot d scern their agreement or disagreement by an immed ate compa ing them And in all these we

together yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas wh ch can be compared with them. In this case when the agreement or dis-

[5] Cf Bk III
[6] Cf. h ii § 1 iii. § 3

agreement of the intermediate idea, on both sides, with those which we would compare, is plainly discerned, there it amounts to demonstration, where knowledge is produced, which, though it be certain, yet is not so easy nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt: the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other: and where there be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it is; and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and too hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c., there the agreement of the first and

whose agreement or disagreement can no otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or likely one: and in these it is that the judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the probability is so clear and strong, that assent as necessarily follows it, as knowledge does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the judgment is

to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then

judgment is ...

agree or disagree by the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.

8. *Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas.* Though the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is *the finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third.* As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our ideas.

9. *Four sorts of arguments.* Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on *four sorts of arguments,* that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition.

I. *Argumentum ad verecundiam.* The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out

Cf. ch. ii, §§ 3 ... iii, §§ 8- ... x, xi, § 0.
Cf. ch. xiv, xv, xvi.
Cf. ch. ii, § 4, iii, § 5, x, §§ 8, 9.

Cf. Berkeley *Principles* Introd. § 2.

against them This I think may be called *argumentum ad verecundiam*

20 II *Argumentum ad ignorantiam* Secondly Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others and force them to submit to their judgments and receive their opinion in debate is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof or to assign a better And this I call *argumentum ad ignorantiam*

21 III *Argumentum ad hominem* Thirdly A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions This is already known under the name of *argumentum ad hominem*

22 IV *Argumentum ad judicium The fourth alone advances us in knowledge and judgment* The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability This I call *argumentum ad judicium* This alone of all the four brings true instruction with it and advances us in our way to knowledge For 1 It argues not another man s opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of conviction will not contradict him 2 It proves not another man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better 3 Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong I may be modest and therefore not oppose another man s persuasion I may be ignorant and not be able to produce a better I may be in an error and another may show me that I am so This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of truth but helps me not to it that must come from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves and not from my shamefacedness ignorance or error

23 *Above contrary and according to reason* By what has been before said of reason we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things into those that are according to above and contrary to reason 1 *According to reason* are such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection and by natural deduction find to be true or probable 2 *Above reason* are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles 3 *Contrary to reason* are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas Thus the existence of one God is according to reason the existence of more than one God contrary to reason the resurrection of the dead above reason *Above reason* also may be taken in a double sense viz. either as signifying above probability or above certainty and in that large sense also *contrary to*

reason wherein it is *opposed to faith* which though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking yet common use has so authorized it that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it

if it be regulated as is our duty cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes with

know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding This at least is certain that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has may have this

case or matter whatsoever believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him He that doth otherwise transgresses against his own light and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability But since reason and faith are by some men opposed we will so consider them in the following chapter

Chap XVIII *Of Faith and Reason and their Distinct Provinces*

1 *Necessary to know their boundaries* It has been above[1] shown 1 That we are of necessity ignorant

ideas 4 That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have no other knowl

[1] Cf chh iii §§ 9-11

edge of our own or testimony of other men t bottom our reaso upon.

From these things thus premised I think we may come to lay d wn *the measu and b ndari betw en faith and ar* the want wh reof may possibly ha e been th cause, if not f great disorders, yet t least f great disputes, and per haps mistakes in the w ld Fo till t be re sol ed how far we are to be guided by reaso and *how far* by faith, we shall in ain disp te, and endea our to co ince ne another in mat ters of religion.

2. *Faith and as what as co tradist ngu hed.* I find every sect, as far as reaso ill help th m, make use of t gladly and where t fails them, they cry out, It is matter f faith, and bov rea son. And I do t see how they can argu w th any ne, o ever co ince gainsayer ho makes use of the same pl a, w tho t setting do n stri t bo ndaries between faith and reaso which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything t d

Reas theref re here, as co tradistinguished *t faith, I take to be th discovery f th certainty p b bili y of ch propo tions truths* hich the mind arri es t by dedu tion made from such deas, which t has g t by the use of its natural faculties iz. by sensat or reflec tion.

Faith, th ther d is th assent t any *proposition, no thus made u by th deductions* of reason, but po the credit of the proposer as coming from God, in some extra rdinary w y of communicatio This w y of discovering truths t me we call *at*

3 *N new simple de an b convey d by t adit nal revelation. Fir t* Then I say that *no man nspi d by God can by any re lat mmunicat to other any new simple ideas hich they had ot befor f m sensa tion or f ct on.* For whatsoever impressions he himself may ha from th immediat ha d f God, this rev lati n, if t be of w simpl deas, cannot be co yed t another either by words or any ther signs. Because words, by their immediat per tio us, cause no th deas but of their natural sounds and t is by the cust m of using them for signs, tha they excit and re- in ur minds latent ideas but yet nly ch d as as were ther bef re F w rds, seen or h ard recall ur th ghts those d as nly which to us they ha bee w to be gns of but cannot introduce any perfectly ew and f merly unknow mpl deas. The same h lds in all ther gns which cann t gnify t us things of which we ha bef re never had any dea t all.

Thus whatever thi gs were discovered to St. Paul, when he as rapt p into the third hea n whatever new deas his mind there rece ed all the descript he can make t oth rs of that place is only this, That there are such things, as eye hath not seen, nor ar h ard, no hath t ent red into the heart f man t conce e. A d supposing God should discover to any one, supernatu ally pecies f creatures inhab ting f r ex ample J p ter r Saturn (for that t is possible there may be uch body can de y) which had six senses and imprint o his mind th d as con eyed to theirs by that sixth sense I e could no m re by words, produce in th minds of other

deas, then, which are the f ndat on, and sole matter f all ur n ti ns and knowledge we must d pend wholly ur reaso I mean ur nat ral f cult es and can by no means recei e th m, or any of th m, from tradit al revelat n. I say *t adit nal re lat n,* dist t n to *origi al re lation.* By th o I mean that first mpress n which is made mmediately by God n the mind of any man, to which cannot set any bounds and by th ther those mpressions d li ered ove to th rs in ords, d th rdinary w ys f co eying ur co ceptions e t another

4. *T adit nal re la on may make us know pr positi ns know ble als by as but not with the ame certainty that ason doth. Se ondly* I say that *the same truths may b dis er d and y d dou f m re lat n, which ar discover ble t us by as and by those ideas u naturally may hav* So God might, by revelation, discover th truth of any propositi n in Eucl d as well as men by the natural use of their faculties, come t make th disco ery themsel es. In all things f this kind there is littl need or use of re latı n, God ha ing furnished us w th natural and surer means t arri t the kno l ed e of th m. For whatsoever truth we com to th clear discovery of from the knowledg and co templa f ur own deas, will alw ys be certainer t us than those which are co eyed t us by *t adit onal re lat on.* F th knowledg e ha that this revelati n came at first from God can never be so sure as the kn ledge e ha e from th clear and distin t perceptio f the gree m t disagreem t of ur wn ideas v g if t were revealed some ges ince, that the three angles of a triangl were equal t two right nes, I might asse t t the truth of that propos ti pon the cred t of th traditi n that t was rev aled.

but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles and the three angles of a triangle The like holds in matter of fact knowable by our senses v g the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation and yet nobody I think will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses inspired but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book as if he had seen Moses write it So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses

5 *Even original revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason* In propositions then whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas attained either by immediate intuition as in self-evident propositions or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the assistance of revelation as necessary to gain our assent and introduce them into our minds Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there or had done it already which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing unless where God immediately reveals it to us and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is that it *is* a revelation from God But yet nothing I think can under that title shake or overrule plain knowledge or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding For since no evidence of our faculties by which we receive such revelations can exceed if equal the certainty of our intuitive knowledge we can never receive for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge v g the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation since the evidence first that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God secondly that we understand it right can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once And therefore *no proposition can be received for divine revelatio* *btain the assent due to all such if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge* Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge evidence and assent whatsoever and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood no measures of credible and incredible in the world if doubtful propositions shall take place before self evident and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in In propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith They cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever For faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge Because though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge Since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it which in this case where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason will always have this objection hanging to it viz that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God the bounti

our faculties useless wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship our understandings and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light less conduct than the beast that perisheth For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of anything to be a divine revelation as it has of the principles of its own reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason to give a place to a proposition whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have

6 *Traditional revelation much less* Thus far a man has use of reason and ought to hearken to it even in immediate and original revelation where it is supposed to be made to himself But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others which by the tradition of writings or word of mouth are conveyed down to them reason has a great deal more to do and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation and nothing else faith as we use the word (called commonly *divine faith*) has to do with no propositions, but those which are sup-

posed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith can say that it is matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such book, is of divine inspiration unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such revelation, the believing or not believing that proposition, or book, to be of divine authority can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself, it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable.

In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge and revelation, though it may in consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet can not in such cases invalidate its decrees, nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith, which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.

7 *Things above reason are when revealed the proper matter of faith.* But, *Thirdly* There being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all, these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and *above reason*, are, when revealed, *the proper matter of faith.* Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state and that the dead shall rise, and live again these and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do.

8 *Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith, and must carry it against probable conjectures of reason.* But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, *must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason.* Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently

Cf. Locke *Reply to Second Letter* of Stillingfleet, pp. 65–2

know but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is satisfied, comes *from one* who cannot err and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signi-

knowledge that a proposition —

the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered as he has that the contrary is true, and so

9. *Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge or but probably ought to be hearkened to* First, What ever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind by its natural faculties and notions, can not judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.

Secondly All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired

admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reason in such probable propositions,

clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason in that particular matter being able to reach no higher than probability faith gave the determination where reason came short and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay

10. *In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened to* Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eter

nal fountain of all knowledge Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of faith but whether it be a divine revelation or no reason must judge which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original in the words we receive it and in the sense we understand it so clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason and therefore *Nothing that is contrary to and inconsistent with the clear and self evident dictates of reason has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith wherein reason hath nothing to do* Whatsoever is divine revelation ought to overrule all our opinions prejudices and interest and hath a right to be received with full assent Such a submission as this of our reason to faith takes not away the landmarks of knowledge this shakes not the foundations of reason but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us

11 *If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted* If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries there will in matters of religion be no room for reason at all and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed For to this crying up of faith in *opposition* to reason we may I think in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind For men having been principled with an opinion that they must not consult reason in the things of religion however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge have let loose their fancies and natural superstition and have been by them led

so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man So that in effect religion which should most distinguish us from beasts and ought most peculiarly to elevate us as rational creatures above brutes is that wherein men often appear most irrational and more senseless than beasts themselves *Credo quia impossibile est* I believe because it is impossible might in a good man pass for a sally of zeal but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by

Chap XIX *Of Enthusiasm*[1]

1 *Love of truth necessary* He that would seriously set upon the search of truth ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it. For he that loves it not will not take much pains to get it nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody in the commonwealth of learning who does not profess himself a lover of truth and there is not a rational creature that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of And yet for all this one may truly say that there are very few lovers of truth for truth s sake even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so How a man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry and I think there is one unerring mark of it viz The not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent it is plain receives not the truth in the love of it loves not truth for truth s sake but for some other bye-end. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence it is plain that all the surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection and not to the love of truth it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true which is in effect to love it as a truth because it is possible or probable that it may not be true In any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence or by the force of demonstration

no tincture from them

Forwardness to dictate another s beliefs from whence The assuming an authority of dictating

Cf Locke letter to Molyneux Oates April 6, 1695

[1] Cf chh § 1 ii. § 14.

Cf chh §§ 2–13 x ii. § 15.

Cf. chh xiv–x ii.

t others, and forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is constant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our judgments. For how al most can t be therwise, but that he should be ready to impose on another s belief, who has al read imposed on his own. Who can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from him in dealing with others, whose understanding is not accustomed t them in his dealing with himself? Who does violence to his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and usurps the prerogative that belongs to truth alone, *which is t command* assent by only its own authority, i.e. by and in proportion to that evidence which it carries with it.

3. *Force of enthusiasm, in which assent taken away.* Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to consider third ground of assent which with some men has the same authority and is as confidently relied on as either faith or reason I mean *enthusiasm*, which, laying by reason, would set up revelation without. Whereby in effect it takes way both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the room of them the ungrounded fancies of man s own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct.

4. *Reason and revelation. Reason is natural revelation*, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties *revelation is natural reason enlarged* by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much what the same as if he would persuade man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by telescope.

5. *Rise of enthusiasm.* Immediate revelation being much easier way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct than the tedious and not always successful labour of strict reasoning is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven in their actions and opinions, especially in those of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowledge and principles of reason. Hence we see that, in all ages, men in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an opinion of greater familiarity with God, and nearer admittance to his favour than is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the Deity and frequent communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding by ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of light this they understand he has promised to do, and who then has so good a title t expect it as those who are his peculiar people, chosen by him, and depend ing on him.

6. *Enthusiastic impulse.* Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies is an illumination from the Spirit of God, and present ly of divine authority and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or direction from heaven, and must be obeyed it is a commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it.

What is meant by enthusiasm. This I take to be properly *enthusiasm*, which, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works t, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men than either of those two, or both together men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they receive from themselves and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For strong conceit, like a new principle carries all easily with it, when g t above common sense, and freed from all restraint of reason and check of reflection, it is heightened into divine authority in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.

8. *Enthusiasm accepted for seeing and feeling without search and proof.* Though the odd opinions and extravagant actions enthusiasm has run men into were enough to warn them against this wrong principle, so apt to misguide them both in their belief and conduct, yet the love of something extraordinary the ease and glory it is to be inspired, and be above the common and natural ways of knowledge, so flatters many men s laziness, ignorance, and vanity that, when once they are got into this way of immediate revelation, of illumination without search, and of certainty without proof and without examination, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them, they are above it they see the light infused into their understandings, and cannot be mistaken it is clear and visible there, like the light of bright sunshine shows itself, and needs no other proof but its own evidence they feel the hand of God moving them within, and

the impulses of the Spirit and cannot be mistaken in what they feel Thus they support themselves and are sure reasoning hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves what they have a sensible experience of admits no doubt needs no probation Would he not be ridiculous who should require to have it proved to him that the light shines and that he sees it? It is its own proof and can have no other When the Spirit brings light into our minds it dispels darkness We see it as we do that of the sun at noon and need not the twilight of reason to show it us This light from heaven is strong clear and pure carries its own demonstration with it and we may as naturally take a glow worm to assist us to discover the sun as to examine the celestial ray by our dim candle reason [1]

9 *Enthusiasm how to be discovered* This is the way of talking of these men they are sure because they are sure and their persuasions are right because they are strong in them. For when what they say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling this is all it amounts to and yet these similes so impose on them that they serve them for certainty in themselves and demonstration to others

10 *The supposed intern l l ght examined* But to examine a little soberly this internal light and this feeling on which they build so much These men have they say clear light and they see they have awakened sense and they feel this cannot they are sure be disputed them For when a man says he sees or feels nobody can deny him that he does so But here let me ask This seeing is it the perception of the truth of the proposition or of this that it is a revelation from God? This feeling is it a perception of an incl nation or fancy to do something or of the Spirit of God moving that incl nation? These are two very different perceptions and must be carefully distinguished if we would not impose upon ourselves I may perceive the truth of a proposition and yet not perce ve that it is an immediate revelation from God I may perceive the truth of a proposition in Euclid without its being or my perceiving it to be a revelation nay I may perceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural way and so may conclude it revealed without perceiving that it is a revelation of God Because there be spirits which without being divinely commissioned may excite those ideas in me and lay them in such order before my mind that I may perceive their connexion So that the kno l edge of any proposition coming into my mind I know not how is not a perception that it is from God Much less is a strong persuasion that it is true a perception that it is from God or so much as true But however it be called light and seeing I suppose it is at most but belief and assurance and the proposition taken for a revelation is not such as they *know* to be true but *take* to be true For where a proposition is known to be true revelation is needless and it is hard to conceive how there can be a revelation to any one of what he knows already If therefore it be a proposition which they are persuaded but do not know to be true whatever they may call it, it is not seeing but believing For these are two ways whereby truth comes into the mind wholly distinct so that one is not the other What I see I know to be so by the evidence of the thing itself what I believe I take to be so upon the testimony of another But this testimony I must know to be given or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it is God that reveals this to me or else I see nothing The question then here is How do I know that God is the revealer of this to me that this impression is made upon my mind by his Holy Spirit and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this how great soever the assurance is that I am possessed with it is groundless whatever light I pretend to it is but *enthusi*

m For whether the proposition supposed to be

mistake not these men receive it for true be-

stantly round in this circle *It is a revelation, be cause they firmly believe it* and *they believe it because it is a revel tion*

11 *Enthusi sm fails of e dence that the pr positi n is from God* In all that is of divine revelation there is need of no other proof but that it is an inspiration from God for he can neither deceive nor be deceived But how shall it be known that

to believe? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the

[1] Cf. ch. ii. § 1

[2] Cf. ch v § 18.

evid nce t pretends to. F r men thus possessed boast of light whereby they say they are en lightened, and bro ght into the knowledge f this or that truth. B t if they know t to be a truth, they must kn w t to be so either by ts o n self-ev dence t natural reaso or by the 1 rnof h t mak t ut t be so If they

w thout th n ip re e ... --

truths, of what kind soever th t m n u inspired are enl gh d w th, cam int their minds, and are established there. If they say they know t to be true, because t is a revel tion from God, the reaso is good but th n t will be demanded how th y kn w t t be a rev latio from God If they say by th light t brings with t, hich shines bright in their minds, and they cann t re sist I beseech them t consider wh ther this be any more than what we ha taken n tice f al ready iz. that t is revelation, because they strongly believ t t be true F r all the light they peak f is b t tro g though unground ed persuas f th ir wn minds, th t t is truth. F r t nal grounds from proofs that t is truth, th y must cknowledg t ha n n for th t is not recei ed as a revelation, but po th rdinary grounds that ther truths are recei ed and if they bel ev t to be tru because t is revela n, and ha e no other reaso f ts being evel tion, b t because they are fully persuaded, with t any ther reason, that t is tru then they bel ev t t be rev lati nly because they tro gly believ t t b ev la tio which ry nsaf ground t proceed n, either in ur tenets or t ons. And what readier w y can there be t run oursel es into the most extra agant errors and miscarriages, tha thus t set p f cy f ur suprem d sol guid and t believ any propos ti t be true, any ctio t be right, nly because w be lie to be so Th trength of ur persuasi ns is no evidence t all f their wn rect tud crooked things may be as tiff and inflexibl as trai h nd men may be p t d pe r mpt ry rr in truth. H w com else the untractabl zeal ts in diff re t and pposit parties. For if th light, whi h every hinks he has in his mind, which in this case is thing bu the trength f his wn persuas n, be evid ce tha is from God contrary pini ns h e the same titl t be inspirati ns and God will be no nly the F ther of l ghts, b t f ppo sit and co tradictory lights, leading men co

trary way and contr d ct ry proposit ns will be di ine truths if an u grounded strength of assurance be an ev d nce that a y proposition is Di ine Revelat n.

1 *Firmness f persuasion no proof that any pr posi ti is f m God* This cannot be therwise, wh lst firmness f persuas n is made the cause of be liev g and confide ce of bei g n the right is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himself be l eved h did well, and that he had a call t it, h n he pers cuted th Chri tians h m he c fid tl thought n the wro g b t y t it was l

f r di in truths, shining in their minds w t the clearest light.

13 *Light i the mind what* Light, true li ht th mind is, or can be n thi g else but th e d nce of th truth of any propositio and if it be t a self-ev d nt proposit n, all the l ht t

led by this Son f th M rning are as fully satis fied of the illuminatio e. are as tro gly per suaded that th y are nl ght ned by the Spirit f God as any o e wh is so they acqu esce and j ic in t, are actuated by t and nobody can be more sure, no more in the right (if their own bel ef may be j dge) than they

4. *Rev lati must b j d d f by as n.* He, theref re, that will ot gi e himself up t all the extra ances of delus and erro must bring this gu d f his l ght u thin t th trial God wh n h makes th prophet does n t unmake th man. H l es all his facult es in the natural state, to

f natural reason, lse makes t known t be a truth which h would ha e us assent t by his th rity and co inces us that t is from him, by som marks which reason cann t be mistaken in. *Reas must be ur last jud and guide every-*

thin I do not mean that we must consult reason and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles and if it cannot that then we may reject it but consult it we must and by it examine whether it be a revelation from God or no and if reason finds it to be revealed from God reason then declares for it as much as for any other truth and makes it one of her dictates Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration if there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions whereby to judge of our persuasions if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves inspirations and delusions truth and falsehood will have the same measure and will not be possible to be distinguished

15 *Belief no pr of of revel tion* If this internal light or any proposition which under that title we take for inspired be conformable to the principles of reason or to the word of God which is attested revelation reason warrants it and we may safely receive it for true and be guided by it in our belief and actions if it receive no testimony nor evidence from either of these rules we cannot take it for a revelation or so much as for true till we have some other mark that it is a revelation besides our believing that it s so Thus we see the holy men of old who had revelations from God had something else besides that internal light of assurance in their own minds to testify to them that it was from God They were not left to the r own persuasions alone that those persuasions were from God but had *outwa d s gns* to convince them of the Author of those revelations And when they were to convince others they had a power given them ^ truth

isible

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without being consumed and heard a voice out of it this was someth ng besides find ng an impulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt and yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with that message till God by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent had assured h m of a power to testify his mission by the same miracle repeated before them whom he was sent to Gideon was sent by an angel to deliver Is ael from the Midian tes and yet he desired a sign to convince h m that th s commission was from God These and several the like instances to be found among the p ophets of old are enough to show that they thought not an inward see ng or persuasion of their own minds without any other proof a sufficient evidence that it was from God though the Scripture does not everywhere mention their demanding or having such proofs

16 *Criteria of a d vine revelation* In what I have said I am far from denying that God can or doth sometimes enl ghten men s minds in the apprehending of certain truths or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, *without any extrao di na y signs accompanying it* But in such cases too we have reason and Scripture unerring rules to know whether it be from God or no Where the truth embraced is consonant ^ h n

ay be assured that we run no risk in entertaining it as such because though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth But it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves that can warrant it to be a light or motion from heaven nothing can do that but the written Word of God without us or that standard of s

t gin of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamn Th l r

L, u neans prove it to be an offspring of heaven and of divine original[1]

Chap XX *Of Wrong Assent or Error*[2]

1 *Causes ferror o how men c me to give assent contra y to p b bility* Knowledge being to be had only of visible and certain truth *err* is not a fault of our knowledge but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true

But if assent be grounded o l lelihood if the ent be proba its in what is

e o egoing chapters it will be demanded *how m n com t g ve ther as nt ont y to pr b b lity* For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opin ons noth ng m r

The reasons whe eof though they may be ery various yet I suppose may all be reduced to these four

[1] Cf Locke s lett r t M lyn ux, Ap il 10 1697
[2] Cf. Bacon N *vum O ganum* Bk. I.

I. W ant f proof

II. W ant f bil ty t us them.

III. W ant f ill t them

IV W g measur s f pr b bility

F t ause f error ant f proof F t By ant f proof I d t m an nly th want of those proofs which are nowhere extant, and so are owhere t be had but the want even f those proofs which are in being o might be procured. And thus men want proofs, who ha e n t the co enience r opportunity t make experi me ts and bserv tions th msel es, tending to t nroposi tio nor likewise the

and nsla ed to ... dition, whose li es are worn o t only th provisions for li g These men s oppo tunities f knowledg and inquiry ar commonly as narrow as their fortunes and their understandings are but little instru ted, when all their whol time and pains are la d ut to till the croakin f their ... f hei hildren. It is

ing ... than pa khorse, who is dri en constantly f wards and backwards in narrow lane and dirty road nly t mark t, should be killed in the geography of the country N is t t all more possible that h wh wants leisure, books, and langu ges, d th ppo tu ty f n rsing w th ariety f men, should be in conditio to collect those testimo es and bserv ti ns which ar in being d n e ary t make ut many nay most, f the propositi ns that, in th soci ies f men are j dged f th greatest momen or t find t grounds f assurance so great as the belief of th points h would build th m is thought necessary So that great part f man kind are by the n tural and unalter bl tat of things in his w ld and th constituti n f h man affairs, una idably gi over to in incibl gnorance f those proofs which thers build, and hich are ecessary t est blish those pin ions the grea est part of men, ha ing much t do g th means f li ing ar t in co d tio look aft those of learned and labori us inq iries

3 *Object What hall become f th se who want proofs* d. What shall we say then Are the gre es part f mankind by the ecess ty f their condi io subjected to un dabl gn ance in those th gs which are of greatest impo tanc to them. (f f those is bvious to in quire) H e the bulk of manki d no other guide but accident and blind chance to co duct them to th ir happ ess r misery Ar the current pin ns, and l censed gu des of every country sufficient ev dence and security to every man to enture his great concernments o nay his ever lasting happiness r misery Or can those be the certain a d infallible or cles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? O shall a poor countryman be eternally happy fo ha ing th chance to be born in Italy or a day labourer be un o dably lost, because he had the ill l ck to be born in England. How ready some men may be to s y some f these things, I will n t here examine but this I am sure, that men must allow e r other of these t be true, (let th m choose which they please,) else grant that God has furnished me wit ... ts ffici nt t direct them in the w y the ... pl ... tic ... ta ...

li ing as t ha e no pare time at all t think of his soul and inf rm himself in matters f rel gion. Were men as intent pon this as they are n things of lower concernment, there are o e so ensla ed to th necessities of life who might not find many acancies that might be husba ded to this d antage of their knowledge.

4. *P ple h d d f m q y* Bes des those whose improvements and informations are strait ened by the narrowness of their f rtunes, th r are others whose largeness of f rtune would plen tifully en gh supply books, and other requis tes f clearing f doubts, and discovering of truth b t th y are cooped in close, by the laws f th ir countries, and the stri t guards of those whose interest t is t keep th m gn rant, lest, knowing more th y should believe the less in th m. These are as far nay further from the liberty and pportunities of fair inquiry than these poor and wretched labourers w bef poke of and ho

... d rsta ding This is g lly th cas f ll those who li in pl ces where care is taken to propag t truth w thout kn wledg where m are f rced at ture, to be of the religi n f th country and must theref re wallow d wn p ns, as illy peopl d empiric s pills, w th ut knowing what they are mad f, how they will wo k, and ha ing nothing to d but bel ev that they will do th cur b t this ar much more miserabl than they in that th y are n t at

liberty to refuse swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone or to choose the physician to whose conduct they would trust themselves

5 *Second cause of error want of skill to use proofs* *Secondly* Those who *want skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities* who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of con

a are not probable There are some men of one some but of two syllogisms and no more and others that can but advance one step further These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie cannot constantly follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion Now that there is such a difference between men in respect of their understand

er Hall or the Exchange on the one hand nor at Alms houses or Bedlam on the other Which great difference in men s intellectuals, whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body particularly adapted to thinking or in the dullness or untractableness of those faculties for want of use or as some think in the natural differences of men s souls themselves or some or all of these together it matters not here to examine only this is ev dent that there is a difference of degrees in men s understandings apprehensions and reasonings to so great a latitude that one may without doing injury to mankind affirm that, there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect than between some men and some beasts But how this comes about is a speculation though of great consequence yet not necessary to our present purpose

6 *Thi d cause of error want of u ll to use them* *Thirdly* There are another sort of people that want proofs not because they are out of their reach but *beca se th y will n t use them* who though they have riches and leisu e enough and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet ne er the better for them Their hot pursuit of pleasure or constant drudgery in business engages some men s thoughts elsewhere laziness and oscitancy in general or a particular avers on for books study and meditation keep others from any serious thoughts at all and some out of fear that an impart al nquiry would not favour those opinions which best suit their prejudices, lives and des gns, content themselves without examination to take upon trust what they f nd convenient and in fashion Thus most men even of those that might do otherwise pass their lives without an acquaintance with much less a rational assent to probabilities they are concerned to know though they lie so much within their view that, to be convinced of them they need but turn their eyes that way We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news and many men forbear to cast up their accounts or so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good posture How men whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance I cannot tell but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes or a patched coat and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches and borrowed shreds such as it has pleased chance or their country tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with) to clothe them in I will not here ment on how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state and their concernment in it which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners of knowledge to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen That how ever th

s ue ed by those that see, or else fall into the ditch and he is certainly the most subjected the most enslaved who is so in his understanding

In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been show n of wrong assent and how it comes to pass that probable doctr es are not always received ith an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability but hitherto we have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist but do not appear to h m who embraces the erro

7 *Fourth cause of erro g measures of pr ba bil ty* *Fourthly* There rema ns yet the last sort who even where the eal probabilit es appear and are pla nly la d before them do not admit of the conv ction nor yield unto manifest rea

sons, but do either wholly suspend their assent, or give it to the less probable opinion. And to this danger are those exposed who have taken up *wrong measures of probability* which are

I. *Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles*

II. *Received hypotheses*

III. *Predominant passions or inclinations.*

IV. *Authority*

8. I. *Doubtful propositions taken for principles.* The first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything has to our own knowledge especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on as *principles* These have so great an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability to that degree, that what is inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible The reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other that the testimony not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anything contrary to these established rules. How much the doctrine of *innate principles*, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another but withal I take leave also to say that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it strictly and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so upon the authority of others. For he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his assent, who hath imbibed *wrong principles*, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently true.

9. *Instilled in childhood.* There is nothing more ordinary than children receiving into their minds propositions (especially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurses, or those about them which being insinuated into their unwary as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned they look on them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies.

10. *Of irresistible efficacy* This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall invalidate their authority or at all thwart these internal oracles whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to such principles, go down glibly and are easily digested. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. that he must believe as the church (i.e. those of his communion) believes, or that the pope is infallible, and this he never so much as heard questioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles how is he prepared easily to swallow not only against all probability but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of *transubstantiation*? This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles) against his senses. Let an enthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine Whoever therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingen

Cf. Bk. I. ch. iii. § 24, also Bk. IV

ous to themselves as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles which many never suffer themselves to do

11 II *Received hypotheses* Next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould and fashioned just to the size of a received *hypothesis*[1] The difference between these and the former is that they will admit of matter of fact and agree with dissenters in that but differ only in assign ing of reasons and explaining the manner of op eration These are not at that open defiance with their senses with the former they can endure to hearken to their information a little more pa tiently but will by no means admit of their re ports in the explanation of things nor be pre *vailed on by probabilities \ hich would convince* them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are Would it not be an in *sufferable thing for a learned professor and that* which his scarlet would blush at to have his au *thority of forty years standing wrought out of* hard rock Greek and Latin with no small ex pense of time and candle and confirmed by gen eral tradition and a reverend beard in an in stant overturned by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess that \ hat he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake and that he sold them hard \ ords and ignorance at a very dear rate What probabilities I say are sufficient to pre

for and turn *himself out stark naked in quest* afresh of new notions? All the a guments that *can* be used w ll be as little able to preva l as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak which he held only the faster To this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced the errors that

they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture are an undeniable proof of it All that call themselves Christians allow the text that says *μετανοεῖτε to carry in it the obligation to a* very weighty duty But yet ho v very erroneous \ *ill one of their practices be* who understand ing nothing but the French take this rule \ ith one translation to be *Repentez vous* repent or with the other *Faitez pénitence* do penance

bility hang on one side of a covetous man s rea soning and money on the other it is easy to fore see which will outweigh Earthly minds like mud walls resist the strongest batteries and though perhaps sometimes the force of a clear argument may make some impression yet they nevertheless stand firm and keep out the enemy truth that would captivate or disturb them Tell a man passionately in love that he is jilted bring a score of \ itnesses of the falsehood of his mis-

\ ardly bel eved is I suppose \ hat every one *hath more than once experimented and though*

stantly to close with the more probable side but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its inquiries and not permit a full and satisfac tory examination as far as the matter in question

13 *Two means f ei d ng probab lit es I Supposed fallacy latent in the words employed* First That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words *there m y be a fallacy latent in them* and the consequences being perhaps, *many in train* they may be some of them inco- herent There are very few discourses so short clear and consistent to \ hich most men may not w th satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt and from hose con ction they may not \ ithout rep oach of d singenuity or unrea sonableness set themsel es free \ th the old re ply *Non per uad bis ti msi persu seris* though I cannot ansv er I ill not yield

14 *Suppo ed u know a guments for the contrary* Secondly Manifest probabilit es may be e aded and the assent \ thheld *upon this suggestion* That *I know n t yet all that may b said o the c nt a y sid* And therefore though I be beaten it is not necessary I should y eld not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind This is a refuge against con ct on so open and so de that it is hard to determ ne hen a man is quite out of the erge of t

[1] Cf Ba on on the buse f hypothesis in Book I f il *N um O g m*

Cf \ *um O ganum* I 19.

Cf Ba on \ *um O g num* I 49.

5. *What pr b b l ties naturally determ ne the t sent* B t y t there is som d f t and man ha in carefully inquired int all th grounds f probability and unlikeliness d his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly and cast p th m t tal o both s d s may in most cases, com t a k ledge upon the wh le mat er o wh h s d th p b bility rests m proof matter f reason being

sent. So that I think m y co cl de, that, propositions, wher th gh the p oofs n ar f mo t m m t y t ther are s ffic t grounds t suspect that ther is ther fall cy in rds, r certain proof as cons d ble t be prod ced the co trary d there assent, suspense disse t are ft n lun ary tions. B t here the proofs ar such as mak t highly probable, and ther is t sufficient gro d t pe t th t th th r f ll y f w rds (hich sober and seri us cons der tio may dis cover) qually alid proofs y t discov red la ent th ther d (which also the tur f the thing may in som cases, mak pla t a considerat man) there I hink, man wh has hed them can scarce refuse his asse t to the sid which th gre ter probability ppears. Whether t be probabl ha promiscu us jum bl f printing l t h uld ft f ll int a method and rd which sh uld tamp n paper a coherent discourse tha bli d f rtu t us co urse f t ms t gu d d by u der tanding gent, sh uld frequently constit t the bodies of any pecies f animals in these and the like cases, I think, body th t considers them can be j t t tand which sid t take, no all w er in his assent. Lastly when ther can be no suppositi (th thing in ts own nature in different and wh lly depending pon th testi mo y f w t esses) that there is as fair testimo y ainst, as f the matter of fact ttested which by inquiry is t be learned g whether there was th usand sev hundred y ars g such a man R me as Julius Cæsar in all uch cases, I say I think is in any ratio al man power to refuse his asse bu th t t essarily f ll ws, and closes w th ch probabilities. In ther less clear cases, I think t is in man power t suspend his asse t d perhap co t h mself th the proofs h has, if they f ur th pin that suits w th his inclina io or in rest, and so top from further search. Bu tha man should afford his assent t that sid which th less probability ppears t him, seems to me utterly impracticabl and as impossible as it is to be lieve the same thing probable and improbable t th same time.

W her t our power t suspend our judgment

two deas appears to u ... diately by *the assistance* f reason I can no more efuse t perce e, no mor a o d knowing t, than I ca a o d seeing those bjects which I turn my yes to and look n in daylight and what upo full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my assent to B t, though e cann t hinder our kn wledge, where the gree me t is nce perce ed r our assent, here the probability manifestly appears upon du cons d erat of all th measures of t y t w can hin

erro infidelity could ot in any case be a f ult. Thus, in som cases can prevent o suspend ur assent but can man ersed in modern o ancie t hist ry d ubt h ther th re is such a pl ce as R me, h ther there as such a man as J l us Cæsar? I deed th re are mill ons of truths that a man is n t, or may ot think him self co d t kn w as wh ther our king Richard the Third was crooked o no r wheth er Ro er Bacon was mathemat cian r a mag cian. I these and such lik cases, where the assent w y or ther is f no importa c t th int rest f any n action, n co cernment f his f llowing d pending thereon th re t is n t trange that th mind sh uld gi tself p to th commo pini or re der tself to the first comer These and the lik pinions are of so little weight and moment, that, lik motes in th sun th ir tendencies are ery arely taken n tice f They ar there, as t were, by chance and the mind l ts th m fl t t libe ty But h the mind j dges that th propos tion has co cern m t in t h re the assent n t assenting is th ght t dr conseq nces f moment after t, and good and evil t d pend choos g r refusing th right d and th mind sets tself seri usly t inquire and examin th probability there I think t is n t in ur cho ce to take which id w please, if manifest odds ppear n ther Th greater probability I think, in that case will d termin th assent and man can n mo a d assenting taking t t be tru where h pe ce es the gre ter prob bility than h ca o d kn wing t t be tru where h percei es the agreement disagreem t of any two deas.

If this be so the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability [1] as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good

17 IV *Authority* The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of and

o o r — —

giving up our assent to the common received opinions either of our friends or party neighbourhood or country How many men have no other ground for their tenets than the supposed honesty or learning or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish men could not err or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude yet this with most men serves the turn The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity it comes to me with the passport of former ages and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it other men have been and are of the same opinion (for that is all is said) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions than take them up by such measures All men are liable to error and most men are in many points by pass on or interest under temptation to it If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world and the leaders of parties we should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own sake that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained This at least is certain there is not an opinion so absurd which a man may not receive upon this ground There is no error to be named which has not had its professors and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in if he th nks that he is in the r ght way wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow

18 *Not so many men in errors as is comm nly supposed* But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions I must do mankind that r ght as to say *There re not so many men in err rs and wro opinions as is commonly pposed* Not that I th nk they embrace the truth but indeed because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about they have no thought no opinion at all For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partizans of most of the sects in the world he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for that they have any op nions of their own much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examinat on of arguments and appearance of probab l ty They are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in and there like the common soldiers of an army show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct without ever examining or so much as knowing the cause they contend for If a man s life shows that he has no serious regard for religion for what reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his church and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit preferment or protection in that society Thus men become professors of and combatants for those opinions they were never convinced of nor proselytes to no nor ever had so much as floating in their heads and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are yet this is certain there are fewer that actually assent to them and mistake them for truths than is imagined

Chap XXI *Of the Division of the Sciences*[1]

1 *Science m y be divided into three sorts* All that can fall within the compass of human understanding being e ther *First* the nature of things as they are in themselves their relations and their manner of operat on or *Secondly* that which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end especially happiness [2] or *Thirdly* the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts —

Physica First The knowledge of things as they are in the r own proper beings their constitution properties and operations whereby I mean not only matter and body but spirits also wh ch have the r proper natures constitutions and operations as ell as bod es This in a little more enlarged sense of the word I call Φυσική or *n tural philosophy* The end of this s bare speculative truth and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such falls under this branch wheth er it be God h mself angels spir ts bodies or any of the r affect ons as number and figure &c.

3 *Practica S c ndly* Πρακτική The skill of r ght applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of th ngs good and useful The most considerable under this head is *ethics* which is

[1] Cf. Bacon *Novum Organum* I 61 122

[1] Cf Bk II ch iii III ch IV ch iii. § 26
[2] Cf. Bk II chh xi, xxvii.

the seeking out those rules and measure of hu man ctions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is n t bare peculatio and th kn ledg of truth but r ght, and a co d ct suitable t t

4. ... Th dly th third b n h may be called Σημ ... the doctrine f signs the most usual whereof being ords, t is aptly nough termed ... the business whereof is t co

use of

...

things th mind co templates are n e f them, besides tself present t th understanding it is ecessary that something else as s gn r pre sentatio f th thing t cons ders sh uld be pres ent to t and these are deas And because the scene of deas that makes man s th ghts cannot be laid pen to th immediat ie of another no laid up any here but in th mem ory a ery sure reposit ry theref t com municat ur th hts t o e an ther as w ll as record th m f ur wn use signs f ur deas are also ecessary those h ch men ha fou d most co enient, and therefore generally mak use of are art culat und Th consideration then, of deas and words as th great nstruments of kn ledge, makes n desp cabl part f their co t mplation who ould take a v ew of human knowl dge in the whole extent of t. And per haps if they were distinctly weighed and d ly cons dered, they would afford us anoth r sort of logic and critic, than what we h e been hitherto acquainted w th.[3]

5. *This t the fir t and m t general d v s on f the b ts f ur under tand g* This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural di ision of the bj ts f our u derstanding Fo a man can empl y his tho ghts about n thing but ei ther the co t mplation f th g themsel es, for th disco ry of truth r abo t the th ngs in his own power wh ch are his own act ns f r the t tainme t f his o n ends o the signs th mind makes use of both in th one and the other and the right rd ring f them, for ts clearer inf mati All which three iz, th gs as they are in themsel es kn w ble act ns as they depend us, in rd to happiness and th right use f signs in rd r to knowledg being t t ll dif ferent, they seemed t me t be the three great pro in es f th intell ct al w ld holly sepa rat and distin t one from another

Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. §§ 4, 5, 8 9.

Cf. Bk. I ch. iii. § 5. So Bacon, *Novum O ganum* I 9.

Cf. Bacon, *Advanc ment f Learn g* Bk. II th map f th I tellectual World also H bbes, *Lev athan*, Pt. I ch. ix.

If this be so the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability [1] as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good

17 IV *Authority* The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter I mean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions either of our fr nd

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3 *P actica S c ndly* Πρακτική The skill of right applying ou own powers and actions for the attainment of things good and useful The most considerable under this head is *thics* which is

1 Cf. Baco *N vum O ganum*, I 61 122

2 Cf. Bk II ch viii III ch IV ch iii. § 26
Cf. Bk II chh xxi, xxvii.

GEORGE BERKELEY

THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

GEORGE BERKELEY 1685–1753

B RKELE the eldest so f an English settl in Ireland, was born March 2 685, probably t Dysert Castle, near Thomasto n in County Kilkenny At th age of eleven h was nrolled ol nd because f his precocity

ter' degre in 7 he btain d jum *ship after passing the examinations w th great distin tion.* In og he was rdained d aco in the Anglican church.

The *Common Place Book* he k pt duri g these early years t Trinity Coll g reveal that Be ke ley first became interested in philosophy through the infl ce f Newton, Boyle, and Locke. I t 5 he had f med soci ty t discuss th new philosophy and his n tes indicate that he was soo convinced that h had discovered new princip which nabled him to over come the difficulties h untered in Locke. His firs publicati ns w re tw hort mathemat ical treatises, which ppeared in 07 His own philosophical doctrin was pplied for the first time in *A Es y Towards Ne Theory f Visio* (og) and gi full tateme t year later in his *T t oncerning the Principle f Huma Knowle g* His co cern w th moral d social problems became evid t t this time in a series of sermons h d li red in th coll chapel, h h ubseq tly published as *A Dis urse Pas e Obedienc*

I 3 Be k l y btai ed lea f bsence from his ad mi responsibili es and w nt to En l nd H in nd d arrang f th pub lica of his *Th Dialogue Bet en Hylas and Phil nous* w answ t bj ns gainst his *Pr nciple* and also to mak cquaintance w h me f men I Lo d his charm and w re instantly ppreciat d. Swift intro d d him cour nd record d th ev t in his p per th *Guardian*, and Addison ntertained him w th wine t th premiere of his *Cat*

Most f th time between 1714 and 1,21 Berkeley spent in tra el on th co tinent. Swift secur d him an appo ntment as chaplain to Lord P terborough, special ambassad r f r th cor onation of the King of Sicily and h pent the great part of 1714 in F ance and Italy His return at th nd f that year co cided th the fall from pow of his fr nds, and being un ble t btain n ppointment to his liking he ac ce nort tv t tr el n the con ti o

Berke y

H pe t most of the time n Ital here, in additi n to his tutorial work, h plored an tiquit es and art treasures and devoted cons d erabl tt ntion to th observ tion f natural ph O ne occasi n he climbed Vesu

Berkeley returned t England in 1,21 to find th country in the midst f the social crisis caused by the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. He published his view f th affair n the *Ess y to wards prevent the Ruin f G at Britain*, in which h proposed ext ns umptuary laws, e cour gement f th arts, and return to simpler lif Soon af erwards, h co ce d his proj ct f the ncourag me t f relig n amo g th Ame can tr es by th establishment f coll g in Berm da. T his friend Lord Perci al t whom h had dedicat d the *Theory f Visio* h se t his erses prophesying Westward th course of Empire takes its y nd in a l tter declared his d terminati n to pend the rest of my days n th island of Bermuda. In 1 3 Esther Vanhomrigh, Swift s Vanessa som what my teriously l ft him half f her property amounting t f ur thousa d po ds, although

su h s Bermuda project w th greate g In

CONTENTS

THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

1724 he returned to London and published his pamphlet entitled *A Pr posal for the Better Supply in f Churches in our Foreign Plantations and for Converting the Savage Americans to Christianity* In addit on to obtaining many private subscrip tions for his plan he persuaded Parliament to promise a grant of twenty thousand pounds and obtained a royal charter for his projected col lege

In 17 8 he married the daughter of the chief justice of Ireland and with three companions departed for America The group settled first at Newport Rhode Island with the aim of buying lands and stock to supply the college at Ber muda and of encouraging commerce between the island and the mainland But with Berkeley away from London Parliament show ed no in clination to forward the promised grant and in 1731 it became clear that the project was a failure During the rest of his sojourn in Amer

house and library to Yale Although his own plans had failed he continued to follow with lively interest the progress of education in America and on several later occasions donated books to both Yale and Harvard

For the last eighteen years of his life Berkeley was Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland The year he became bishop he published his *A alyst* (1734) in which he criticised Newtonian mathemat cs and suggested certain corrections Between 1735 and 1737 he published a ser es of papers en titled *The Querist* which dealt with the welfare of Ireland The plague years of 1740 and 1741 led him to publish his *Siris or a Chain f Philosophical Reflexions and Enquiries concerni g the* ...

Berkeley s health which had begun to fail was seriously affected by the death of his eldest son in 1750 He had long wanted to retire to Oxford and now in order to be with his younger son who was studying there he took the extra ordinary step of resigning his bishopric The King refused to accept his resignation and declared that he might live where he chose but he must die a bishop Berkeley moved to Oxford in 1752 He died there the following year on January 14 and was buried in Christ Church

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THOMAS EARL OF PEMBROKE &c.

KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER
AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S
MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL

My Lord

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship should presume to address you in this manner But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether un acquainted with the present state of the church and learning and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship s character I might add my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship s feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship

My Lord

Your lordship s most humble
and most devoted servant,
George Berkeley

INTRODUCTION

1 Philosophy being nothing lse but th tudy f sd m and truth, t may th reason be ex pected that those wh ha e pent most time and pains in t hould j y a great calm d seren ty of mind, gre t cl arness d e d nce f kn ledg d be l ss dist bed w th do bts and difficulties than ther m Y t so t is we see the illi erat bulk of mank d that walk the high-road f plain common sense and are gov erned by the di tates of nature f th most part d d hed T th m thing that is

part from sense an ins of perior principl t reaso meditat and reflect th ture f things, b t thousa d scruples p ing p in ur minds co erning hose things which bef re w seemed fully to compr hend Prej dices a d rrors of sense d from all parts disco th msel es t ur ew d en dea uri g t correct these by reason, w are in sensibly dr wn int uncouth par d xes, difficul ties, d t c wh h m fuply and grow po us as w d an peculation, till t l gth, h ing wandered thro gh many in tricat mazes, w find ursel es just where we re, wh ch is wors d w in forl rn Sc pticism.

2 The cause of this is th ught t be th b- scurity of things. th na ural weakness and m- perfec io of ur derstandings. I is said, the faculties we ha are f w d those des gned by na ur f th pport and comf rt f lif and penetrat in the inward esse and con t tio of things. Besides, th mind of ma be ing fini wh treats of things which partake of infin y is no be w dered at if t ru int bsurdi ies and co tr di tions, ut of which t is mpossibl t should ex extrica tself being of th na ure f infini t t be compreh d d by tha which is finite.

3 B t, perhaps, we may be too partial ur sel es in placing the f l originally in ur f cul ties, and not ther in the wro g use we make of them. I is hard thing suppose that right de ductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be ma nta ed or made consist t We should bel eve that God has d alt more bou tifully w th the sons of men than t h m stro g desire f r that k ledge

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tites t may ha mpla ted n th crea ures, u usually furnish them w th s ch means as, if right ly mad use f will not fail t satisfy them. Upon th h l I am n l d t th n that th far greater part, if not all of those difficult es which ha hithert amused philosophers, and blocked up th y to kn wledge, are entirely wing to oursel es—that we ha first raised a dust and th complain w cannot see.

4 My purpose th refore is, t try if I can dis- cover what those Principles are which ha e in trod ed all that doubtful ess and u certainty

—

ness d limitation of ur f culties. And surely t is wo k well deserving our pains t make strict inquiry concerning th First Principles f Human Knowledge, to ift and examin th m n ll d n ally s th may be some

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wh h h be sust d and might h e bee ded.

5. H w difficult and discouraging soever this att mpt may seem, wh n I cons der how many gre t and extr rdinary men ha e g before me in th lik designs, y t I am n t w th ut some hopes— pon the considerati n th t th largest ew are n t al ys th clearest, and that h who is sho t ghted will be bliged t draw th bject nearer and may perhaps, by close and narrow survey discern that which had escaped far better yes.

6 In rder to prepare the mind of th re der f th easier co cer ing what f ll ws, t is proper t premise somewhat, by w y of Introductio

PREFACE

WHAT I here make public has after a long and scrupulous inquiry seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known—particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God or the natural immortality of the soul Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth But to the end this may not suffer I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject matter shall seem to deserve For as there are some passages that taken by themselves are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation and to be charged with most absurd consequences which nevertheless upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them so likewise though the whole should be read over yet if this be done transiently it is very probable my sense may be mistaken but to a thinking reader I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious As for the characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions may seem to bear it is I hope needless to make any apology on that account He must surely be either very weak or very little acquainted with the sciences who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration for no other reason but because it is newly known and contrary to the prejudices of mankind Thus much I thought fit to premise in order to prevent if possible the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it

INTRODUCTION

1 Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and *undisturbed*. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, *which multiply and* grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into *the inward essence and constitution* of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it *run into* absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is *impossible* it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.

3 But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to *suppose* that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong *desire for that knowledge* which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to *satisfy them*. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, *if not all, of those difficulties* which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves—that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4 My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that *doubtfulness and uncertainty*, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men *have thought* our *ignorance incurable*, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And surely *it is* a work *well deserving our pains* to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring *from any darkness and* intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

5 How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before *me in the like designs*, yet I am not without some hopes—upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

6 In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction,

concerning the nature and abuse of Language But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing *abstract ideas* or notions of things He

ner thought to be the object of those sciences which gc
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which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind and that it is well acquainted with them

7 It is agreed on all hands that the *qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself and separated from all others* but are mixed as it were and blended together several in the same object But we are told the mind being able to consider each quality singly or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas For example there is perceived by sight an object extended coloured and moved this mixed or compound idea the mind *resolving into its simple constituent parts and viewing each by itself exclusive of the rest does frame the abstract ideas of extension* colour and motion Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension but only that the mind can frame to itself by *abstraction* the idea of colour exclusive of extension and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension

8 Again the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all and some other things peculiar as this or that figure or magnitude which distinguish them one from another it considers apart or singles out by itself *that which is common making thereof a most abstract idea of extension which is neither line surface nor solid nor has any figure or magnitude but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these.* So likewise the mind by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another and retaining that only which is common to all makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red nor blue nor white nor any other determinate colour And in like manner by considering motion abstractedly *not only from the body moved* but likewise *from the figure it describes* and all particular directions and velocities the abstract idea of motion is framed which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense

9 And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes so does it by the same precision or mental separation attain abstract ideas of the *more compounded beings* which include *several coexistent qualities. For example* the mind having observed that Peter James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter James and any other particular man that which is peculiar to each retaining only what is common to all and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake—*abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after* this manner it is said we come by the *abstract* idea of man or if you please humanity or *human nature* wherein it is true there is included colour because there is no man but has some colour but then it can be neither white nor black nor any particular colour because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake.
n lud d stature but then it

ing a great var ety *of other creatures* ... take in some parts but not all of the *complex* idea of man the mind leaving out *those parts* which are peculiar to men and retaining *those* only which are common to all the living creatures frames the idea of *animal* which abstracts not only from all particular men but also all birds beasts fishes and insects The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body life sense and spontaneous motion. By *body* is meant body without any particular shape or figure there being no one shape or figure common to all animals without covering either of hair or feathers or scales &c nor yet naked hair *feathers scales and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals and for that reason left out of the abstract idea* Upon the same account the *spontaneous motion must* be neither walking nor *flying nor creeping* it is nevertheless a motion but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive

10 Whether others have *this wonderful facul*

of abstracting their deas, they best can tell r myself, I find indeed I ha e faculty of im gining, or representing t myself th d as f hose particular things I ha percei ed and of ar ously compoundi g and d ding them. I can imagine man w th t o h ds, r the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, th eye, the nose each by t self abstracted or separated from the rest of the body But then whatever hand o eye I magine t must ha e some part cular shape and colour ra se th d of man that I frame to myself

of all other bstrac ge eral u as
be plain, I own myself bl t abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from thers, w th which, though they are united in some bject, yet t is possibl they may really exist w thout them. But

And there are grounds
ackno ledge themsel es to be in my case. The generality of me which are simpl and illiterat never pretend t *ab t act notions* It is said th y are difficult and not t be attained w thout pains and tudy we may theref re reasonably co clude that, if such there be, they are confined nly t the learned.

I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of bstra ti n, and try if I can discover what t is that inclines th men of peculatio to mbrace an pinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been lat deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has gi n t ery much coun nance, by seeming to think the ha ing abstract general ideas is wha puts the widest difference po t f u dersta d g betwixt man and beas The ha ing of g neral id as, saith he is that which puts perfec distinction betwixt man and bru es, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes d by no means ttain unto. For t is evident we bserve no foot steps in them of making use of general signs for uni ersal ideas from which e ha e reason to imagine that they ha e not the faculty of abstracting or making g neral deas, since th y ha e no use of ords r ny oth r g n al s gns And a l tl aft r Therefore, I think, e may suppose that t is n thus that the species of brutes are discriminated from men and t is that proper difference where in they are wh lly separ ted and which at last w dens to so w de a dist nce. Fo if they ha e any d as at all and are t bare machines (as some would ha e them) we can ot de y them to ha e some reason. It seems as ev d nt to me that they do some of them, in certain instances reason as that they ha sense but it is only n particular deas, just as they recei e them from their senses. They are the best of them t ed up w thin those narrow bounds, and ha e n t (as I think) the faculty to enlarg th m by any kind of bstra t o —*Es y Human L n er tan*
II xi. I I I e I
uth I f f I s)
means ttain to bst u
m d th distinguishing property of that sort of

mad the signs of ge eral deas. —*Es y Human Under tandirg* IV iii. 6 But t seems that w d be mes g n al by being mad

ple, when t is said the change of motion is proporti nal to the impressed force, or that what er has ext nsi n is di isibl these proposi tions are t be understood of motion and ext sio in general and nevertheless t ll t f l low that they suggest to my thoughts an d a f motion w thout body moved, or any determi nat direction and elocity or that I must co n b tr t g n l d of extensi n, which is neither line, surf ce, nor sol d, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, or of any ther determinat colour It is only impli d that

whatever particular motion I consider whether it be swift or slow perpendicular horizontal or oblique or in whatever object the axiom concerning it holds equally true As does the other of every particular extension it matters not wheth er line surface or solid whether of this or that magnitude or figure

12 By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge how words are made so And here it is to be noted that I do not deny ab solutely there are general ideas but only that there are any *abstract* general ideas for in the passages we have quoted wherein there is men tion of general ideas it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9 Now if we will an nex a meaning to our words and speak only of what we can conceive I believe we shall ac knowledge that an idea which considered in it self is particular b com

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itheless with regard to its significa tion general since as it is there used it repre sents all particular lines whatsoever so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines or in other words of a line in general And as that *parti ular* line becomes general by being made a sign so the *name* line which taken ab solutely is particular by being a sign is made general And as the former owes its generality not to its being th

13 To give th re d

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e *Es ay on H m n Unde stand ng* (IV vii 9) which is as follows *Ab t ct ideas* are not so obv ous or easy to children or the yet unexer cised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so For when we nice ly reflect upon them we shall find that general ideas are fict ons and contrivances of the mind that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine For example does it not requ re some pa ns and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle neither equilateral equicrural nor scalenon but *all and none* of these at once? In ef fect it is something imp f

this imperfect state has need of such ideas and makes all the haste to them it can for the conveniency of communication and enlarge ment of knowledge to both which it is naturally very much inclined But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most ab stract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about —If any man has the faculty of framing in h s mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it nor would I go about it All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no And this meth nks can be no hard task for anyone to perform What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts and there try whether he has or can attain to have an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, wh c is neither oblique nor rectangle equilateral equicrural nor scalenon but all and none o these at once?

14 Much is here said of the difficulty that ab stract ideas carry with them and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind to emancipate our thoughts f om particular objects and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abst act ideas From all wh ch the natural consequence should seem to be that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not nec essary for *comm nic t o* which is so easy and fa mil ar to all sorts of men But we are told if they seem obvious and easy to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so No w I would fain know at what t me it is men are employed in surm unting that dif ficulty and furnish ng themsel es w th those necessary helps for discourse It cannot be when they are grown up for then it seems th y are not conscious of any such painstaki g it remains therefore to be the bus ness of thei childhood. And surely the great and mult pl ed labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age Is it not a hard th ng to

imagine that couple of children cannot p t together of their sugar plums and rattles and the rest of their li tle trinkets, till they ha e first tacked tog th mbe less ons ste cies *and so framed in their minds* bstra t general deas, and annex d th m t ry c mmon me they make use of?

15. Nor d I think them what more needful for the *en co ment f kno ledg* than for c mm *uni cation*. It is, I know a point m ch insisted n, that all knowledge d demonstrat are bo t uni ersal not ns, t which I fully gree b t then t d th not ppear t me that those notions are formed by bstra t th mann pre mised—*uni ersality* so far as I can compreh nd not consisting in the bsol te, positi e nature or cep f ythi g b t in th relat n t bears to the part culars signified or represented by it, by irt whereof t is that thi gs, names, or notions, being in their wn nature *part cular re rend red uni er al* Thus, h n I d monstrat

der whether of this or that so t t matters not, doth equally tand for and represent all rectilin ear triangles whatsoever and *is in that sense uni versal* All hich seems ery plain and n t to in clude any difficulty in t.

ra ed of the abstract dea of triangle which equally grees to all. F because property ma be demonstra ed gree t some par ticular triangle, t will t the ce f ll that t equally belo gs to any ther triangl which in all respects is no the same w th t. For example, ha ng d monstrated tha th thre angles of an isoc les re angular triangl are qual t t right nes, I cannot therefore co l d *this af* fectio rees all ther tria gles which ha neither righ angl tw equal sides. It seems therefor tha t be certain this pr pos tio is ni ersall tru w mus ei her mak part cu lar demonstra io f every particular triangle, which is mposs ble or ce for all d monstrat t of h bstrac de of triangle, in which all the particulars d ind iere tly partake d by which they are all equally represe ed T which I answer that, though the de I ha e in ew whils I make the demonstra io be for instance tha of an isosc les re tangular trian l whose sides are of a d terminate length, I may never theless be certain t extends t all other rectilin ear triangles, of hat so *t or b gness soever* And *th t be au e n* th r the right ngle nor the equal ty nor determinate length of th s des are at all co cerned n the demonstrat n. *It is true* the diagram I ha e in includes all these par ticulars, but th n there is n t th l ast menti n made of them in the proof of th propositi n. It is not said th three angles are equal to t o right nes, because one of them is right angle, r be cause th sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which suffici tly sh s that the right a gl might ha bee oblique, and th s des un equal and f r all that th d monstration ha e held good. And f r this reason t is that I con clud that to be true of any bliquangular o sca lenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right a gl d equicrural triangle, and n t be cause I d monstrated th proposition of th ab stra t de of a triangle And here t must be ac knowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular thout ttending to th particular qualities of the an les, or relations of th sides. So far h may bstra t but this will never prov that he can frame an abstract, g n eral, inconsist nt dea of triangle. In lik man ner w may consider P ter so far forth as ma so far f rth as animal, w thout fr mi th f re me u ned bstract dea, either of man or of animal nasmuch as all that is perce ed is t considered.

7 It we e a dl ss as w ll as an usel s thing to trace the Schoolmen those great mas ters f bstr ction, thro gh all th manifold in extricable l byri hs f rror and dispute hich th ir doctrin of bstr ct natures and n ti ns seems t h l d th m int What b cker gs and co tro rsies, and what learned dust ha e be n ised b ut th m tters, and what mi hty d ant g has been from th nce d ri d t ma kind are thi gs t this d y too learly known t eed being insisted n. And t had been *well if th ill ff ts f that doctri* w re con fined t those nly wh mak th most o ed prof ss f t. Wh n men nsid th great pains, ndustry and parts that ha e for so many ges been laid t th ulti ati n and d ancem nt f th sc n es, d th t n tw h tanding all this th far greater part of th m re mains full f darkness nd uncertainty and dis putes that are like nev to ha e an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by th most cl ar and coge t d monstrati ns co tain in th m parad xes which are perfectly irreconcil bl t the understandings f men and that, tak

ing all together a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind other wise than by being an innocent diversion and *amusement—I say the consideration of all this* is apt to throw them into a despondency and per fect contempt of all study But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world amongst all which there is none methinks hath a more wide and extend ed sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this of *abstract* general ideas

18 I come now to consider the *source* of this prevailing notion and that seems to me to be language And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an *opinion so universally received The truth of this* appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming from which it is a clear conse quence that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been *any thought of abstraction See III vi 39* and elsewhere of the *Essay on Human Understanding* Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that mistake —First then it is thought that every name has or ought to have one only precise and settled significa tion which inclines men to think there are cer *tain abstract determinate ideas that constitute* the true and only immediate signification of each general name and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing Whereas in truth there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general

and w ll clearly appear to anyone by a little re flexion To this it will be objected that every name that has a definit on is thereby restrained to one certain signification For example a tri angle is defined to be a plain surface compre hended by three right lines by which that name *is limited to denote one certa n idea and no oth* er To which I answ er that in the defin tion it is not said whether the surface be great or small black or white nor whether the s des a e long or short equal or unequal nor w ith w hat angles they are inclined to each other in all w hich there may be great variety and consequently there is *no one* settled idea w hich limits the signification of the w ord triangle It is one thing for to keep a name *constantly to* the same def nition and another to make it stand everywhere for the same

idea the one is necessary the other useless and impracticable.

19 But to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion

ing withal certain that names w hich yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not alw ays mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for ab stract notions That there are many names in use amongst speculative men w hich do not always sug gest to others determinate particular ideas or in *truth anything at all is what nobody w ill deny*

time they are used excite in the understand ing the ideas they are made to stand for—in reading and discoursing names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra *in w hich* though a particular quantity be marked by each letter yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for

20 Besides the communicating of ideas *marked by words is not the chief* and *only* end of language as is commonly supposed There are other ends as the raising of some passion *the ex* citing to or deterring from an action the putting the mind in some particular disposition—to which the former is in many cases barely subser vient and sometimes entirely omitted hen *these can be obtained* w ithout it as I think does not unfrequently happen in the *familiar use of* language I entreat the reader *to reflect* w th himself and see f it doth not often happen ei ther in hearing or reading a d scourse *that the* passions of fear love hatred admirat on dis- d n d h like a ise immediately in his mind

of the cl aracters is oft *immediately* att with those passions w hich at first ere ont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now qu te om tt d May w e n ot for exan ple be affected w

w e hav

being th e e

a dread, though we think not of any part cular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to oursel es an idea of danger bstract. If any one shall join ever so littl reflexi of his own to what has been said, I believe that t will ev d tly ppear t him that g neral names are often used n the propriety of language w thout the peaker s designing them for marks of deas in his wn, which he uld ha th m use th mind of the hearer E en proper names th msel es do n t seem always spoken th des n t bring int our iew the deas of those indi duals that are supposed to be marked by them. F r example hen schoolman tells me Aristotl hath said ll I conce e he means by t is t dispose me

caused in the minds of those

to resign their judgme t uthority of that philosopher as t is impossibl any d either of his person, writings, reputatio should go before. I m bl mpl of th k d m y be given, b t wh should I insist those things hich every ne experience will, I doubt n t, plentifully suggest unt him.

2 W ha e I think, shewn th impossibility of Abstract Ideas. W ha cons d red what has

lastly w ha traced th m t th source from

way t extricat m self out of that fine and subtl net of bstract eas which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men and that w th this peculiar circumstance that by how much the fine and more urious was the w t of any man, by so much the deeper was he lik ly to be nsnared and fast r h ld therein. Thirdly so long as I confin my thoughts to my own deas di ested of ords, I do not see l ow I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider I cl arly and adequately know I cannot be decei ed n thinking I ha e an dea which I ha e not. It is not possible for me t magine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements o disagreements there are between my d as, t see what deas are included in any compound d a and what not, there is n thin more requisit than an ttenti e percept of hat passes in my own understanding

23 But the ttainment of all these ad antages doth presuppose an ture deli erance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself so d fficult a th g t is to dissol an uni so early begun and confirmed by so l ng a habit as that betwixt words and d as. Which d fficulty ems t h be n ery m ch creased by th doctrine of b ract n. For so long as men thou ht abstra t d as ere annexed t their words, t d th not seem trange that they should use words for deas— t being f und an impracticabl thin t l y as de th word, and retain the b tract dea in the mind which n tself was perf tly inconce ble. This seems t me the principal cause why those men who ha so

and na ons may be dr wn t the w and made the possessio of ne singl person. B t t the same ime must be wned that most parts of knowledge ha e bee trangel perpl ed nd darkened b th buse f words, d g neral w of peech wherein th y are deli ered. Since therefore words are so pt impose the understandin wha ever deas I consider I shall ende our take them bare and naked into my iew keepin u of my tho ghts so far as I am ble hose names whi h l g and constant use hath so trictly uni ed w th them from which I may expect to deri e th following d antages

F I shall be sure t ge cl ar of all controversies purely bal—the pri ing up of hich weeds in almost all the sci nces has been main hindr th growth f tru d sound knowledge Seco dly this seems t be sure

to perf rm t th msel es. Of late many ha e been ery sensibl of th bsurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of th buse of words. And, in rder t remedy these ils, th y ad ise well, that w t end t th deas signified, d d w ff att nt on f m the w rds which signify th m. B t how good soever this ad ce may be they ha e gi en thers, t is plain

mediat signific tio of every general name was d terminat bstract d a.

4 B t, these being known to be mistakes, a man may w h greater ase prevent his being imposed by words. H that kn ws he has no other than part cular deas, will not puzzl himself in ain to find o t and conce e the b ract dea an

... ooking for ideas where there are none to be had It were therefore to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which ...

... into the entrails of the earth in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity—we need only draw the curtain of words to hold the fairest tree of knowledge whose fruit is excellent and within *the reach of our hand*

25 Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose we may draw consequences from consequences and be never the wiser The farther we go we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words and I do not see how he can be led *into an error by considering his own naked* undisguised ideas.

A TREATISE
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

1 It is evident to any ne who takes survey of the ects of human knowled that they are either ideas actually imprinted n the senses r else such as are percei ed by attending to the passions and operations of the mind or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagina tion—either compoundin di ding or barely representing those originally perce ed in the aforesaid wa s. By si ht I ha e the id as of L t and colours, w th their several degrees and variations. B ouch I percei e hard and soft heat and cold, motio and resistance, and of all these more and less ther as quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me w th odours the pala w th tastes and hearin con eys sounds to the mind in all their ari ty of tone and composition. And as several of these are b- served t accompany each ther th y come to be marked by ne name, and so t be re- pu ed as ne thing Thus, for example certain colour taste, smell, figure and consistence ha ing been bserved t go tog ther are accounted one distinc thin signified by th name *ff* ... her collections of ideas constitut st ne, a tree, book, and the like sensibl things—which as they are pl asing or disagreeabl exci the passions of love hatred, joy grief and so forth.

B t, besides all tha ndless ariety of deas or ob ects of knowledge there is likewise some thing hich know or percei es them, and exer cises di ers perations, as willing imagining, re membering bout them. This percei ing u being is ha I call *mind*, *spirit*, *soul* or *myself* By hich words I do no denot any ne of my d as, bu thing entirely distinct from them, wherein, they exist, or which is the same thing whereby they are percei ed—for the existence of an dea consists in being percei ed.

3 Tha ... deas for ... the mind, ... seems no less evident that the ari us sensations or deas imprinted on the sense however blend ed or combined to ther (that is, whatever b- jects they compose) cann t exist oth rwise than in a mind percei g them.—I think an intui u knowledg may be obtained of this by any one that shall att nd to what is meant by the term *exist* when applied t sensible thi gs. Th tabl I writ n I say exists, that is, I see and feel t and if I ere out of my tudy I sh uld say t existed—meanin thereby that if I was in my s udy I mi ht perce t, or that some ther spirit t ll does percei t. There was an odour t ...

... ble. Their is *per* *pi* no is t possibl they sh uld ha e any exis nce out of the minds or thinking things which perce e th m.

4. It is indeed an pini n trangely pre ailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, ri ers, and in word all sensibl bjects, ha e an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being per cei ed by the understandin But, w th h w gre t an assurance and acquiescence soe r this prin- ciple may be ntertained in th wo ld, yet who- ever shall find in his heart to call t in questi n may if I mistake not, perce t to in ol e a manifest contradi tion. For what are the fore menti ned bjects but the things w percei e by sense. and what do we percei e besides our wn

nexed to any name And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had It were therefore to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity—we need only draw the curtain of words to hold the fairest tree of knowledge whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of our hand

25 Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose we may draw consequences from consequences and be never the wiser The farther we go we shall only lose our

entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them By this means it will be easy for

guised ideas.

existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.

Again, *great* and *small*, *swift* and *slow* are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of *abstract ideas*. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of *materia prima*, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived: since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word *unity* I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an *abstract idea*.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object?

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an un-

ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?

5 If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will perhaps be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract id*[illegible] [illegible]e a nicer [illegible]h the ex[illegible] [illegible]ing per[illegible] [illegible] as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours heat and cold extension and figures—in a word the things we see and feel—what are they but so many sensations notions ideas or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate even in thought any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself I may indeed divide in my thoughts or conceive apart from each other those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided Thus I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself So far I will not deny I can abstract—if that may [illegible] [illegible] But my con[illegible] extend be[illegible] or percep[illegible] [illegible]ce as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it

6 Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them Such I take this important one to be viz that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world have not any subsistence without a mind that their *being* is to be perceived or known that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit they must either have no existence at all or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit—it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstraction to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit To be convinced of which the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the *being* of a sensible thing from its *being perceived*

7 From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than *Spirit* or that which perceives But for the fuller proof of this point let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure motion smell taste etc *i e* the ideas perceived by sense Now for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction for to have an idea is all one as to perceive that therefore wherein colour figure and the like qualities exist must perceive them hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or *substratum* of those ideas

8 But say you though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance I answer an idea can be like nothing but an idea a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again I ask whether those supposed originals or external things of which our ideas are the pictures or representations be themselves perceivable or no? If they are then they are ideas and we have gained our point but if you say they are not I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible hard or soft like something which is intangible and so of the rest

9 Some there are who make a distinction betwixt *primary* and *secondary* qualities By the former they mean extension figure motion rest, solidity or impenetrability and number by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds tastes and so forth The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind or unperceived but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind in an unthinking substance which they call Matter By Matter therefore we are to understand an inert senseless substance in which extension figure and motion do actually subsist But it is evident from what we have already shown that extension figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving sub[illegible]

[illegible] assert that figure motion and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold and such like secondary qualities do not—which they tell us are sensations

to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without

rors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes

confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated ... as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22 I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence

thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas ...

and ... proofs against the existence of material substance

24 It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the *absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind*. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is on this

Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue.—If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them. But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your

This is what I repeat and inculcate and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25 All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive—there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense

pass... ess... d in rt ess in t nsomuch that t

t being as is ... t from sect 8 Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say therefore, that these are the effects of pow

thinking subject without the mind or in truth that there should be any such thing as an outward object

16 But let us examine a little the received opinion —It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter and that Matter is the *substratum* that supports it Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter s *supporting* extension Say you I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it I answer though you have no positive yet if you have any meaning at all you must at least have a relative idea of Matter though you know not what it is yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears *to accidents and what is meant by its supporting* them It is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense—as when we say that pillars support a building in what sense therefore must it be taken?

17 If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by *material substance* we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents The general dea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other and as for its supporting accidents this as we have just now observed cannot be understood in the common sense of those words it must therefore be taken in some other sense but what that is they do not explain So that when I consider the two parts or branches hich make the signification of the words *material substance* I am convinced there is no d stinct meaning annexed to them But why should we trouble ourselves any farther in discussing this material *substr t m* or support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an ex s tence w thout the mind? And is not this a d ect repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?

18 But, though it were poss ble that solid figured movable substances may exist ithout the m nd correspond ng to the ideas we have of bodies yet ho is it possible for us to know this? Either we must kno t by sense or by reason. As for our senses by them we have the knowledge only of our sensat ons ideas or those things that are immediately perceived by sense call the n what you will but they do not inform us that things exist ithout the mind or unperce ved like to those hich are percei ed This the materialists themselves acknowledge It remains therefore that if we h ve any kno ledge at all of external things it must be by eason inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind from what we perceive since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams phrensies and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now though there were no bodies existing without resembling them Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas since it is granted they are produced sometimes and might possibly be produced alw ays *in the same order* we see them in at present without their concurrence.

19 But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them yet perhaps it may be

and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bod es that excite their ideas in our minds But neither can this be said for though we give the materialists their external bodies they by the r own confess on are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon pirit or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in

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sations or ideas that you are impr i ted in the same order and w th l ke vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to belie e the existence of corporeal substances represented by his ideas, and exciting

question—which one cons ut

to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments h may think himself to have, for the exist nce of bodies w th out the mind.

2 Were t necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of Matter after what has been said, I could instance sev ral of those er rors and difficulties (not t mentu n imp ties) which have sprung from that t net. It has oc casioned numerless co tro ersies and disp tes in philosophy and not few of far greater mo ment in religion. But I shall not en er int the detail of them in this place as well because I think argume ts posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, suf ficiently demonstra ed pri as because I shall hereafter find occas t peak somewhat of them.

2. I am afraid I ha gi en cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this su ject. For to what purpose is t dilat that which may be demonstrated w th the utmos dence in line or two, to any ne that is capabl of th l ast reflexion. I is but looking int your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conce t pos sible for sound, or figure motion, or colour to exist w thou the mind or unperce ed. This easy trial may perhaps make ou see that what ou co tend for is a downright co tradi u n. Insomuch that I am content to put th whole upo this issue —If you can but co cei e pos sible for ne ext nded movable substance, in general, for any ne idea, or an thing like an idea, to exist therwise than in mind percei ing t, I shall readily gi up the cause And, as

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3. But, say you, surely there is thing eas er than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in park, or books existing in closet, and body by to percei them. I answer you may so, there is no difficulty in t, but wh t is all this, I be seech you, more than framin in your mind cer tain ideas which ou call books and trees, and the same time omi ting to fram the idea of any one that may percei them. But do not you ourself percei e or think of them all the while This therefore is nothing to the purpose t nly shew ou ha the power of imagining or form ing ideas in your mind bu t does not shew that you can concei it possible the jects of your

5. All ur ideas, sensa ions, noti ns, or the things which w percei e, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, ar isibly na t —there is nothi g of power or ency l ded in th m. So ha dea or bject of th ught cannot prod ce make any alt ratio an ther T be sa isfied of the truth of this, ther is nothi g else requisit bu bar observ ti f ur ideas. For si ce they and ev ry part f them xis nly in the mind, f llow tha there is thing in th m but what is percei ed bu who ever shall tend t his ideas, whether of sense reflexi n, will not perce them an pow er or acti ty ther is, ther fore, no su h th g co tained in them. A li tle entu n will discov er us that th ery being f an idea impl es passi ness nd inertness in t, insomuch tha t is impossibl f an idea t d anything or tri t ly speakin t be th cause f anythin either can t be the esemblance pa tern of any ac ti bein as is eviden from sect. 8 Wh ce t plainly f llow that ext ns n, figure, and mo tion canno be the cause of ur sensations. To say therefore, that these are the effects of pow

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repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?

18 But though it were possible that solid figured movable substances may exist without the mind corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies yet *how is it possible for us to know this?* Either we must know it by sense or by reason As for our senses by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations ideas or those things that are immediately perceived by sense call them what you will *but they do not inform us that* things exist without the mind or unperceived like to those which are perceived This the materialists themselves acknowledge It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things *it must be by reason inferring* their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind from what we perceive since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? *I say it is granted on all hands* (and what happens in dreams phrensies and the like puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now though there were no bodies existing without resembling them Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas since it is granted they are produced sometimes and might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in at present without their concurrence.

19 But though we might possibly have all our *sensations without them yet perhaps it may be* thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds But neither can this be said for though we give the materialists their external bodies they by their own confession *are never* the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced since they own themselves *unable to comprehend* in what manner body can act upon spirit or *how it is possible it should* imprint any idea in the mind Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain *equally inexplicable with or without this supposition* If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind yet to hold they do so must needs be a very precarious opinion since it is to suppose without any reason at all that God has *created innumerable beings that are entirely useless* and serve to no manner of purpose

bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are imprinted in the *same order and with like vividness in his mind.* I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question—which one consideration were enough

more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called *real things*: and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit: yet still they are *ideas*: and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary to spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature; and I am willing to be understood by every one.

First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of *ideas* takes place. All things that exist exist only in the mind; that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a *rerum natura*, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is meant by *real things* in opposition to *chimeras* or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are alike *ideas*.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which *philosophers* call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:—There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense—which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more *reality* in them than the former—by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of *reality* it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a *real being* by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term *reality* different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense—for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension,

knowledge that we take it away: if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh

ers resulting from the configuration number motion and size of corpuscles must certainly be false

26 We perceive a continual succession of ideas some are anew excited others are changed or totally disappear There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combinat on of ideas is clear from the preceding section It must therefore be a substance but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit

27 A spirit is one simple undivided active being—as it perceives ideas it is called the *understandin* and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the *will* Hence there can be no *idea* formed of a sou l ~ s

a

ure of *spirit* or that wh ch acts that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produceth If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being and whether he has ideas of two principal po ers marked by the names *will* and *understand n* distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers—which is signified by the name *soul* or *sp rit* This is what some hold but so far as I can see the words *will soul sp rit* do not stand for different ideas or in truth for any idea at all but for something which is very different from ideas and which being an agent cannot be like unto or represented by any idea whatsoever Though it must be o ned at the same time that we have some *noti n* of soul spirit and the ope a tions of the mind such as lling loving hating —inasmuch as we kno v or understand the meaning of these words

28 I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit It is no mo e than willing and straight ay this or that id a arises in my fancy and by the same po er it is obliterated and makes ay for anothe This mak ng and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active Thus much is certain and grounded on experience but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition we only amuse ourselves with ords.

29 But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will When in broad daylight I open my eyes it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will There is therefore some *other* Will or Spirit that produces them.

30 The ideas of Sense are more strong lively and distinct than those of the imagination they have likewise a steadiness order and coherence and are not excited at random as those which are the effects of human wills often are but in a regular train or series the adm rable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author Now the set rules or established methods herein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense are called the *laws f nature* and these e learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things

31 This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life And w thout this e should be eternally at a loss e could not know how to act anything that m ght procure us the least pleasure or remove the least pain of sense That food nourishes, sleep refreshes and fire warms us that to sow in the seed time is the ay to reap in the harvest and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are co d c e

... a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born

32 And yet this consistent uniform orki g wh ch so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose W ll constitutes the laws of nature is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that t rather sends them wande ing after second causes For hen e perceive certain deas of S

more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for exam ple, ha ing bserved that whe we perce e by s ht certain round luminous figure we at th same time perce e by touch the dea or sensa tio called heat, we d from th nce onclud the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perce ing the motio and collisi of *bodies* to be ttended w th sound we are inclined t think the latter the effect of the former

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34. Bef re we proceed any farther t is necessary pend some time in answering bjecti ns hich may probably be mad against the princi ples ha e hi h l d d wn. I d g of every ne.

F t, then, t will be bjected that by th fore going principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished t of th w ld, and ins d thereof chime ical sch me of *deas* takes place. All things tha xist, exist nly in the mind that is, they are purely nal What theref re be comes of the sun, moo and ars. What mus w think of houses, *ri rs*, *mountains*, trees, t nes nay eve of ur wn bodies Are all thes b t so man chimeras d illusi ns th fancy To all which, and wh tever lse f the same so t may be bjected, I answer that by the principles pre mised w are no d pri ed f any thi g na ure. Wha ever we see feel h ar anywise concei or understand remains as se ure as ever and is as real as er Th re is *erum natur* and th distinctio betw n al ties d chimeras retains its full f rce. This is ev den *from sect.* g 30, and 33, where we ha e sh n hat is meant by *al thing* n pposition to *chimeras* or ideas of our own framing but th they both equally ex ist n the mind, and in that sense they are al ke *ideas*

35. I do not argu against the existence of a y one thi g that we can pprehend ther by sense o reflexion. That the things I see w th my eyes and t uch w th my hands do exist really exist, I make ot th least questi n. Th only thi g hose existence we d ny is that which *phil sophers* call Matter or corporeal substance. And n d g of this there is no damage d e to the rest of ma ki d, who I dare say ill never miss t. The Ath ist indeed ill nt the col ur of an empty name to uppo t his mp ty a d the Philosophers may possibly f d they ha e lost a great handl for trifling a d disputation.

36 If any man thi ks this detracts from the existe ce or real ty of thi gs, he is ery far from understanding hat hath been premised n the pl nest terms I could think of. Take here an bstr ct of what has been said —There are spiritual bstan s minds, or huma souls, which will o exci deas themsel es t pl asure but these are faint, k, and unst dy respect of thers they perce e by sense—which, bei g impressed upo them according t certain rules or laws of nature, speak themsel es the effects of mind more powerful and wise tha human sp ts. These latter are said t ha e more *eal ty* n them than the former —by which is meant that they are *more* ff ting orderly and dist ct, and that th y are not fictions of the mind per ce ing them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is th real sun and that h ch I magine by night is th d a f the f rmer I th sense here gi n of *ality* t is dent that every eg tabl tar mineral d in general ach part f th m ndan t *m*, is as *m ch al being* by our principles as by y th r Whether thers mean anything by the term *al ty* different from what I do I tre t th m t look into their wn tho ghts and see

37 It will be urged that thus much t least is true, to w t that we take way all corporeal ubst nces. To this my nswer is, that if th word *b-tance* be taken in the ulgar sense—f comb nau f ns bl q al t es, uch as ext ns knowled that e tak t ay if ne may be said t tak way that which ever had y exist enc not ev n in the imaginati n.

38 B t after all, say y t sounds ery harsh

to say we eat and drink ideas nd I

a y expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition which in other words is no more than to say we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses The hardness or softness the colour taste warmth figure or suchlike qualities which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perc ives th m and this which would an it I am not for disputing about the propriety but the truth of the expression If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas

39 If it be demanded why I make use of the word *idea* and do not rather in compliance with custom call them *things* I answer I do it for two reasons —first because the term *th* contra to de d sec p ensive signification than *idea* including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind and are withal thoughtless and inactive I chose to mark them by the word *id a* wh ch impl es those properties

40 But say what we can some one perhaps may be apt to reply he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments how plausible soever to prevail o er the certainty of them. Be it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you please we are willing to do the same That what I see hear and feel doth exist that is to say is perceived by me I no more doubt than I do of my own being But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses on the contrary we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable nor are there any pr nciples more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41 *Secondly* it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt and actually being so if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said and I shall only add in this place that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is or can possibly be in an unperceiving thing or without the mind any more than its idea

42 *Thirdly* it will be objected that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts In answer to this I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off and yet for all that those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind

43 But for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight For that we should in truth see external space and bodies actually existing in it some nearer others farther off seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision which was published not long since wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceiv d by sight nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles or anything that hath a necessary connexion with it but that it is only suggested to our tho ghts by ce tain visible ideas and sensat ons attending vision which in their own nature have o manner of simil tude or relation e ther with distance or things placed at a distance but by a connexion taught us by experie ce they come to s gnify and suggest them to us after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they

41 Of the forementioned treatise

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two spe

ces entirely distinct and h terogeneous. Th former are marks and prognost cs of the latter That th pr per bj cts f sight neith r exist thout mind, nor are th mages of external things, as shewn e in that treatise. Though throughout the same the co trary be supposed true of tangible bjects—not that to s ppose that ulgar error was necessary for establishing th notion therein laid down, but because t was be

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them distance and things placed t a distance, do not suggest or mark t t us things actually existing t distance, b t nly dmonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds t such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say e dent from what has been said in the forego g parts of this Treatise and in sect. 147 and else here of the Essay concerning Vision, that isi ble ideas are the Languag whereby the Governing Spirit whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is bo t t imprint upon us, in case w excite this that mo io in our wn bodies. But for a fuller informatio in this point I refer the Essay tself

45. *Fourthly* t will be bjected that from th foreg ing principles f llow things are every moment annihila ed and created anew The bjects of sense exist nly when they are percei ed the trees therefore are in the gard n, the chairs th parl ur no l ger than whil there is somebody by to percei th m. Upon sh tting my eyes all the furni ure in th room is reduced to nothing, and barely po pening them t is again created. I answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has bee said in sect. 3 4, &c. and desir he will consider wh th h means anything by the actual exis nce of an idea distinct from is being percei ed. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am t bl discover tha ything else is meant by those words and I nce more trea th read t sound his own tho ghts, and not suffer himself t be imposed by words. If he can concei t possible either for his d as or th ir arch types to exist w thout being percei ed, th I gi p the cause bu if he cannot, he will ackn wledg t is unreasonable for him to tand up in def nce of he know no what, and pre end charg me as an bsurd y the n t assentin t those propositions which bo tom ha no meaning in them.

46 It will no be amiss to bserv how far th recei ed principles of philosophy are themsel es charg able w th those pret nded absurdit es. It is thought strang ly absurd that upon closi g my eyel ds all the is ble objects around me should be reduced to nothing and y t is not this what ph losoph rs omm nly ack owledg when they agree on all hands that l ght and colours, which al ne are the proper nd immediate bj ts of sight, are mere sensations that exist no l ger tha they are perce ed Again t may to some perhaps seem ery cred ble that th gs should be every mome t creating y t this ery not on is commonly t ght in the schools. For th Schoolme th ugh th y cknowledge the xiste ce of Matter a d that th whole mu dane fabric is framed out of t, are neverth less of pinion that t cannot subsist w thout the d ine conservation, wh ch by th m is expou ded to be co tinual creation.

47 Farth r l ttl thought will discover to us that th gh we allow th exist nce of M tter or corporeal substance, yet t will una idably f l l w from the principles which are now generally dmitted th t th part cular bod es of what kind soever do n ne of th m exist whilst they are not percei ed. For t is e dent from sect. II and the f llowing sections, that the M tter philosophers co end for is an incompreh nsible some what, which hath none of those particular quali ties whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distu guished one from another But, to mak this more plain, t must be remarked that the infinite di isibility of M t er is now uni ersally al l wed, at l ast by the most pproved and co s derabl philosophers, who th rece ved prin pl d m nstrat t beyo d ll xc pt n. Hence, t f ll w there is an infinit number of parts in each particl of Matter which are not percei ed by sense Th reason theref re that any particular body seems to be of a finit mag nitude, or exhibits only a finit umber of parts to sense, is, no because t co tains no more, ince in tself t contains an infinit number of parts, b because the sense is not a t enough to discern them. In proporti n therefore as the sense is ndered m re cute, t perc es a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object ppears gre er and ts figure aries, those parts n ts extremities which were before unpercei able ppears g now t bound t in ery different lines and angles from those perce ed by an btuser sense. And a l gth, after arious changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes in finitely acut the body shall seem infinite. Dur ing all which there is no al eration in th body bu nly in th sense. Each body therefore considered in tself is infinitely extend d, and co

to say we eat and drink ideas nd clothed he word e to sig e quali certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition which in other words is no more than to say we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses The hardness or softness the colour taste warmth figure or suchlike qualities which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them and this is all that is meant by calling them *ideas* which word if it was as ordinarily used as *thin* would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it I am not for disputing about the propriety but the truth of the expression If h

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40 But say what we can some one perhaps may be apt to reply he will still believe his senses and never suffer any arguments how plausible soever to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you please we are willing to do the same That what I see hear and feel doth exist that is to say is perceived by me I no more doubt than I do of my own being But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a p oof for the existence of anyth ng which is not perceived by sense We are not for hav ng any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses on the contrary we give them all the st ess a d assurance magi nable nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

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42 *Thirdly* it will be objected that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts In answer to this I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off and yet for all that those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind

43 But for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight For that we should in truth see external space and bodies actually existing in it some nearer others farther off seems to carry with it some opposit on to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind The consideration of this d fficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision which was published not long since wherein it

a angles or any thing that hath a necessary connexion with it but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain vis ble ideas and sensat ons attending vis on which in their own nature have no manner of simil tude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance but by a connexion taught us by experience they come to signify and suggest them to us after the same manner that wo ds of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see would not at first s ght think the th ngs he saw to be without his mind or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the forementioned treatise

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two spe

scope and t nor and connexion t a discours making allowances for those naccurate modes f peech hich use has made ine table.

53. As to the opinio that there are no Co po eal Causes, this has be h etofo e main tained by some of the Schoolmen, as t is of late by thers among the modern philosophers, who though they all w Matter to exist, yet will ha e God alone to be the immediat effici t cause of al thin s. These me saw that amo gst all the objects of sense there was none hich had any power or ti ty included in t and that by co seq ence this was likewise tru f whatever bod es they supposed t exist w tho t th mind, lik unto the immediat bjects of sense. But then, that they sh ld ppose an umerable mul titud f cr t d be gs wh ch they ackn wl edg are no cap bl f p od cing y o e effect in nature, and which therefore ar mad to no manner of purpose nce God might ha d ne ryth g as w ll w th t th m th s I say though should allow t possibl must yet be ery unaccountabl and tra ag t suppos tion.

54. I th *eighth* place, the uni ersal concur rent assent of mankind may be tho ght by some an in incibl argume t in behalf of M tter th existence of xternal thi gs. Must w ppose the hol world to be mistak n. And if so what cause can be ass gned f so w despread and pre dominant an erro I ans er firs that, upo narrow inquiry t will not pe haps be f und so many as is imagined d really belie th exist f M t o th g w th ut h mind Strictly peaking t belie th t which in l es co t adicti n, has no meaning in t, is im possibl and whether th f reg ing exp ess ns are not of tha so t, I refer t t the mpartial ex aminatio of th reader In sense, d ed, me may be said t belie tha Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immedia cause of their sensati ns, whi h ff ts them ry mom t, d ly p t t th m wer some senseless unthinking being But, that they should clearly pp h nd any meaning marked by those ds d f m th f settl d pe ul u pinion, is what I am t bl t concei Thus is t th ly t e wh n men impose po th msel by m g g th y b l e those p pos tions wh ch they ha ft n h ard, though t bo m they ha no meaning in th m.

55. But sec ndly though we should grant a not n to be never so uni ersally and te dfastly adhered to, y t this is weak argument f its truth to whoever cons ders what ast number of p j udices and false op n ns are everywh re em br ed w th the utmost t naciousness, by the un reflecting (wh ch are the f r gr ter) part of manki d. There was a time wh n th ant podes and m t n f th earth were looked upon as monstrous absurd ties even by men of learning and if it be cons dered what a small proport o th y bear to th rest of mankind, e shall f nd that at this d y those notions ha e gained but a ery ncons derable footing in the world.

56 But it is d manded that w assign cause f this prejud ce and ccount for its obtaini g n the w ld. T this I answer that men know g they percei ed several deas, whereof they them sel es were not th a thors—as n t being cited from w thin n r dependi g on the operatio of the w ll —th m d them ma t n th e deas, o obj ts of percept n had an existence d pend nt f and w thout the mi d th ut ever dreaming that co t di tio was in ol ed in those words. But, philosophers ha g pla nly seen that th immediat bj cts of percept do not exist w tho t th mind they some degree corrected the mistake of the ulgar but t th printed by those bjects n th mind. And this not of the philosophers owes t origin to the same cause w th the f mer namely their be g conscious that th y were not the th rs of their own sensat ns, which they ev dently knew wer mpri t d f m w th ut nd whi h the f re must ha e som cause distinct fr m the minds n which they are mpri ted.

57 B t why they hould ppose th deas of sense t be xcit d in us by things in their like ness, and t ather have ecourse to *Spirit* which alon can t, may be ccounted f first, be cause th y w n t war f th epugnancy there is, as well pposing things lik to ur deas existing w th ut, as n ttributing to them p w t ty Se o dly because th S p m Spir t whi h tes th d as our minds, is not marked t d l mited to ur w by y p ti lar fin t collecti n f ns ble ideas, as huma g nts are by their siz com plexi l mbs, d m tions. And thirdly be cause His per tions are regular nd unif rm. Whenever the course of nature is in errupted by

sequently void of all shape or figure From which *it follows that though we should grant the exist ence of Matter to be never so certain yet it is* withal as certain the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge that neither the particular bodies perceived by *sense nor anything like them* exists without the mind Matter I say and each particle thereof is according to them infinite and shapeless and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world any one where

on the principles we have premised so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions For though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist un perceived yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are per ceived by us since there may be some other spirit *that perceives them though we do not* Wher ever bodies are said to have no existence with out the mind I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind but all minds what soever It does not therefore follow from the fore *going principles that bodies are annihilated and* created every moment or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them

49 *Fifthly* it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind it fol *lows that the mind is extended and figured* since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists I answer those qual ties are in the mind only as they are perceived by it—that *is* not by way of *mode* or *att ibute* but only by ay of *idea* and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended because extens on exists in it alone than it does that it is red or blue because those c l are on all hands acknov ledged *to exist*

osition a die is hard extended and squa they will have t that the ord *die* denotes a subject or substance d stinct from the hardness ex tension and figure hich are pred cated of it and in hich they exist This I cannot compre hend to me a die *seems* to be nothing dist nct from those things wh ch are termed its modes or accidents And to say a d e is hard ext nded and square is not to attribute tl ose qual t s to a subject distinct *from and supporting* them but only an explication of the meaning of the word *die*

puscular philosophy and undermine those me chanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenom ena In short whatever advances have been *made either by ancient or modern philosophers* in the study of nature do all proceed on the sup-

of particulars To explain the phenomena is all one as to shew why upon such and such occa sions we are affected with such and such ideas. B it ho *Matter should operate on a Spirit* or

ophy Besides they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance but by f gure motion and other qualities which are in truth no more than mere ideas and therefore cannot be the cause of anything as hath been *already shewn See sect* 25

S thi it ill upon this be demanded

say upon these principles that fire heats or water cools but that a Sp rit heats and so forth Would n rdly laughed at who should

Copernican system do nevertheless say the s rises the sun sets or comes to the merid d f they affected a contrary style in

of language ould rece e no manner of a t tion or disturbance fro n the admission of our

a manner as is necessary for our well be i g false soe er they may be if taken n a str ct and speculat ve sense Nay this is una oidable since propr ety be ng regulated by custom, language is suited to the rece ved op nions which are not al ays the truest Hence it s mposs ble even in

to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena—which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the *uniformity* there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this:—ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely *inefficacious perceptions* in the mind, are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of *cause* and *effect*, but only of a mark or sign with the thing *signified*. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by *rule*, and with *wise contrivance*. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are

a miracle men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent But when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflexion their order and concatenation though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom power and goodness in their creator is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a *Free Spirit* especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting though it be an imperfection is looked on as a mark of *freedom*

58 *Tenthly* it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics For example the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons But *on the foregoing principles* there can be no such thing For motion being only an idea it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense I answer *that tenet if rightly understood will be* found to agree with the principles we have premised for the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this to wit whether we have *reason to conclude from* what has been observed by astronomers that if we were placed in such and such circumstances and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets and appearing in all respects like one of them and this by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust is reasonably collected from the phenomena

59 We may from the experience we have had *of the train and succession of ideas in our minds* often make I will not say uncertain conjectures but sure and well grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present Herein consists the knowledge of nature which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said *It will be easy* to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature

60 In the *eleventh* place it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals might not vegetables grow and shoot forth leaves of blossoms and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together which being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a *fiat* or act of his will we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature to be made in vain By this doctrine though an artist hath made the spring and wheels and every movement of a watch and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed yet he must think all this done to no purpose and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day If so why may not the Intelligence do it without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going *of a watch there is some corresponding disorder* to be found in the movements which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature *great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and* subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope In short it will be asked how upon our principles any tolerable account can be given or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines framed with the most exquisite art which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61 To all which I answer first that though *there were some difficulties relating* to the administration of Providence and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature which I could not solve by the foregoing principles yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved *a priori* with the *utmost evidence* and rigor of demonstration Secondly but neither are the received principles free from the like greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind for it has been made evident that solidity bulk figure motion and the like have no *activity* or *efficacy* in them, so

God, which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method—much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter seems too extravagant ... active con... ation. Besides, it is in effect no

sense. T me, I say it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient t explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for *inert senseless Matter*, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. F as t its being an occasion we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen.

3. It is worth while t reflect ... the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of *material substance*; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking *substratum* or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this *substratum* or material ... of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an *unthinking substratum* of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.

4. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the *thing* itself is indefensible, at least to retain the *name*; which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds.

5. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless *somewhat*, by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain *unknown Ideas* in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by *occasion* with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name *Matter*, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such

to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that by discerning a figure texture and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies whether natural or artificial we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon or the nature of the thing

66 Hence it is evident that those things which under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects are altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities may be very naturally explained and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information And it is the search ng after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle that supreme and wise Spirit in whom we live move and have our being

67 In the *twelfth* place it may perhaps be objected that—though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert senseless extended sol d figured movable substance existing without the mind such as philosophers describe Matter—yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of *matter* the positive ideas of extension figure solidity and motion and say that he means only by that word an inert senseless substance that exists without the mind or unperceived which is the occasion of our ideas or at the presence whereof God is pleased to exc te ideas in us it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist In answer to which I say first that it seems no less

this unkno n substance may poss bly exist yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind s agreed and that it exists not in place is no less certa n—s nce all place or extension exists only in the mind as hath been already proved It remains therefore that it exists no where at all

68 Let us exam ne a little the descript on that is here given us of *matter* It neither acts nor perceives nor is perce ved for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert senseless unknown substance which is a definition entirely made up of negatives excepting only the relative not on of its standing under or supporting But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all and how nearly this comes to the description of a *nonentity* I desire may be considered. But say you it is the *unknown occasion* at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now I would fain know how anything can be present to us which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion nor capable of producing any idea in our minds nor is at all extended nor hath any form nor exists in any place The words to be present, when thus applied must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meanin and which I am not able to comprehend.

69 Again let us examine what is meant by *oc*

thing that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things But when it is applied to Matter as above described it can be taken in neither of those senses for Matter is said to be passive and inert and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause It is also unperceivable as being devoid of all sens ble qualities and so cannot be the occas on of our perceptions in the latter sense as when the burning my finger is said to be the occas on of the pain that attends it What therefore can be meant by call ng matter an *occasion?* The term is either used in no sense at all or else in some very distant from its received s gnification

70 You will perhaps say that Matter though it be not perceived by us is nevertheless perceived by God to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds For say you since we observe our sensat ons to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occas o s of their being produced That is to say that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter corresponding to our ideas, which though they do not exc te them in our minds or anyw ise immed ately affect us as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us they are nevertheless to God by whom they are perceived as it were so many occasions to remind H m when and what ideas to imprint on our minds that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner

71 In ans er to this I observe that as the notion of Matter is here stated the quest on is no longer concerning the existence of a thing d stinct from *Sp it* and *id* from percei ing and being perceived but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not hat sort, in the mind of

facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. T which I answer that no sort of writings wha ever sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have meaning in them, are in dan f ha in their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn t be greeabl t our principles and the difference be wixt things and ideas, and has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call Matter or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

83. Again, whether there can be be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us, whence it plainly follow that in the tenets w have laid down there is nothin inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of wha kind soever so far as is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, t least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. Wha must we think of Moses' rod, was it no ly turned int serpent was there only chan e of ideas in th minds of the spectators. And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more t the marriage feas in Cana than impose the sight, and smell, and tast of the guests, so as crea in them the ppearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles which, in conseq nce of the foregoing principles, must be looked pon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. T this I reply tha the rod was changed int real serpent, and the water in real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I ha e elsewhere said ul be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of al and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so o en referred to, and the difficulties abou are so asily answered from wha has gone before tha t were an affront to the reader' understanding t resume the explicatio of in its place I shall only

ple concerning real miracles has no place at all on urs, but only o the recei ed principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

85. Ha ing done w th the Objections, which I end a oured to propose in the cl arest l ght, and g e them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in th next place to take a ew of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these ppear at first sight—as that several difficult and hen re estions, on which abundance of spec

d isible, and how it per tes on pirit — th s and l k qu h g en infin te amusement to philosophers in all ages but depending on the existence of Matter they ha e no longer any place on our principles. Many other ad antages there are, as well w th regard to religion as th sciences, which t is asy for any one t ded ce from what has been premised but this will ppear more plainly in th sequel.

86. From the principles we ha e laid down t follows human knowledge may naturally be red ced to two he ds—that of ideas and that of spirits Of each of these I shall treat in order

And first as to id as or unthinking things. Our kn wled of these hath been ery much obscured and confounded, and we ha been led in ery dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the bjects of sense—the one intelligible or in the mind, the other al and without th mind whereby unthinking things are th ught t ha e natural s bsistence f their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistak not, hath been shewn t be a most groundless and bsurd notion, is the ery root f S pu m f so l g s men th ght that real things subsisted w thout the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth al as t was conformabl to l thin t follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge t all. For how can t be known tha th things which are percei ed are conformable to those which are n t percei ed, or exist w thout the mind.

87. Colour figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered nl as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perce ed. But, if they are looked n as no es or images, referred t thin or existing w thout th mind, then are w in ol ed all in scepticism. W see only the ppearances, and not the real qualities of things What may be the extension, figure, or motion o

thing since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance

77 But say you though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we per ceive yet there may perhaps be some inert un perceiving substance or *substratum* of some other qualities as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind because we have not a sense adapted to them But if we had a new sense we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours I answer first if what you mean by the word *Matter* be only the unknown support of unknown qualities it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no since it no way concerns us and I do not see the ad vantage there is in disputing about what we know not *what* and we know not *why*

78 But secondly if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensa tions and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving sub stance that has been already offered with rela tion to figure motion colour and the like Qual ities as hath been shewn are nothing else but *sen sations* or *ideas* which exist only in a *mind* perceiv ing them and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever

79 But you will insist what if I have no rea son to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it or ev n conceive what is meant by that word? yet st

Matter exis

a *substance*

go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular expl cat on of those words may be at tended with great difficulties I answer when words are used without a meaning you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction You may say for example that twice two is equal to seven so long as you declare you do not take the words of that propos tion in their usual acceptation but for marks of you kno v not what And by the same reason you may say there is an nert thoughtless sub accidents which is the occa sion

as i

gi

sta

neither substance nor accident spi

inert thoughtless indivisible immovable, unex tended existing in no place For say you what ever may be urged against *substance* or *occasion*, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter hath no place at all so long as this *negative* defini tion of Matter is adhered to I answer you may if so it shall seem good use the word Matter in the same sense as other men use nothing and so make those terms convertible in your style For after all this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition the parts whereof when I consider with attention either collective ly or separate from each other I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term *nothing*

81 You will reply perhaps that in the fore said definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing—the positive ab stract idea of *quiddity entity* or *existence* I own indeed that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea which is say they the most abstract and general notion of all that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others That there are a great var ety of spirits of different orders and capacities whose faculties both in num ber and extent are far exceeding those the Au thor of my being has besto ed on me I see no reason to deny And for me to pretend to deter mine by my own few stinted narro v inlets of perception vhat ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption —since there may be for aught tl at I kno in numerable sorts of ideas or sensat ons as differ ent from one another and from all that I have from sounds But how

sibly exist yet for any one to p e e ... of Entity or Existence *abstracted* from *spi it* and *idea* from percei ed and being perceived is I suspect a downright repugnancy and trifling with ords —It rema ns that we cons der the ob ject ons which may poss bly be made on the part of Rel g on

82 Some there are vho th nk that though the arguments for the real ex stence of bod es which are drawn from Reason be allo ed not to amount to demonstration yet the Holy Scrip tures are so clear in the point as ill sufficiently convince every good Christ an that bodies do really exist and are someth ng more than mere ideas there being in Holy Writ innumerable

..at the sensible qualities do exist in an nert, extended, unpercei ing substance which they call *Mat* to which they ttribute a natural subsistence, exterior t all thinking beings, *or distinct from be..g perceived* by any mind hatsoeve even the ternal mind of the Creat r wherein they suppose o ly deas f the corporeal substances created by him if indeed they allow them *to be at all created*.

92. For as we ha e shewn th doctrine f Mat ter or corpore l bstance t ha e been th main

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most cel brated amo th ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being f God, ha tho ght M tt to be u cr t d and coternal w th Him. How great fri d *material substance* has bee to Ath ists all ages were needless to relate. All th ir *monstrous syst ms* ha e so isible and ecessary d pendence n t that, when this corner-sto is once removed the whole f bric cann t choose but fall t the gr und, insom h th t t is l g worth hile to bestow a particular consideration n th absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

93 That impious and profane persons should readily *fall* in w th those sy t ms which f our

bearken to those wh d y Provid ce, in spection of S perio Mind over the affairs f the world, ttributing the whol ser es f events either to blind chance fatal necess ty arising from the impulse of ne body an ther— ll thus ery natural. And th ther hand, when

rejoice to see them d pri ed f th ir grand p port, and driven from tha nly f rtress, w thout hich your Epicureans, H bbists, and th like, ha no even the shadow of pretence, b t become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

94. The existence of Matter or bodies unperceived, has not only been the mai support of Atheists and F talists, but the same principl d th Id l try likewise in all its arious forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon and tars, and every other object of th senses are *only so ma y sensations in their minds*, wh ch h e the exist nce but barely being per ce ed, doubtless they would never fall down and w rship their own *ideas* b t *ther address their* homage to that ETER AL I VISIBLE MI D which produces and sustains all things.

95. The same bsurd principle, by mingling itself th th articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficult es to *Christians. For example*, about the Resurrectio how many scruples and obj ct ons h e been raised by Socinians and others. But d not the most plaus ble of them depend th suppositio that a body is denominated the *sa e* w th regard not to th form or that whi h is perce ed by sense but the material substance, which remains the same under several f rms Tak away this *m ter al substance* about the dentity whereof *all the dispute is*, and mean by *body* what every plain ordinary person means by that word, t w t, that which is immediately seen and felt which is nly a combination of sens bl qualities r deas, and then their most unanswerabl *objections come t nothing*

96 Matter being ce expelled out of nature drags w th t so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredibl number of disputes and p zzl g questions, which ha been thorns in

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knowledge, peace, and religio ha e reason to wish they were.

97 Besid the external existence of the objects of perception, an ther great source of errors and difficulties th regard t d al kn wledg is the doctrin f *bst act ideas* such as t hath been set forth in the I trod ct n. Th plainest things in th w ld th se w ar m t tim t ly qu inted w th and perf tly kn w wh they are *cons dered in an bstract* w y ppear trangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place d mo n, tak n in particular o co crete, are wh t ybody k w b t ha g passed thro h th hands f m taphysician they become too bstract and fin t be pprehended by *men of o d ary sense*. B d y u servant me t you ch *t me* uch *plac* and h hall never tay t deliberat th meaning f those words ce h t part cular t m and place, th motion by which h is g t thither h finds n t th least d ffi ulty B t *if t me* be

anything really and absolutely or in itself it is impossible for us to know but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses Things remaining the same our ideas vary and which of them or even whether any of them at all represent the true quality really existing in the thing it is out of our reach to determine So that, for aught we know all we see hear and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera and not at all agree with the real things existing in *rerum natura* All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between *things* and *ideas* and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived It were easy to dilate on this subject and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects

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with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being but even that it exists Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth of every thing they see or feel even of their own bodies. And after all their labour and struggle of thought they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things But all this doubtfulness which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words and not amuse ourselves with the terms absolute external exist and such like signifying we know not what I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch and at the same time have no existence in nature since the very *existence* of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*

89 Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing reality existence* for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things or pretend to any knowledge thereof so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words *Thing* or *Being* is the most general name of all it comprehends under it two *kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous* and which have nothing common but the name viz *spirits and ideas* The former are active indivisible substances the latter are inert fleeting dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves but are supported by or exist in minds or spiritual substances We comprehend *our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion* and that of other spirits by reason We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas In like manner we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas—which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former To me it seems that *ideas spirits* and *relations* are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse and that the term *idea* would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of

90 Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things or do really exist this we do not deny but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived and an idea can be like nothing but an idea Again the things perceived by sense may be termed *external* with regard to their origin—in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them Sensible objects may likewise be said to be *without the mind* in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind thus when I shut my eyes the things I saw may

things It is acknowledged on the received principles that extension motion and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support as not being able to subsist by themselves But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities and consequently cannot subsist by themselves Thus far it is agreed on all hand So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist we detract nothing from the received opinion

sense have no existence distinct from being perceived and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them whereas philosophers vulgarly hold

much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine.

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how

... this also is accounted for by attraction: but, in this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc. there is something alike namely an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange because it is that we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men because it is discerned only in the tides But a philosopher whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other which he denotes by the general name attraction, whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them—for that can be no other than the *will of a spirit*—but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind, for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place as well as to predict things to come which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it *universal*; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other: and so far is that gravitation from being *essential* to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself: as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a *mind* or *spirit*. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a *wise and good Agent*, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things: and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought a good way of accounting for them

taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it

98 For my own part whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of *time* abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties I have no notion of it at all only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life both which seem equally absurd Time therefore being nothing abstracted from the sucession of ideas in our minds it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind Hence it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the *existence* of a spirit from its *cogitation* will I believe find it no easy task.

99 So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities and consider them by themselves we presently lose sight of them and run into great extravagances All which depend on a twofold abstraction first it is supposed that extension for example may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities and secondly that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived But whoever shall reflect and take care to understand what he says will if I mistake not acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike *sensations* and alike *real* that where the extension is there is the colour too *i e* in his mind and that their archetypes can exist only in some other *mind* and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined blended or (if one may so speak) concreted together none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived

100 What it is for a man to be happy or an object good every one may think he knows But to frame an abstract idea of happiness prescinded from all particular pleasure or of goodness from everything that is good this is what few can

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words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions seems to have rendered morality very difficult and the study thereof of small use to mankind And in effect the doctrine of *abstraction* has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge

101 The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics with regard to each of these I shall make some observations And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low are drawn principally from this head namely that we are under an invincible blindness as to the *true* and *real* nature of things This they exaggerate and love to enlarge on We are miserably bantered say they by our senses and amused only with the outside and show of things The real essence the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object is hid from our view something there is in every drop of water every grain of sand which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend But it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend

102 One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow and whereon they depend Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes to wit the figure motion weight and such like qualities of insensible particles whereas in truth there is no other agent or efficient cause than *spirit* it being evident that motion as well as all other *ideas* is perfectly inert See sect 25 Hence to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds by figure motion magnitude and the like must needs be labour in vain And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory Which may be said in general of those instances where one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out and how

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than *relative*; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being, it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation.

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For however some may define relative motion, so as to term that body *moved* which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to *move*, because they change distance with his feet. To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in motion.

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted *absolutely* to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For as hath been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII*. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section.

115. For to denominate a body *moved* it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all.

116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an *absolute Space*, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of *pure Space* exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *Space*; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is *Body*; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less *pure*. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion—though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains *pure Space*, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for

and altogether worthy a philosopher Thirdly from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied and observations and experiments made which that they are of use to mankind and enable us to draw any general conclusions is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves but only of God s goodness and kindness to men in the ad ministration of the world See sect 30 and 31 Fourthly by a diligent observation of the phe nomena within our view we may discover the general laws of nature and from them deduce the other phenomena I do not say *demonstrate* for all deductions of that kind depend on a sup position that the Author of nature always oper ates uniformly and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles which we can not evidently know

108 Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and afterwards derive the phe nomena from those rules seem to consider signs rather than causes A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so And as it is very possible to write improperly through too strict an observance of general grammar rules so in arguing from general laws of nature it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far and by that means run into mis takes

109 As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use rather than lay them out in grammati cal remarks on the language so in perusing the volume of nature it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each part cular phenomenon to general rules or shewing how it follows f om them We should propose to ourselves nobler views namely to re create and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty order extent and variety of natural things hence by proper inferences to enlarge

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servient to the ends they were des gned for God s glory and the sustentation and comfort of our selves and fellow creatures

110 The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Sc ence will be easily ackno ledged to be a certa n celebrated Treatise of *Me ha ics* In the entrance of which justly admired treatise Time Space and Motion are d stinguished into *absolute* and *relative t ue* and *pparent mathematic l* and *vulgar* which distinction as it is at large ex plained by the author does suppose these quan tities to have an existence without the mind and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all

111 As for *Time* as it is there taken in an ab solute or abstracted sense for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject Sect. 97 and 98 For the rest this celebrated author holds there is an *absolute Space* which being unperceiv able to sense remains in itself similar and im movable and relative space to be the measure thereof which being movable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies is vul garly taken for immovable space *Place* he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place *Absolute Motion* is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place as relative motion is from one relative place to another And because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable But it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest as likewise one and the same body may be in rel ative rest and motion or even moved with con trary relative motions at the same time accord ing as its place is variously defined All wh ch

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respect of the whole partake of the mot ons of the whole Secondly the place being mo ed that which is placed therein is also moved so that a body mo ing in a place which is in motion doth partic pate the motion of its place. Thirdly true motion is never generated or changed other wise than by force impressed on the body itself Fourthly true motion is always changed by force imp essed on the body moved Fifthly in circu lar motion barely relat e there is no centrifugal force which nevertheless in that which is true or absolute is proport onal to the quantity of motion

and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed which seems to have been done in imitation of language so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or *vice versa*. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them and, thus computing in signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit) we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

2. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 9, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.

3. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which considered as relative, is the ob-

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where supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning, so it is the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.

24. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind. wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite num-

the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance but if that too were annihilated then there could be no motion and consequently no Space Some perhaps may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense See the Essay concerning Vision

117 What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of *pure Space* But the chief advantage aris ing from it is that we are freed from that dan gerous dilemma to which several who have em ployed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced to wit of thinking either that Real Space is God or else that there is some thing beside God which is eternal uncreated infinite indivisible immutable Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions It is certain that not a few divines as well as philosophers of great note have from the diffi culty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space concluded it must be di vine And some of late have set themselves par ticularly to shew the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it Which doctrine how un worthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature yet I do not see how we can get clear of it so long as we adhere to the received opinions

118 Hitherto of Natural Philosophy we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge to wit, Mathematics These how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of dem onstrat on wh ch is hardly anywhere else to be found cannot nevertheless be supposed alto gether free from mistakes if in their princ ples there lu ks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind Mathematicians, though they de duce the r theorems from a great he ght of evi dence yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity and they do not ascend into any inquiry concern ng those trans cendental maxims which influence all the par ticular sciences each part whereof Mathemat ics not excepted does consequently partic pate of the errors involved in them That the princi ples laid down by mathematic ans are true and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestible we do not deny but we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas and the existence of objects without the mind

119 Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of *Number* of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowl edge The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and eleva tion of thought It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use but serve only for amusement and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries in volved in numbers and attempted the explica tion of natural things by them But if we inquire into our own thoughts and consider what has been premised we may perhaps entertain a low

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subservient to practice and promote the benefit of life

120 Unity in abstract we have before consid ered in sect 13 from which and what has been said in the Introduction it plainly follows there

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denoted by the numeral names and figures The theo ies the efore in Arithmetic if they are ab stracted from the names and f gures as likewise from all use and practice as well as from the particular things numbered can be supposed to

[illegible]

ling it becomes when cons dered as a matter of mere speculation

121 However since there may be some who deluded by the specious show of discovering ab stracted verities waste their time in arithmet cal theorems and problems wh ch have not any use it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence and this will plainly appear by tak ng a view of Arithmet c in its infancy and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science

are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions, or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.

131. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order and so on *ad infinitum*. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end, so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity *ad infinitum* of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all: thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all: which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

132. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are *both* in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry and promotes the benefit of human life, doth still remain firm and unshaken on our principles. That science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what hath been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

132. If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it: I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the *minimum sensibile*: nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.

133. By what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise, and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly *Matter* or *the absolute existence of corporeal objects* hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether *human or divine*, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise: if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason: if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being incomprehensible": if withal the removal of this *Matter* be not attended with the least evil consequence: if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it: if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Re-

ber of other ideas that is that they are not infinitely divisible If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea I declare I do not know what that is and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it But if the terms extension parts &c are taken in any sense conceivable that is for ideas then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a *principle* are not only themselves but likewise whatever is deducible from them thought privileged from all examination And there is no absurdity so gross which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow

125 He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in *abstract* is infinitely divisible And one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that a line but an

[illegible] of geometricians as of other men and have a like influence on their reasonings and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine

126 It hath been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect 15 Introd) where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood to wit the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes or in other words the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude—which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is whether great or small but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts since it is regarded not in itself but as it is universal and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more though there may not be above an inch in it After this manner the [illegible] sidered in its own nature

127 Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more the inch line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number which is true not of the inch taken absolutely but only for the things signified by it But men not retaining that distinction in their thoughts slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable There is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth which may be signified by that inch When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper and take one side not above an inch for example in length to be the radius,

all and consequently may be neglected without an error or inconveniency yet these described lines being only marks standing for greater quantities whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable it follows that to prevent notable errors in practice the radius must be taken of 10 000 parts or more

128 From what has been said the reason is plain why to the end any theorem become universal in its use it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not In doing of which if we examine the matter thoroughly we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of or being divisible into a thousand parts but only some other line which is far greater than an inch and represented by it and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible we must mean a line which is infinitely great What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry

129 The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it But by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a *posteriori*

understand the meaning of the w rd ld t affirm r deny anything

spirits that bl eness or h at by me percei ed as t those d as perce ed by an ther

41 It must t be suppo ed that they wh assert the natural immo tal ty f th so l are f pinio that t is bsol t ly incapabl of an hilation even by the infinit po r f th Cre tor ho first g t being b t nly that t is n t liabl t be broken r dissol ed by th ord ary la s of nature or motion Th y d ed who hold the soul f ma t be ly thi t l

enclosed And thus tio has be gr edily em braced and chersh d by the w rst part f ma kind as th most ffect al ant d t gainst all impressi ns of irt and el g on. B t t has

hat m by th *ur f tur*) ca t poss bly affect an mpl unc mpo d d substance ch being th f is indissol ble by th f rce f tur that is t say th soul of man turally immo tal.

4 After what has been said, t is, I p-pose, plain that ur so ls ar t t be kn w th same manner as senseless, ina ti bjects, or by y of *dea. Spirits* d *deas* are things so holly different, that wh w say th y exist, they are known th lik these w rds must not be tho ght t gnify anythin commo to both natures. There is thing al k comm in them and to expect that by y multiplica tio enlarg ment f ur f cult es w may be enabled to know pirit as w d triangle, seems as bsurd as if w h uld h pe t se sound. This is inculcated beca se I ma t may be of moment t wards clean g everal m portant q estions, and p eventing som ery dangerous rrors con er ing the nature of the soul We m y not, I think, stri tly be said t h an *d a* of an ct e be ng or of an act although e may be sa d to h e a *t* of them I ha some k ledge r n t f my mind and t acts about ideas, inasm ch as I kn w r u derstand h t is meant by these words. What I kn w that I ha e some noti n of I will not say that the terms *ide* and *ot* may not be used con ert bly if the wo ld ll ha e t so b t yet t co d ceth to clearness and propriety that e distinguish things ery differ ent by d ff re t ames It is also t be remarked tl t

we ca

but u

tudes bet e things But if n th mod rn way the word is exte ded to pirits, and rel t ns, and cts, this is, after all an affair of er bal co ern.

43 It will n t be amiss to add that th doc tri e f *b t act as* has had no small hare re deri g thos sci n es intricate d obscur wh ch are part cularly co rsa t abo t sp rit ual things. M h e magi ed th y co ld f me bstra t n t ns f the po rs d act of the mind a d cons der th m p esci ded as w ll from th mi d spir t tself as from th ir re spect b ts d ff ts. He a great n m be f dark and amb gu us t ms, presumed to stand f r abstr t n t ns, ha e been intod ced int metaphys cs d mo ality and from these h e gro infinit distr ctio and disputes am g t the l ar ed

144. But n thi g ems m re to ha con trib t d tow ards ging m co tro ers es and mistakes w th egard t th atur d operat ns f th mind than th being used to peak f th se thin s in terms borrow d from sens bl d as. F xampl th w ll is t med th *m ti* f the soul this nfuses belief that th mi d f m is as ball in moti mpelled and d t rmi ed by th bjects f sense as neces sarily as that is by th strok f a k t. H nce arise dless scruples and errors of danger consequ ce in m ali y All which I d bt n t m y be cleared and truth ppear pl in unif rm d co ist t, could b t philosoph rs be p evailed t reture int th msel es a d ttent ely cons d th ir wn meaning

45 From what has been said t is plain that w can ot kn w th existence f th pirit th rwise than by th ir per ti ns, th deas by th m excited in us. I perce several mo-t ns, changes, and mbinat ns f deas, th t inf m m there are certain part cular g ts,

ligion methinks we may expect it should be ad mitted and firmly embraced though it were proposed only as an *hypothesis* and the existence of Matter had been allowed possible which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not

134 True it is that in consequence of the foregoing principles several disputes and specu lations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning are rejected as useless But how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply en gaged and make large advances in studies of that nature yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down that they abridge the labour of study and make hu man sciences far more clear compendious and attainable than they were before

135 Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of IDEAS the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of SPIRITS—with regard to which per haps human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined The great reason that is as signed for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an *idea* of it. But surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27 to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or sup- port wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist but that this *substance* which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd

136 It will perhaps be sa d that we want a sense (as some have magined) proper to know substances withal which if we had we might know our own soul as we do a triangle To this I answer that in case we had a new sense be stowed upon us we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense But I be lieve nobody will say that what he means by the terms *s ul* and *substance* is only some part cular sort of idea or sensation We may therefore nfer that all things duly considered it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a *ro nd square*

137 From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets and much scepticism about the nature of th soul It is even probable that this opinion ma have produced a doubt in some whether the had any soul at all distinct from their bod since upon inquiry they could not find they ha an idea of it That an *idea* which is inacti and the existence whereof consists in being pe ceived should be the image or likeness of a agent subsisting by itself seems to need no oth

essary that an idea or image be in all respec like the original

138 I answer if it does not in those me tioned it is impossible it should represent it any other thing Do but leave out the power

degree of those powers should be represente in an idea it is evident there can be no idea of spirit

139 But it will be objected that if there is r idea signified by the terms *soul spirit and su stance* they are wholly ins gnificant or have r meaning in them. I answer those words d mean or s gnify a real thing which is neither a idea nor like an idea but that which percei ideas and wills and reasons about them. Wh I am myself that which I denote by the term is the same with what is meant by *soul* or *sp ritu substance* If it be said that this is only quarrelin at a word and that since the immediately s g

may not partake in the same appellation I an swer all the unthinking objects of the min agree in that they are ent ely passive, and thei existence consists only in be g perceived wl ere as a soul or spirit is an active being whose exist ence consists not in being perce ed but i perceiving ideas and thinking It is therefor

id a See sect 27

140 In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of *spirit* that

person of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce any thing at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend. He maketh lightnings with rain, He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures. Jerem. x. 13. He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night. Amos 5. 8. He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers. He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness, so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) He be not far from every one of us.

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62, it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. Verily (saith the prophet) thou art a God that hidest thyself. Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose, it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does, nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain

like myself which accompany them and concur in their production Hence the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate as is the knowledge of my ideas but depending on the intervention of ideas by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself as effects or concomitant signs

146 *But though* there be some things which *convince us human agents are concerned in* producing them yet it is evident *to* every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature that is the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us are not produced by or dependent on the wills of men There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves See sect 29 But if we attentively *consider the constant regularity order* and concatenation of *natural things the surprising* magnificence beauty and perfection of the larger and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole but above all the never-enough admired laws of pain and pleasure and the instincts or natural inclinations appetites and passions of animals *I say if we cons der all these things and* at the same time attend *to* the *meaning* and import *of* the attributes One Eternal Infinitely Wise Good and Perfect we h ll e
o

147 Hence it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or *spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves* We may even assert that the most

rous and cons derable than those ascribed to human agents There is not any one mark that denotes a man or effect produced by him which does not more *strongly evince* the *being of that Sp rit who is the Author of Nature* For it is ev dent that in affect rsons arely that ve te olly on the will *of the Creator* He alone it is who *upholding* all things by the w o d of His power maintains that inte course betw s

148 It seems to be a general pretence of the *unthinking herd that they cannot see* God Could we but see Him say they *as we see a man* we should believe that He is and believing obey His commands But alas we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow creatures Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view or see corporeal things not by *themselves* but by see n
I
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s explain my meaning —A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense as not being an idea when therefore we see the colour size figure and motions of a man we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds and these being exhibited to our view in *sundry dist nct collections* serve *to mark* out unto us the existence of f

co ection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like to ourselves accompanying and represented by it *And* after the same *manner* we see God all the difference *is* that whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind whithersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity everything we see hear feel or any wise perceive by sense being a sign or *effect of the power of God as is our perception of* those *very motions which are produced* by men

149 It is therefore plain that noth ng can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least eflexion than the existence of God or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds produc ng in them *all* that ariety of ideas *or* sensations wh ch co *tinually aff ct us on whom* we have *an* absolute and ent re dependence in sho t in whom we l e and move and ha our be ng That the disco ery of this great truth which lies so near and obv ous to the mind should be attained to by the reason *of so* very fe is a sad instance of the stupidity *and* inattention of men *who though they are sur rounded* w *th such* clear manifestat ons of the D ity a e yet so little aff cted by them that th y seem as it we e blinded with excess of l ght

150 But you w ll say Hath Nature no share in the p oduction of natural th ngs and must *they be all ascribed to the* immed ate and sole

operation of God. *I answer, if by Nature is* meant only the visible *series* of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense cannot produce any thing at all. But, if by *Nature* is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain, He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures. Jerem. 13. He turneth the shadow of death into the morning and maketh the day dark with night," Amos 5. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers. He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead though (if we may believe Saint Paul) He be not far from every one of us."

51. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in good measure plain from sect. 62, it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty *machine of nature* that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. 'Verily' (saith the prophet) 'thou art a God that hidest thyself' Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear from what we have elsewhere observed *that the operating according to general and stated laws* is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose, it were even impossible there should be any such *faculties or powers in* the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

52. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal

Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere *fiat* or act of *His will*. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

53. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well being. *But* our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain

into our thoughts and account it *evil* whereas if we enlarge our view so as to comprehend the *various ends connexions and dependencies of things* on what occasions and in what propor tions *we are affected with pain and pleasure* the nature of human freedom and the design with which we are put into the world we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular

for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found Little and un reflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence the beauty and order where of they have not capacity or will not be at the pains to comprehend but those who are mas ters of any justness and extent of thought and are withal used to reflect can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Good ness that shine throughout the Economy of Na ture But what truth is there which shineth so *strongly on the mind that by an aversion of* thought a wilful shutting of the eyes we may *not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be won* dered at if the generality of men who are ever intent on business or pleasure and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

155 We should rather wonder that men can be found so stup d as to neglect than that neg lecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure who live in Christian countries are merely

[illegible]

ough sense of the omnipresence holiness and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a *remorseless violation of His laws* We ought therefore earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points that so we may attain conviction without all scruple that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on that He is pres ent and conscious to our innermost thoughts and that we have a most absolute and imme diate dependence on Him A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear which is the strongest incentive to *Virtue* and the best guard against *Vice*

156 For after all what deserves *the first* place in our studies is the consideration of God *and our* Duty *which to promote* as it was the main drift and design of my labours so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if by what I have said I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God and having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the sal utary truths of the Gospel which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature

DAVID HUME

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

DAVID HUME 1711–1776

Hume was born at Edinburgh on April 26, 1711, the younger son in a good but not wealthy family.

His father, "who passed for a man of parts," died when Hume was still a child, and he was brought up by his mother at the family estate of Ninewells, near Berwick. About 1723 he entered the University of Edinburgh, and, according to his *Autobiography* "passed through the ordinary course of education with success." His letters show that when he returned to Ninewells about three years later he had acquired a fair knowledge of Latin, slight acquaintance with Greek, and literary tastes inclining to books of reasoning and philosophy and to poetry and the polite authors. His studious disposition led his family to believe that law was the proper profession for him, but he "found an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring."

"A too ardent application" to his studies threatened his health, and in 1734 he determined to try another change of scene and occupation. Hume entered a business house in Bristol. In a few months he found the scene totally unsuitable, and he set out for France, resolved "to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible, except the improvement of my talents in literature." He visited Paris, resided at [illegible] Rheims, and then settled at La Flèche, where Descartes had gone to school. During his three years in France he wrote the *Treatise of Human Nature*, and in 1737 returned to London to attend to its publication. It appeared in three volumes during 1739–40. Contrary to his expectations, his first effort "fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots."

Upon the failure of his work Hume returned to Ninewells and devoted himself to study, mainly in politics and economics. In 1741 he published the first volume of his *Essays, Moral and Political*, which enjoyed such success that a second edition was brought out the following year. At that time he also issued a second volume of essays. He continued to look about for a position that would secure him independence, and in 1744 tried hard to obtain the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. Failing in this attempt, he accepted the post of tutor to the Marquis of Annandale, who had been declared a lunatic by the court. Upon his dismissal a year later Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St. Clair, a distant relative, who was engaged in an expedition which was at first meant against Canada, but ended in an incursion on the coast of France. After the failure of this venture he accompanied the general on a military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin, on which he "wore the uniform of an officer and was introduced at these courts as aide-de-camp to the general." He remarks that these two years (1746–48) almost the only interruption which my studies have received during the course of my life, enabled him to return to Scotland master of near a thousand pounds."

During his absence from England in 1748 his *Philosophical Essays* was published. Afterwards entitled *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, it was a re-casting of the first part of the *Treatise* by which he hoped to gain a larger audience. But the first reception of the work was little more favorable than that accorded to the *Treatise*. In 1751 he re-cast the third book of the *Treatise* and published it as *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. That same year he was again unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain a professor's chair at Edinburgh, this time as the successor to his friend, Adam Smith, in the chair of logic. The following year, despite accusations of heresy, he received the post of librarian at the Advocates' Library, which though small in salary provided excellent facilities for literary work.

During his years as librarian Hume attained his greatest success as a man of letters. He continued his essays and in 1757 brought out the *Four Dissertations*, one of which was devoted to the *Natural History of Religion*. The *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* were also completed, but

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on the advice of friends publication was post poned until after his death Most of his efforts however were devoted to the writing of history to which he may have turned his attention be cause of the success of his political and economic essays Adam Smith had recommended that he begin with Henry VII but he chose to start with the period of James I an epoch when I thought the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take place Although Hume was dis appointed by the reception of the first volume which appeared in 1753 his *History of England* was well received and within a few years it brought the author a larger revenue than had ever before been obtained in his country from literature The work was completed by 1761 although Hume continued to revise it through out most of the remainder of his life excising from it all the villainous seditious Whig strokes and plaguy prejudices of Whiggism that he could detect

Although not only independent but opu lent and determined never more to set foot out of his native country Hume in 1763 ac cepted an invitation to go to Paris as acting secretary of the embassy For three years he enjoyed Parisian society Meeting with men and women of all ranks and stations he noted the more I resiled from their excessive civilities the more I was loaded with them He returned home convinced there is a real satisfaction in living at Paris Rousseau accompanied him persuaded by Hume to seek shelter in England The association was of short duration it ended in a violent and sensational quarrel for which Rousseau seems to have been largely to blame Hume after serving as undersecretary at the Foreign Office for a year (1767 68) retired to Edinburgh where he built himself a new house and settled down with the prospect of enjoyin long my ease and of seeing the increase of my reputation

In the spring of 1775 Hume was stricken with a troublesome though not painful illness Pre paring himself for a speedy dissolution he wrote a short autobiography in which he drew his own character I am he wrote or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments) I was I say a man of mild dispositions of command of tem per and of an open social and cheerful hu mour capable of attachment but little suscep tible of enmity and of great moderation in all my passions Even my love of literary fame my ruling passion never soured my temper not withstanding my frequent disappointments

A visit to Bath in 1776 seemed at first to re lieve his sickness but on the return journey more alarming symptoms developed his strength rapidly sank and little more than a month later he died in Edinburgh on August 25 1776

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Most of the principles a d *in this*
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t *fore he left College and which he wrote and published not long after But not finding it successful he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression are he hopes corrected Yet several writers who have honoured the Author s Philosophy with answers have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work which the Author never acknowledged and have affected to triumph in any advantages which they imagined they had obtained over it A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair dealing and a strong instance of those polemical artifices which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ Henceforth the Author desires that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles*

AN ENQUIRY

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Sect. I *Of the different Species of Philosophy*

1 Moral philosophy or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment pursuing one object, and avoiding another according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life place opposite characters in proper contrast and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us *feel* the difference between vice and virtue they excite and regulate our sentiments and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

2 The other species of philosophers considers man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being and endeavours to *form his understanding* more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation, or behaviour They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy the foundation of morals, instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity

3 It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse and by many will be recommended not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other It enters more into common life moulds the heart and affections and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary the abstruse philosophy being founded on a turn of mind which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

4 This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame has been acquired by the easy philosophy and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation from the caprice or ignor

ance of their own age but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings and one mistake is the necessary parent of another while he pushes on his consequences and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion by its unusual appearance or its contradiction to popular opinion But a philosopher who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours if by accident he falls into error goes no farther but renewing his appeal to common sense and the natural sentim n

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on perhaps will be read with pleasure when Locke shall be entirely forgotten

The mere philosopher is a character which is commonly but little acceptable in the world as being supposed to contr

up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension On the other hand the mere ignorant is still more despised nor is anything

e noble entertainments The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes retaining an equal ability and taste for books company and bus ness preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy h ch ar se from pol te letters and in business that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy In order to diffuse and cultivate so accompl shed a character nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner which draw not too much from life requ re no deep appl cation or retreat to be comp ehended and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and w se p ecepts applicable to every exigence of human life By means of such compositions virtue becomes amiable sc ence agreeable company instructive and et rement ente taining

Man is a reasonable being and as such receives from science *his proper food and nourishment* But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding that little sat sfaction can be hoped for in this particular either from the extent of security or his acquisitions Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing or preserve the proper relish for them Man is also an active being and from that disposition as well as from the various necessities of human life must submit to business and occupation But the mind requires some relaxation and cannot always support its bent to care and industry It seems then that nature has po nted out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to *draw* too much so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments *Indulge your passion for science says she but let your science be human and such as may have a direct reference to action and society* Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit and will severely punish by the pensive melancholy

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5 Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter

at a sentiment But as the matter is often carried farther even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings or what is commonly called *met physics* we shall now proceed to cons der what can reasonably be plead ed in their behalf

We may begin with observing that one cons derable advantage hich results from the accurate and abstract philosophy is its subserviency to the easy and humane which without the former can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness *in its sentiments precepts or reasonings* All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human l fe in

artist mu t be better qual f ed to succeed in this und rtaking who besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension possesses an accurate kno l dge of the nternal fabric, the *operations* of the understand ng the workings of the pass ons and the various *species of sentiment* h ch discriminate vice and virtue Ho

pa... soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisit to those, who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeabl objects but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other

Besides, we may observe in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society and bestow similar correctness on every art and calling The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtilty in the subdividing and balancing of power the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings and the general more regularity in his discipline and more caution in his plans and operations The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy has improved, and probably will still improve by similar gradations.

6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on the human race The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning and whoever can either remove

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minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise and reap a pleasure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye but to bring light from obscurity by whatever labour must needs be delightful and rejoicing.

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error Here indeed lies the justest and most plausibl objection against a considerabl part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science but arise either from the fruitless ef...

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tions, which being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open country these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many through cowardice and folly open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission as their legal sovereigns.

7 But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat. Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics besides this, I say the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences since however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope that the industry good fortune or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him al... The only method of freeing learning at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding and show from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy is, with others, overbal

anced by curiosity and despair which at some moments prevails may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy fitted for all persons and all dispositions and is alone able to subvert that *abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon* which being mixed up with popular superstition renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners and gives it the air of science and wisdom

8 Besides this advantage of rejecting after deliberate enquiry the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning there are many positive advantages which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind that though most intimately present to us yet whenever they become the object of reflexion *they seem involved in obscurity* nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries which discriminate and distinguish them The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation and must be apprehended *in an instant* by a superior penetration derived from nature and improved by habit and reflexion It becomes therefore no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind to separate them from each other *to class them under their proper* heads and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflexion and enquiry This talk of ordering and distinguishing which has no merit when performed with regard to external bodies the objects of our senses rises in its value when directed towards the operations of the mind in pro

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more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance *of it be esteemed in all pre*tenders to learning and philosophy -

Nor can there remain any suspicion that this science is uncertain and chimerical unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive *of all speculation and even action* It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties that these powers are distinct from each other that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by *reflexion* and consequently that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth *and falsehood*

which lie *not beyond the compass of human understanding* There are many obvious distinctions of this kind such as those between the will and understanding the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain though more difficult to be comprehended Some instances especially late ones of success in these enquiries may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets and *adjust the position and order of those* remote bodies while we affect to overlook those who with so much success delineate the parts of the mind in which we are so intimately concerned?

9 *But may we not hope that philosophy if* cultivated with care and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther and discover at least in some degree the secret springs and principles by which *the human mind is actuated in its operations*? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving from the phaenomena the true motions, order and magnitude of the heavenly bodies Till a philosopher at last arose who seems, from *the happiest reasoning to have also determined*

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equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution It is probable that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another which again may be resolved into *one more general and universal And how far* these researches may possibly be carried it will be difficult for us before or even after a careful

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enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention that if it lie within the compass of human understanding it may at last be happily achieved if not it may however be rejected with some confidence and security This last conclusion surely is not *desirable nor ought it to* be embraced too rashly For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed when they *considered the vast multitude and diversity of*

those actions that excit our pprobation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they ha e sometimes carried the mat ter too far by their passion for some one general principle, it must, how ever be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and ir eal principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly t be resol ed. The like has been the endea vour of critics, logicians, and even politicians. Nor ha e their attempts been wh lly unsuccessful though perhaps l nger time, great er accuracy and more ardent pplication may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. T throw p at once al pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosoph that has ever attempted to impose ts crude dictates and principles on mankind.

What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension. This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary t seems impossible, that what has hithert escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy And whatever pains these re searches may cost us, we may think oursel es suf ficien dy rewarded, not nly in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.

But as, after all, the bstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, bu rather disad antage them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmoun ed by care and art, and the voiding of all unnecessary detail, we ha e, in the followin enquiry attemp ed o throw some light pon subjects, from which uncertainty has

...ch novel And still more happy if, reasoning in this easy manner we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy which seems to ha hithert served only as shelter to superstition, and cover bsurdity and error!

Sect. II *Of the Or gin f Ideas*

E ery one will readily allow that there is considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when man feels the pain of ex cessi heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he af erwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates t by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the per ceptions of the senses but they never can entirely reach the force and acity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even wh n they operat w th greatest gour is, that they represent their object in so li ely a manner that we could *almost* say e feel or see t But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arri e at such a pitch of acity as t render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry however spl ndid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. Th most li ely thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

W may bserv a like distinction to run through all th other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger is ctuated in a ery differ ent manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation but never can mistake tha conception for the real disorders and gitations of the pass n. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is faithful mirror and copies ts objects truly but the colours which t employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original per ceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.

2. Here therefore we may di id all the per ceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and acity The less forcible and li ely are commonly denominated *Thoughts* or *Ideas* The other species want name in our language, and in most others I suppose, because t was not requisite for any but philosophical pur poses, t rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore use a little freedom, and call them *Impressions* employing that word in sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more li ely perceptions, when we hear or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less li ely perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

3. Nothing, t first iew may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and uthority but is not even restrained w thin the limits of nature and reality To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and ppearances, costs the imag

ination no more trouble than to conceive the *most natural and familiar objects* And while the body is confined to one planet along which it creeps *with pain and difficulty* the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe or even beyond the universe into the unbounded chaos where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion What never *was seen or heard of may yet be conceived* nor is any thing beyond the power of thought except what implies an absolute contradiction

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty we shall find upon a nearer examination that it is really confined within very narrow limits and that all this creative *power of the mind amounts to no more than the* faculty of compounding transposing augmenting or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience When we think of a golden mountain we only join two consistent ideas *gold* and *m untain* with which we were formerly acquainted A virtuous horse we can conceive *because from our own feeling* w e can conceive virtue and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse which is an animal familiar to us In short all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward *sentiment the mix* *mposition of* will Or to iage all our opies of our

14 To prove this the two following arguments will I hope be sufficient First when we analyze our thoughts or ideas however *compounded* or sublime we always find that they resolve them*selves into such simple ideas as were copied from* a precedent feeling or sentiment Even those ideas wh ch at first vi ost wide of rutiny to s meaning ~ b wis and good Being arises from reflecting on the operations of our *own mind and augmenting* without limit those qualities of goodness and wisdom We may prosecute *this enquiry to what length* we please whe ev e shall always find that every idea wh ch we examine is copied from a s milar impress on Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception have only one and that an easy method of refuting it by producing that idea wh ch in their op n on *is not derived* from this source It w ll then be incumbent on us if we would ma ntain our doctrine to produce the *impress on* or lively perception which corresponds to it.

15 Secondly If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is *not susceptible* of any species of sensation we always find that he is as l ttle susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours a deaf man of sounds Restore either of them that sense in wh ch he is *deficient* by *opening this new inlet* for his sensations you also on

rr u u ne organ A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of w ine And though there *are few or no instances of a like deficiency* in the mind where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or pass on that belon s to his species yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree A man of mild manners can form no idea of in et r

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n ny senses of which we can have no conception because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind to wit by the actual feeling and sensation

16 There is however one contradictory phenomenon which may prove that it is not abso*lutely impossible for ideas to arise independent* of their correspondent impressions I believe it will readily be allowed that the several *distinct* ideas of colour which enter by the eye or those of sound which are conveyed by the ear are really d fferent from each other though at the same time resembling No v if this be true of dif*ferent colours it must be no less so* of the d fferent shades of the same colour and each shade produces a d stinct idea *independent of the rest* For if this should be denied it is possible by the continual gradat on of shades to run a colour i sensibly into what is most remote from it and if you will not allow any of the m s to b d ff ent e ex per and

u a c become perfectly acquai t d w ith colours of all k nds except one part *cular shade* of blue for instance wh ch it ne er has been his fo tune to meet th Let all the d *fferent shades* of that colour except that single one be placed befo e him descendi g gradually from the d eepest to the lightest it is pla n that he w ll perce e a blank where that shade is anting and w ll be sensible that there is a greate distance in that place between the cont guous colours than in

rather Now I ask, whether it be possibl for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible, but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined: nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, *from what impression is that supposed idea derived?* And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.

It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by *innate*? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word *idea*, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by Locke and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?

But admitting these terms, *impressions* and *ideas*, in the sense above explained, and understanding by innate, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Locke was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that Philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects.

Sect III Of the Association of Ideas

18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

19. Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity* in time or place, and *Cause* or *Effect*.

That these principles serve to connect ideas

— ;

ing the others [2] and if we think of a wound we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it [3] But that this enumeration is complete and that there are *no other principles of* association except these may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man s own satisfaction All we can do in such cases is to run over several instances and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible The more instances we examine and the more care we employ the more assurance shall we acquire that the enumeration which we form from the whole is complete and entire

Sect IV *Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding*

PART I

20 All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds to wit *Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact* Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry Algebra and Arithmetic and in short every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain *That the square of the hypothe use is equal to the square of the two sides* is a proposition which expresses a relation betv een these figures *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty* expresses a relation between these numbers Propositions of this kind are disco erable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on hat is nyv l ere existent in the universe Though there

1 a

21 Matters of fact which are the second objects of human reason are not ascertained in the same manner nor is our evidence of the r truth hov ever great of a l ke nature tl the foregoing The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality *That the sun will not ri e tomorrow* is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation *that it will rise* We should in vain therefore attempt to demonstrate its falsehood Were it demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind

It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity to enquire what is the nature of that e i dence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory Th s part of philosophy it is observable has been little cultivated either by the ancients or moderns and therefore our doubts and errors in the prosecution of so important an enquiry may be the more excusable while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction They may even prove useful by exciting curiosity and destroying that implicit faith and security which is the bane of all reasoning and free er The discovery of defects in the comm not I p an incitem e as — more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public

22 All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect* By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact h ch is absent for instance that h s friend is in the country or in France he would g ve you a reason and this reason would be som o l er f t as a letter recei ed from him, or the promi machi there reasoi ture Ai d here it is constantly suppo ed that there is a con exion bet een the present fact and that which is inferred from it Were there noth ng to bind tl em together the inference ould be ent r ly precarious The hearing of an articulate o ce and rat onal d scourse in the da k assures us of the presence of some person Why? because these a e the effects of the human make and fabr c and closely conn cted ith t If anato nize all the otl er reasoi n gs of tl is natu e e sh ll f nd tl at they are founded on

Res mblan
Cont gu ty
Cau e and effect

[4] For nstance Cont ast o *Contr r ty is lso a* conn h r t m y p l p be cons *bl ne* stroy t on implies tn — —

the relation of cause and ffect and that this re lation is either near r remot direct o coll t eral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the e effect may justly be inferred from the other

3. If uld satisfy oursel es, theref re concerning the nature of that ev d nce which assures us of matters of f ct, we must enquire how arri e t the knov ledg f cause and effect.

I hall enture t affirm, as general propos ti n, wh ch dmits f n c pt on th t the knowledge of this rel tio is t, in any instance ttained by reasonings *priori* but arises entirely from experience, wh we find that any particu lar bjects are constantly co j ined w th each other Let an bject be prese ted to a man f ever so trong natural reason and bilities if that object be tirely new t him, he will n t be able, by th most accurat examin ti n of its sen ibl l es, t discover any of its causes r

causes which prod ced t, th ffects which

proper nourishment f r a man, not for a lion or a ti er?

B t the sam truth may not ppear at first sight t ha e the same ev d e w th regard to events, which ha become familiar to us from our first appearance in the w ld which bear a close analogy t th wh le course of nature and which are supposed to d pend on the mple qualit es of objects, th ut any secret tructure of parts. We are pt to imagi e that we could disco er these effects by the mere perati n of our reason, thout experie ce We fancy that ere we brought n a sudden int this world w could t first ha e inferred that n billiard ball w uld commun cate motion to another upon impulse a d th t w needed not to ha waited f th ev nt in order t pronounce w th certainty co cerni g t. Such is the infl ence of custom, that where t is tro gest, t n t only overs ur natural gn rance, but even conceals tself and seems n t t take place, merely be cause it is f und n th highest degree.

5. B t t co ince us that all th laws of na ture and all th perat ns of bod es w thout ex ception, are known nly by experie ce, the fol

kno n t us since we mus be consci us f the tter inability which we th n lay u der of fore telling what would arise from them. Prese t two smooth pieces of marbl t ma who has n tinctur of natural philosophy h ill never discover that they will dhere og ther in such mann as t require gr t f rc separ them in direct line, whil they mak so small resistance la eral pressure Such events, as bear littl analogy t th mmo course of nature, are also readily confessed to be kn wn nly by experience no does any man magine tha the explos f gunpowder o th trac tio of loadst ne could ever be disco ered by argume ts *prior* I lik manner whe an ef fect is supposed depe d upon an intricat machinery or secre tru ture of parts, w mak no difficul y in rib in all ur knowledg of t exper ce. Wh will assert that h can gi e the ultimat reason, why milk or bread is

in entio must be entirely arb trary Th mind can never possibly find the effect in th supposed cause by th most accurat scrutiny and exami n ti n. For th effect is totally different from th cause, and consequently can never be dis co ered in t. Moti n in the seco d billiard ball is quit distinct ev nt from motion in the first n is there anything in th ne to suggest the smallest hint of the ther A to o p ece f metal raised int the air and left w th ut any support, immediately falls but t consider th matter *priori* is there anything we discover n this situati n which can beg t th dea of d wn ward rather than an upward o any her motion, in th t n m tal

And as th first imagination in ention of a particular effect, in all natural perati ns, is ar bitrary where w consult n t exper nce so must we also esteem th supposed ti connex between th cause and effect, which binds them tog ther and renders t mpossibl that any ther effect could result from th per ti of that cause. When I see, for instance, billiard

That these principles serve to connect ideas will not I believe be much doubted A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original [1] the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others [2] and if we think of a wound we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it [3] But that this enumeration is complete and that there are no other principles of association except these may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man s own satisfaction All we can do in such cases is to run over several instances and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible [4] The more instances we examine and the more care we employ the more assurance shall we acquire that the enumeration which we form from the whole is complete and entire

Sect IV *Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding*

Part I

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21 *Matters of fact* which are the second objects of human reason are not ascertained in the same manner nor is our evidence of their truth however great of a like nature with the foregoing The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation *that it will rise* We should in vain therefore attempt to demonstrate its falsehood Were it demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind

It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory This part of philosophy it is observable has been little cultivated either by the ancients or moderns and therefore our doubts and errors in the prosecution of so important an enquiry may be the more excusable while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction They may even prove useful by exciting curiosity and destroying that implicit faith and security which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry The discovery of defects in the common philosophy if any such there be will not I presume be a discouragement but rather an incitement as is usual to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public

22 All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect* By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is absent for instance *that*

or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island would conclude that there had once been men in that island All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it Were there nothing to bind them together the inference would be entirely precarious *The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark* assures us of the presence of some person Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric and closely connected with it If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature we shall find that they are founded on

[1] Resemblance
[2] Contiguity
[3] Cause and effect
[4] For instance Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas but it may perhaps be considered as a mixture of *Causation* and *Resemblance* Where two objects are contrary the one destroys the other that is the cause of its annihilation and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence

tion, such may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that gi e th msel es airs of superior wisdom and ufficiency ha a hard task when they encounter persons of in quisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are ure at last bring them t some dangerous dil m ma. The best expedi nt to prev nt this confu sion, is to be modest in ur pretens ns and even to discover the difficulty oursel es bef re t is objected to us. By this means, w may make a kind of merit of our ery gnorance.

I shall co tent myself in this secti n, w th an easy task, and shall pretend nly t gi e a neg ative answer to the q estion here proposed I say then, that, even after w ha experi nce f the oper tions of cause and effect ur conclu sions from that experience are *not* f unded on reasoning, or any process f th understanding This ans er w must endea ur both t explain and to defend.

29. It must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us t great distance from all her sec rets, and has afforded us nly th kn wledg of few superficial qualities f objects whil sh conceals from us those powers and prin ples n which the influe ce of those bjects tirely d pends. Our senses inf rm us f th col ur weight, and consistence of bread but neith sense n r r ason can ever f m us f h se qu l t es which fit t for the nourishment and uppo t f h man body S ght feeling co eys an d a of the actual mo ion f bod es but as t that wonderful force power which w uld carry n movin body f ever n continued hang of place, and which bodies nev lose but by communicating th rs f this w cann t form the mos distan co cep io Bu n w th standing this igno ance f natu l powers and principles, w alw y presume, wh n w see lik sensibl qualities, tha they ha lik secre pow ers, and pec that ffects, milar t those which w ha e experie ed will f ll w from th m. If body of l ke colour and consi ce w th tha bread, which w ha f rmerly t, be p esen ed t us, we mak no scrupl f repea ing th ex periment, and f esee w th certai ty like n ur ishme and suppo t w his is process f th mind or though of which I would willingly know the founda io I is allowed all hands tha there is no known connexi n between th sens ble quali es and the secre powers and co sequently that th mind is not led to form such a conclus on concerning their constant and reg ular conjunct on by anything which t knows of th ir natu e. As to past *Experience* it can be all wed to gi e *d ect* and *certai* informat n of those precise bjects only and that precise per od f time, wh ch f ll under ts cognizance but why this experience should be extended t fu ture times, and to other objects, wh ch for aught we know may be only in appearance similar this is th ma n question on which I uld n sist. The b ead wh ch I formerly eat nourished me that is, a body of such sens ble qualit es was, at that tim ndued th uch secret po ers but does t f ll w that other bre d must also n urish me t another t me and that like sens bl qual ties must alw ys be attended w th like secret powers. The consequence seems n wise necessary A l ast, t must be acknowledged that there is here consequ nce dr wn by the mind that there is a certain st p taken a process of th ught, and an inference hich wants t be explained. These two propos tions are far from be ng th same, *I ha f und that such bj t has al y been attend d u th uch an ff ct* and *I foresee that other bjects which ar ppearanc similar u ll be attend d u th similar ff ts* I shall all w if you please, that th on propos tion may justly be inferred from th ther I know in fact that t always is inferred But if you insist that the n ference is mad by chain f reasoning I desire you t produce that reasoning Th conn xion between these proposit ns is not intu tive. There is required a med um which may enabl the mind dra uch an infer nce if indeed t be drawn by reason ng and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my compre h ns and t is incumbent n those t produ e t wh assert tha t really exists, and is th ori gi f all ur conclus ns co cerning matter of f t

3 This neg ti argument must cert nly n process f me, become altog ther con in ing if many pen tra ing nd bl philosophers shall urn th ir nquiries this way and n n be ever bl t discover any connecting propos tion or intermed te t p which upports th u d rsta d g this con lus n But as th q es io is y t new every reader may not trust so far t his own pen tration as to concl de, be cause an argum n esc pes his quiry that theref re t does no really exist. F r this ason t may be requis t t ture upon a more dif ficult task and numerating all th b anches of human knowledg ndea ur to show that none f them can aff rd such an argument.

The word, Power is here used in loose nd popular sense. The more accur explica io of would gi e additional evidence to this argume t. See Sect. 7

ball moving in a straight line towards another even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me as the result of their *contact or impulse* may I not conceive that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line or leap off from the sec*ond in any line or* direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable Why then should we give the preference to one which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings *a priori* will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference

In a word then every effect is a distinct event from its *cause* It could *not therefore* be discovered in the cause and *the first invention or* conception of it *a priori* must be entirely arbitrary And even after it is suggested the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary since there are always many other effects which *to reason must seem fully* as consistent and natural In vain therefore should we pretend to determine any single event or infer any cause or effect without the assistance of observation and experience

26 Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher who is rational and modest has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation or to show distinctly the act on of that power which produces any single effect in the universe *It is confessed* that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the pr nciples productive of natural phenomena to a greater simplicity and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes by means of reasonings from analogy experience and observation But as to the causes of these general causes we should in vain attempt their discovery nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves by any particula

pu se these are probably the ultimate causes and p inciples which we shall ever discover in *natu e* and we may esteem ourselves suffic ently happy if by accu ate enquiry and reasoning we can trace un th

our gnorance a little longer as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to d scover larger portions of it Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy and meets us at every turn in pite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it

7 Nor is geometry when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy ever able to remedy this defect or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes by all that accuracy of reasoning *for which it is so justly celebrated* Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain la s are established by nature in her operations and abstract reasonings are employed either to assist experience in the d s*covery of these laws* or to determine *their influ*ence in particular instances where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity Thus it is a law of motion discovered by *experience that the m* ... ty

... d

... ay that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight if by any contrivance or machinery we can in*crease the velocity of that fo* ... it ... ts

... ons of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine but still *the discovery of the law itself is owing merely* to experience and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it When we reason *a p iori* and consider merely any object or cause as it appears *to the mind and* ... f

... eparable and inviolable connexion between them A man must be very saga*cious who could discover by reasoni g that crys*tal is the effect of heat and ice of cold without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities

PART II

28 But we ha e not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to *the question first* proposed Each solut on still g es rise to a new question as difficult as the forego ng and leads us on to fa ther enqui ies When t is asked *What is the n* ... *f* ... *matt* ... *fact* the p oper answer *seems to be* that they are founded on the elation of cause and effect When again it is asked *What the f nd* ... *on of all* ... *nd c nclus* ... *th t r lat on* t may be repl ed n one word Experience But if *e still* carry on our sifting humour and ask *What s the f d t on f ll c clusions f m e per nce?* this implies a new ques-

which may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are *not* founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

29. It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past *Experience*, it can be allowed to give *direct* and *certain* information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, *I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect*, and *I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects*. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the original of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.

30. This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds namely demonstrative reasoning or that concerning relations of ideas and moral reasoning or that concerning matter of fact and existence That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change and that an object seemingly like those which we have experienced may be attended with different or contrary effects May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body falling from the clouds and which in all other respects resembles snow has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm that all the trees will flourish in December and January and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived implies no contradiction and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning *a priori*

If we be therefore engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience and make it the standard of our future judgement these arguments must be probable only or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned But that there is no argument of this kind must appear if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory We have said that all arguments concerning ex stence are founded on the relation of cause and effect that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past To endeavour therefore the proof of this last suppos tion by probable arguments or arguments regarding existence must be evidently going in a circle and taking that for granted which is the very po nt in question

31 *In reality* all arguments from experience are founded on the s milarity which we disco er among natural objects and by which we are induced to expect effects s milar to those which we have found to follow from such objects And though none but a *fool or madman* will ever pretend to dispute the authority of exper ence or to reject that great guide of human life it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the prin c l of h iman nature which g ves this mighty

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which appear *simil r* we expect s mai —
This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions Now it seems evident that if this conclusion were formed by reason it would be as perfect at first and upon one instance as after ever so long a course of experience But the case is far otherwise Nothing so like as eggs yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity expects the same taste and relish in all of them It is only after a *long course of uniform experiments in* any kind that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event Now where is that process of reasoning which from one instance draws a conclus on so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that s ngle one? *This question I propose as much for the* sake of information as with an intention of raising difficulties I cannot find I cannot imagine any such reasoning But I keep my mind still open to instruction if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me

32 *Should it be said that from a number of* uniform experiments we i fer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers this I must confess seems the same difficulty couched in different terms The question still recurs on what process of argument this i fere ce is founded? Where is the medium the *interposing ideas* which *join propositions so very* wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour consistence and other sensible qualities of bread appear not of themselves to have any connex ion with the secret powers of nourishment and support For otherwise we could *infer these secret po ers from the first appearance of these* sensible qualities ithout the aid of e perience contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers and contrary to plain matter of fact Here then is our natural state of ignorance w th regard to the po ers and influence of all objects *How is this remedied by experience? It only sho s* us a number of uniform effects resulting from certain objects and teaches us that those particular objects at that particular time were endo ed w th such powers and forces When a new object endowed with s *milar sensible qualities is produced* we *expect similar* powers and forces and look for a l ke effect From a body of l ke colour and consistence th bread we expect like nourishment a d support But this surely s a step or pro
expla ned
p st instances —
such ecr t pou e s And when he says *Simila ensi ble qu lit es u ll always be co j ned u th s m l r se cret p uers* he is not gu lty of a tautology nor are these propos tions *in any respect the same* You

say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative. Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.

33. I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present subject there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.

It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which *result from them*. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities

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that argument; nor have you any pretence to re

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obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

Sect V *Sceptical Solution of these Doubts*

PART I

34. The passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side which already *draws* too much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage, and endeavour to confine our *pleasures* altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of Epictetus, and other *Stoics*, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we study with attention the vanity of human life,

and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours we are, perhaps all the while flattering our natural indolence which hating the bustle of the world and drudgery of business seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence There is however one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement of danger in hasty determinations of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice Nothing therefore can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind its rash arrogance its lofty pretensions and its superstitious credulity Every passion is mortified by it except the love of truth and that passion never is nor can be carried to too high a degree It is surprising therefore that this philosophy which in almost every instance must be harmless and innocent should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy But perhaps the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment By flattering no irregular passion it gains few partizans By opposing so many vices and follies it raises to itself abundance of enemies who stigmatize it as libertine profane and irreligious

Nor need we fear that this philosophy while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life should ever undermine the reasonings of common life and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action as well as speculation Nature will always maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever Though we should conclude for instance as in the foregoing section that in all reasonings from experience there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding there is no danger that these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will ever be affected by such a discovery If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same What that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry

35 Suppose a person though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection to be brought on a sudden into this world he would indeed immediately observe a continual succession of objects and one event following another but he would not be able to discover any thing farther He would not at first by any reasoning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses nor is it reasonable to conclude merely because one event in one instance precedes another that therefore the one is the cause the other the effect Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other And in a word such a person without more experience could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses

Suppose again that he has acquired more experience and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other Yet he has not by all his experience acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other nor is it by any process of reasoning he is engaged to draw this inference But still he finds himself determined to draw it And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion

36 This principle is Custom or Habit For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding we always say that this propensity is the effect of *Custom* By employing that word we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity We only point out a principle of human nature which is universally acknowledged and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther or pretend to give the cause of this cause but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle which we can assign of all our conclusions from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction that we can go so far without repining at the narrowness

or ten thousand, because they will carry us no far ... ther ... certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects—heat and flame, for instance ... its nature—we are determined by custom to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand instances, an inference which ... are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation. The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen one body move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.

Nothing is more useful than for writers, even on moral, political, or physical subjects, to distinguish between reason and experience, and to suppose that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual faculties, which, by considering *a priori* the nature of things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their operation, establish particular principles of science and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation, by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are thence able to infer what will, for the future, result from them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of civil government, and a legal constitution, may be defended, either from reason ... trusted with unlimited authority, or from experience and history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition, in every age and country has been found to make of so imprudent a confidence.

The same distinction between reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician, or merchant is trusted and followed, and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. Though it be allowed, that reason may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances; it is still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience, which alone is able to give stability and certainty to the maxims, derived from study and reflection.

But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received, both in the active speculative scenes of life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, at least, superficial.

If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above mentioned, are supposed to be ... inference and conclusion.

There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have formed, from observation, many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must be confessed, that when a man comes to put these in practice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their proper use and application. In every situation or incident, there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, though on them the justness of his conclusions, and consequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that character to any one, we mean it only in comparison, and suppose him possessed of experience in a smaller and more imperfect degree.

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.

5. But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant ...

and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours we are perhaps all the while flattering our natural in dolence which hating the bustle of the world and drudgery of business seeks a pretence of rea son to give itself a full and un [illegible]

[illegible] any natural affection or propen sity and that is the Academic or Sceptical phi losophy The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement of danger in hasty deter minations of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding and of re nouncing all speculat ons which lie not within the limits of common life and practice Nothing therefore can be more contrary than such a phi losophy to the supine indol [illegible]

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Nor need we fear that this philosophy while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life should ever undermine the reasonings of common l fe and carry ts doubts so far as to de stroy all action as well as speculat on Nature will always maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract reason ng whatsoever Though we should conclude for instance as in the foregoing section that in all eason ngs from exper ence there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument o proc ess of the understanding there is no danger that these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will ever be affected by such a discov ery If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority and that p inc ple will preserve ts influence as long as human nature remains the same What that principle is may well be worth the pains of en quiry

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[illegible] e would not be able to disco er any thing farther He would not at first by any rea soning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event in one instance pre cedes another that therefore the one is the cause the other the effect The r conjunction may be arbitrary and casual There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other And in a word such a person with out more experience could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses

Suppose again that he has acqu red more ex perience and has lived so long in the world as to have observed fam liar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together what is the con sequence of this exper ence? He immediately in fers the existence of one object from the appear ance of the other Yet he has not by all his ex perience acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other nor is it by any process of reason ng he is engaged to draw this nfe ence But still he finds himself determined to d aw it And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation he would neverthe less continue n the same course of thinking There is some other princ ple which determines him to for n such a conclusion

36 This princ ple is Custom or Habit For wherever the repetition of a ny particular act or operat on produces a propensity to rene the same act or operation without be g impelled by any reasoning o process of the understand ing we al ays say that this propens ty is the ef fect of *Cust m* By employ g that ord we pre tend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity We only po nt out a princ ple of human nature hich is un versally ackno l edged and w l ch is well kno n by its effects. Pe haps e can push our enqu r es no farther or pretend to g e the cause of th s cause but must rest contented with it as the ult mate pri ciple which we can ass g of all our conclus ons from experience. *It is suffic ent satisfaction* that we can go so far without r p ning at the narrowness

he hole nature of belief. For as there ter of fact which we believe so firmly cannot co cei th c ntrary there e no difference between the conception d to and that which is rejected, were t not e sentiment which distinguishes the one e er If I see a billiard-ball moving to another on a smooth table I can easily n it stop pon contact. This concep ion s no contradiction but sti l feels ery dif fr from that conception by which I repre- o myse the impulse and the communica of motion from one ball to another

Were e to ttempt definition of this senti- nt, should, perhaps, find t ery difficult, ot an impossible task in the same manner as we should endea our to define the feelin of d or passion of anger to creature who never ad any experience of these sentiments. Belief is e true and proper name of this feeling and no ne ever loss to know the meanin of that term, because every man is every moment con- scious of the sentimen represented by t. It may not, however be improper to ttempt a descr p- tion of this sentiment, in hopes w may by that means, arrive some analogies, which may af ford more perfect explication of t. I say then, that belief is nothing but more vivid, li ely for cible, firm, steady concep ion of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able ttain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphil osophical, is intended n to express tha act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is tak en for such, more present to us than fi tions, causes them to weigh more n the thou ht, and gives them superior influence the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, is needless to dispu about the terms. Th command over all ts d

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den that belief consists no in the peculiar tture or order of ideas, bu in the manner of their conc ption, and in their f ling the mind I confess, tha is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. W may make use of words which express something near t. Bu is true and proper name, as w bserved before is b lief which is term that every ne sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy w can g no farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagination. It gi es them more w ght and influence makes th m appear of gre ter importance enforces them in the mind and renders them the governing principle of our actions. I hear t present, for instance a person s ce, w th whom I am equ ted and the sound comes as from the next room. This impres- s n of my s n s mm d t ly con ys my thoug t to the person, tog ther w th all the sur rounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existing, at present, w th the same qualities and rela ions, of which I formerly knew them pos- sessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are ery different to the feeli g and ha e much gre ter influence of every kind, ther to g e pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow

Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow that the sentiment of be ief is n thi g but a co p ion more int nse and steady than wha ttends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this manner of conception arises from a cus mary conjunction of the ob- ject w th somethi g present t the memory or senses I believe that it will not be difficult, pon these suppositions, t find other oper tions of the mind analogous to t, and to trace up these phe nomena to principles still more general.

4 W ha e already observed that nature has established connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner e idea occurs to our thoughts than t introd ces its correlati and carries our ttention towards t, by a gentle and insensible mov ment. These principles of connexion or as- sociatio w ha e reduced to three, namely Re- sembl nc C nt g ty and Causation which are the nly bonds that unit our thou ts together and beget that regular train of reflection or dis- course, which, in a greater or less degree, takes pl amo g all mankind W ther arises a question, on which the solution of the present dif ficulty will depend. Does t happen, in all these relations, that, when e of the objects is pre sented o the senses or memory the mind is not nly carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a st dier and tro er concep ion of than wha otherwise t would ha e been able to ttain. This seems to be the case w h that be lief which arises from the relation of cause and effect. And if the case be the same w th the other relations or principles of associations, this may be established as general law which takes place in all the perations of the mind.

W may therefore, observe, as the first experi-

tant places and most remote ages yet some fact *must* always be present to the senses or memory from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions A man who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings would conclude that the country had in ancient times been cultivated by civilized inhabitants but did nothing of this nature occur to him he could never form such an inference We learn the events of former ages from history but then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruc tion is contained and thence carry up our in ferences from one testimony to another till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and spectators of these distant events In a word if we proceed not upon some fact present to the memory or senses our reasonings would be merely hypothetical and

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ticular matter of fact which you relate you must tell me some reason and this reason will be some other fact connected with it But as you cannot proceed after this manner *in infinitum* you must at last terminate in some fact which is present to your memory or senses or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation

38 What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one though it must be con fessed pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses and a custom ary conjunction between that and some other object Or in other words having found in many instances that any two kinds of objects—flame and heat snow and cold—have always b ned together if flame or snow be pre

upon a nearer approach This belief is the neces sary result of placing the mind n such circum stances It is an operation of the soul when we are so situated as unavoidable as to feel the pas sion of love hen we receive benef ts or hatred when we meet with injuries All these operat ons are a spec es of natural instincts which no rea soning or process of the thought and understand ing is able either to produce or to prevent

At this point it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches In most questions we can never make a single step further and in all questions we must terminate here at last after our most restless and curious enquiries But still our curiosity will be pardon able perhaps commendable if it carry us on to still farther researches and make us examine more accurately the nature of this *belief* and of the *customary conjunction* whence it is derived By this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction at least to such as love the abstract sciences and can be entertained with speculations which ho ever accurate may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty As to readers of a different taste the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them and the following enquiries may well be understood though it be neglected

PART II

39 Nothing is more free than the imagination of man and though it cannot exceed that origi nal stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses it has unlimited power of mixing compounding separating and dividing these ideas in all the varieties of fiction and vision It can feign a train of events with all the appear ance of reality ascribe to them a particular time

belongs to any histor ca

with the greatest certainty Wherein therefore consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea which is annexed to such a conception as com mands our assent and which is wanting to every known fiction For as the m nd has authority over all its ideas it could oluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases contrary to what we find by daily experience We can in our conception join the head of a man to the body of a horse but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed

It follo s therefore that the difference be tween *fiction* and *belief* l es in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter not to the former and which depends not on the will nor can be commanded at pleasure It must be ex cited by nature like all other sentiments and must arise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any part cular juncture Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses it i mmed ately by the force of custom carries the imag nation to concei e that object which is usually conjoined to it and this concep t on is attend d with a feel ng or sent ment dif ferent from the loose reveries of the fancy In this

reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound

and existence and is satisfactory to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of *final causes*, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration.

45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and *vice versa*, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs,

forward the thought in a corresponding course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

Section VI Of Probability[1]

46. Though there be no such thing as *Chance* in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which we discover the superiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side different, the probability would be

[1] Mr Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into *demonstrations*, *proofs*, and *probabilities*. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.

ment to our present purpose that upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the *resemblance* and that every passion which that idea occasions whether of joy or sorrow acquires new force and vigour In producing this effect there concur both a relation and a present impression Where the picture bears him no resemblance at least was not intended for him it never so much as conveys our thought to him And where it is absent as well as the person though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend when it is set before us but when it is removed rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image which is equally distant and obscure

The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature The devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries with which they are upbraided that they feel the good effect of those external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour which otherwise would decay if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects We shadow out the objects of our faith say they in sensible types and images and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related and which they resemble I shall only infer from these practices and this reasoning that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle

42 We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind in considering the effects of *contiguity* as well as of *resemblance* It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea and that upon our approach to any object though it does not discover itself to our senses it operates upon the mind with an influence which imitates an immediate impression The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous but it is only the actual presence of an object that transports it with a superior vivacity When I am a few miles from home whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant though even at that distance the reflecting on anything in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter case both the objects of the mind are ideas notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas for want of some immediate impression [1]

43 No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and holy men for the same reason that they seek after types or images in order to enliven their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives which they desire to imitate Now it is evident that one of the best reliques which a devotee could procure would be the handywork of a saint and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light it is because they were once at his disposal and were moved and affected by him in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those by which we learn the reality of his existence

Suppose that the son of a friend who had been long dead or absent were presented to us it is evident that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us This is another phaenomenon which seems to prove the principle above mentioned

44 We may observe that in these phaenomena the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed without which the relation could have no effect The influence of the picture sup-

[1] *N t ne nobis i q t datum d m rrore quodam t cum l a d mus i qu bus mem d gnos m ol bam intuens Scip nem C tonem Laelium no trum ve primis um g tar T nta vis admor t onis t loc t non sine aus x his memoriae deducta t discipl na*

Cicero *De finibus* Book V

poses, that *believe* our friend t ha e once ex sted. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home unless we *b lie* that t really ex ist. N w I ass rt, th t this bel f whe e t reaches beyond th memory or senses, is of a similar na ure, and arises from similar causes, w th the transition of thou ht and acity of conception here explained. When I throw piece of dry wood into fire, my mind is immediat ly carried to conceive, that t ments, not extinguishes the flame. This transit of tho ght from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin al o ether from cust m and experience. And as t first begins from an object present to the senses, t renders th idea or co ception of flame more tro g and li ly than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediat ly The thou ht moves instantly towards t, and co ev t all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present t the senses. Wh n sword is lev elled t my breast, does not th id a of wound and pain strik me more tro ly than when a glass of ine is presented t me, even thou h by accident this idea should occur af er the appearance of the latter b ect. But what is there in this whole matter to cause such stro g co ception, except nly prese t bject and cust mary transition to the idea of another bject, which we ha e bee accustomed t co j in w th th former? This is the whole peration of the mind, in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence and it is sa isfactio find some analogies, by hich may be explained. The transition from present object does in all cases g strength and solidity t the related d a.

Here, then, is kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the su cession of our ideas and thou h th powers and forces, by hich the former is governed, be whol ly unknown to us et our thoughts and conceptions ha e still, w find, gone in the same train with the other works of nature Cust m is that princip by whi h this rrespo d has been effected so necessary the subsist ce of our species, and the regulatio of ur co d t, in every circumstance and oc urrence f h man

limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses and should never ha e been ble to adjust me ns t ds, mpl y ur n ural powers, th t th p od g of good or voiding of evil. Those, who delight in th discovery and co t mplation of *final* us ha e

here ample subject t employ their wonder d admir tion.

45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of th forego theory that, as this peration of the mind by which we infer lik effects from like causes, and *vice versa* is so essential t the subsistence of all human creatures, t is not probable that t could be trusted t the fallacious ded c tions of our reason, which is sl w n ts oper tions appears not, in any degree during the first years of nf ncy and t best is, in every age and period of h man life extremely li ble to error and mistake. It is more conformabl t the ordinary wisd m of nature t secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tend ncy which may be infall ble in its oper tions, may discover tself t the first ppearance of life and thought, and may be independ nt of all the laboured ded tions of the understand ing As nature has ta ht us the use of our l mbs, w thout gi ing us the knowledge of the muscles and erves, by which they are ctuated so has sh mpla ted us a instin t, wh h carries forward the thou ht correspond t course to that which she has established mo external objects though w are gnorant of those powers and forces, o which this regular course and succession of bjects totally depends.

Sect VI *Of Pr b bil ty*

6. Th ough there be no such thing as *Chance* in th world our gnorance of the real cause of any ev t has th same inf ence on the under tand g, and beg ts lik pecies of belief r pinion.

There is certainly probability which arises from superi rity of chances any d and ccord g as this superiority encreases, d surpasses th pposit chances, th probabil ty rece ves proportionabl encrease and begets till a higher degree of belief or asse t to that sid in which we discover th superiority If a d w re marked w th figure or n mber of pots f ur sides, and w th nother f gure or number of pots o th tw remaining sides, t would be more probabl that th former would turn p than th la ter tho h, if had thou sand des marked in th same manner and nly d different, th probability w uld be

Mr Lock di ides all arguments in demonstr ti e nd probable I this ew we must say that t is nl probabl all men mus di or that the sun will rise o-morrow But nform our language more to commo use we gh t di ide argume ts in *demonstrations proofs* d *probabilities* By proofs mea ing such arguments from experience as lea e no room for doubt or position.

much higher and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure This process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious but to those who consider it more narrowly it may perhaps afford matter for curious speculation

It seems evident that when the mind looks forward to discover the event which may result from the throw of such a die it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable and this is the very nature of chance to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other the mind is carried more frequently to that event and meets it oftener in revolving the various possibilities or chances on which the ultimate result depends This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately by an inexplicable contrivance of nature the sentiment of belief and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist which is supported by a smaller number of views and recurs less frequently to the mind If we allow that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination this operation renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible and in a word begets that reliance or security which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion

47 The case is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance There are some causes which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation Fire has always burned and water suffocated every human creature The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law which has hitherto admitted of no exception But there are other causes which have been found more irregular and uncertain nor has rhubarb always proved a purge or opium a soporific to every one who ture but suppose that some secret causes in the particular structure of parts have prevented the operation Our reasonings however and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future in all our inferences where the past has been entirely regular and uniform we expect the event with the greatest assurance and leave all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future and enter into our consideration when we determine the probability of the event Though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual and believe that this effect will exist we must not overlook the other effects but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent It is more probable in almost every country of Europe that there will be frost sometime in January than that the weather will continue open throughout that Here then it seems evident that when we transfer the past to the future in order to determine the effect which will result from any cause we transfer all the different events in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past and conceive one to have existed a hundred times for instance another ten times and another once As a great number of views do here concur in one event they fortify and confirm it to the imagination beget that sentiment which we call *belief* and give its object the preference above the contrary event which is not supported by an equal number of experiments and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy and he will be sensible of the difficulty For my part I shall think it sufficient if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects

Sect VII *Of the Idea of necessary Connexion*

Part I

48 The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this that the ideas of the former being sensible are always clear and determinate the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas without ambiguity or variation An oval

is never mistaken for circl or n hype bola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and scalenum are distinguished by boundar es more e ct tl n vice and irt right and wro If y term be defined in geometry th mi d read ly of itself substitutes, o all occasions, the d fi tio f r the term defined Or ev when no defi tio is employed, the object itself may be prese ted to the senses, and by that means be te d ly and clearly pprehended B t the f ner se t ments of the mind, th perations f th d rst ding the various git ti ns f th pass ns, th gh reall themsel e distin t, asily escape us, hen urv yed by flect r is t n o r power t recall th riginal bject, as ofte as we ha e occasio to co t mpl te t. Amb guity by this means, grad ally introd ced into o rea sonings Similar bjects ar re d ly tak t be the same And the co clusi becomes at last ery ide of the premises.

One may saf ly how er affirm, that, if w consider these sci es in proper light the ad antages and disad ant ges arly compen sat each her and red ce both of th m t state of eq ality If the mind, w th gre ter fa cility retains th deas of geometry clear and d terminate, t must carry m ch l ger a d more intricat chai of reaso ing and compare ideas much ider of ch ther in rd t re ch the abstruser truths of that science. And if mo al ideas are pt, ith t extreme care to fall int obscur ty and confusion, the infere ces are al) m ch shorter in these disq is tions and th intermediat t ps, which lead t th co clus on, much fewer than in the scie ces which treat f q tity and mb l l ty th e scarcely propositio in E clid so simple as t to consist of more parts, than are t be f d in any moral reasoni g which runs t t ch mer and conceit. Where we tr ce th p inciples f the human mind thro gh few teps w may be ery ll satisfied w th ur progress ns d ering how soo t re thro bar to all ur enq iries concerning causes, d red es us to an ackno ledgme t f ur gn ra Th cl f obstacle, theref t ur improv m t in th moral or metaphysical sci ces is th bscurity of the deas, and mb guity f th t rms. The principal difficulty th math m tics is th length of inferences d compass f th ght re quis t the forming f any co cl A d perhaps, ur p ogress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by th want f prope peri ments and pha m hich are often dis covered by chance and cann t alw) be f d he requisite ev by th most diligent and amo g these sc ences, the difficult es, wl ch b struct the progress of the f rmer require pc rio care nd capacity to be surmou ted

49 There are no d as, which occur n net phy cs, more obscure d u certain than thos [power for energy or nec ary c ne of which t is every moment ecessary for us t tr t n all our disquisit ns. We shall tl erefore d r n this section, to fix, if poss bl the pre cise meaning f these t rms, and thereby remov some part of that obscurity whi h is so m ch complai ed of in this species f philosophy

It seems proposition wh h will not dm t of m ch disp te that all our deas are nothi g b t cop es of ur mpress ns, or in other words that it is impossible f us t think of nything which we ha e t a t ced ntly f lt ther by our t rn l or ter al senses. I ha e nd ured to plain and pro thus propositi d h e e pressed my hopes, that, by proper ppl cat of t, men may reach greater clear ness and precisio philosophical reaso gs, than what th y ha hith to been bl t attain. Compl deas may pe haps, be well known by defi t o wh ch is thi g but an meration of tl ose parts or s mpl d as, that compose th m. B t when we ha e pushed p defin t ns to th most mple deas, nd find till some amb gu ty a d bscurity what resource are we then pos sessed of? By what ent n can w throw light upo these deas, d re d r th m altog ther precise and d term nat to our tellectual ew? Prod ce the mpressions riginal sentime ts, from which th deas are cop ed These impres ns are all strong d sensible. They dmit t f mb gu ty Th y are t only pl ced a full l ght th msel es, b t may throw l ght o th ir correspo d t deas, wh h l obscurity And by this means we may perhaps, ttain a new microscope or pec es of pt cs, by which, in the m ral sc ces th most min t d most s m pl deas may be so nlarged as to fall readily u der ur pprehens and be equ lly known w th th grossest a d most sensibl d as, that ca be th bj t f ur quiry

5 T be fully cq ted theref re w th the dea f power r cessary co exi let us ex amı e ts impress and rd to fi d the mpress o w th greater certainty l t us search f t all th sources, from which t may pos bl be deri ed.

Sectio II.

When we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes we are never able in a single instance to discover any power or necessary connexion any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other We only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second This is the whole that appears to the *outwa d* senses The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from this succession of objects Consequently there is not in any single particular instance of cause and effect anything which can suggest the idea of pow er or necessary connexion

From the first appearance of an object we never can conjecture what effect will result from it But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind we could foresee the effect even without experience and might at first pronounce with certainty concerning it by mere dint of thought and

... g ve us ground to imagine that it could produce any thing or be followed by any other object which we could denominate its effect Solidity extens on motion these qualities are all complete in themselves and never point out any other event which may result from them The scenes of the universe are continually shifting and one object follow s another in an uninterrupted succession but the power of force which actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body We know that in fact heat s a constant attendant of flame but what is the connexion bet een them we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine It is imposs ble therefore that the idea of pow er can be derived from the ontemplation ... ir operation ... any pow e ... dea [1]

51 Since therefore external objects as they appear to the senses gi e us no id a of pow er or necessary connexion by the r operat on in particular instances let us see whether this idea be

I ... ay be said that we are every moment conscious of internal power while we feel that by the simple command of our will we can move the organs of our b d ...

... nis influence of the will we know by consciousness Hence we acquire the idea of pow er or energy and are certain that we ourselves and all other intelligent be ngs are possessed of power This idea then is an idea of reflection since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind and on the command which is exercised by will both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul

52 We shall proceed to examine this pretension and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body This influence we may observe is a fact which like all other natural events can be known only be experience and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause which connects it with the effect and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will Of this we are e ery moment conscious. But the means by which this is effected the energy by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation of this we are so far from being immediately conscious that it must for ever escape our most d ligent enquiry

For *fi st* is there any pr nciple in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body by which a supposed spiritual substance acqu es such an influence over a material one that the most ref ned thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empow ered by a sec et w ish to remove mountains or control the planets in the r orbit this extensive authority w ould not be mo e extrao d nary nor more beyond our comp ehension But if by consciousness we perceived any po er o ene gy in the will we must kno v this po er we must know its connexion th the effect we must know the sec et uni n of soul and body and the nature of both these substances by which the one is able to operate n so many instances upon the other

S c ndly We are not able to mo e all the organs of the body with a like authority though we cannot assign any reason bes des experience for so emarkable a diffe ence bet een o e and the other Why has the w ll an influence over the tongue and fingers not over the heart or

[1] ... ny nis r as ning t th dea of power B t no easoning can e g us a n w or g nal s mpl de as this philo oph h ms lf confesses This ther fo can n er be th o gin of that dea

ences of experience, why the thority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed such particular limits. Being in that case acquainted w th the power o f e by it opera es, we should also know why its ence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no further

A man, suddenly struck w th palsy in the leg or arm, or ho had newly lost those members, frequently end vours, t first t move them, and employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of pow t command ch limbs, as man in perfect health is conscious of power to actua any member which remains in its natural state and condition. B t consciousness never deceives. Consequently neither in the one case nor in th other are w ever conscious of any power We l arn the infl ence of our will from experie ce alo And xpe nce only teaches us, how on even constantly foll ws an other hout instructing us the secret con nexion, uch binds them together and renders them inseparable.

Thir y W learn from anatomy that the immediate object of power in vol tary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, bu cer tain muscles, and erves, and animal pirits, and, perhaps, something till more minut and more unknown, throu h which th motion is uc cessively propagated, ere t reach the member self hose motion is th immediat object of volition. Can there be more certain proof that the power by hich this whol peratio is per formed, so far from being dire tly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last degree my terious and uni elli gible. Here the mind wills certain ev nt Immediately another eve t, unknown to urselves, and totally different from the ne intended is produced. This event produces another equally unknown. Till last, throu h long succession the desired even is prod ced B if the original pow er f lt, t must be kn w W t known, ts effect also must be known since all power rela e to its effect. And vic er if th effect be no known, the power cann be kn wn nor felt. How indeed can w be consc ous of power to move our limbs, wh n we ha uch power bu nl that t mo certain animal spirits, hich, thou h th y produce las th motion of our limbs, y t perat in such manner as is holly beyo d ur comprehension.

W may therefore, conclud from th whole, I hope without any temerity though w th assurance that our idea of power is not copied from a y sent ment or consc ousness of power w thin oursel es, wh n we g e rise to a mal motio or apply our limbs to their prope use and office. That their motion follows the command of th will is a matter of common exper nce like other natural events But the power or energy by which this is e fected like that n otl er natural events, is unknown and concei ble.

53 Shall w then assert, th t we are conscious of a power or nergy in our own minds, wh n, by an ct or command of our will we aise p a new d a, fix the mi d to the co t mplation of t, turn t on all sides, d at last dismiss t for some other d a, when we think that we ha e surveyed t w th ufficient accur cy I bel eve the same arguments will prove that even this command of the will g es us no real idea of force or nergy

Fir t It must be allowed, that, when we know a pov er w know that ery circumstance in the cause by which t is enabled t prod ce the ef fect For these are supposed to be synonymous. W must, theref re know both the cause nd effect and th relation between them. But do we pretend t be acquainted w th the nature of the h man soul and the nature of an id a, o that t may seem, at first ht, beyo d the re ch of any bein less than infinit At least t must be owned th t h pow is ot felt, n known no even concei ble by the mind. We nly feel the ev nt, namely th existence of an idea, consequent t command of the will But

men *Second.y* This se timen f an nde our overcome resistance has no known connexi n w th an event Wha f llow t, we know by experience b could not know *à priori*. It must, how ever be confessed tha the animal *nisus* which we experience tho gh it can afford no ccurat pre ise ide f power n ers ery much in that vulgar inaccura dea, which is formed of it.

the manner in which this operation is performed the power by which it is produced is entirely beyond our comprehension

Secondly The command of the mind over itself is limited as well as its command over the body and these limits are not known by reason or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect but only by experience and observation as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries Will any one pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries or show why the power is deficient in one case not in another

Thirdly This self command is very different at different times A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening Fasting than after a full meal Can we give any reason for these variations except experience? Where then is the power of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here either in a spiritual or material substance or both some secret mechanism or structure of parts upon which the effect depends and which being entirely unknown to us renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible?

Volition is surely an act of the mind with which we are sufficiently acquainted Reflect upon it Consider it on all sides Do you find anything in it like this creative power by which it raises from nothing a new idea and with a kind of *Fiat* imitates the omnipotence of its Maker if I may be allowed so to speak who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition

54 The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature— such as the descent of heavy bodies the growth of plants the generation of animals or the nourishment of bodies by food But suppose that in all these cases they perceive the very force or energy of the cause by which it is connected with its effect and is for ever infallible in its operation They acquire by long habit such a turn of mind that upon the appearance of the cause they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena such as earthquakes pestilence and prodigies of any kind that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men in such difficulties to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle[1] as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them and which they think cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature But philosophers who carry their scrutiny a little farther immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar events the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual and that we only learn by experience the frequent *Conjunction* of objects without being ever able to comprehend anything like *Connexion* between them

55 Here then many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse on all occasions to the same principle which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural They acknowledge

appears in nature They pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated *causes* are in reality nothing but *occasions* and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature but a volition of the Supreme Being who wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other Instead of saying that one billiard ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature it is the Deity himself they say who by a particular volition moves the second ball being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe But philosophers advancing still in their inquiries discover that as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body or of body on mind nor are we able either from our senses or consciousness to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other The same ignorance therefore reduces them to the same conclusion They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body and that they

[1] Θεὸ ἀ ὁ μηχανῆ (d us x machina)

-e not the organs of sense, which, being gi tated by external bjects, prod ce sensations i the mind but that t is a part cular vol u of our omnipotent Maker which exc tes such a sen sation, in consequence of such a motio in the organ. In like manner it is t any en rgy in the ill that prod ces local mot ur members. It God himself, who is pleased t seco d our ill, in tself impote t, and to command that motion hich we erroneously ttribut to our n po er and efficacy Nor do philosoph rs stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind tself in ts internal operations. Our mental 'sion co ception of ideas is nothing b t a rev latio made to us by our Maker Wh n we ol tarily turn our thoughts to any b ect, and aise up ts image in the fancy t is not th will which creates that idea. It is the uni ersal Creat who discovers t to the mind, and renders it present to us.

56 Thus, cco ding t these phil sophers, ery thing is full of God. N t co t t w th tl

ence the Deity till more sensible and imm d a e. They consider not that, by this theory the diminish, instead of magnify the grandeur of those ttributes, which they affect so m ch to celebrate. It argues surely more power in th

will, not an absol te assurance, that t has carried us quit beyo d th reach of our facul ties, hen it leads t conclusions so extraordi

nary and so remote from common l fe d x peri nce. We are got i to f iry land l g ere we have re ched the last t ps of our theory and ther we ha no reaso to trust our common methods f argument r to th nk that ur usual analog es and probab lit es have any a thority Our line is too short to fathom s ch immense abysses. And howev r w nay flatter oursel es that we are gu ded, in every st p which w take, by a kind of erisimil t de and pe ence, w may be ass red that tl is fancied per nc has no uth rity when we thus apply t to s bjects that l e e tirely out of the sphere of experience. But n this we shall ha occasion to to ch after ards

Sec ndly I cann t percei e any f rce in the ar gume ts n h ch this theory is fou ded. We are gn ant, it is tru of th man in which bod es oper te e ch other Their force n ergy is urely incomprehensible But are we t equally gno ant of the manner o force by which a mind even th supreme mind per tes either on tself or on body Whe ce, I beseech yo do we cquire y de of t. We ha e no se t ment or conscious ess f this power n ur sel es. We ha e no dea of th S preme Be g but what e lear from reflection n ur own

S preme Being as m ch as in the grossest mat ter W surely compreh nd as l ttl th opera tions of e as of the her I t more difficult to con ei that moti n may arise from mpulse tha that t may arise from l tion. All w know is ur profound gno ance in both cases.

Sec io xii.
I need not xamine t length th *vis inertiae* which is so much talked of in th ew philosophy and which is ascr bed t ma t W find by expe ri nce that body t rest in mo io co tin es for ever in ts prese t ta ill p from t by some

some f his f llo ers h e d oured to establish tha theory po his thor y O th co trary tha great philosoph h d rec urse to an therial ti e fl id explain his uni ersal tr io though h was so ca ious and modest as t ll w tha was mere hypothesis, n be ins ed witho more perime ts. I must confess that ther is something in th fa f pinions h l ex tr dinary Descartes insinua ed that doctrine f

Part II

58 But to hasten to a conclusion of this argu ment which is already drawn out to too great a length We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could

a ything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates or any connexion between it and its supposed ef fect The same difficulty occurs in contemplat ing the operations of mind on body—where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition or the energy by which the mind produces this effect The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensibl

events seem entirely loose and separate One event follows another but we never can observe any tie between them They seem *co joined* but never *c nnect d* And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment the necessary conclusion *e ms* to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life

59 But there still remains one method of avo ding this conclusion and one source which we have not yet examined When any natural object or event s presented it is imposs ble for us by any sagacity or penetration to discover or even conjecture without experience what event w ll result from it or to carry our fo es ght beyond that object which is immed ately p es ent to the memory and senses Even after one instance or expe iment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another we are not entitled to form a general rule or fore tell what will happen in like cases it be ng justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single ex periment however accurate or certain But when one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any mat ter of fact or existence We then call the one ob ject *Cause* the other *Effect* We suppose that there is some connexion between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest cer tainty and strongest necessity

It appears then that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant can that idea ese instances positions But nstances dif ferent from every single instance which is sup posed to be exactly similar except only that after a repetition of similar instances the mind is carried by habit upon the

of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or neces sary connexion Nothing fa ther is in the case Contemplate the subject on all s des you will never find any other origin of that idea This is the sole difference between one instance from which we can never rece ve the idea of connex ion and a number of similar nstances by which it is suggested The first t me a man saw the communication of motion by impulse as by the shock of two bill ard balls he could not pro nounce that the one ev nt was *co nected* but only that it was *j d* w th the other After he has observed several nstances of this nature he then pronounces them to be *c n ct d* What alteration has happened to gi e rise to th s new dea of *con n xio* Nothing but that he now *f el* these events to be *c n ect d* in h s maginat on and can read ily foretell the x stence of one from the appear ance of the othe When we say therefore that one object is conn cted th a other e mean only that they have acqu ed a connex on in our thought and gi e rise to this inf rence by which they become p oofs of each other s existence A con lus on which is somewhat extraordinary but hich seems founded on uff cient evidence Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gen

the un rsal nds le ff cacy of th D ty th t nsisting on t M l b nche and oth r Ca t ians mad t th foundat on f ll th h It

mod n metaphys ians?

eral diffidence of th understanding or sceptical suspicion co cernin every co clus o which is new and extr ordinary N conclusions can be more greeab to scept cism than such as make discoveries co cerning th weakness a d narro v limits of human reaso and cap city

60. And wh t stro ger nstance can be produced of the surpris g gno ance and w akness of th dersta d g th th p t For surel if there be any rel t amo g obj cts hich t imports t us t know perf tly t is that of cause and effect. O this are f u ded all ur reasonings co cerning matt f f ct ex ist nce. By means of t al ne we ttain any assurance concernin bjects which are removed from th present testimo y of ur memory and senses. The nly immediat util ty f all sc nces, is t each us, ho to co trol and regulat fu ture events by their causes Our thoughts and es ar th f ry m m t m

these t o l ghts but beyond these, we ha e no id a of t.

61 To recap tulat therefore the reaso ings of this sectio E ry de is cop ed from some preced g mp ess n or sent ment and where w ca n t f d ny mpressi we may be certain th t there is no d a. In all singl instances of the per tio of bod es or minds, there is noth ing that prod ces any impression nor conse quently can ggest a y ide f power or necessary co xi n. B t hen ma y u form i stances ppear d th same object is alw ys f llowed by th same eve t we then beg n to entertai the tio of cause and conn xi n. We then *f l* a new se t me t or mpressio to w t a cust mary connexi in th thought or imag na ion between ne bject and is usual ttend ant and this se t ment is th original of that d a which we seek for For as this dea arises from numbe of milar nsta ces, and n t from t must arise from that cir

may d fine cause t be *an bj ct follo d by an other and her all th bjects similar t the fir t ar follo d by bjects sim lar t th se ond* O in ther words her *f th fir t bj t had ot b en, the se nd ne er had xi ted* Th ppearance f cause al co y the mind by cust mary tran tion, t th id of th ffect Of this also w ha e experi ce W ma theref re t bly t this experi ce f rm another d finitio of cause, and call *an bj ct follo d by ther and whose ppearance al y on ey the tho ght t that other* B t though both these d fin ns be drawn from

cumstance in th cause which gi es connex io w th ts ffect W ha d of this con nexi nor ev y dis nc t what t is desire kn w wh w d ur co ceptio of W say f nstance, th the br io of this tring is the cause f this particu lar so d B wha d w mean by that affir ma io W enth mean *hat th ib ation is fol lo d b this und and that ll sim lar vib ations ha been follo d by sim lar so nds O that th vib is follo d by this und and that po the ppear nc f one he mind ant pat the sense and forms immediately an ide f th other* W may co sider the rel tio of cause and effect in either f

had any dea of power as ... whethe not they Measure in itself? Th d p the force of body in mot be as its veloc y or th squar f its elocity this disp te, I say need no be dec ded by comparing its ffects in equal or unequal imes but by direct mensur io and

tion f thing t anoth These words, as commonly used ha e ery loose me ings n ed th m d th ir d as are ery unc rtain d confused. N animal ca p t xternal bodies in motio w tho th se ime t f *nisus* or de our d ery animal has se timent or feel ing from th troke or blow f an ex ernal bject tha is in mo ion. These sensations, which are merely animal and from which we can *à priori* dr w inference we are pt transfer to inanima

ca d motion, w conside nly th constant pe

ternal sensation, which th y occasion.

Part II

58 But to hasten to a conclusion of this argu ment wh ch is already drawn out to too great a length We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived It appears that in single instances of the opera tion of bodies v e never can by our utmost scru tiny discover anything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the or

ons of mind on body—where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition or the energy by which the mind produces this effect The authority of the will over its own facult es and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible So h e

events seem entirely loose and separate One event follows another but we never can observe any tie between them They seem *c njo ned* but never *connected* And as we can have no dea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense o inward sentime it the necessary conclusion *s ems* to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosoph cal reasonings or common life

59 But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion and one source which we have not yet examined When any natural object or event s presented it is imposs ble for us by any sagacity or penetration to discover or even conjecture without expe ience what event will result from it or to carry our fores ght beyond that object wh ch is immediately pres ent to the memo y and senses Even afte one instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon anothe we are not ent tled to fo m a general rule or fore tell what will happen in l ke cases it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single ex periment however accurate or certain But when one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any mat ter of fact or existence We then call the one ob ject *C use* the other *Effect* We suppose that there is some connexion between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest cer tainty and strongest necessity

It appears then that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances surveyed in all possible lights and positions But there is nothing in a number of instances, dif ferent from every single nstance which is sup posed to be exactly similar except only that after a repetition of similar instances the mind is carr ed by habit upon the appearance of one event to expect its usual attendant and to be lieve that it will exist This connex on therefore which we *fe l* in the mind this customary transi t on of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the sent ment or impress on from which we form the dea of power or neces sary connexion Nothing farther is in the case Contemplate the subject on all sides you will never find any other or gin of that idea This is the sole difference between one instance from which we can never receive the idea of connex ion and a number of similar instances by which it is suggested The first time a man saw the communication of mot on by impulse as by the shock of two bill ard balls he could not pro nounce that the one event was *c nnect d* but only that it was *c njoi ed* with the other After he has observed se e al instances of this nature he then pronounces them to be *c nn ct d* What alteration has happened to g e rise to this new dea of *c n ne ion?* Nothing but th t he no *fe ls* these events to be *c nn t d* in his imagination and can read ily foretell the existence of one from the appear ance of the othe When we say therefore that one object s connected with another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought and gi e rise to this inf rence by which they become proofs of each other's existe ce A conclus on which is somewhat extraord nary but which seems founded on sufficient e idence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gen

th un v rsal and l effi a of h D

t or t but s ppose all l ng th t m it has a real tho gh subo d nat and d ed powe By wh t means has t be ome so prevale t amo g our modern metaphy cians?

no tw events bore any resemblance to e ch oth er but every bject was entirely new w tho t any similitude to hatever had been see before, we should never in that case ha e ttained th least idea of ecessity or f co exi mong tese b ects. We might say upo s el a supposition, that ne bject or event has f llowed an other not that o was produced by th ther The relatio of cause and effect must be utterly known t mankind. Infere ce and reaso ing

knowledge of any real existence could poss bly ha access to the mind. Our dea, th ref re of necessity and causatio arises tirely from the uniformity bserv bl in the perations of na

ter Beyond the constant junct of imilar objects, and the conseq t ferenc from e to the ther w ha no tion of any ecessity o connexion.

If t ppear therefore, that all mankind ha e ever allowed, w tho t any d bt hesit t on that these two circumstances tak pl ce in the luntary ctı ns of me and in th perat ns of mind t must f llow that all manki d ha e ever agreed in the doctrin f ecessity and that they ha hithert disp ted, merely f n t understanding each ther

65. As to th first circumstance the constant and regular co j io f similar events, w may possibly satisfy oursel es by th f llowing considerations. It is uni ersally acknowl dg d that there is gre t unif rmity amo g th tions of men, in all nati ns and ges and that human nature remains till th same in its pri ciples and perations Th same moti es alw ys prod ce th same tions The same ev t f l low from the same causes. Amb tion, arice self love, anity friendship g rosity publi pirit these passions, mixed in ari us degrees,

kind. Would you know the se timents, inclina tions, and course f lif f th G eeks and R m

observations which you ha mad w th regard t the latter Mankind are so much the same in all times and pl ces, that history informs us of n thing new or tr ge i this particular Its chief use is nly to disco er the consta t and u ersal pri ciples of human nature by sh w g men in all ari ties of circumstances and sit uat ons, and furnishing us w th materials from wh ch we may f rm ur observ tions and be come acquai ted w th the regular pri gs of human ct o and beha iour These reco ds of wars, intrigues, f ctions, and revol tions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician moral philosopher fixes the princi ples of his sci nce in the same manner the physician o natural philosopher becomes c quainted w th the nature f plants, mi erals, and ther external obj ts, by th exper ments hich he f rms co cern g th m. Nor are the earth, water and ther el me ts, xam ed by Aristotle a d H ppocrates, more lik to those which t present l u der our observ tion than th men described by P lybius nd Tacitus are t those wh now govern the world

Should a tra eller returning from a far cou try bri g us an account of men, wholly d ffer t from any w th whom we were ever cquainted men, who were entirely d ested of arice, amb tion o rev ge who knew no pl asure but friendsh p g nerosity and publ spirit w should immediat ly from these circumstances, d tect the falsehood, and prove him liar w th the same certainty as if h had t ffed his narra tio w th st ries f ce taurs and dr g ns, mir cles and prodig es. And if w would explod any f rgery in history w cannot make use of more co mein argument than t prove that th a tions ascribed t any perso are directly co trary t the course f nature, and that n l man moti es, in such circumstances, could eve ind ce him t such co d ct. The er city f Quintus Curtius is as much to be uspected wh h describes th s pernatural cour ge of Al xander by which he was hurried singly t ttack mult tudes, as when he describes his supern tural f rce and activ ty by which h was bl t resist th m. So readily and un er sally d w cknowledg unif rmity in human motives and t ns as well as in the per tions f body

Hen lik wise th be fit of that experience cquired by l g lif and ari ty of business and company in rder t instru t us in the prin ciples of human nature, and regulat ur future co d t, as well as pecul tion. By means of this guide, w mou t p t the knowledg of men s inclinations and moti es, from their ctions, ex

fer from every individual instance But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ In every other particular they are alike The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any instance that may at present occur to us except only that we could not at first *infer* one event from the other which we are enabled to do at present after so long a course of uniform experience I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning I am afraid that should I multiply words about

to reach and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them

Sect VIII *Of Liberty and Necessity*

Part I

62 It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy that the meaning of all the terms at least should have been agreed upon among the disputants and our enquiries in the course of two thousand years been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning and make these definitions not the mere sound of words the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion From this circumstance alone

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the terms employed in the controversy For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together it were impossible if men affix the same ideas to their terms that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject especially when they communicate their views and each party turn themselves on all sides in search of arguments which may give them the victory

over their antagonists It is true if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity such as those concerning the origin of worlds or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests

could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions which keep the antagonists still at a distance and hinder them from grappling with each other

63 This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity and to so remarkable a degree that if I be not much mistaken we shall find that all mankind both learned and ignorant have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry that it is no wonder if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question from which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment But the state of the argument here proposed may perhaps serve to renew his attention as it has more novelty promises at least some decision of the controversy and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning

I hope therefore to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty according to any reasonable sense which can be put on these terms and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words We shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity

64 It is universally allowed that matter in all

effect in such particular circumstances cou u possibly have resulted from it The degree and direction of every motion is by the laws of na ... with such exactness that a li ing

than what is a ...
therefore form a just and precise idea of *necessity* we must consider whence that idea arises when

erate not with their wonted powers when irreg... events follow from any particular cause ... physician are not surprised at the matter nor are ever tempted to deny in general, the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine That many secret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension. That to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations And that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity in its internal operations and government.

68. The philosopher if he be consistent must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer But he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage But he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an action as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for either by the person himself or by others we know in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree inconstant and irregular This is, in a manner the constant character of human nature though it be applicable, in a more particular manner to some persons who

steady principles though ... able by human sagacity and enquiry

69. Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life Now as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined it may seem

superfluous to prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we draw *inferences* concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist, though briefly on this latter topic.

The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer who labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour He also expects that, when he carries his goods to market and offers them at a reasonable price he shall find purchasers, and shall be able by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect from the proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external objects and firmly believe that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same that they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations disappointed. In short, this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reason therefore to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in

...ular For not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would become of *history* had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind. How could *politics* be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of *morals* if par

pressions and even gestures and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations The general observations treasured up by a course of experience give us the clue of human nature and teach us to unravel all its intricacies Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us Public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a cause And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority that perfect disinterestedness so often pretended to is never expected in multitudes and parties seldom in their leaders and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station But were there no uniformity in human actions and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind and no experience however accurately digested by reflection would ever serve to any purpose Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain un form ity in the operation of the sun rain and earth towards the production of vegetables and experience teaches the old practit oner the rules by which this operation is governed and d d

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cumstances will always act precisely in the same manner without making any allowance for the diversity of characters prejudices and opinions Such a uniformity in every particular is found in no part of nature On the contrary from observing the variety of conduct in different men we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity

Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education which mould the human mind from its infancy and fo m it into a fixed and established character Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes and which she preserves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life from infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observat ons concern ng the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures Even the characters which are peculiar to each individual have a uniformity in their influence otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them

67 I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men But if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature and the operations of external objects All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity An artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents

The vulgar who take things according to their first appearance att ibute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence though they meet with no impediment in their operat on But philosophers observing that almost in every pa t of nature there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles which are hid by reason of their minuteness or remoteness find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause but from the secret operation of contrary causes This possib l ty is converted into certainty by farther observation when they remark that upon an exact scrutiny a contrar ety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes and proceeds from their mutual oppos tion A peasant can give no better

influence on the wheels but fails of its usual effect perhaps by reason of a grain of d st which puts a stop to the whole mo ement From the observation of seve al parallel instances philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes

Thus for instance in the human body when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation when med cines op-

era e not w th their wonted powers when irreg ular events follow from any particular cause the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the ma er nor are ever t mpted t d y in general, the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know that a human body is mighty complicated machine That many secret powers lurk in t, which are al o ether beyond our comprehension. That t us t must often appear ery uncertain in its perations And that therefore the irregular events, which out ardly discover themselves, can be no proof that the la s of nature are not bserved w th the greatest regularity in its internal per tions and government.

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either by the person himself or by thers w know in general, tha the characters of me are, to certain degree inconstant and irregular. Th manner the constant character

operate in uniform manner

these seem irregularities in th same manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and ther ariations of the weather are supposed t be governed by steady principles though no easily disco er able by human sag city and nquiry

69. Thus ppears, not nl that th conjunction between moti es and oluntary ctions is as regular and uniform as tha between the cause and ffect in any part of na ure but also tha this regular co junction has been uni er sall cknowledged amo g mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common l. Now as t is from past experience tha w draw all inferences concerning the future and as we conclud that bjects will alw y be conjoined together which we find to ha e alw ys been conjoined t may seem superfluous t prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we draw *inferences* co cerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater ari ty of lights w shall also insist, tho gh briefly on this latter t p c.

The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human ction is entirely complete in tself or is performed w thout some reference to the ctions of others, which are requisite t make t answer fully the intention of th agent. Th poorest artificer who labours alone xpects t least the protection of the magistrate to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour He also expects that, when he carries his goods to market and offers them t reasonabl price he shall find purchasers, and shall be bl by the money he c quires, to ngage thers to supply him w th those commodities which are requisit for his subsistence. I proportio as men extend their d alings, and render their intercourse w th others more compl cated, they always comprehend, in their sch mes of life a greater ari ty of oluntary ctions, which they expect from the proper moti es, t co-operat w th their own. In all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience, in th same manner as in their reasonings concerning ex ernal bjects and firmly believe that men, as well as all the elements, are to co tinue, in their operations, the same that they ha e ever found them. A manuf turer reckons pon the labour of his servants for th executio of any work as much as upon the tools which h employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations disappointed. In short, this experime tal inference and reasoning co cerning the actions of thers enters so much into h man life that no man whil wak is ever moment w thout mploying t Ha e we not reason therefore to affirm that all mankind ha alw ys agreed in the doctrine of necessity ccording to the fore going definition and explication of t.

70 Nor ha e philosophers ever entertained different opinio from the people in this partic ular For not to mentio that almost every action of their lif supposes that pinion, there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which t is not essential. What would become of *history* had we not a dependence the era city of the historian according to the experience which w ha e had of mankind. H w could *politics* be science, if laws and forms of govern ment had not uniform infl ence upon society? Where would be the foundation of *morals*, if par

ticular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticism* upon any poet or polite author if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible therefore to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this *inference* from motive to voluntary actions from characters to conduct

And indeed when we consider how aptly *natural* and *moral* evidence link together and *form only one chain of argument* we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same n t ire and derived from the same principles

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ed and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other The same prisoner when conducted to the scaffold foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the axe or wheel His mind runs along a certa n train of ideas The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape the action of the executioner the separation of the head and body bleeding convulsive motions and death Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another Nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical* necessity The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind hether the united objects be motives volition and actions or figure and motion We may change the name of things but their nature and their operatior

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ship to come into my house where I am surrounded with my servants I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my s l er standish and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself which is new and solidly built and founded —*But he may have been seized with a sudd n and unknown frenzy*—So may a sudden earthquake arise and shake and tumble my house about my ears I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed And this event I think I can foretell with the same assurance as that if he throw himself out at the window and meet with no obstruct on he will not remain a moment

n nd d n the air No suspicion of an un

at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular s tuations

71 I have frequently considered what could possibly be the reason why all mankind though they have ever without hesitation ackno l

d d h doctrine of necessity in their whole

profess the contrary opinion The matter

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us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are *constantly co joined* together and that the mind is carried by a *customa y transitio* from the appearance of one to the belief of the other But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject men still entertain a strong propensity to belie e that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature and percei e something like a necessary connexion bet een the cause and the effect When again they turn their reflect ons towards the operat ons of their o n *minds and feel no such connexion* of the moti e and the action they are thence apt to suppose that there is a difference bet een the effects which result from material force and those which arise from thought and intelligence But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the *c nstant c njunction* of objects and the consequent *i fer ence* of the mind from one to another and f nd ng that these two circumstances are universally

allowed to ha e place in oluntary ct ons we may be more easily led to own th same necessity common to all causes. And tho gh this reasoning may co tradict th yst ms of many philosophers, in ascribing ecess ty to th d ter minations of the will, we shall find upon reflec tion, that they dissent from it in rds only n t in their real sentiment. Necessity according to the sense in hich t is here tak n has never yet been rejected or can ever I think, be rejected by any philosopher It may nly perh ps, be pretended that th mi d can perce e, in the operations of matter some farther connexion between the cause and effect nd connexi n that has not place in ol tary a tions of intell gent beings. Now wh th t be so or ot, can only ppear po examinatio and t is incumbent o these philosophers t make good their assertion, by definin or describing that eces ity and pointing t out to us in th perati ns of material causes.

2 It ould seem, indeed that men begin t the rong end of this questi co cerning liberty and necessity when they enter upon t by examining the faculties of th soul, the infl ence of the understanding and the perations of the ill. Let them first discuss more simpl question, namely the perations f body and of brute unintelligent matter and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and ecessity except that of a constant co ju ction f objects, and subseq ent inference of the mind from ne to another If these circumstances form, in reality the whol of that necessity which we concei in matter and if these circumstances be also uni ersally cknowledged t take place in the perations of th mind, the disp t is t an end t least, must be ow d t be th nc forth merely erbal. B t as lo g as w will ash ly suppose, that we ha some farther idea of

dent that these ha e a regular conjunct on w th moti es and circumstances and characters, a d as we always draw inferences from ne t t e other we must be obl ged to acknowledge in words that necessity which w ha e already a owed in every deliberation of our li es, and in every t p of our co d ct and beha our

73 B t to proceed in this reconciling project w th regard to th question of liberty and necessity the most contentious q estion of metaphysics, th most cont ntious sc ence it will not require ma y words t pro e that all mankind ha e ever greed in the doctrine of l berty as w ll as in that of necessity and that the whol dispute in this respe t also, has been hitherto merely erbal. F what is meant by liberty wh n pl ed to ol tary acti ns We cannot urely

nel ty that all w know of them is th constant co junction and inference hen me t rd

that t present, t can W cons der not that the fantastical desire f shewing liberty is here he moti e of ur actions. And seems certain, that however we may imagine we feel liberty w thin urselves, pecta or can commonly infer ur ti ns from ur mo es nd character and even where h cannot, h concl des in general, th h

ticular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticism* upon any poet or polite author if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible therefore to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this *inference* from motive to voluntary actions from characters to conduct.

And indeed when we consider how aptly *natural* and *moral* evidence link together and form only one chain of argument we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature and derived from the same principles

as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other The same prisoner when conducted to the scaffold foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the axe or wheel His mind runs along a certain train of ideas The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape the action of the executioner the separation of the head and body bleeding convulsive motions and death Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary act ons but the mind feels no differ

ent to the memory or senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physic l* necessity The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind whether the united objects be motives volition and actions or figure and motion We may change the name of things but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change

Were a man whom I know to be honest and opulent and with whom I live in intimate friendship to come into my house where I am surrounded with my servants I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself which is new and solidly built and founded —*But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy* —So may a sudden earthquake arise and shake and tumble my house about my ears I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed And this event I think I can foretell with the same assurance as that if he throw himself out at the window and meet with no obstruction he will not remain a moment suspended in the air No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations

71 I have frequently considered what could possibly be the reason why all mankind though they have ever without hesitation acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words and have rather shown a propensity in all ages to profess the contrary opinion The matter I think may be accounted for after the following manner If we examine the operations of body and the production of effects from their causes we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are *constantly conjo ned* together and that the mind is carried by a *cust mary t nsition* from the appearance of one to the belief of the other But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature and perceive somethi g like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect When again they turn their reflections towards the operat ons of their own minds and *feel* no such connexion of the motive and the action they are thence apt to suppose that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force and those which arise from thought and intelligence But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causat on of any kind than merely the *constant co junction* of objects and the consequent *i fer ence* of the mind from one to another and f nd ng that these two circumstances are universally

allowed to have place in voluntary actions, we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes.

22. It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity, which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation in the operations of external objects; at the same time, that we can

find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind; there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to convince ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour.[1]

23. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely

[1] ... tion. Now this is *the very essence of necessity*, according *to the foregoing doctrine*.

mean that actions have so little connexion with motives inclinations and ... it ... o ... by which we can conclude the existence of the other For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact By liberty then we can only mean *a power of act n o not acting ac co din to the determinations of the will* that is if we choose to remain at rest we may if we choose to move we also may Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains Here then is no subject of dispute

74 Whatever definition we may give of liberty we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances *f st* that it be consistent with plain matter of fact *secondly* that it be consistent with itself If we observe these circumstances and render our definition intelligible I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it

It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence and that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has any where a being in nature But it is pretended that some causes are necessary om

o ... t ie definition a *nec s y connexion* with its effect and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definit on and I shall readily give up the whole controversy But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received this must be absolutely impracticable Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding which is the only connexion that we can have any comprehension of Whoever attempts a definition of cause exclusive of these circumstances will be obliged e ther to employ unintell gible terms o such as are synonymous to the term which he endea ours to define And if the definition above mentioned be admitted

whi h p oduc *oduc g* is sy if a cause be is is liable to ant by th se at a caus is w sh ld ms to this is ind ed all we kn w of th matter And this constancy f rms th very ess nce of necess ty nor h e we any other idea of it.

liberty when opposed to necessity not to constraint is the same thing with chance which is universally allowed to have no existence

PART II

75 There is no method of reasoning more common and yet none more blameable than in philosophical disputes to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality When any opinion leads to absurdities it is certainly false but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequence Such topics therefore ought entirely to be forborne as serving nothing to the discovery of truth but only to make the person of an antagonist od ous This I observe in general without pretending to draw any advantage from it I frankly submit to an examination of this kind and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines both of necessity and of liberty as above explained are not only consistent with morality but are absolutely essential to its support

Necessity may be defined two ways conformably to the two definitions of *cau e* of which it makes an essential part It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another Now necessity in both these senses, (which indeed are at bottom the same) has universally though tacitly in the schools in the pulpit and in common life been allowed to belong to the will of man and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions and that those inferences are founded on the exper enced union of like actions with like moti es inclinations and circumstances The only particular in which any one can differ is that either perhaps he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property of human actions But as long as the meaning is unde stood I hope the word can do o harm Or that he ill maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operat ons of matter But th s it must be ackno l dged can be of no consequence to morality o rel gio what ever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphys cs We may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necess ty or connexion in the actions of body But surely e as cribe noth ng to the act ons of the mind b t hat everyone does and must read ly all w of We change no circumstance in the received orthodox system ith regard to the will but only in that with regard to material objects and

causes. N than th refore ca be mo no- cent, at least, than this doctrine.

76 All la s be g fo ded n rewards a d punishme ts, t is pposed as a f ndamental principle, that these mou es ha e a regular and uniform infl ence the mi d and both produce the good and p event the e il a tions. We ma gn t this infl ence what ame w please but as it is usually co j ined w th th t n, it must be esteemed a *cause* and be looked pon as an instance of that ecessity which w would here establish.

The only proper bject f h tred o geance perso or cr atur d wed w th tho ght and consciousness and wh a y crimi al in jurious ctions xcite th t pass t is nly by their relatio t the perso co exi w th him. Actions are, by their ery nature t mporary and perishing and where they proceed t from some cause in th char ter and disposition of the perso ho perf rmed th m, th y can ther redound t his ho our if good infamy if evil. Th ti ns th msel may be blame b they may be co trary t ll th rul of morality and religi B t th perso is t swerable for them and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is dur bl and constant, and lea nothing of that nature behind th m, t is impossible he can, po th ir ccount, become the object of pun hme t o geance. A cord g to the principle, theref e, which denies n cessity nd conseq tly causes, man is as pure and untainted, af er ha ing committ d th most horrid crime, as t the first mome t f his birth, nor his character anywise co cern d in his tions, since they are t deri ed from t, and the k dness f th e c be used as proof of the depr ty f the ther

Men are not blamed f ch t ns as th y perform gnorantly and casu lly whatever may be th nseq ce Why b t b cau th principles of these acti ns ar nly m mentary a d t min t th m l M e l s blamed f such tions as th y perf rm hastily and unpremedita ly than f ch as p oceed from deliberation. F what reaso b t because hasty temper tho gh constant cause prin ciple in the mind, per tes nly by intervals, and infects not th whol chara ter Again repe t ance pes ff every crim if ttended w th re formatio of lif and man ers H w is this t be ccounted for b t by asserting th t tions n der a perso criminal merely as th y ar proofs of criminal principles th mind and when, by an alteratio of these principles, th y cease to be just proofs, th y lik wise ase t be criminal. B t except upon the doctri e f n cessity they never were just proofs, a d consequently never w re crimi al.

77 It will be eq ally asy to prove, d from the same arg m ts that *l berty* cordi g to that d f t abo e m t ed t wh h all me gr e is also esse tial to mo al ty d th t no h man act ns, where t is w ting are s- cept ble of any moral q al t es, or can be the ob- j ts e th of pprobat r dislike. Fo as c tions are objects of our mo al sentime t, so far o ly as they are nd cat ons f the int rnal char ct p ssions, d aff t o s t is mposs bl that they can gi e rise th r to pr ise o blame whe they p oceed t f m these p ples b t ar de d alt g th from exte l o- le ce

78 I pretend ot t ha e bviated or moved all obj t ns to this theory w th regard t n cess ty d l berty I can f resee ther bj ctions, d ri ed from top cs wh h ha e not h e been treated of It may be sa d f inst ce, that if ol tary ct ns be s bjected to the sam la s of ecess ty w th th operat ns f matter th re is co tin d cha n of ecessary causes pre rd ed and pre-d termi d reaching from the g al cause f ll t ev ry gl l t o f ry human e t No c t g ncy y wh re th un erse o d ff rence l he

m t esult H man ct o th f e th can ha o mo al turp t d at all, as proceed g from so good cause if th y h y tur p t de th y mu t I C t the sam guilt whil h is ck wledged t be th ir ultimat cause and th F as man wh f d m w bl f ll th nse q ces wh th th t ai h mpl y d be l g h t so wherev co t ed has f c essary causes is fixed that Be g either fin t infinit wh prod es th first is lik wise th th f all th rest, d must both bear the bl me d q ir th p ise h h b l g t th m Our clear and al bl d as f mo al ty t blish this rule, po q est bl easons wh n w xamin th conseq ces f y h m ti n nd th as m t t ll ha e greater f ce h ppl d to th l t ns and int ntions f Be g infin t ly wise and power f l Ign an mpot m y be pl ded f so limi ed re ure as an b t th se impe

fections have no place in our Creator He fore saw he ordained he intended all those actions of men which we so rashly pronounce criminal And we must therefore conclude either that they are not criminal or that the Deity not man is accountable for them But as either of these posi tions is absurd and impious it follows that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true as being liable to all the same objections An absurd consequence if necessary proves the original doctrine to be absurd in the same manner as criminal actions render crimin al the original cause if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable

This objection consists of two parts which we shall examine separately *First* that if human actions can be traced up by a necessary chain to the Deity they can never be criminal on ac count of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived and who can intend nothing but what is altogether go id abl O ist as

y and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral tur pitude in all his creatures

79 The answer to th ob so- ple

a ure conclude that the WHOLE considered as one system is in every period of its existence ordered with perfect benevolence and that the utmost possible happiness will in the end result to all created beings without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery Every physical ill say they makes an essential part of this benevolent system and could not pos sibly be removed even by the Deity himself con sidered as a wise agent without giving entrance to greater ill o excluding greater good wh ch will result from it From this theory some phi losophers and the ancient *Stoic* among the rest derived a topic of consolation u ider all afflic tions while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they labou ed were in reality goods to the u iverse and that to an enlarged view which could comprehend the whole system of nature every event became an object of joy and exultation But though this topic be pecious and subl me it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual You would surely more irritate than appease a man ly ng the racking him the rec roduced the and led them through the proper canals to the s nev s and nerves where they now excite such acute tor ments These enlarged views may for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man who is placed in ease and security but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antag onists The affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object and by an econ omy more suitable to the infirmity of human minds regard alone the beings around us and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system.

80 The case is the same with *moral* as with *physical* ill It cannot reasonably be supposed that those remote considerations which are found of so little efficacy

ie appearance of certain char acters dispositions and actions it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human soc ety as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturb- ance Whence it may reasonably be presumed that the moral sentiments

a different opinion or conjec ture that everything is right w th regard to the WHOLE and that the qualities which disturb so- c ety are in the main as beneficial and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those wh ch mo e directly promote its happ ness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the senti ments which arise f om the natural and imme diate vie of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum do

and ems n oth

ict ons a e found d in the n tur l se ti nents of the human mind And these senti ments are not to be controul d or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever

8 The second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer nor is it possible to explain distinctly how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy if she be thence sensible of her temerity when she pries into these sublime mysteries and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty to her true and proper province the examination of common life where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty and contradiction!

Sect. IX. *Of the Reason of Animals*

82. ALL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive nor does any man ever entertain a doubt where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts as in all other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a similarity the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal, are by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature as a frog, or fish, it forms a strong presumption that the same principle has place in all. These analogical observations may be carried farther even to this science, of which we are now treating and any theory by which we explain the operations of the understanding or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority if we find, that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the hypothesis, by which we have in the foregoing discourse endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings and it is hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.

83. *First* It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire water earth, stones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded on any thing but his observation and experience

This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him. Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain tone and accent.

In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

84 *Secondly* It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning by which he concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be reg

ular in its operations For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them Animals therefore are not guided in these inferences by reasoning Neither are child are the actions rs them are in a i the same with the vulgar and are governed by the same maxims Nature must have provided some other principle of more ready and more general use and application nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that of inferring effects from causes be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation Were this doubtful with regard to men it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one we have a strong presumption from all the rules of analogy that it ought to be universally admitted without any exception or reserve It is custom alone which engages animals from every object that strikes their senses to infer its usual attendant and carries their imagination from the appearance of the one to conceive the other in that particular manner which we denominate *belief* No other explication can be given of this operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation [1]

85 But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of nature which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions and in which they improve, little or nothing by the longest practice and experience These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding But our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider th elf nd is g t a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties Though the instinct be different yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire as much as that which teaches a bird with such exactness the art of incubation and the whole economy and order of its nursery

Sect X *Of Miracles*

Part I

86 There is in Dr Tillotson s writings an argument against the *r al pr sence* h ch is as concise

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[1] S nc all eas nings once ni g f cts or causes is de ed me ely f om cust m it may be asked how t h pp ns that men so much s pass an mals in eas ning and on man so much su pass anothe ? Has not the same custom the same influ enc on all

We hall he e end a o b efly to explain the g eat diff en e in h m idings After etw n m n ded d ha e be n e o

I gara en one xp im nt as th fo nd t n f ason g and xp ct a milar e ent w th some deg e of t inty h th ex p r m nt has been made u t ly d f e f om ll fo gn c cumst n s It is th fo e ns d d as a matt r of great impo tan to obser e th on sequ nc s of things and as on man m y v y mu h urpass n th r n attent on nd m mo y and obse t n this ll m k a y g t d f fer n e n th ir reasoning

2 Whe e there is a ompl cat n f causes to p o duce any effect one mind may be m ch larg r

than anoth and bette ble t comp he d the whole y tem of obj cts nd to inf justly th ir cons quen s

y n e operat n and n th ing is m ual f om hast a narrowness of mind wl h s not on ll d s tl an to omm t mistak s in this part ul

7 Wh n w eason f om nalog the ma who has th great pe n o th greater p ompt t d of uggesting n l g will be the b tt as n

8 Byass s f om p j d ed at n p ss o party & hang m re upo o m nd th n notl r

9 After w ha acquir d confid in l m n testim y books nd o sat n nlarge mu h m th ph fon m n pe d th ght th th se f th

It w ld be asy to disc m y oth ir mst es th t make a diff nc n th u der standing of men

and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.

87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our rea [illegible]

dence.

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full *proof* of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability*. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.

88. To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to

a certain degree had not men commonly an in clination to truth and a principle of probity were they not sensible to shame when detected in a falsehood Were not these I say discovered by *experience* to be qualities inherent in human *nature* we *should never repose the least* confi dence in human testimony A man delirious or noted for falsehood and villany has no manner of authority with us

And as the evidence derived from witnesses *and human testimony is founded on past* expe rience so it varies with the experience and is re garded either as a *proof* or a *probability* according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration *in all judgements of this kind* and the ultimate standard by which we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them is always de rived from exper ence and observation Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side it is attended with an unavoidable contrari ety in our judgements and with the same oppo sition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence We frequently hes itate concerning the reports of others We bal

still with a diminution of assurance in propor tion to the *force of its antagonist*

89 This contrariety of evidence in the present case may be derived from several different causes from the opposition of contrary testi mony from the character or number of the wit *nesses from the manner of their delivering their* testimony or from the union of all these c rcum stances We entertain a *suspicion concerning* any matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other when they are but few or of a doubt ful character when they have an interest in what they affirm when they deli er the r testimony with hesitation or on the contrary with too vio lent asseverations There are many other partic *ulars of the same kind* which *may* diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human testimony

Suppose for instance that the fact which the testimony endeavours to establish partakes of the extraord nary and the marvellous in that ca e the evidence resulting from the testimony admits of a diminution greater or less in propor tion as the fact is more or less unusual The rea son why we place any credit in witnesses and his torians, is not derived from any *connexion* wh ch we perceive *a priori* between testimony and real ity but because we are accustomed to find a con formity between them But when the fact at *tested is such a one as has seldom fallen under* our observation here is a contest of two opposite experiences of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testi *mony of witnesses gives us also in this case* an other degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish from which contra diction there necessarily arises a counterpoize and mutual destruction of belief and authority

I should not believe such a sto y were it told me by Cato was a proverbial saying in Rome even dur *ing the lifetime of that* philosophical *patriot* [1] The incredibility of a fact it was allowed might invalidate so great an authority

The Indian prince who refused to bel eve the first relations concerning the effects of frost rea soned justly and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, *that arose from a state of nature with which he* was unacquainted and which bore so little anal ogy to those events of which he had had con stant and uniform experience Though they were not contrary to his experience they were not conformable to it [2]

90 But in order to encrease the probability *against the testimony of witnesses* let us suppose, that the fact which they affirm instead of being

[1] Pl tarch *M cus Cat*

[2] No Indian t is id nt could ha e e pe ce th t w t d d n t f e z in c ld cl mates This is

of the *ers o ght to be d m d rodgy* t th y ne er saw w t r in Muscovy du g th win t nd ther f th y ca ot eason bly be po t hat w ld th e be the conseq n e

only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full *proof*, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.

91. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.' When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. [illegible] he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

PART II

92. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence.

For *first*, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.

93. *Secondly*. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we

Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, *a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent*. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.

commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is that the objects of which we have no experience resemble those of which we have that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable and that where there is an opposition of arguments we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations But though in proceeding by this rule we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree yet in advancing farther the mind observes not always the same rule but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous it rather the more readily admits of such a fact upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority The passion of *su prise* and *wonder* arising from miracles being an agreeable emotion gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived And this goes so far that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are in ormed yet love to n

With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received their descriptions of sea and land monsters their relations of wonderful adventures strange men and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder there is an end of common sense and human testimony in these circumstances loses all preten

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o be false and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the world for the sake of promot ng so holy a cause or even where this delusion has not place vanity excited by so strong a temptation operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances and self interest with equal fo ce His auditors may not have and commonly have not sufficient judgement to canvass h s evidence what judgement they have they renounce by p inciple in these sublime and mysterious subjects or if they were ever so w lling to employ it passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operat ons Their credulity in cr ases his impudence and his impudence overpowers the r credulity

leaves ddress ections captivates the w ll ng hearers and subdues their understanding Happily this pitch it seldom attains But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience every *Capuchin* every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind and in a higher degree by touching such gross and vulgar passions

The many instances of forged miracles and prophecies and supernatural events which in all ages have either been detected by contrary evidence or which detect themselves by their absurdity prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous and ought reasonabl

u spreads so quickly especially in country places and provincial towns as those concerning marriages insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting of propagat g it and of being the first reporters of it spreads the intell gence And this is so well known that no man of sense gives attention to these reports till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence Do not the same passions and others st ll stronger incline the generality of mankind to believe and report with the greatest vehemence and assurance all rel g ous miracles?

94 *Thi dly* It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations that they are observed chiefly to abou d among ignorant and barbarous nations or if a civilized people has ever g en ad mission to any of them that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions When we peruse the first histories of all nations we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world where the whole frame of nature is disjointed and every element performs ts operations in a different manner from hat it does at p esent Battles re olutions pestilence famine and death are never the effect of those natural causes which we experience I rod gies omens oracles judgements quite obscure the few natural e ents that are interm ngled with them. But as the fo mer grow thinner every page in propo tion as e ad a ce nearer the enl ghten d ages e soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or super

natural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind toward the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of these wonderful historians, *that such prodigious events never happen in our days.* But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.

It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who though now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even among the Grecian philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome; nay, could engage the attention of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies.

The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them (*which, though seldom, is sometimes the case*) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread, throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true; Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and detect his impostures.

95. I may add as a *fourth* reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over subtil and refined; but is not in reality different from

the reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of two others who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed

96 One of the best attested miracles in all profane history is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian who cured a blind m

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o had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor for these miraculous cures The story may be seen in that fine historian [1] where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition The gravity solidity age and probity of so great an emperor who through the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius The historian a contemporary writer noted for candour and veracity and withal h

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s under the contrary imputation of atheism and profaneness The persons from whose authority he related the miracle of established character for judgement and veracity as we may well presume eye witnesses of the fact and confirming their testimony after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire and could no longer give any re

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at no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood

There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which may well deserve our consideration When that intriguing politician fled into Spain to avoid the persecution of his enemies he passed through Saragossa the capital of Aragon where he was shewn in the cathedral a man wh had serv d se en years as a doorkeeper and was well known to every body in town that had ever pa d his devotions at that church He had been seen for so long a t me want ng a leg but recovered that l mb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact whom the cardinal found by their zealous devotion to be thorough believers of the miracle Here the relaters as also contemporary to the supposed prod

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ardinal himself who relates the story seems not to give any credit to it and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud He considered justly that it was not requisite in order to reject a fact of this nature to be able accurately to disprove the testimony and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it He knew that as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place so was it extremely difficult even where one was immediately present by reason of the bigotry ignorance cunning and roguery of a great part of mankind He therefore concluded like a just reasoner that such an ev dence carried falsehood upon the very face of it and that a miracle supported by any human testimony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument

There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one pe son than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris the famous Jansenist with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded The c

e miracles were immediately proved upon the spot before judges of unquestioned integrity attested by witnesses of cred t and distinction in a learned age and on the most eminent theat e that is now in the wo ld Nor is this all a relation of them was published and dispersed everywhere nor were the *J s ts* though a learned body s pported by the civil magistrate and determined en mies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were sa d to have been wrought ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number

[1] *Hist* res v 81 S et n s g s n ly th same acco nt *L ves of the Ca s rs* (V pas an)

of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact. And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate. And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.

97 Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relate the battl of Philippi or Pharsalia for instance, that therefore all kinds of testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed the victory in these battles, and the historians of each party had uniformly

equally strong between them the miracles related by Herodotus or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian.

The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his

tion, a man has first made a convert of himself and entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause?

The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame, because the materials are always prepared for it. The *avidum genus auricularum*, the gazing populace, receive greedily without examination, whatever soothes superstition and promotes wonder.

How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature?

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I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history at the place where it is said to happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all

the reasons and debate and flying rumours; especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.

In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.

No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony

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fane history is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian who cured a blind man in Alexandria by means of his spittle and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor for these miraculous cures The story may be seen in that fine historian [1] where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition The gravity solidity age and probity of so great an emperor who through the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius The historian a contemporary writer noted for candour and veracity and withal the greatest and most penetrating genius perhaps of all antiquity and so free from any tendency to credulity that he even lies under the contrary imputation of atheism and profaneness The persons from

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and confirming their testimony after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire and could no longer give any reward as the price of a lie *Utrumque qui interfuere nunc quoque memorant postquam nullum mendacio pretium* To which if e add the public nature of the facts as related it will appear that no evidence can ell be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood

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enemies he passed through Saragossa the capital of Aragon where he as shev n in the ca th dral a man who h d serv d seven years as a doorkeeper and was ell known to every body in town that had ever paid his devotions at that church He had been seen for so long a time anting a leg but recovered that limb by the

rubbing of holy oil upon the stump and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact whom the cardinal found by their zealous devotion to be thorough believers of the miracle Here the relater as also contemporary to the supposed prodigy of an incredulous and libertine character as well as of great genius the miracle of so singul r a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit and the itnesses very numerous and all of them in a manner spectators of the

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is that the cardinal himself who relates the story seems not to give any credit to it and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud He considered justly that it was not requisite in order to reject a fact of this nature to be able accurately to disprove the testimony and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it He knew that as this as commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place so was it extremely difficult even where one as immediately present by reason of the bigotry ignorance cunning and roguery of a great part of mankind He therefore concluded like a just reasoner that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it and that a miracle supported by any human test mony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument

There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were lately said to have been rought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris the famous Jansenist ith whose sanctity the people were so long deluded The curing of the sick gi ing hearing to the deaf and sight to the blind ere every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre But vhat is more e traordinary many of the miracles ere immediately proved

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persed every where nor ere the J suits though a learned body supported by the civil magistrate and determined enemies to those opinions, in hose favour the miracles were said to ha e been vrought ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number

[1] *Hist r es v 8i S ton u g e nea ly th* same account *L es of th C e a s* (V pas an)

nation gi es of its origin. Upo readin this book, find t full of prodigies and miracles. It gi es an account of tat of the world and of human na ure entirely different from th present Of our fall from that tat Of the ge of man, extended to near thousand years Of the destructi of the rld by del ge Of th arbitrary cho ce of one peopl as the f ourites of hea n and that people the countrymen of the author Of their deli erance from bondage by prodigies the most astonish imaginabl I desire anyone to lay his hand po his heart and af er a serious consider ti declare, wh th he thinks that the falsehood of such book, supported by such a testimony would be more extraordinary d miraculous than all th miracles t relates which is, however necessary to make t be recei ed, ac cording to the measures of probability abo e established.

10 What we ha e said of miracles may be pplied, w th t any aria i n to prophecies and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such onl can be dmitted as proofs of any revelation. If t did not exceed h capacity f human nature t fore ell f ture eve ts, t would

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that the *Christian Religion* not nly as t first at tended th miracles, but eve t this d y can not be believed by any reasonabl perso th out e. Mere reason is insufficient t co ince

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mination to believe what is most contrary t cus tom and experience.

Sect. XI *Of part cular Pr idence and f f e State*

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I can by no means pprov y t as they seem to be curious, and bear some relat to th chain of reasoning carried thro ghout this enquiry I shall here copy them from my memory as c curately as I can, in order t submit th m t the judgement of the reader

Our conversatio began w th my dmiring th singular good fort f philosophy which as t requires ure liberty bov all ther pri leges, and chiefly flourishes from th free ppo sition of sentiments and argumen tion, rece ed its first birth in an g and country of freed m and toleration, and was never cramped even in its most extra agant principles, by any creeds, co essions, or penal statutes. F r except the b of Pro oras, and the death of Soc r

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ad anced age, in pe ce and anquil — cureans ere even admitted t recei e the sac erd tal char ter and *fficiate at the altar in* the most sacred rites of th established rel gi n And the p bl c e cour gement[3] of pensions and salaries was ff rded equally by the wisest of all the R ma mperors, to the professors of every sect of philosophy How requisite such ki d of treatment was to philosophy in her early youth ill easily be co ce ed, if we reflect, that even at prese t, whe she may be supposed more hardy and robust she bears w th much difficulty the incl mency of the seasons, and those harsh inds of calumny and persecut on which bl upon her

Y u dmire, says my friend as the singular good f rtune of philosophy what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be un a dabl in every g and nati n. This perti nacious b gotry of which you complain as so f tal to philosophy is really her off pring ho after allying w th perst ti n separates himself entirely from th interest of his parent and be comes her most in t at n my and persecutor Speculati e d gmas of rel gion the present oc casions of ch furi us disp te, could not possi bly be co cei ed dmi ted in the early ges of th orld wh n mankind being h lly ill t erat formed d a of religio more suitable to th ir w ak pprehens and composed their sacred t n ts of such tales chiefly as ere th b jects f traditional bel ef more than of argument or disp tati n Af er th first alarm, theref re, was er which arose from th new parad es a d r ciples of the philosophers these teachers

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3 It seems then say I that you l poli tics entirely o t of the questi n, and ne er s p-

Lucian [The B quet, or the La piths]

Lucian, [The Eunuch]

Lucian and Dio

records of history Thus suppose all authors in all languages agree that from the first of January 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people that all travellers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition without the least variation or contradiction it is evident that our present philosophers instead of doubting the fact ought to receive it as certain and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived The decay corruption and dissolution of nature is an event rendered probable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the reach of human testimony if that testimony be very extensive and uniform

But suppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree that on the first of January 1600 Queen Elizabeth died that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court as is usual with persons of her rank that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament and that after being interred a month she again appeared resumed the throne and governed England for three years I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event I should not doubt of her pretended death and of those other public circumstances that followed it I should only assert it to have been pretended and that it neither was nor possibly could be real You would in vain object to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned queen with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an [illegible]

[illegible] that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature

But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat and sufficient with all men of sense not only to make them reject the fact but even reject it without farther examination Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed be in this case Almighty it does not upon that account become a whit more probable since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony and make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it with whatever specious pretence it may be covered

Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning We ought says he to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions and in a word of everything new rare and extraordinary in nature But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny lest we depart from truth Above all every relation must be considered as suspicious which depends in any degree upon religion as the prodigies of Livy And no less so everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy or such authors, who seem all of them to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable [1]

100 I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered as I [illegible]

[illegible] on *Faith* not on reason and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure To make this more evident let us examine those miracles related in scripture and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the *Pentateuch* which we shall examine according to the principles of these pretended Christians not as the word or testimony of God himself but as the production of a mere human writer and historian Here then we are first to consider a book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people written in an age when they were still more barbarous and in all probability long after the facts which it relates corroborated by no concurring testimony and resembling those fabulous accounts, which every

[1] *Novum Organum* II aph 29

ties as ll -we t a just proportion to the effect. But if ascribe to t farther qualities, or affirm t capab. of prod cing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of co jecture, and arbitra y suppose the existence of qualities and energies, thout reason or uthority

The same rule holds, whether the cause as-

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it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requis to produce the effect. Nor can we, by any ules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and iner ther effects from t beyo d those by which alone t is known t us. No one merely from the sight of ne of Zeuxis p ctures, could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in st e and marble than in colours. Th talents d taste, displa ed in the particular ork before us these we may safely conc de th workma to be possessed of. The cause must be proportioned t the effect and if w exactly and precisely proportion t, e shall never find in t any qualities, that point farther or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities mus be somewhat beyo d what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine.

106. Allowing, therefore, the gods t be the authors of the existence or order of the uni erse t follo s, tha they possess that precise degree of power intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery t supply the defects of argument and reasonin So far as the traces of an tributes, t present, ppear so far may we conclud these ttribu es t exist. The supposition of farther ttributes is mere h pothesis much more th supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there has been, or will be, more magnificen display of these ttribu es, and scheme of dministration more suitabl t such imaginary irtues. W can never be allowed t mount p from the un erse, the ffect, J piter the cause and then descend downwards, to infer any ew ffec from that cause as if the present effects alone were not entirel worthy of the glorious ttributes, hich we ascribe t that deity The knowledge of the cause bein der ed solel from the effect, they must be exactly djusted t each ther and the one can never refer to anythin further or be the foundatio of any new inference and conclusion.

You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or thor You imagine th t you ha e found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this o fspring of your brain, that you mag it imposs ble but he *must* produce somethi g gre ter a d more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder You forget that this superlat e intell gence and be evolence are entirely maginary or at least, w thout any foundatio n reaso and that you ha e n grou d to ascribe to him any qualities, but what ou see he has a tually exerted and displa ed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore O philosophers, be suited to the present ppearances of nature and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to su t them to the ttributes h h you so fondly as r be to y ur deities.

\ nner s d poets su pported by

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w th reverence But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect uthority and t cultivat reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same bsequious submission and pious deference. I ask who carried them into the celestial regi ns, who admitted them i to th councils of th gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus ashly affirm, that their deities ha e executed or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually ppeared. If they tell me, that they ha e mou ted on the teps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still insist, that they ha e aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination therwise they could not thus *change th ir manner of inference*, and argue from causes t effects presuming that a more perfect production than th present world would be more suitabl to such perfect beings as th gods, and *forgetting that they ha n reason* t ascribe to these celestial beings any perfec tio or any ttribute but what can be found in the present world.

Hence all the fruitless industry t *ccount for* th ill ppearances of nature and save the ho our of the gods while we must acknowledge the reality of tha evil and disorder w th which th world so much abounds. Th obstinate and intractabl qualities of matter w are t ld, or the observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sol cause, which controlled the power and benevolence of J p ter and obliged him to create mankind and every sensibl creature so

pose that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy such as those of Epicurus which denying a divine existence and consequently a providence and a future state seem to loosen in a great measure the ties of morality and may be supposed for that reason pernicious to the peace of civil society

I know replied he that in fact these persecutions never in any age proceeded from calm reason or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy but arose entirely from passion and prejudice But what if I should advance farther and assert that if Epicurus had been accused before the people by any of the

of his adversaries who endeavoured with such zeal to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy?

I wish said I you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic and make a speech for Epicurus which might satisfy not the mob of Athens if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob but the more philosophical part of his audience such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments

The matter would not be difficult upon such conditions replied he And if you please I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment and make you stand for the Athenian people and shall deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries

Very well Pray proceed upon these supposi*tions*

104 I come hither O ye Athenians to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers Your deliberations which of right should be directed to questions of public good and the interest of the common wealth are diverted to *the disquisitions of speculative philosophy and these magnificent but perhaps fruitless enquiries take place of* your more familiar but more useful occupations But so far as in me lies I will prevent this abuse We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public interest And if I can persuade you that they are entirely indifferent to *the peace of society and security of government I hope that you will* presently send us back *to our schools there to* examine at leisure *the question the most sub*lime but at the *same time the most speculative* of all philosophy

The religious philosoph*ers not satisfied with* the tradition of your forefathers and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce) indulge a rash curiosity in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason and they thereby excite instead of satisfying the doubts which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry They paint in the most magnificent colours the order beauty and wise arrangement of the universe and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire *I shall not examine the justness of this argument I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists* and accusers can desire It is sufficient if I can prove from this very reasoning that the question is entirely speculative and that when in my philosophical disquisitions I deny a providence and a future state I undermine not the foundations of society but advance principles which they themselves upon their own topics, if they argue consistently must allow to be solid and satisfactory

105 You then who are my accusers have acknowledged that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (*which I never questioned*) *is derived from the order of nature where there appear such marks of intelligence and design* that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause either chance or the blind and unguided force of matter You allow that this is an argu*ment drawn from effects* to causes From the order of the work you infer that there must have been project and forethought in the workman If you cannot make out this point you allow that your conclusion fails and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater *latitude* than the phenomena of nature will justify These are *your concessions I desire you to mark the consequences*

When we infer any particular cause from an effect we must proportion the one to the other and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces but can never *afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred If the cause* assigned for any *effect* be not sufficient to produce it we must either reject that cause or add to it such qual

any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied.

... the only marks of distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, *at present*, exert itself.

1 a. Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to a short issue with my antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is useless because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.

1. I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always expressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement concerning this, and all other questions of fact, I doubt not but, from the very same experience to which you appeal, it may be possible to refute this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus. If you saw, for instance, a half-finished building, surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry; could you not infer from the effect, that it was a work of design and contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause, to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art could bestow upon it. If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature. Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence, and arguing from that superior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect, why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time. Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other?

2. The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he, is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of *human* art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and coherence, according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him, and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it is impossible they could point to anything farther, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some figure adapted to it, by which it was produced: but the print of a human foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably

imperfect and so unhappy These attributes then are it seems beforehand taken for granted in their greatest latitude And upon that supposition I own that such conjectures may perhaps be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena But still I ask Why take these attributes for granted or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions which for aught you know may be entirely imaginary and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?

The religious hypothesis therefore must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact and alter or add to the phenomena in any single particular If you think that the appearances of things prove such causes it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes In such complicated and sublime subjects every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument But here you ought to rest If you come backward and arguing from your inferred causes conclude that any other fact has existed or will exist in the course of nature which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes I must admonish you that you have departed from the method of reasoning attached to the present subject and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause beyond what appears in the effect otherwise you could never with tolerable sense or propriety add anything to the effect in order to render it more worthy of the cause

108 Where then is the odiousness of that doctrine which I teach in my school or rather which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question wherein the security of good morals or the peace and order of society is in the least concerned?

I deny a providence you say and supreme governor of the world who guides the course of events and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment and rewards the virtuous with honour and success in all their undertakings But surely I deny not the course itself of events which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination I acknowledge that in the present order of things virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice and me [illegible] h

[illegible] joy a

human life and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life but am sensible that to a well-disposed mind every advantage is on the side of the former And what can you say more allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? You tell me indeed that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design But whatever it proceeds from the disposition itself on which depends our happiness or misery and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same It is still open for me as well as you to regulate my behaviour by my experience of past events And if you affirm that while a divine providence is allowed and a supreme distributive justice in the universe I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good and punishment of the bad beyond the ordinary course of events I here find the same fallacy which I have before endeavoured to detect You persist in imagining that if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly contend you may safely infer consequences from it and add something to the experienced order of nature by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods You seem not to remember that all your reasonings on this subject can only be d [illegible] is [illegible] -d [illegible] a [illegible] sophism since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause but what you have antecedently not inferred but discovered to the full in the effect

109 But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners who instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation so far reverse the whole course of nature as to render this life merely a passage to something farther a porch which leads to a greater and vastly different building a prologue which serves only to introduce the piece and give it more grace and propriety? Whence do you think can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely For if they derived it from the present phenomena it would never point to anything farther but must be exactly adjusted to them That the divinity may *possibly* be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted may be governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be satisfied all this will freely be allowed But still this is mere *possibility* and hypothesis We never can have reason to *infer* any attributes or

114. There is still ne circumstance replied I hich you seem t ha e ove looked. Though I should allow your premises I must deny your co l You c cl de, that l gious doc

beyond what ppear in the ordinary course nature. Whether this reasonin of th irs be just or not no matter Its infl ce on th ir lif

of the la of soc ty in ne respect, more easy and secure.

After all, I may perhaps, agree t your g n eral conclusio in fa ur of liberty though upon diuere t premises from those, wh ch y u en de vour to f und t. I think, that the tat ught to tolera every princ ple f philosophy nor is ther an instance, that any government has uf fered in its polit cal interests by h ind lg nce There is enthus asm mo g phil soph rs their doctrines are not ery allurir to th peo ple and no restraint can be put upo th ir rea sonings, but hat must be of dang rous conse quence to the sciences, and ev n t th ta e, by p in, the y f persecuti n and pp essi n in po ts, where the generality f ma ki d are more deeply interested and co cer ed

5. But there occurs to m (co tin ed I) w th regard to your main t pic, a difficulty which I shall just propose you w th t insisting lest lead into reasonings f too nice and d li cat na ure I word, I m ch d ubt whether it be possibl f cause to be known nly by its

cause or bject, tha has ev fallen under ur bserv tion. It is nly wh two *pec* f b- jects are found t be cons antly co j ined that can infer the ne from the ther and wer an ffect present d, hich was tirely ingular

cause. If experience and bserv tion and anal ogy be, indeed, the nly guides wh ch w ca

reasonably f llow in inferences of this nature both the effect nd cause must bear a similarity nd resembl n e to other eff cts nd causes which we kno d which we ha f und in many instances t be co j ined w th e ch oth r I le it t your n reflect on to pursue the conseq ences f this principle. I shall just ob- serve, that as the tago ists of Ep curus al ays ppose th ni erse an effect q tes gu lar and unparallel d t be tl e proof of a De ty cause less singular and u paralleled your ason s upon th t ppos t on seem at least, t mer t o r att nt on. There is, I n some difficulty h w e can ev r return from the cause t the ff t and reaso ing from our d as of th f rme infer any alt ation on the l tter y add t t t.

Sect XII *Of the academ al or sc pt al Ph losophy*

Part I

116 There is not greater number f philosopl al reasoni gs, displ yed upon any ul j ct, tha those wl ch p th exist nce of De ty and refute the fallacies of *Athe ts* and yet the most religious philosophers still disput whether y ma can be so bl d d as to be a pe ul t e ath ist H w shall reco cile these co trad c tions. Th k ghts-err t h and red bout to clear th o ld of dr g ns and giants, ev entertained th l ast do bt w th regard t th exis en f these monst rs.

The *Sceptic* is an th n m f religi ho naturally prov kes th ind gnation f all di ines nd gr ph l soph rs th ugh t is rtai th t o man ev met th any such bsurd cre ur co ersed th ma wl had no op p nciple co ernin any subj t e th f act speculation. Tl is beg ts ry t ural q estion What is mea t by sc p c. And how far t is possibl t push these philosophical principles f do bt and u certa nty

Ther is pecies f scept cism, *antecedent* to all tudy and ph losophy which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as so ere gn preser u gainst erro d precip tat judg me t. It recomm nds uni ersal d bt ot ly f all ur f rmer pinions and pri ciples, b t also f ur ery facult es of whose city say they w must assure ursel es, by chain of reason g deduced from som riginal principl hich cann t poss bly be fall us d tful. B t th is th y h g n l p pl which has pre og ti e bove thers, that ar lf-ev d nt d n n if th were,

another foot which also left its impression though effaced by time or other accidents Here we mount from the effect to the cause and descending again from the cause infer alterations in the efffect but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations concerning the *usual* figure and members of that species of animal without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical

113 The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature The Deity is known to us only by his productions and is a single being in the universe not comprehended under any species or genus from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer any attribute or quality in him As the universe shews wisdom and goodness we infer wisdom and goodness As it shews a particular degree of these perfections we infer a particular degree of them precisely adapted to the effect which we examine But farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes we can never be authorised to infer or suppose by any rules of just reasoning Now without some such licence of supposition it is impossible for us to argue from the cause or infer any alteration in the effect beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness a more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature and consequently being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis [1]

The great source of our mistake in this subject and of the unbounded licence of conjecture which we indulge is that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being and conclude that he will on every occasion observe the same conduct which we ourselves in his situation would have embraced as reasonable and eligible But besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us that almost every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours besides this I say it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason from the intentions and projects of men to those of a Being so different and so much superior In human nature there is a certain experienced coh

[illegible] reasonable from experience to infer another and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being so remote and incomprehensible who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection What we imagine to be a superior perfection may really be a defect Or were it ever so much a perfection the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being where it appears not to have been really exerted to the full in his works savours more of flattery and panegyric than of just reasoning and sound philosophy All the philosophy therefore in the world and all the religion which is nothing but a species of philosophy will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis no event foreseen or foretold no reward or punishment expected or dreaded beyond what is already known by practice and ob-

[illegible]

the philosophical disputes concer[illegible]ing metaphysics and religion

[1] In gen ral t m y I th nk b establ h d as a maxim th t h e a y ca s k n ly by ts part c lar ff cts t must be mposs bl to inf any n eff cts f om th t c use c th qu l t es h ch are equis te to p od tl [illegible] s

f ts ll not mo tl d ff ulty Fo [illegible] ing this t b tl cas (wh h [illegible]

PART I

ties. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us. It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from any thing external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely, as all other questions of like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.

To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.

This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe, that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.

122. There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by *Abstraction*, an opinion, which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension, which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither *Isosceles* nor *Scalenum*, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas.

This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, *that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction*. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.

could we advance a step beyond it but by the use of those very faculties of which we are supposed to be already diffident The Cartesian doubt therefore were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject

It must however be confessed that this species of scepticism when more moderate may be understood in a very reasonable sense and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements and weaning our mind from all those prejudices which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion To begin with clear and self-evident principles to advance by timorous and sure steps to review frequently our conclusions and examine accurately all their consequences though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems are the only methods by which we can ever hope to reach truth and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations

117 There is another p c

ss of their mental faculties or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employed Even our very senses are brought into dispute by a certain species of philosophers and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in some philosophers and the refutation of them in several they naturally excite our curiosity and make us enquire into the arguments on which they may be founded

I need not insist upon the mo trite topics against the are deri ed ousness of our organs on numberless occasions the c ooked appearance of an oar in water the various aspects of objects accord ng to their diff rent distances the double images hich arise from the pressing one eye with many other appear nces of a like d are only one are not that we must correct their evidence by reason and by considerations derived from the nature of the medium the distance of the object and the disposition of the organ in order to render them within their sphere the proper *criteria* of truth and falsehood There are other more profound arguments against the senses which admit not of so easy a solution

118 It seems evident that men are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses and that without any reasoning or even almost befor h e of reason erse wh ch ould exist re ab- on are us be nature they ented by the nd never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of the other This very table which we see white and which we feel hard is believed to exist independent of our perception and to be something external to our mind which perceives it Our p esence bestows not being on it our absence does not an ih l p ate it

But this universal and p imary op nion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception and that the senses are only the inlets through which these images are conveyed thout being able to produce any im nediate intercourse between the mind and the object The table hich we see seems to diminish as we remove farther from it but the real table hich exists independent of us suffers no alte herefore nt to the reaso that the existences h ch we conside when i dependent

119 So far then a e we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or d part from the primary inst ncts of natu e and to emb ace a ne system w th egard to the evidence of ou senses B t *here ph losophy finds herself extrem ly embarrassed* when she w uld justify this new system and obviate the ca ils and object ons of the scep

conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity

6. The sceptical objections against *moral* evidence, or the reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either *popular* or *philosophical*. The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools, where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.

7. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those *philosophical* objections, which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived

quently conjoined together; that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather indeed, his own and our weakness; and seems, for the time, to destroy all assurance and conviction.

them.

8. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, *What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches?* He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A Copernican

beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in

It seems to me not impossible ... to find these ...

dropped this hint at present, without ... prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems the easiest solution of these difficulties.

123 Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this that such an opinion if rested on natural instinct is contrary to reason and if referred to reason is contrary to natural instinct and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it to convince an impartial en quirer The second objection goes farther and represents this opinion as contrary to reason at least if it be a principle of reason that all sensi ble qualities are in the mind not in the object Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary you in a manner annihilate it and leave only a certain unknown inexplicable *something* as the cause of our per ceptions a notion so imperfect that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it

Part II

124 *It may seem a very extravagant attempt* of the sceptics to destroy *re son* by argument and ratiocination yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes They endeavour to find objections both to our abstract reasonings and to those which regard matter of fact and ex istence

The chief objection against all *abst act* reason ings is derived from the ideas of space and time ideas which in common l fe and to a careless view are very clear and intellig ble but when they pass throu h the scrutiny of the profound sc ences (and they are the ch ef object of these sc ences) afford principles which seem full of ab surdity and contradiction No priestly *do mas* in vented on purpose to tame and subdue the ebel lious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctr ne of the infinit ve di visibility of extension ith its consequences as they are pompously displayed by all geometri cians and metaphysicians th a kind of tri mph and exultation A real quant ty *infinitely*

t on to support because it l ocks the clearest a u most natural p inc ples *of human reason But what renders* the matter m re extr o d nary is that these seemingly absurd op nions are sup ported by a chain of reasoni g the clearest and most natural nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfac tory than all the conclusions concernin the *properties of circles and triangles and yet, when* these are once received how can we deny that the angle of contact between a circle and its tan gent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle that as you may increase the diameter of the cir cle *in infinitum* this angle of contact becomes still *less* even *in infinitum* and that the angle of con tact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those bet een any circle and its tangent and so on *in infinitum?* The demonstration of these principles seems as unex ceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones though the latter opinion be natural and easy and the former big with contradiction and absurdity *Reason here seems to be thro n into a kind of* amazement and suspence h ch ithout the st ons of any scept c gives her a diffidence

zled and confounded that she scarcely can pro- nounce with certainty and assurance concern ng any one object

125 The absurdity of these bold determina tions of the abstract sciences seems to become if possible still more palpable with regard to time than extension An infinite number *of real parts of t me passing in succession and* exhausted one after another appears so evident a contradic tion that no man one should think whose judgement is not corrupted instead of being im pro ed *by t e sciences ould ever be able to* admit of it

Yet still reason must rema n restless and un quiet e en th regard to that sceptic sm to l ch she s dr ven by these seeming absurdities and contradictions Ho v any clear distinct dea can conta n circumstances. contrad ctory to it self or to any other clear dist nct idea is *abso- lut ly incomprehensible and i pe haps, as ab- surd as any proposition* h ch can be formed So that nothing can be more sceptical or more full of doubt and hes tation th n this scepticism itself hich ar ses from som of the paradox cal

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not be d ded o less ned ther by the y o imaginat n These images then h ch are pres- ent to the f *ncy or nses* are absol tely ind s ble and cons quently must be llo d b m th

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[illegible] different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, [illegible] can never advance farther by our utmost scrutiny than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That *the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides*, cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, *that where there is no property, there can be no injustice*, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.

3. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever *is* may *not be*. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Cæsar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.

The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely [illegible] experience. If [illegible] reason [illegible] anything may appear [illegible] to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source [illegible]

Mo[illegible] ticula[illegible] regar[illegible] tory[illegible]

The sciences, which treat of g[illegible] politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is *faith* and divine revelation.

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

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[illegible] cause [illegible] tion can assign.

any philosophical res h "

- amusement and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind who must act and reason and believe though they are not able by their most diligent enquiry to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations or to remove the objections which may be raised against them

PART III

129 There is indeed a more *mitigated* scepticism or *academical* philosophy which may be both durable and useful and which may in part be the result of this Pyrrhonism or *excessive* scepticism when its undistinguished doubts are in some measure corrected by common sense and reflection The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions and while they see objects only on one side and have no idea of any counterpoising argument they throw themselves precipitately into the principles to which they are inclined nor have they an d

a u suspends the r action They are therefore impatient ll h a k ar

c g om it by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmit es of human understand ng even in its mo t perfect state and when most ac cu ate and caut ous n its determinations such a reflection would natu ally inspire them with more modesty and reserve and diminish tl eir fond opinion of themselves and thei p ejudice against antagon sts The illite ate may reflect on the disposition of the learned who amidst all the advantages of stu d

r o augntines and obstinacy a small t ncture of Pyrrhonism might abate the r pr de by showing them that the few advantag s w h ch they may have attained o er the fellows are but inconside able if compared w th the un e sal perplexity and confusion h ch is inhe ent in human nature In general there is a degree of doubt and caution and modesty wl ich n all kinds of scrutiny and decision ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner

130 Another sp s pticism d and yrrhoni

c uouots and scruples is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understandin The *ima inati n* of man is naturally sublime de lighted with whatever is remote and extraordi nary and running without control into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too fa miliar to it A correct *Ju d* m

as fall under d ily practice and ex perience leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators or to the arts of pr ests and politicians To bring us to so salu tary a determination nothing can be more serv iceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt and of the impossibility that anything but the strong pow er of natural instinct could free us from it Those who have a propensity to philosophy will st ll continue their researches because they reflect that besides the mmediate pleasure attending such an occupation ph losoph cal decis ons are nothing but the reflections of common life meth odized and corrected But they will ne er be tempted to go beyond common l fe so long as they consider the impe fection of those faculties which they employ the r na row reach a d their inaccurate operations While we cannot give a satisfactory reason h

u yuete mination w l ich w e may form w ith regard to the or gin of w o lds and the situatio i of nature from and to etern ty?

This narrow l mitation indeed of our enquir ies s in every espect so reasonable tl at it suf fices to make the slight st ex mi ation to the natural pow e s of tl e human mi d and to com pare th m w ith tl eir objects in orde to r com mend it to us We l all then f nd w hat are the prope subjects of sc e ce and e qu ry

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L u e m re sophistry a d llus n As the component pa ts f quant ty a d u i ber a en ti ely s m lar thei rel tions b com ntricate and involved and nothing can be i e urt us, as well as usef l than to t ace by a var ty of med ums the r equality or inequal ty thro gh